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The Ploughshares Monitor
March 2000, volume 21, no. 1
Analysis and perspectives
on the humanitarian disaster in Iraq: 1990-2000
By Inter-Church Action for Development, Relief
and Justice (ICA)
The UN sanctions on
Iraq are the most draconian in modern history. Will they help to
end the human rights abuses of the Iraqi government or only further
punish the Iraqi people already burdened by an oppressive state?
It seems obvious that sanctions have been a colossal failure on
nearly every count, and a gross violation of the rights of the Iraqi
people.
Canadian government policy on Iraq over the past decade
has rarely strayed from US positions. During the intense military
phase of the Gulf War in 1991, Canadian military forces played an
active role in providing air protection for bombing raids. Nevertheless,
the situation in Iraq has posed a dilemma for Foreign Affairs Minister
Lloyd Axworthy whose criticism of the Canadian role in the Gulf
War while in opposition and current initiative to promote the new
concept of "human security" do not mesh well with the
sanctions-induced humanitarian disaster in Iraq. Consequently, there
have been some small initiatives from Canada to investigate and
alleviate the effects of the sanctions, especially after Canada's
appointment to the UN Security Council in 1999.
Although the strict sanctions have been responsible
for the vast majority of the suffering of the Iraqi people, it must
be noted that the military campaign against Iraq did not end with
the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and surrender of Saddam
Hussein to the western alliance. In 1992, the US, UK, and France
established "no-fly" zones over large portions of northern
and southern Iraq. Routine bombings by US and UK warplanes occurred
every few days in 1999.
UN sanctions, humanitarian disaster
On August 6, 1990 United Nations Resolution 661 was
adopted, beginning the most draconian sanctions in modern history.
Although food and medicine imports are theoretically permitted,
the application, importation, inspection, and distribution process
all supervised by the UN is horrendously slow and
inefficient with the result that some goods can take up to two years
to reach their intended destination. Furthermore, the sanctions
outrightly ban "dual use" goods, defined as items that
have civilian uses but could potentially be used by the Iraqi military.
The UN has no criteria to delineate such goods and a sample list
compiled by one researcher revealed hundreds of items, including
baking soda, combs, light bulbs, medical journals, fertilizer, water
purification tablets, and toothbrushes. Pencils were banned on the
pretext that the graphite they contained could be used for military
purposes.
The humanitarian impact of the sanctions on the population has been
devastating. In 1989, the World Health Organization noted that Iraq
had 92 per cent access to clean water, and 93 per cent access to
high quality health care. Iraqis boasted of one of the highest standards
of living in the Middle East, thanks largely to its rich oil reserves.
After eight years of sanctions, mortality rates, nutrition sufficiency,
and most other social development indicators have tumbled precipitously.
Precise appraisals of the human damage resulting from the sanctions
vary but all sources, including the US government, UN agencies,
humanitarian organizations, and the Iraqi government agree that
it is severe. The following statistics are mainly from UN and other
international agencies:
UNICEF estimated that from 1990 to 1997, 1.2 million people
had died due to food and medicine scarcity resulting from the sanctions
including 750,000 children under 5. The figures are arrived at through
comparisons of statistics before and after the sanctions. Estimates
to October 1999 are approximately 1.5 million deaths.
the under-5 child mortality rate more than
tripled from 1989 to 1997 (UN humanitarian panel report, March 1999)
underweight births have gone from 4 per cent
in 1990 to 25 per cent in 1998 (International Red Cross)
32 per cent of children under age 5 are chronically
malnourished, a rise of 72 per cent since 1991 (UNICEF November
1997 report)
women have been affected disproportionately
by the sanctions with 16 per cent of adult women under 26 malnourished
and 70 per cent anemic (1997 statistics of the Food and Agriculture
Organization). Maternal mortality rates have climbed from 50/100,000
live births in 1989 to 117/100,000 in 1997.
Confronting the human rights record of the Iraqi government
One lesson to be learned from the Iraq experience is that NGOs need
to be cautious in their call for sanctions. At a minimum they must
provide more detailed policy recommendations regarding the type
of sanctions to be invoked.
Although Saddam Hussein has been demonized by the
US and its allies, there is incontrovertible evidence pointing to
the abysmal human rights record of the Iraqi government. Successive
human rights reports in the 1990s confirm the ongoing disregard
for civil and political rights as the Iraqi government engages in
arbitrary arrests, disappearances of suspected opponents, and ongoing
campaigns against religious minorities in the country.
Although the sanctions have caused far more pain to
Iraqi civilians than their leaders, they have without doubt pinched
the regime of Saddam Hussein and it has strategized relentlessly
to have the sanctions removed. Thus, groups which campaign for the
ending of sanctions are often criticized by sanction proponents
as being "soft" on Saddam Hussein and playing into his
hands.
The abuses of the Iraqi government are deplorable
and cannot be ignored by the rest of the world. However,
the question remains: Will the sanctions help to end these violations
or, on the contrary, do they exacerbate the plight of a people already
burdened by an oppressive state?
Assessing the UN sanctions
1. The goals of the sanctions
The UN sanctions are contained in Resolutions 661 and 687. Resolution
661 was passed on August 6, 1990, four days after the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait. The resolution was meant to punish Iraq for the invasion
of another sovereign territory and force it to end its military
occupation of that country.
Resolution 687 was passed on April 3, 1991 after Iraq
agreed to withdraw from Kuwait and respect other UN Security Council
resolutions. It upheld the strict sanctions of Resolution 661 on
the pretext that they were needed as a lever to assure the implementation
of Resolution 687, the main purpose of which was to eliminate so-called
"weapons of mass destruction" in Iraq, including biological
and chemical weapons, all missiles with a range greater than 150
kilometers, and to eliminate any capability for developing nuclear
weapons. Ironically, although the technical definition of "weapons
of mass destruction" includes only chemical, biological, and
nuclear weapons, the sanctions themselves have been described as
the most lethal weapon of mass destruction ever unleashed in the
Middle East region.
A serious question must be raised as to why such objectives would
apply to Iraq and not to other countries, not only in the Middle
East, but anywhere in the world. Many other member states of the
UN are known to currently possess weapons of mass destruction.
Furthermore, one cannot ignore the role of the US and its western
allies in saturating the Middle East with highly destructive weapons,
including missiles, bombers, attack helicopters, and a wide range
of other military instruments that have kept their military industries
thriving. Consequently, many of the Iraqi weapons faced by the US
and its Gulf War allies in 1991 were produced in US factories. Since
1990, the Middle East has become Canada's second largest market
for its military exports. Disarmament of this volatile region of
the world is absolutely essential but the process of stripping one
country of its military capability while arming its neighbours is
illogical and counterproductive to long-term regional security plans.
The UN sanctions are to stay in place until inspectors are absolutely
certain that Iraq has rid itself of all mass destruction weapons.
However, the goal of the UN sanctions is ultimately unattainable,
a fact the Canadian government acknowledged in May 1999 when it
proposed that this precondition to the lifting of sanctions be eliminated.
More recently, it is clear that for the US and Britain, the political
goal posts have been moved in Iraq. Although UN Resolution 687 explicitly
states that the sanctions shall end once Iraq has complied with
the weapons inspections process, the US has publicly stated that
its larger goals involve the reshaping of the Iraqi political landscape,
including the removal of Saddam Hussein as President. "Sanctions
will be there until the end of time, or as long as he lasts,"
stated Bill Clinton in November 1997.
2. The justification of the Iraq sanctions as an
instrument
Several problems have already been identified with regard to
the goals of the sanctions. Bracketing those for the moment, are
sanctions justifiable as an instrument to achieve the military disarmament
of Iraq? In answering this question, three areas require exploration:
the disarmament of Iraq (the official reason for the sanctions),
the deposition of President Saddam Hussein (the unofficial reason
for the sanctions), and the legality of the sanctions.
i) disarming Iraq
There is wide agreement that the weapons inspections and sanctions
have made significant progress towards the objective of eliminating
Iraq's biological and chemical weapons, its nuclear capability,
and its long-range missiles. Scott Ritter, a former officer in the
US Marines, was a senior official with the UNSCOM, the UN weapons
inspection team in Iraq, until he resigned in 1998 in protest of
the sanctions. In an interview in June 1999, he states emphatically
that Iraq has no meaningful military capacity in weapons of mass
destruction and long-range missiles.
The two key issues that are likely to delay a lifting
of the sanctions indefinitely are verification and the condition
of absolute disarmament in the UN specified areas. Not surprisingly,
the Iraqi military leadership has been uncooperative and inconsistent
in assisting in the dismantling of military hardware which it spent
decades assembling. Furthermore, the process of verification of
disarmament is a complex quagmire, as even a cursory review of the
UN Panel on Disarmament report (January 1999) reveals. The report
admits, for example, that even if present biological weapons agents
are destroyed, Iraq has the industrial capacity and knowledge to
produce them again. A country's capacity to produce civilian goods
and military hardware are not easily delineated as technology to
produce an agent for a biological weapon may be the same one that
helps to produce a vaccine. Does verification of elimination of
these weapons then also include the assurance that Iraq's industrial
capacity and knowledge base are destroyed? The conundrums involved
indicate the difficulty of absolute verification without essentially
destroying most of a country's scientific and industrial capacity,
something many say the sanctions are actually doing.
ii) deposing Saddam Hussein
There is no indication that the sanctions have had
any effect on removing Saddam Hussein from office, even if this
were a legitimate UN sanctioned objective. If anything, they have
consolidated his grip on power and hardened his resolve to continue
governing Iraq, regardless of the cost to Iraqi citizens.
iii) legality of the sanctions
The humanitarian effects of the sanctions have already
been outlined above in some detail. From a legal point of view,
the sanctions themselves violate international law and UN resolutions.
Protocol 1 of the Geneva Conventions (1977) states:
(1) Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare
is prohibited.
(2) It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove, or render useless
objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population,
such as foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations
and supplies such as irrigation works, for the specific purpose
of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population...whatever
the motive.
Many analysts point to sanctions as simply another
form of ancient siege warfare. Indeed, it appears as though sanctions
have become a preferred instrument by the UN and the US to police
the globe. Between 1945 and 1990, the UN imposed sanctions only
twice but has done so eleven times in the past decade. The US has
done so twenty times in the 1990s and was instrumental in many of
the UN sanctions. Although sanctions against apartheid era South
Africa are often held up as positive evidence of their efficacy,
one careful analysis has revealed that sanctions are successful
in terms of their political goals less than five per cent of the
time (Gordon 1999). Perhaps most crucial is the need to heed the
voices of civil society in countries where sanctions are being considered.
In South Africa, there was overwhelming support for sanctions against
the apartheid regime. In Iraq, there is overwhelming consensus among
civilians that the sanctions must end.
3. Alternatives to sanctions
The Iraq sanctions experience of the past nine years has made clear
that broad sanctions intended to break the backbone of a country
are, in fact, themselves a form of warfare and therefore other solutions
must be sought.
The suggestions here relate specifically to the context of Iraq
after nine years of sanctions. Those who oppose the removal of sanctions
in Iraq frequently ask what the alternatives are. But as the ostensible
objectives of the sanctions relating to the disarmament of Iraq
have largely been fulfilled, one must ask whether any alternative
to sanctions is now necessary and for what objective. At this point,
it is difficult for anyone to argue that Iraq remains a threat to
its neighbours with most of its military power stripped, its infrastructure
in shambles, and its economy in ruins.
Some would point out that Saddam Hussein remains a dictator who
indiscriminately represses the human rights of the population in
order maintain his grip on power. Aside from the fact that sanctions
and international isolation appear to have fomented this tendency,
the same accusation could be made about leadership in Iran, Syria,
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Indonesia, China, and dozens of other countries
around the world. Thus, any "alternatives" being proposed
for Iraq should also be applied in a consistent fashion to any country
that flouts international law and systematically abuses human rights.
Countries in the West are by no means immune from such violations
and, as this paper has asserted, the sanctions against Iraq and
the unilateral actions of the US and its close allies are themselves
violations of international law. The special treatment of Iraq and
other selected "rogue" states speaks more to the geopolitical
interests of the US and its western allies, including their vital
oil interests, than any particular outstanding characteristic of
the Iraqi regime nine years after its invasion of Kuwait.
At the heart of resolving the Iraqi humanitarian crisis must be
a lifting of the economic sanctions. The UN Iraq Programme humanitarian
panel report of March 30, 1999 stated unequivocally that despite
any humanitarian efforts, whether through the Oil for Food Programme
or otherwise, "the humanitarian situation in Iraq will continue
to be a dire one in the absence of a sustained revival of the Iraqi
economy" (UN 1999). Humanitarian agencies agree that there
can be no reversal of the dramatic declines of the past decade without
a lifting of the economic sanctions.
Thus, the following policy suggestions for the current Iraqi context
could be applied with some contextualizing to many other countries
as well.
1. Maintain military sanctions against Iraq
Military sanctions prohibiting the importation of military equipment
to Iraq should remain in place until international human rights
organizations have documented an end to major human rights abuses
in Iraq. Benchmarks for human rights improvements would include
the repeal of repressive laws which allow for arbitrary arrests,
an end to torture, summary executions, "disappearances,"
forced relocations, and changes in policy towards the minority Kurds
and the non-ruling Shi'ite majority.
These sanctions must be coupled with a commitment from Canada and
other arms exporting countries to work towards the demilitarization
of the Middle East region in general.
2. Only impose other sanctions targeted at the Iraqi leadership
The great tragedy and failure of the sanctions of the past nine
years has been their inability to affect the Iraqi leadership responsible
for violations of international law and domestic human rights abuses,
and their indiscriminate impact upon people who have no culpability
in those acts, including not only small children but the majority
of Iraqi citizens. More precise instruments of pressure must be
brought to bear on those who are the targets for policy change,
what some refer to as "smart" sanctions.
These can include the freezing of assets, restrictions on travel,
banishment from international bodies, the breaking off of diplomatic
relations, and other measures which are likely to impact on the
leadership but have little affect on the daily life of society.
In using such targeted sanctions, it is not being suggested that
the sanctions should focus on removing Saddam Hussein from power.
Aside from the fact that such a change would not likely result in
any significant differences in overall government policies vis-à-vis
human rights, explicitly focusing on changing the leadership would
be a violation of national sovereignty.
3. Strengthen civil society as a way of promoting democracy
and accountability
Respect for democracy and human rights in Iraq will not come through
changing a few positions in government. Experience demonstrates
that democracy flourishes when people's organizations are strengthened
and they have the resources to engage in civic functions. As a result
of the sanctions, the majority of Iraqis are entirely preoccupied
with mere day to day survival. Consequently, it is clear that the
sanctions have weakened prospects for democracy in Iraq. The assumption
that the sanctions would increase the misery and deprivation of
the Iraqi people to the point that they would rise up against the
Iraqi leadership in a revolution is callous, immoral, and ultimately
fallacious as nothing of the kind has occurred.
Conclusion
Nearly a decade after the imposition of sanctions on Iraq, it is
abundantly clear that the Iraq policy of the UN, the US, Canada,
and other enthusiastic supporters has been a colossal failure on
nearly every count. Whether measured against the objective of bringing
stability to the Middle East, promoting democratic change in Iraq,
or most spectacularly, in helping the ordinary people of Iraq, the
sanctions have been an unmitigated disaster.
It is evident, however, that the sanctions go beyond that of a policy
failure. They are a gross violation of the political, cultural,
social, and economic rights of the Iraqi people. Every day that
the sanctions remain in place avoidable deaths are compounded to
the tragic number who have already died. Lifting the economic sanctions
is not an overnight panacea for peace, security, and justice in
Iraq. But it is a first step in admitting the international community's
abysmal failure to achieve a just purpose in Iraq.
Inter-Church Action is a coalition of the Canadian
Lutheran World Relief, Canadian Catholic Organization for Development
and Peace, Mennonite Central Committee, Presbyterian World Service
& Development, Primate's World Relief and Development Fund (Anglican),
and the United Church of Canada (Division of World Outreach). Its
aim is to seek partnership and support organizations in Asia, the
Pacific, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and the Caribbean
which are engaged in the work of sustainable human development and
global transformation. This article is excerpted from a report which
can be found on the ICA website: www.web.net/~icact.
References
ICA recognizes the work of its partner in the Middle
East region, the Middle East Council of Churches (MECC), which has
issued several statements on Iraq, the war, and the sanctions and
has personnel in Iraq.
Gordon, Joy 1999, "Sanctions as Siege Warfare," The
Nation, 22 March 22.
UN 1999, "Report of the second panel established
pursuant to the note by the president of the Security Council concerning
the humanitarian situation in Iraq," article 58, 30 March.
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