The Conflict at a Glance
Who (are the main combatants): The government of Pakistan, supported by the Pakistani Armed Forces and the country’s intelligence agency, versus the Taliban, al-Qaeda and various militant groups. There is also fighting among different regional militant groups. Groups such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda often target civilians.
What (are the major aims and events): Most groups struggle for regional control, while some, such as the Baluch Liberation Army, aim for regional autonomy.
When (has fighting occurred): Pakistan’s tumultuous past dates back to its creation at the partition of India in 1947. The current phase of the conflict began in 1998 when a provincial government coalition broke down and a state of emergency was declared in Karachi. In recent years, some groups have adopted terrorist strategies, such as suicide bombings.
Where (has the conflict taken place): All regions of Pakistan have been affected by this protracted conflict. In the Sindh and Balochistan provinces, fighting has been directed toward independence efforts. Karachi has been heavily affected by terrorist attacks.
2017 Violence toward religious minorities and law enforcement officials continued to be a source of instability. While there were fewer attacks by Islamist militants than in previous years, these groups remained active. On February 16, a suicide bombing at a Sufi shrine was the deadliest attack in years. Members of the ISIS affiliate Khorasan Province, operating near the Aghan-Pakistani border, claimed that they carried out the attack.
Roused by this escalation of violence, Pakistan’s military captured at least 558 suspected terrorists between February and April. The Islamic State and the Pakistani Taliban (Jamaat-ur-Ahrar) remained active in the northwestern provinces of Balochistan, Nangarhar, and Kurram, targeting religious minorities. Khorasan Province expanded their presence along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Pakistan launched a military operation (Khyber 4) against the Islamic State in the Rajgal Valley on the border with Afghanistan. Tension escalated along that border, in response to a population census in contested tribal regions and security threats from the Taliban, Islamic State, and other rebel forces.
Charged with corruption, Nawaz Sharif stepped down as prime minister in July. According to Human Rights Watch, many reports implicated security forces in extrajudicial killing and enforced disappearances, with no one held accountable. Journalists and civil society organizations faced many restrictions and limitations on their freedom of expression and many continued to be targets for attacks.
2016 Militant groups continued to attack civilians and civil society organizations. The Pakistani government began deporting undocumented Afghan refugees in November; 221, 882 refugees returned or were deported (IOM). When the Afghan “green-eyed girl” from the National Geographic cover in 1985 was among those deported, it caused a stir in the media. The Pakistan Rangers allegedly tortured Aftab Ahmad, a well-known political activist and member of the opposition party MQM. Pakistan’s relationship with the United States has been strained, while relations with China improved with the announcement about the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in June. The construction of transportation infrastructure began in November.
2015 Pakistan’s civilians continued to suffer from targeted attacks. The January bombing of a Shiite mosque killed 60 (International Crisis Group). In April prominent human rights activist Sabeen Mahmud was shot dead. Armed forces engaged in Operation Khyber I against militant positions in the Khyber Agency of Pakistan and then launched Operation Khyber II in different parts of the same area. The Pakistani government passed legislation to allow military courts to try suspects, including civilians, accused of terrorism charges. Despite a Supreme Court challenge, these laws remained on the books. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and the Muttahida Quami Movement accused the Pakistan Rangers—Pakistani security forces—of extrajudicial killings.
2014 Peace negotiations initiated at the beginning of the year collapsed and the government began intense military offensives against militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Operations began in Waziristan in mid-June and the Khyber Agency in October, causing mass displacements of civilians. Major attacks claimed by Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan factions included a massacre at the Army Public School in Peshawar, an attack on the Jinnah International Airport, and a suicide bombing at the India-Pakistan border. Attacks by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jaish-ul-Islam militant groups targeted Shia Muslims. Armed conflict resulted in an estimated 5,496 deaths this year—an increase over 2013. Drone attacks killed an estimated 122 people. In response to violence perpetrated by armed groups, the government of Pakistan announced the reinstatement of the death penalty for persons convicted of terrorism and introduced measures that increased the powers of government forces when dealing with threats to national security. The Pakistani government pursued measures to increase cooperation with Afghan and Russian authorities on regional security and counter-terrorism.
2013 Suicide bombings, attacks on minority civilian populations and fighting between militant groups continued to destabilize the country. Violence remained high, with 5,379 reported deaths, although the number of fatalities decreased from the previous year. Both the Shia Muslim and minority Christian populations experienced significant attacks. A Taliban faction claimed responsibility for a deadly suicide attack in September at a historic Peshawar church. Significantly, in the May general elections, Pakistan experienced its first electoral transfer of power after a full term served in office, when Nawaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz was elected Prime Minister. Although the elections were considered fair by most, violent attacks before and on election day marred the process. Drone strikes by the United States, although down from 2012, still killed 158 suspected militants. The Pakistan High Court ruled that the attacks were illegal and should be stopped, with force if necessary.
2012 The conflict in Pakistan continued with widespread violence, including suicide bomb attacks, kidnappings, extrajudicial killings and beheadings. The federal political leadership was in shambles as the result of deep systemic corruption; the Supreme Court disqualified Prime Minister Gilani from holding office. More than 6,000 people died because of armed conflict; figures were similar to those of recent years. Continuing U.S. drone attacks killed at least 222 people. In October 14-year-old activist Malala Yousafzai was shot in the head by the Taliban, but survived. The attack garnered global media attention.
2011 Suicide attacks and shootings, attributed to the Taliban, al-Qaeda and the Haqqani network, continued, killing both civilians and Pakistani military forces. Clashes between government forces and insurgents also continued, with numbers killed approaching those in 2010. The Pakistani Army launched a new offensive in Mohmand Agency, located in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), displacing more than 25,000 civilians. Violence, fuelled by hostility among political parties, roiled Karachi in 2011, with 240 people killed in July alone. In May, a U.S. Special Forces raid killed al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden at a compound in Abbottabad, a military town near Islamabad. The mission was criticized by Pakistani military leaders, who were not informed prior to the raid, and led to many high-profile revenge attacks against U.S. military and NATO forces. In November, 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed by friendly fire from a NATO warplane over Pakistan near the Afghan border, further damaging deteriorating U.S.-Pakistan relations. Pakistan responded by blocking NATO supply routes. Despite a drop in the number of drone attacks to almost half the 2010 total, military officials, politicians and media commentators in Pakistan continued to condemn their use, citing civilian deaths and violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty.
2010 Violence between Pakistani forces and Taliban and al-Qaeda militants in the northwest, as well as clashes between political rivals elsewhere in the country, continued, although fewer fatalities were reported than in 2009. In South Waziristan, the army increased its efforts against al-Qaeda, leading to an increase in militant violence in the area. The army claimed some success in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), driving out the Taliban from portions of the area. At 118, the number of U.S. drone attacks was dramatically higher, more than twice the 2009 total. The number of terrorist attacks increased, especially in Karachi. Officials suspected Karachi might be the new base for the Quetta Shura Taliban. Political violence, involving the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and Baluch nationalists, continued throughout the year. The Pakistani government strengthened ties with the United States. The MQM threatened to back out of the governing coalition and did so in early 2011. Despite these domestic challenges, in May, parliament officially passed the eighteenth constitutional amendment, which limits presidential powers, strengthens parliament and transfers more power to the provinces.
2009 A new operation to reclaim the Swat Valley from Taliban control was launched in January. In an effort to stop the violence in the Swat Valley and other areas by satisfying a chief Taliban demand, the Chief Minister of North Western Frontier Province announced that a bill had been signed to implement sharia law in the region. The ceasefire that followed was violated by the Taliban in April when they attempted an advance into Buner district. By July, the Swat Valley was back under military control. As the Swat operation wound down, a new operation in South Waziristan targeted high-ranking Taliban leaders. This operation resulted in the death of Baitullah Mehsud, a top Taliban leader in Pakistan. This year saw significant use of unmanned U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan. There were reports of 51 drone attacks that killed more than 700 people. Between11,000 and 12,000 people died as the result of conflict during the year. In mid-March, the administration of U.S. president Barack Obama announced a new strategy for Pakistan, which included increased economic assistance for the country in return for greater co-operation in fighting terrorists along the Afghan border.
2008 Newly elected President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani advocated a new approach to dealing with the insurgency. Peace talks between all levels of government and militants were proposed, but never materialized as violence continued. Late in the year, the Pakistani government sought to root out insurgents and solidify control in the Northwest Frontier Province. Operations against militants in the region displaced thousands; estimates put the civilian death toll in the hundreds and the insurgent death toll in the thousands. U.S. drone attacks escalated late in the year. Both the United States and the United Kingdom pledged to increase anti-insurgency measures and bolster democratic institutions by funding multimillion-dollar projects in the tribal regions.
2007 Fighting continued throughout the country, while violence intensified between government security forces and foreign militants in North and South Waziristan. More than 1,300 conflict deaths were reported, including 250 from suicide bombings. President Pervez Musharraf suspended the constitution in November, sparking an international outcry and Pakistan’s suspension from the Commonwealth. Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto returned from exile in a bid to return to power and was assassinated on December 27; elections were postponed until February 2008.
2006 Conflicts killed approximately 1,650 people. They took place between Sunni and Shia Muslims, the military and rebels seeking autonomy in the province of Baluchistan, and the military and Islamic militants along the porous Afghan border.
2005 Sectarian violence across Pakistan and military operations in northeastern Pakistan continued. In October, a major earthquake in northern Pakistan killed 55,000 people.
2004 Sectarian fighting continued; attacks on civilians and security forces, bombing of mosques and drive-by shootings of politicians killed at least 190 people. Most casualties were civilians who died in the year’s two most serious attacks, both bombings of Sunni mosques. President Pervez Musharraf was entrenched as head of the government and army until at least 2007 by a bill approved by Pakistan’s lower house. Pakistan was declared a “major ally” by U.S. President George W. Bush, in recognition of Pakistan’s contribution to the fight against al-Qaeda.
2003 Sectarian violence claimed approximately 100 lives, with Shia Muslim civilians accounting for most of the casualties. President Pervez Musharraf’s continuing crackdown on militant groups might have provoked the attempt on his life in December.
2002 Sectarian violence claimed dozens of lives this year, as Islamic militants stepped up attacks against Pakistani Christians and foreigners.
2001 Targeted assassinations of prominent citizens marked the year. In August, the Sindh provincial government initiated a crackdown on Islamic militants. According to one Pakistani media source, more than 250 people died in the violence during the year.
2000 Although violence declined after the military coup of October 1999, sectarian tensions persisted between the majority Sunni and the minority Shia Muslims in Karachi. The killing of prominent religious leaders and political activists resulted in violent protests. At least 150 people were killed.
1999 Despite the central government’s imposition of Governor’s Rule (state of emergency) in late 1998 in response to Sindh violence, political and sectarian killings continued in Karachi, but at a much reduced level. At least 75 were killed during the year, down from the estimated 1,000 conflict deaths in 1998.
1998 In 1998, reprisal killings between militants of the Muttahida Qami Movement (MQM) and a breakaway faction increased violence in the city of Karachi.
1. Government of Pakistan: In May 2013, Nawaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) replaced Yusuf Raza Gilani as Prime Minister after parliamentary elections. Mamnoon Hussain—a long-time member of the same PML-N political party—was elected President of Pakistan on July 30, 2013.
2. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI): Pakistan’s domestic and foreign intelligence service was established in 1948. The ISI is mandated to bolster intelligence sharing between branches of the armed forces and conducts covert offensive operations.
3. Pakistani Armed Forces: The Pakistani Armed Forces includes an army, navy, and air force and has a reserve force of more than 500,000 personnel. It also has a 100,000-member paramilitary group, the Pakistan Rangers, which is charged with defensive tasks in border regions. The National Guard, the Frontier Corps, the Maritime Security Agency, the Coast Guard, and the Anti-Terrorist Elite Force are other paramilitary agencies. The Pakistani Armed Forces has significant military capacity, including tanks, artillery, and missiles. According to The Military Balance 2016, the Pakistani Armed Forces comprises:
- 550,000 army personnel
- 23,800 navy personnel
- 70,000 air force personnel
- 304,000 paramilitary personnel
4. United States: After 2011, tensions between the United States and Pakistan resulted in a temporary reduction of U.S. defence aid. In October 2013, however, the United States moved to release $1.6-billion in military aid. Some leaders in Pakistan argue that using U.S. aid to fight internal terrorist groups infringes on Pakistan’s sovereignty. The United States continues to use drone strikes to target militants in Pakistan. In 2016, the U.S.-Pakistani relationship became more tumultuous and strained. Critical of Pakistan’s actions against the Haqqani Network, the United States reduced the amount of foreign assistance it gives to Pakistan to the lowest level since 2007 (Human Rights Watch).
Militant Groups: Most are ethnic or religious groups and are active within particular regions. In addition, criminal elements, some working through the groups listed below, participate in the violence—a legacy of Pakistan’s involvement in the war in Afghanistan and the related drug trade. The major groups active in fighting include:
5. Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz (JSQM): JSQM was created in 1972 to liberate Sindh province – located in the south-east of Pakistan – from central rule, and create a free Sindhudesh. The Sindh nationalist group is led by Sunan Khan Qureshi and senior officials Niaz Kalani and Syed Munir Hyder Shah. JSQM believes that Sindh, which is a major economic driver in Pakistan and the source of a large percentage of its natural resources, is being exploited and that residents of Sindh are denied their fair share of economic benefits. Sindh nationalism focuses on water concerns.
6. The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM): The Mohajir Quami Movement first emerged in 1986, led by Altaf Hussain. In 1991, internal disagreements resulted in the formation of an MQM splinter group, the MQM-H, described below. Since the split, the MQM faction led by Altaf Hussein has been known as MQM-A. The two factions have clashed repeatedly. MQM-A reportedly has ties with Shia sectarian parties. In 1997, the group changed its name to the Muttahida Quami Movement.
7. Mohajir Qaumi Movement Haqiqi (MQM-H): This is the most prominent splinter group of the original Mohajir Quami Movement (now MQM-A). Formed by Afaq Ahmed in 1992, this group wants a separate province as they believe the Mohajirs are subjected to socioeconomic and political inequalities. They are reportedly allied with the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP).
8. Baluch Liberation Army: This insurgent group seeks an independent Baluchistan and mainly operates in the province of Balochistan in southwest Pakistan. In August 2006, its leader, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, was killed in a military offensive. It is currently led by Harbiyar Marri. Both Pakistan and the United Kingdom have labeled BLA a terrorist organization.
Sunni-based groups, some of which are funded by supporters in the Arabian Gulf states
9. Taliban: This militant group emerged in northern Pakistan after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from neighbouring Afghanistan, where it ruled from 1996 to 2001. The Pakistani Taliban is believed to be providing a safe haven for al-Qaeda leaders.
a. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (Taliban Movement of Pakistan, TTP): The main Pakistani faction of the Taliban is led by Mullah Fazlullah. Fazlullah was elected in 2013 after former leader Hakimullah Mehsud died in a drone attack. The TTP is considered an umbrella organization that is linked to, but independent of, the Afghan Taliban.
b. Haqqani network: This guerilla insurgent group is led by and named after the Afghan Taliban leader, Sirajuddin Haqqani. The network is allied with Taliban operatives based in North Waziristan, a mountainous region of northwest Pakistan, and Eastern Afghanistan. Attacks are launched from North Waziristan into Afghanistan. The United States has repeatedly accused the Pakistani army, specifically its intelligence branch (ISI), of supporting the Haqqani network. In 2014, the Pakistani army launched military operations against this group for the first time.
c. Quetta Shura: This militant group is comprised of the leadership of the Afghan Taliban. Since 2001, it is believed to have been based in Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan province.
d. Jammat-ul-Ahrar: Led by Omar Khalid Khorasani, this militant group formed as a splinter of TPP. This group claimed that TTP leaders were not following the TTP ideology and denouced commander Mullah Fazlullah.
10. Al-Qaeda: Al-Qaeda is an international terrorist network led by Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri. Its members follow a radical version of Sunni Islam and claim to be waging a war for an Islamic form of global government.
11. Millat-e Islami-ye Pakistan (MIP): Previously known as Sipah-Sabaha-Pakistan, the MIP represents Sunni Muslims and is supported by fundamentalist groups in Saudi Arabia and Libya.
12. Jamaat-i-Islami (JII) and its student wing, Islamic Jamiat Tulaba (IJT): JII is an Islamic political organization and socially conservative movement. Established in 1941 by Abūʾl-Aʿlā Mawdūdī, it aims to create an ideological Islamic society via education and social work.
13. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ): Anti-Shia LeJ militants are suspected of having links with al-Qaeda, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Toiba, and Harkatul Muhajideen, among other terrorist groups.
14. Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shiriat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM): TNSM comes out of the former Malakand Division of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (known as North-West Frontier Province until 2010). It receives support from the Taliban Movement of Pakistan (TTP, described below).
15. Jaish-ul-Islam: This militant group targets Shia Muslims in Pakistan
16. Islami Tehrik-e Pakistan (ITP): Previously known as Tehrik-I-Jaffaria-Pakistan, it represents Shia Muslims and receives some financial support from Iran. Its leader is Mohammad Baqar Najfi.
2017 On January 21, at least 20 Shia Muslims were killed by the Taliban in the Kurram tribal district bordering Afghanistan. February was one of the deadliest months in Pakistan’s recent history. On February 13, 13 people were killed and at least 83 injured after a bomb exploded during a pharmacists-led protest in the city of Lahore, near the Punjab assembly building. On February 14, two police officers were killed in the city of Quetta while attempting to defuse a bomb assembled by the faction Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al Alami. On February 15, a government official was killed and four people were injured after a Taliban suicide bomber ran his motorcycle into a government van in the city of Peshawar in northwestern Pakistan. Also on February 15, a suicide bomb detonated at the main entrance of the tribal headquarters in Ghalanai, in the Mohmand tribal region, killing three police officers and two civilians. The attack was executed by Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, a faction of the Pakistani Taliban. On February 16, three Pakistani soldiers were killed after an IED deployed by the Baloch Liberation Front hit a military convoy near the city of Awaran. Also on February 16, ISIS offshoot Khorasan Province carried out a suicide attack that killed at least 88 Sufis (including 20 children) performing a ritual at the Lal Shahbaz shrine in Sehwan, in the southern province of Sindh. Pakistan then closed two border checkpoints with Afghanistan. On February 17, the army of Pakistan claimed to have killed more than 100 terrorists in less than 24 hours. On February 21, Taliban faction Jamaat-ur-Ahrar attacked a court in the northwestern district of Charsadda, where suicide bombers killed at least six people. On February 23, at least eight people were killed and dozens injured by a blast in a shopping area in Lahore.
In March, the Taliban targeted Shia Muslims in the Kurram tribal district, where a car bomb killed at least 24 people. On March 6, Jamaat-ur-Ahrar killed at least 15 people at three border posts with Afghanistan in the tribal province of Mohmand. On March 31, Jamaat-ur-Ahrar killed at least 24 people and injured more than 70 in a bombing of a Shia Muslim mosque in the city of Parachinar, near the border with Afghanistan. On April 6, at least six people were killed and 19 injured after a suicide bomb targeted census workers in Lahore. On April 14, clashes between the Pakistani military and the Pakistan Taliban in the district of Dera Ghazi Khan, at a Taliban hideout 490 south of the capital city of Islamabad, left nine Taliban fighters and three Pakistani soldiers dead. On April 17, Jamaat-ur-Ahrar head Ehsanullah Ehsan surrendered to military forces. On April 25, at least 10 people were killed by a roadside bomb in the northwestern tribal district of Kurram.
During a census on May 6 in the province of Balochistan (on the contested border between Pakistan and Afghanistan), 15 people were killed and dozens wounded after a battle between security forces across the border. The border divides large tribal communities and families. On May 8, at least 50 Afghan soldiers and eight civilians were killed and five checkpoints along the border were destroyed, according to Pakistan. Afghanistan denied this claim. On May 12, an explosion hit a convoy, killing at least 40 people. The attack targeted Senator Ghafoor Haideri, who sustained minor injuries. ISIS claimed responsibility. On May 23, the Indian army bombed Pakistan’s Nowshera army post along the de facto border in Kashmir.
On June 23, at least 25 people were killed in a Taliban attack on Shias at a market in Parachinar in the northwestern province of Kurram. The same day, at least 13 people were killed by a suicide bomb in Quetta, and four policemen were killed in Karachi. On July 16, Pakistan launched a military operation (Khyber 4) against ISIS in the mountainous Rajgal Valley that borders Afghanistan. In a Lahore market on July 23, at least 26 people were killed and at least 50 injured by a suicide bomber from the Pakistani Taliban.
On October 2, a roadside IED in Malam Jabba, 150 km north of Islamabad, killed anti-Taliban leader Ahmed Zeb and his father Mian Sher, while his brother and friend were wounded. On October 5, a suicide bomber from Islamic State killed 20 and wounded 25 Sufis at a shrine in Quetta, southwestern Pakistan. On October 9, five people from the targeted Hazara Shia Muslim community in Quetta in southwestern Pakistan were killed in a drive-by shooting at a market. On October 18, at least six elite police officers and one civilian were killed and 22 wounded by a roadside suicide bomber in Quetta.
On November 13, Pakistani forces killed eight suspected terrorists near the Afghan border, where Pakistan is building a 2,400-km fence between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In November, weeks of protests in Islamabad demanding the resignation of the law minister (who later resigned) left six dead and 200 wounded. On November 8, a Pakistani Taliban suicide bomber killed a police chief and three other officers in Quetta. On November 25, a Pakistani Taliban suicide bomber targeted and failed to kill senior officer Abdur Razzaq Cheema, but killed four civilians and wounded 19 in Quetta.
On December 1, three Taliban fighters stormed a college in Peshawar near the Afghan border, killing at least nine people and wounding 36. On December 17, two Islamic State suicide bombers attacked a Methodist church in Quetta, killing eight and wounding as many as 45 people. On December 26, unknown nonstate actors crossed the Pakistan-India de facto border in Rakhchikri, Kashmir and killed three Pakistani soldiers. On December 31, four Indian soldiers were killed by four rebel fighters, who crossed the border from Pakistan-administered Kashmir to Indian-administered Kashmir in Srinagar. Three of the fighters were killed, while the fourth escaped.
2016 While violence was less than in previous years, civilians, minorities, and civil society actors continued to be targeted by militant and terrorist organizations (Human Rights Watch). Violence and conflict persisted in Balochistan and the semi-autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of northwestern Pakistan that border Afghanistan. The Taliban and other armed groups continued to use children as suicide bombers (Human Rights Watch). The paramilitary Pakistan Rangers were accused of torturing prisoners; the body of Aftab Ahmad, a prominent MQM political activist who died in their custody, bore evidence of torture, as did Kehar Ansari, Vice-Chairman of the JSQM political party. These cases caused an outcry from opposition groups and international human rights organizations (Amnesty International).
Three major bombings occurred. On Easter Sunday, a bomb went off in a park in Lahore, attacking Pakistan’s Christian minority. Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, a Pakistani Taliban faction, claimed responsibility for the attack (International Crisis Group), which killed at least 74 people and injured 362 (CNN). In August, a suicide bomb killed more than 70 people at the Quetta Civil Hospital in the capital of Balochistan. It appeared that some of Blochistan provice’s most prominent lawyers were deliberately targeted; they had gathered in the hostpital’s emergency department to mourn a colleague who had been shot dead earlier in the day (International Crisis Group). Islamic State and Jamaat-ul-Ahrar both claimed responsibility for the attack, which lawyers condemned in protests across the country (Guardian). Lawyers Jahanzeb Alvi and Amanullah Achakzai in the same city were killed in June and August by unknown gunmen. In November, a suicide bomb killed 52 people and wounded 100 at a Sufi shrine in the Khuzdar district of Balochistan. Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack, but the Home Minister of Balochistan blamed the anti-Shia group, Laskar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alami (International Crisis Group).
U.S. drone strikes decreased in 2016; there were three recorded attacks—one each in January, February, and May. Approximately 13 people, including at least one civilian, were killed and six injured. Afghan Taliban leader, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, was killed near the Afghan border in the May strike (Bureau Investigates). Pakistan protested that the attacks violated international law as well as its sovereignty (Al Jazeera).
2015 The year was marked by violence against civilians. On January 30 at least 60 people were killed when Sunni militants bombed a Shiite mosque in Sindh province’s Shikapur district (International Crisis Group). On September 17 dozens died when the Taliban carried out a major attack on Badaber Air Force Base (International Crisis Group). The United States responded with ongoing drone strikes. On March 16 the Pakistani military announced that Operation Khyber I, a mission to clear militants from the Khyber Agency, had ended. It was followed by Operation Khyber II against armed groups in different areas of the same region. Major air strikes on militant positions occurred in the second half of March and in May. Operation Khyber II ended June 15. In September the Pakistani military conducted its first drone attack, killing three militants in Shawal (International Crisis Group).
2014 The government of Pakistan initiated talks with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on January 29. Then the Mohmand faction of the TTP declared that it had killed 23 Frontier Corps membersin response to the alleged killing of captured TTP members by government forces (this action was denied by an unnamed security official). On February 19 the government ordered a military response that put an end to the talks. In mid-June, the government of Pakistan launched operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan to target terrorism in Waziristan. In October, it launched military operation Khyber 1 against militants in the Khyber Agency. Military offensives against the Haqqani network began this year. On December 16, 141 people (132 of them children) were killed at the Army Public School in Peshawar. A suicide bombing at the Pakistan-India border killed at least 57 people on November 2. On June 8, Jinnah International Airport in Karachi was attacked by militants, resulting in at least 28 deaths, 10 of whom were militants. All three attacks were claimed by factions of the TTP.A suicide bombing on January 21 in Mastung, Balochistan, claimed by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, killed at least 22 Shia Muslims. Another attack killed at least 30 Shia in Taftan, Balochistan on June 8; Jaish-ul-Islam claimed responsibility for the attack.
2013 Although the death toll decreased by approximately 15 per cent, violence was widespread. With 3,251 people killed in Karachi, the year was deemed the deadliest for the city by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. Quetta, the provincial capital of Balochistan, also experienced serious attacks: suicide bomb attacks in January and a bomb attack the following month by the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi group killed more than 200 Hazara Shias. In April, the military launched a campaign in the Tirah valley after fighting between militant groups resulted in extensive population displacement.
Attacks continued on workers and police officers supporting vaccination programs; 22 polio vaccination workers were killed and 14 injured in 2012 and 2013. The Taliban alleged that polio vaccinations were part of a U.S. ploy to create infertility.
On December 26, the Ministry of Interior and Narcotics Control committed to negotiations to bring peace and stability to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Human Rights Watch reported 400 fatalities among Shia Muslims from sectarian violence in 2013. The South Asia Terrorism Portal reported 24 U.S. drone strikes against suspected militants in Pakistan in 2013 that killed 158 people, fewer than in 2012. In May a High Court judge in Pakistan ruled the U.S. drone strikes illegal; he urged the government to collect data on drone use and to use force, if necessary, to end attacks in the tribal areas.
2012 While deaths among militant and security forces decreased by 12 and five per cent respectively, civilian fatalities were 10 per cent higher than in 2011. Sectarian violence increased, with at least 507 recorded fatalities in 173 incidents, up from 203 killings in 30 incidents in 2011. Violence against Shias was the highest on record, with at least 396 killed in 113 targeted attacks, up from 136 in 24 incidents in 2011. The perpetrators of the attacks were believed to have links with the government. Politically motivated killings were common. According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), 135 political activists were killed in the first half of 2012. Members of the Awami National Party were frequently targeted by the TTP. In December senior ANP leader and provincial minister Bashir Ahmed Bilour was killed in a suicide bomb attack. In October, 14-year-old children’s rights activist and Pakistan’s first National Peace Prize winner Malala Yousafzai was shot in the head by Taliban gunmen, in an attack that captured the world’s attention. She survived and recovered after intensive treatment in the United Kingdom. Thirty-four security forces personnel were beheaded by terrorists, including 22 in one December incident in Peshawar. According to the New America Foundation, at least 222 people were killed in 48 U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan in 2012.
2011 Suicide attacks and shootings, attributed to the Taliban, al-Qaeda and the Haqqani network, continued, killing both civilians and Pakistani military forces. Clashes between government forces and insurgents also continued, with death tolls similar to those in 2010. A new offensive by the Pakistani Army in Mohmand Agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) displaced more than 25,000 civilians. Violence, fuelled by hostility among political parties, roiled Karachi in 2011; 240 people were killed in July alone, despite the deployment of paramilitary troops to restore order. On May 2, a U.S. Special Forces raid killed al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden at a compound in Abbottabad, a military town near Islamabad. The mission was condemned by Pakistani military leaders, who were not advised in advance of the raid. Many high-profile revenge attacks against U.S. military and NATO forces followed. In November, 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed by friendly fire from a NATO warplane in Pakistan near the Afghan border. Pakistan responded by blocking NATO supply routes. The U.S. briefly halted drone attacks, restarting in early 2012. While there were only about half as many drone attacks in 2011 as in 2010, military officials, politicians and media commentators in Pakistan continued to condemn them, citing civilian deaths and violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty.
2010 Early in the year, the military intensified its campaign in South Waziristan to root out al-Qaeda. Around the same time, security forces and local tribesmen stepped up their campaign against the Taliban in Bajaur, an agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, regaining control. Senior Taliban commander Kalifa and 37 militants surrendered, other militants fled and a number of key military Taliban leaders were later captured in a series of raids conducted by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, the CIA and Pakistani forces. The Taliban continued to launch attacks—including bombings and suicide attacks—against NATO and Pakistani forces, as well as NGO targets across the country. The number of terrorist attacks throughout the country increased, especially in Karachi. Officials suspected that Karachi might be the new base for the Quetta Shura Taliban. The number of U.S. drone attacks continued to rise; with 118 strikes, the number was more than twice that for 2009. Most drone attacks were in North Waziristan. A number of key Taliban leaders were killed by drone attacks and the remaining leadership largely forced underground, but civilian casualties to achieve these results have been very high, with hundreds or even thousands killed. In January and February, clashes between political rivals led to 50 deaths. In July, the secretary-general of the Baluchistan National Party was killed. In separate incidents in August, 16 Punjabis in Baluchistan, an MQM MP and another member of the MQM were killed. The MQM deaths triggered political violence that killed hundreds more, mainly in Karachi.
2009 Although the Pakistani army launched an operation to reclaim Swat Valley from Taliban control in January, militants were able to expand their control to include nearly the entire district and began imposing strict sharia law. In mid-February, the Chief Minister of the Northwestern Frontier Province announced that a bill had been signed that would implement sharia law in the Northwest Frontier Province’s Malakand Division, including Swat. The Taliban proclaimed a 10-day truce to examine the bill and in late February extended the truce indefinitely. At the beginning of March, Major General Tariq Khan, commander of military operations in Pakistan’s tribal agencies, said that his paramilitary Frontier Corps had driven extremists out of Bajaur in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The conflict in Swat was reignited in late April after Taliban militants violated the peace deal by advancing into Buner district. Two million people fled the fighting in the northwest—more than one million in Swat region. The UN Refugee Agency warned that Pakistan was facing one of its fastest major displacements in recent history. By July, the government announced that Swat Valley was back under military control and began the phased return of those displaced by the fighting. The military estimated that 340 soldiers and 1,800 Taliban militants had been killed and 2,000 militants arrested in the Swat operation.
A new military offensive was announced in South Waziristan on June 14, targeting Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, who was killed in a U.S. drone attack on August 5. Hakimullah Mehsud was named his successor. Another major military offensive was launched in South Waziristan on October 17 after militants stepped up the frequency of bomb and suicide attacks. Approximately 28,000 soldiers joined in battle with an estimated 10,000 Taliban and Uzbek fighters and members of al-Qaeda. As a result of this most recent clash, more than 32,000 civilians fled; as many as 100,000 civilians have been forced to leave this area because of the violence. By mid-November the army had managed to push militant fighters out of 90 per cent of their stronghold in South Waziristan, but the operation failed to end the militants’ suicide attacks. Nearby districts experienced an influx of militants from South Waziristan, who began to set up new strongholds. In general, the number of suicide attacks in Pakistan rose in 2009, but militant attacks overall fell sharply, indicating that the army was succeeding in efforts to rein in the Taliban, but at the cost of civilian lives.
Unmanned drone attacks on Pakistan increased significantly in 2009. The first drone attacks of the new U.S. administration came a few days after Barack Obama’s inauguration in January. By the end of 2009, the United States had reportedly launched 51 drone attacks, compared with 45 during the entire eight-year administration of George W. Bush. In early December, the United States expanded its CIA drone program to Baluchistan. Pakistan had long publicly stated that drone strikes were counterproductive and a violation of its sovereignty. But there was speculation that Pakistani intelligence agencies were providing information to the United States to assist in the strikes. Drone strikes that targeted militants, such as the August 5 attack that killed the commander of the Pakistani Taliban, Baitullah Mehsud, fueled anti-U.S. feelings among Pakistanis. According to an August 2009 Gallup poll, only 9 per cent of Pakistanis approved of such attacks. In 2009, more than 700 people were killed in drone attacks. According to Pakistani news agency, Dawn Media Group, Pakistani authorities reported that of 51 drone attacks in 2009, only five hit their targets, killing five al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders. “For each al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorist killed by U.S. drones, 140 innocent Pakistanis also had to die,” the media outlet reported. In contrast, the New America Foundation reported that in 114 reported drone strikes since 2004, between 550 and 850 of the estimated 830 to 1,210 killed were militants.
2008 Clashes continued between militant groups and the Pakistani government, especially in the Northwest Frontier Province, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Baluchistan province. Peace talks started but soon collapsed and fighting intensified. Militant hijackings increased on the major Torkham highway, a supply route that fed the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. More than two dozen U.S. drone airstrikes on targets in Pakistan were reported. Targets were apparently militants, accused of attacking ISAF troops in Afghanistan and residing in tribal regions along the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
2007 Fighting between government forces and foreign militants as well as sectarian conflicts intensified in North and South Waziristan. Rampant suicide bombings throughout Pakistan claimed at least 230 lives and raised fears that sectarian violence would further destabilize the country. Reports in June indicated that children were being abducted by pro-Taliban militants in northern tribal areas. In early July, government security forces stormed the Red Mosque in central Islamabad, where radical clerics and student sympathizers advocating the imposition of sharia law had barricaded themselves. Numerous suicide bombings and reprisal killings followed. Also in July, one of Pakistan’s most wanted people, Taliban leader Abdullah Mehsud, committed suicide after security forces surrounded him in Zhob. In November, President Pervez Musharraf suspended the constitution and imposed a state of emergency, claiming that the Supreme Court was aiding foreign militants. Also in November, the government deployed some 2,000 troops to the Swat Valley to fight militants linked to pro-Taliban cleric Maulana Fazlullah. Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who had recently returned from exile to run in the federal elections, was assassinated at a political rally in Rawalpindi on December 27. The assassination sparked waves of street violence, resulting in approximately 50 deaths.
2006 Conflict between Sunni and Shia Muslims resulted in suicide bombings and clashes throughout the year. The province of Baluchistan increased efforts to secure political and economic autonomy from Islamabad, with rebels attacking gas pipelines, railways and power transmission lines and launching rocket attacks on military targets. The military stationed 123,000 troops in the province to maintain control. The regions bordering Afghanistan—North and South Waziristan—experienced ongoing conflict between supporters of the region’s strengthening Taliban and the Pakistani government as it participated in the U.S.-led war on terror.
2005 Sectarian violence between Shia and Sunni Muslims continued; deadly bombings and violent street fights killed almost 200. The Pakistani government continued its offensive against al-Qaeda and allied terrorist groups and tribes, particularly in Pakistan’s northern Waziristan territories, where heavy casualties included civilians. Local elections in August were marked by violent clashes between opposing political groups that killed dozens.
2004 Attacks on civilians, bombings of mosques, drive-by shootings of politicians and attacks on security forces continued. March and October bombings of Sunni mosques killed more than 80 people and wounded hundreds more. In March, the government launched a series of military operations against “high-value” al-Qaeda targets and supporters in South Waziristan, marking a significant escalation in the military’s efforts against al-Qaeda. The military operations, which continued throughout the year, were met with armed resistance. These actions coincided with increased U.S. military operations along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
2003 Fighting between Sunni and Shia Muslims spread to southwestern Pakistan. In most cases, Shia civilians were indiscriminately attacked, allegedly by extremist Sunni militant groups. The July bombing of a Shia mosque in Quetta resulted in 60 deaths. Militants employed guerrilla tactics, such as bombings and drive-by shootings. Extremist sectarian groups opposed to President Pervez Musharraf’s policies, including his administration’s alliance with the United States in its war on terror, launched attacks on government security forces and narrowly failed to assassinate Musharraf in December.
2002 Fighting continued between Sunni and Shia Muslims. Government officials, Pakistani Christians and foreigners were targeted by militant Muslim groups.
2001 Sectarian violence persisted in 2001 with attacks by extremists from all sides. Sunni extremists began to target prominent community members such as doctors, lawyers and businessmen.
2000 Although violence had declined since the military coup of October 1999, sectarian tensions persisted between the majority Sunni and the minority Shia Muslims in Karachi. The killing of prominent religious leaders and political activists resulted in violent protests. In September, Pakistani police arrested 250 members of the hardline Sunni Muslim group Sipah-e-Sahaaba. Other police and army operations targeted the two leading ethnically based parties in Sindh, the Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz (JSQM) and Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM).
1999 Despite the central government’s imposition of Governor’s Rule (state of emergency) in late 1998 in response to Sindh violence, political and sectarian killings persisted in Karachi, at a much reduced level. The intensity of the violence dropped further after the military assumed power in an October coup.
1998 In 1998, tit-for-tat killings between the MQM and its breakaway faction increased the level of violence in Karachi.
Total: With many regions inaccessible to outsiders, it is impossible to independently verify the number of dead in Pakistan. South Asia Terrorism Portal attributed 61,497 deaths to terrorist violence between 2003 and 2016, including 21,489 civilians (South Asia Terrorism Portal). In November 2009, an official Pakistani report recorded 22,128 deaths from terror-related incidents in the previous six years (2003-2009), of which 7,004 were civilians, 2,637 were security forces, and 12,487 were militants (Trend).
2016 The South Asia Terrorism Portal recorded 1,803 conflict deaths in 2016. This number includes 612 civilians, 898 terrorists, and 293 security force personnel (South Asia Terrorism Portal).
Refugees and IDPS: The CIA World Factbook reported 1,459,000 internally displaced people in Pakistan, with the majority displaced due to violence in the FATA region (Central Intelligence Agency). Pakistan also hosted 2,600,000 Afghan refugees, both registered and unregistered, in 2016 (Central Intelligence Agency).
2015 The South Asia Terrorism Portal recorded 3,682 conflict deaths: 940 civilians, 339 security forces, and 2,403 terrorists (South Asia Terrorism Portal). The Portal indicated that 327 people were killed in sectarian violence (South Asia Terrorism Portal); it recorded 14 drone strikes that killed 85 people (South Asia Terrorism Portal).
Refugees and IDPs: The UNHCR reported 1,556,400 internally displaced persons in Pakistan by June 2015. There were 262,136 refugees and 52,409 asylum seekers originating from Pakistan (UNHCR).
2014 The South Asia Terrorism Portal reported that 1,781 civilians, 533 state forces personnel, and 3,182 militants were killed by terrorist activity and military responses against non-state armed groups. It also reported 210 people killed in sectarian violence. Nineteen drone attacks killed 122 people.
Refugees and IDPs: According to UNHCR, in July 2014, there were 1,183,905 internally displaced persons in Pakistan and 175,961 refugees originating from Pakistan. The International Rescue Committee reported that more than one million people were forced from their homes in North Waziristan after Pakistan’s military initiated an operation against militants in the summer. Operation Khyber 1, launched in October, further contributed to mass displacement; according to FATA Disaster Management Authority (FDMA), on November 26 there were 539,315 displaced individuals from the Khajuri and Tirah valley area of Bara Tehsils of Khyber Agency.
2013 The reported death toll decreased substantially from 2012, to a total of 5,379 fatalities from terrorism-related activity. The South Asia Terrorism Portal reported at least 3,001 civilian deaths, 1,702 terrorist and 676 state forces. Because media access is limited and the government carefully controls the release of information, the actual number of conflict-related deaths was probably higher. Forty-three suicide bomb attacks killed 751 and injured 1,411. The number of U.S. drone attacks declined to 24 from 46 in 2012, killing 158 and injuring 29.
2012 In 2012, the South Asia Terrorism Portal reported at least 6,211 fatalities caused by terrorist attacks and military operations against militants, including 3,007 civilians, 2,472 militants and 732 security forces personnel. As media access is heavily restricted in some areas of Pakistan and the government releases limited information, actual figures may be higher.
2011 The South Asia Terrorism Portal reported 6,142 deaths related to terrorist attacks and military operations against militants. Of these, 2,580 were civilians, 1,952 were security forces and 524 were militants. According to news sources, approximately 203 deaths can be attributed to sectarian violence, bringing the total of all conflict-related violence in Pakistan to 6,345.
2010 The South Asia Terrorism Portal reported a total of 7,435 deaths, including 1,796 civilians, 5,170 militants and 496 security forces. News media sources, with limited access to some regions, numbered the dead at approximately 1,000, up to 90 per cent civilian.
2009 The South Asia Terrorism Portal reported 11,585 deaths in 2009, marking a major upsurge in deaths from the previous year.
2008 The South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) reported 6,715 deaths in 2008. According to SATP, the number of fatalities have doubled each year since 2006. The 2008 deaths included 2,155 civilians, 654 security forces and 3,906 militants. Pro-government tribal elders were targeted by militants in 2008. The number of police killed in the Northwest Frontier Province, where fatalities were more than double the previous year’s, increased significantly. According to international human rights groups, approximately 350,000 people had been internally displaced in the conflict.
2007 International Crisis Group documented more than 1,300 deaths, at least 200 from suicide bombings and at least 350 civilians. Actual numbers were likely much higher.
2006 The South Asia Terrorism Portal estimated that terrorist violence killed 1,471 and sectarian violence 201, many of them civilian.
2005 Between 700 and 1,000 people were killed.
2004 At least 190 people, primarily civilians, were reported killed in sporadic violence.
2003 Independent media reports indicate that approximately 100 people, most Shia Muslim civilians, were killed.
2002 According to media reports more than 100 people were killed in sectarian violence and attacks on government officials.
2001 According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, more than 250 people were killed in sectarian violence.
2000 At least 150 people were killed in Karachi, mostly due to sectarian violence.
1999 At least 75 people were killed in Karachi due to political violence.
1998 More than 1,000 people were killed.
2017 At the beginning of January, hundreds of people across Pakistan held protests in reaction to the alleged abductions of five activists who spoke critically of Pakistan’s military activity. Four activists/journalists were released three weeks later. On January 31, Jamaat-ud-Dawa head Hafiz Muhammad Saeed was put under house arrest. On April 17, the leader of the Pakistani Taliban (Jamaat-ur-Ahrar), Ehsanullah Ehsan, turned himself in to the Pakistani military.
On July 28, Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif resigned after the Supreme Court disqualified him from parliament in response to corruption allegations. On August 7, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, leader of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, launched the political party anti-India Milli Muslim League. Jamaat-ud-Dawa, a charity organization, is believed to be a front for the armed group Lashkar-e-Tayyaba.
On August 30, the lower house of parliament in Pakistan passed a resolution to suspend supplies to the U.S.-led NATO operation in Afghanistan after U.S. President Donald Trump accused Pakistan of harbouring Afghan terrorist groups. In September, former military ruler Pervez Musharraf declared he would return from exile to stand trial for the assassination of Pakistan’s first female prime minister, Benazir Bhutto.
On September 17, Kulsoom Nawaz, wife of disgraced former prime minister Sharif, won her husband’s parliamentary seat in Lahore in a byelection. During the election campaign, while Nawaz received cancer treatment, daughter Maryam Nawaz stepped in to campaign for her mother (BBC). On August 1, Sharif’s brother Shahid Khaqan Abbasi had been elected as his successor in the Muslim League. On October 19, Nawaz Sharif and Maryam Sharif were indicted on charges of corruption, along with Finance Minister Ishaq Dar. On November 27, the federal law minister, who had been accused of blasphemy, resigned after protesters blocked a major highway for three week.
2016 The year was characterized by ongoing human rights abuses, a high-level corruption scandal, the deportation and repatriation of Afghan refugees, and criticism of the government’s National Action Plan.
In August, the government passed the Prevention of Electronic Cybercrimes Act. The law marked a dramatic shift in Pakistan’s surveillance system, allowing the government to censor online content, such as criticism of government, and criminilize user activity, such as posting or sharing videos that discuss conspriacy videos on the government or offend Islamic beliefs (Al Jazeera). In October, police used a colonial-era law forbidding gatherings of more than four people to defuse public protests against Prime Minister Sharif (Amnesty International). Police fired tear gas and rubber bullets into crowds of protestors and arbitrarily arrested and detained hundreds (Amnesty International). Human rights organizations have condemned these actions, alleging that the continued use of force and this law restriced the right to freedom of peaceful assembly.
In April, the press leaked records that showed that the children of the Prime Minister owned offshore companies and assets that they failed to declare on tax returns (BBC). Imran Khan, leader of the Tehreek-e-Insaf oppostion party, organized protests, which might have spurred the Supreme Court to create a judicial commission to investigate possible political corruption (ICG).
In Novemeber, Pakistan decided to deport unregistered Afghan refugees, citing security reasons (Al Jazeera). According to the IOM, 221,882 undocumented Afghan refugees either voluntarily returned or were deported to Afghanistan in 2016 (IOM). The UNHCR expressed concern that such an influx would cause more hardship in Afghanistan (Al Jazeera). The deportation caused a stir in the international media, when it was learned that Sharbat Gula, the famous Afghan “green-eyed girl” who appeared on the 1985 cover of National Geographic magazine, was among those deported (BBC).
In December, the Judicial Commission of Pakistan publicly released its report on the Quetta hosptial attack in August, outlining motives for the attack and examining the reasons that terrorism is still rampant in the country. The Judicial Commission recognized the government’s efforts to improve security and acknowledged the problem of banned extremist groups that re-formed under a new name (ICG). Yet, it also criticized the lack of accountability and transparency of goernment intelligence agencies; the status of the FATA; the Afghan refugee deportations; and the implementation of the National Action Plan, the government’s strategy to decrease terrorism within its borders. In response, Prime Minister Sharif asked security services to work together against terrorism. Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar denounced the report as one-sided (ICG).
2015 On January 6 Pakistani President Mamnoon Hussain signed the 21st Constitutional Amendment Bill 2015 and the Pakistani Army Act 1952 (amendment) Bill 2015. These two pieces of legislation permitted military courts to try civilian terrorism suspects. On January 22 Pakistan’s Supreme Court agreed to consider petitions against the 21st Constitutional Amendment after protests filed by the Lahore and Sindh High Court Bar Associations. On August 8 the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the 21st amendment. The decision dismissed legal challenges against trying civilians in military courts on terrorism charges, but affirmed the right of the Supreme Court to oversee these tribunals. In November Pakistan’s National Assembly passed the Pakistan Army (amendment) Bill, providing security agencies with retroactive legal protection against unlawful arrest charges and permitting them to conceal the identity of individuals involved in court cases.
The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan publicized an increase in extrajudicial killings allegedly committed in Karachi during Pakistan Rangers-led counter-terrorism operations. The number of deaths increased from 191 in the first half of 2014 to 255 during the same period in 2015 (International Crisis Group). On August 12 Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) politicians resigned from national and provincial political bodies to protest alleged extrajudicial killings and disappearances during Pakistan Rangers operations against the MQM starting in 2013. In October MQM politicians retracted their resignations following an agreement between senior party leaders and Finance Minister Ishaq Dar to form a “Grievances Redressal Committee” to address MQM concerns.
In November an all-parties conference endorsed a proposal to merge the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The plan would grant full political and constitutional rights to Pakistan’s tribal belt. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif formed a five-member committee to explore FATA reform options.
2014 Early in the year, the government announced that it would engage in peace talks with the TTP. However, this process broke down amid ongoing violence. In May, a large wing of the TTP, the Mehsud group, disassociated itself from the TTP central command. On November 20, Pakistan and Russia signed a military cooperation pact to bolster regional peace and stability efforts. Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan improved. Following a state visit to Pakistan by Afghan President Ashraf Ghani in November, the two countries committed to economic and security cooperation.
Following the Peshawar school attack, Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif reinstated the death penalty for terrorists and announced that the government would not differentiation between “good and bad Taliban.” Six prisoners were executed. Amnesty International expressed concern that some of the trials that resulted in the death penalty in Pakistan did not meet international standards for fairness. The government of Pakistan passed the Protection of Pakistan Act, 2014, which strengthened the powers of the military and law enforcement agencies when dealing with incidents of war, insurgency, and other threats to national security. Among other measures, the act shifts the burden of proof onto the accused, who are considered guilty until proven innocent.
2013 For the first time, Pakistan completed an electoral exchange of power from one government to another after the completion of a full term in office. In the May general elections, Nawaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) was elected Prime Minister, replacing Yusuf Raza Gilani and the Pakistan Peoples Party. Mamnoon Hussain was elected President in July. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, which helped to monitor the May elections, found no evidence of vote rigging and encouraged all political parties to respect the result. In a post-election report, European Union elections monitors observed that women voters continued to be significantly under-represented, with 11 million fewer female than male voters. The report noted that pre-election violence caused more than 150 deaths in the four weeks before the election; on the day of the election there were 64 election-related deaths and 225 people injured.
Former President Pervez Musharraf, who resigned in 2008, was arrested by police in April. Musharraf, a high-ranking general, was believed by some to have overextended the powers of his office when he suspended the constitution and imposed a state of emergency in 2008. He was also indicted by the Supreme Court in August in connection with the 2007 assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. These actions represented a significant step away from military impunity in Pakistan.
Thousands of Christians in Lahore were forced to flee after one was accused of blasphemy. According to Human Rights Watch, a mob burned 150 houses and two churches. On Sunday, September 22, a suicide attack on a historic church in Peshawar killed at least 85 people.
In November, thousands gathered in Peshawar to protest U.S. drone attacks, blocking a road used by NATO troops to transport supplies.
2012 Pakistani federal politics in 2012 were described by the BBC as a “farce” and a “soap opera.” In January, Prime Minister Gilani faced charges of contempt by Pakistan’s Supreme Court for refusing to ask Swiss authorities to reopen the corruption case against President Zardari relating to funds in Swiss accounts. He insisted that the constitution provided presidential immunity. Gilani was convicted of contempt of court in April, but refused to step down. He was subsequently disqualified from office. The Supreme Court then demanded that new Prime Minister Raja Ashraf reopen the corruption case against President Zardari. In early 2013, the Supreme Court ordered the arrest of Ashraf and 15 others on charges of corruption. In December, Tahirul Qadri, founder of the pro-Communist Party Awami Tehreek (PAT), returned to Pakistan to pursue a “democratic revolution.” A rally in Lahore attracted hundreds of thousands of people. Adnan Rasheed, the mastermind of an assassination attempt on former President Pervez Musharraf, was appointed the “chief operational commander” of the fidayeen (suicide) unit of the Taliban. Earlier in 2012, Rasheed was freed in an unprecedented jailbreak operation. Approximately 200 Tehrik-i-Taliban militants armed with guns, grenades and rockets attacked the high-security Central Jail in Bannu District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and released 384 prisoners.
2011 Pakistan’s relationship with the United States suffered a number of blows in 2011. Raymond Davis, a U.S. contractor working for the CIA, was arrested for shooting and killing two men in Lahore in January. Although it was unclear whether the shooting was self-defence or murder, it resulted in heightened anti-U.S. sentiment and increased suspicion of Americans, especially by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Continued use of unmanned drones by the United States on targets in Pakistan caused protests in Pakistan.. Washington accused the Pakistani army, particularly the ISI, of supporting the Haqqani network of Taliban-aligned militants. The Haqqani network was believed to be responsible for multiple attacks against U.S. targets in 2011, including the U.S. embassy in Kabul in September. Osama bin Laden was slain by U.S. forces in May in a military town near Islamabad, where he appeared to have been living for some time, raising further suspicions of complicity between the Pakistani military and militants. In November, 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed by friendly fire from a NATO warplane near the Afghan border; Pakistan responded by blocking NATO supply routes to Afghanistan.
Prominent politicians Salman Taseer (Governor of Punjab province) and Shahbaz Bhatti (Minister for Minorities Affairs) were assassinated in January and March, respectively, for their opposition to Pakistan’s controversial and harsh blasphemy laws. In August, legislation was passed to allow political parties to operate legally in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), giving local elected officials hitherto denied authority to represent their constituents, who remain second-class citizens in a colonial-era legal framework. The political conflict among the Mutahida Qabail Party, Pakistan Peoples Party and Awami National Party, rooted in ethnic conflict, continued to stifle economic growth in the major port city of Karachi.
2010 The Pakistani government strengthened ties with the United States. Following violent clashes between political rivals early in the year, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement threatened to leave the government coalition. In May, parliament passed the eighteenth constitutional amendment, which, inter alia, limits presidential powers, strengthens parliament and transfers more power to the provinces. It also changed the name of the Northwest Frontier Province to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, sparking ethnic clashes in Hazara. Both the ruling coalition and opposition agreed to the constitutional changes, the first time such unanimity had occurred. On January 2, 2011, MQM officially left the federal coalition and joined the opposition, raising concerns about the stability of the PPP-led government. Despite Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani’s demands in January for an end to U.S. drone attacks, relations between the United States and Pakistan strengthened. In February, the United States proposed $1.2-billion (U.S.) in military aid, an increase over 2009 of more than 100 per cent. In March, Pakistani officials travelled to Washington, where they were praised by the U.S. Defense Secretary for their fight against the Taliban. In particular, Pakistan’s capture of a number of key Taliban leaders was cited as evidence that Pakistan is taking control of Taliban safe havens in certain regions of the country. The United States continued to pressure Pakistan to enter North Waziristan.
2009 In late January, with a military offensive in Swat Valley under way, reports surfaced that the government was planning to renew talks with the militants. To meet demands of the Taliban, who had all but taken over the entire Swat Valley, the Chief Minister of the Northwest Frontier Province signed a bill that would subject the Malakand Division, which includes Swat, to sharia law. The bill effectively gave the region a separate justice system from that of the rest of Pakistan. The Taliban responded by announcing a 10-day truce to examine the bill. Pakistani officials said that the Swat deal was part of the government’s three-pronged approach—dialogue, deterrence and development—to deal with insurgents. NATO allies expressed alarm at the deal because Swat is only 160 kilometres from the capital, Islamabad, Pakistan’s nuclear technology hub. In March, the Mamoond tribe and the Pakistani government signed a 28-point agreement to bring law and order to Bajaur, an agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. Under the terms of the agreement, all terrorist organizations in the area would be disbanded, tribes would be responsible for establishing the writ of government in their areas and no foreigners, including Afghan refugees, would be allowed to stay in the agency. Also in March, the new U.S. administration under President Barack Obama announced its strategy for Pakistan, which included increased economic assistance in exchange for greater cooperation in fighting terrorists operating along the Afghan border. The announcement raised sovereignty concerns in Pakistan. In December, Pakistani officials announced the creation of a National Counter-Terrorism Authority to keep data on terrorists.
2008 The February general election resulted in a coalition government made up of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League. Benazir Bhutto’s widower, Asif Ali Zardari, was declared president on September 6, accepting the position in the name of his assassinated wife. Pakistan’s government and the newly elected government in Northwest Frontier Province sought to promote peace talks and a ceasefire with militant groups operating within the tribal belt on the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Peace talks were suspended by Baitullah Mehsud, a commander in the Pakistani Taliban, after his demands that government troops leave Waziristan and Swat Valley were not met. The Pakistani government implored Pashtun elders to assert their authority in the region in an attempt to influence militants. The opposition criticized the government for failing to take a diplomatic stand after U.S. drones hit targets in Pakistan. In the aftermath of the November Mumbai attacks in India, Pakistani National Security Adviser Mahmoud Ali Durrani acknowledged that the single surviving gunman was of Pakistani origin. Durrani was subsequently fired by the Prime Minister for “irresponsible behavior.”
2007 Border struggles with foreign militants and Taliban supporters intensified. President Pervez Musharraf suspended the constitution on November 3 and instituted a state of emergency, claiming that the Supreme Court was aiding foreign militants. Subsequent international condemnation and Pakistan’s suspension from the Commonwealth forced Musharraf to reinstate the constitution on December 15. During the state of emergency, there were reports of human rights abuses and thousands were arbitrarily arrested. Musharraf stepped down as head of the country’s military in November and appointed General Ashfaq Kayani as his successor. Also in November, former prime ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto returned to Pakistan after years in exile. After narrowly escaping one assassination attempt, Bhutto was assassinated on December 27. Presidential elections were rescheduled for February 2008.
2006 Militant Islamists, dubbed the Pakistani Taliban, strengthened their power in the provinces of North and South Waziristan. In March, clerics in these provinces announced the enforcement of sharia law as the only means to resolve disputes. President Pervez Musharraf accused India of arming and financing Baluch rebels, a charge India denied.
2005 President Pervez Musharraf further consolidated his power as parties allied to the President fared well in disputed August local elections.
2004 A bill was passed in Pakistan’s lower house extending President Pervez Musharraf’s tenure, ensuring he would remain head of the military and government until at least 2007. Musharraf named Shaukat Aziz, a political novice, Prime Minister in August. Although the government ordered an inquiry into a March attack on civilians, several strikes were called (mainly in Sindh province) to protest government handling of the conflict. The Sindh provincial government failed to form a “coalition of national unity” with the seven opposition parties in an attempt to stem the tide of conflict. The minister of Sindh province resigned after violence escalated in June. U.S. President George W. Bush declared Pakistan a “major ally” in the fight against al-Qaeda and allowed Pakistan access to special benefits, including expanded foreign aid and priority delivery of military equipment.
2003 The leader of the militant Sunni organization Millat-e Islami-ye Pakistan (MIP) was assassinated in October, sparking riots in Islamabad. The government cracked down on banned Sunni and Shia militant groups and arrested their leaders. President Pervez Musharraf continued to support U.S. initiatives in the “war on terror” in neighbouring Afghanistan, a position not welcomed by many Pakistaniis.
2002 In January, the government banned five militant Islamic groups, including the Sipah-Sabaha-Pakistan and Tehrik-I-Jaffaria. Some groups reacted to the ban and to Pakistan’s support of the U.S.-led “war on terror” by attacking foreigners and Pakistani Christians, prompting the Christian community to demand protection from the government. The government responded by introducing new security measures around non-Muslim places of worship. Fighting continued between Sunnis and Shias in Sindh, despite government efforts.
2001 In August, the government of Sindh province arrested more than 200 Islamic militants in raids.
2000 Despite increasing international pressure to restore democracy, military leader Pervez Musharraf ruled out general elections or reviving the suspended Pakistan parliament within the next two years.
1999 On October 12, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was ousted from power in a bloodless military coup led by Army Chief of Staff General Pervez Musharraf.
1998 A month after the MQM left the provincial government coalition, federal Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif declared Governor’s Rule (a state of emergency) in Karachi, called out the army to quell the violence and announced the establishment of military courts for the city.
Sectarian and ethnic instability in Pakistan can be traced to the tumultuous formation of Pakistan in 1947. As a result of the partition of the Indian subcontinent into India and Pakistan, millions of Muslims migrated west to the newly formed Pakistan, primarily into the border province of Sindh, even as millions of Hindus migrated eastwards, out of Pakistan and into India. Prior to 1947, urban society in Sindh had been dominated by Hindus, with the native Muslim population primarily rural. The vacuum created by the exodus of Hindus was filled by educated Muslims from India.
Sharing culture and language, Punjabi migrants from India easily assimilated into the Pakistani Punjab. However non-Punjabi immigrants to Sindh, who came to be known as mohajirs (“migrant” or “refugee” in Arabic), had a different experience. Mohajirs had a language, culture, and social values that were different from native, largely rural Sindhis. They had been in the forefront of the struggle for an independent Pakistan and were ardent Pakistani nationalists, unlike the Sindhis, Pathans, and Punjabis who identified with their respective regions. Mohajirs soon came to be overrepresented in the media and management in the private sector. They also began to dominate Pakistan’s bureaucracy and national political scene, supporting a strong central government.
In 1971, Bengali-dominated East Pakistan separated from Pakistan, forming the state of Bangladesh. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a Sindhi, was elected Prime Minister of Pakistan the same year. Bhutto nationalized Mohajir-owned financial institutions, revised the regional quota system that had favoured them, and introduced federal governance to Pakistan. With his reforms, Mohajir dominance in Pakistan’s politics began to erode in favour of the Punjabi bureaucratic-military elite. His acession to power also strengthened Sindhi assertiveness, leading the provincial government to impose Sindhi as the language of education through the Sindh Act of 1972. Throughout Pakistan, ethnic tensions rose as regional groups in Baluchistan and rural Sindh began to assert cultural and nationalist agendas.
Chief of Army Staff General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq took control in a 1977 military coup and ruled as president of Pakistan from 1978 to 1988, with the support of right-wing Islamists. The ousted Pakistani government of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971-1977) had promoted Islam as a unifying force among disparate ethnic groups, but Zia took this policy further, promoting Islamists in the previously secular Pakistani army. Zia’s attempt to gain legitimacy coalesced with the building of close ties with the Afghan mujahedeen to improve Pakistan’s national security after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. During the 1980s, the Pakistani state developed a complex network between the Afghan mujahedeen and domestic religious groups, with a generous supply of weapons from the United States.
In 1986, the Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM), led by Altaf Hussain, began to challenge Punjabi-dominated state bodies in Sindh. From 1986 to 1988, the MQM sought a Mohajir-Sindh alliance, aligning with Benazir Bhutto’s Sindhi-dominated Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) in an effort to thwart Punjabi dominance in politics. The MQM’s first attempt at power sharing delivered few tangible improvements to Mohajir. It thus withdrew its support of the PPP government and fought the next election allied with Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League. In 1992, internal strife led to the split of the MQM, with the splinter group taking the name MQM-Haqiqi (Urdu for “authentic”).
Pakistan’s involvement in and proximity to Afghanistan fostered:
- Large-scale migration of Afghan refugees to major urban centres in Pakistan (especially Karachi), increasing ethnic tensions.
- A powerful network of militant madrassas in Pakistan, which combined weapons training and a violent, fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. The madrassas were originally established to train volunteer students (Taliban) for the war in Afghanistan.
- The free movement of Taliban and al-Qaeda affiliates in northwest Pakistan, including Northwest Frontier Province, Waziristan, and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Each area shares a border with Afghanistan, is historically independent, and is not easily controlled by the central government. The porous Afghan-Pakistani border, along with an allegiance to ethnic Pashtuns in Afghanistan, have implicated these regions in the current Afghan war.
In 2004, the Pakistani government launched a series of military operations against “high-value” al-Qaeda targets and supporters in South Waziristan, marking a significant escalation in the military’s efforts against al-Qaeda. The military operations were met with armed resistance throughout northwest Pakistan and coincided with increased U.S. military operations along the Afghan-Pakistani border. In 2007, Pakistan came under strong international criticism and was suspended from the Commonwealth after President Pervez Musharraf suspended the constitution. In December of that year, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was assassinated after returning from self-imposed exile.
Between 2009 and 2010, U.S. drone attacks on militant targets in Pakistan doubled to 118. In 2012, the Taliban’s non-lethal shooting of girls-education activist Malala Yousafzai attracted international attention.
In 2013, Pakistan experienced its first successful transition of power with the election of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the head of the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz). In 2014, the government launched another aggressive military offensive against militant groups. In 2015, foreign policy experts expressed continuing concern that Pakistan was hosting terrorist groups operating in neighbouring countries (Wall Street Journal).
From 2005 to 2009, China supplied Pakistan with 37 per cent of its arms imports. The United States provided 35 per cent. In 2009, Pakistan received its first shipment of 42 JF-17 combat aircraft from China, with outstanding orders for 300 and 36 J-10 aircraft. That year it also received 18 American F-16C aircraft. In 2010, the United States delivered 12 surveillance drones to Pakistan and approximately 15 AH-1 Cobra helicopters for spare parts.
In 2009, the United States passed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act. The United States gave Pakistan $700-million in military aid for the country’s counterinsurgency efforts. In 2010, trade in illegal arms was brisk due to poor border control and a lack of central authority in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The weapons trade was closely linked to the cross-border drug trade in Afghanistan. In 2011, U.S. military aid increased to $1.2-billion. Despite heightened tension between the two countries, the United States continued to transfer weapons to Pakistan, including one frigate and two antisubmarine warfare aircraft. In 2012, SIPRI listed Pakistan as the third largest importer of conventional weapons, up from eleventh in 2006.
By 2013, China was supplying 75.8 per cent of arms imports and the United States only 11 per cent (SIPRI). That year Pakistan inducted the last of four F-22P frigates into its navy following a $750-million deal signed with China in 2005. The final delivery of a U.S. air defence system also occurred in 2013.
In June 2014, Russia announced the end to its embargo on arms sales to Pakistan. In November 2014, the Pakistani Defence Minister confirmed that Pakistan was buying Russian MI-35 combat helicopters. Pakistan also has its own domestic conventional arms industry and imports weapons from France, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the UAE, and Ukraine. In 2014, Pakistan’s defence budget, including that of the Ministry of Defence Production, was $6.31-billion. In 2015, its defence budget grew to $7.18-billion (The Military Balance, Vol. 116, p. 279). In 2016, its defence budget increased to $7.47-billion (The Military Balance, Vol. 117, p. 319).
Reports allege that private and state-owned firms in Pakistan have been developing military drones. In September 2015, a surveillance drone that had been modified to carry a missile carried out the military’s first drone strike (Express Tribune).
Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state and is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. In November 2014, the Council on Foreign Relations stated that Pakistan had the world’s “fastest growing nuclear program.” In February 2015, Pakistan had a nuclear arsenal of approximately 100 to 120 warheads (Arms Control Association).
In August 2016, the U.S. Congress stopped the dispersal of $300-million in counterterrorism (“Coalition Support”) funds to Pakistan, citing insufficient action against the Haqqani Network (International Crisis Group). In 2016, Pakistan ordered eight submarines from China (The Military Balance, Vol 117, p.247).
Economic factors are at the heart of discontent in Baluchistan province. Despite having most of Pakistan’s natural resources, including natural gas, uranium, copper, and oil, Baluchistan is one of Pakistan’s poorest provinces, receiving, for example, only 12 per cent of the royalties from gas sales. The illegal trade in hashish, opium, and heroin funds both Taliban arms purchases and militant salaries. Drugs and arms are trafficked across the poorly monitored Afghan-Pakistan border.
The 2008 economic recession devalued the Pakistani rupee and caused the price of some staple foods to skyrocket. In recent years, however, Pakistan’s GDP growth has accelerated; according to the World Bank, the poverty rate in Pakistan fell from 34.5 per cent in 2001/2002 to 21 per cent in 2008. But armed conflict in the Federally Appointed Tribal Areas (FATA) has created serious barriers to trade and business development, particularly in the industrial sector. Female factory owners and managers have been prevented from going to work. Many businesses have been forced to shut down due to militant violence and a shortage of raw materials. November 2013 protests blocked NATO supply trucks and caused temporary disturbances to trade with Afghanistan.
Pakistan has faced severe electricity shortages, which reached crisis proportions in 2010 and 2013, when the country faced a balance-of-payments crisis. Lengthy power outages chronically stalled economic activity in the country, and the industry was plagued by such financial problems as “circular debt”: power generators could not afford the fuel to operate because their customers were not paying their bills (New York Times). Since 2013, reforms to the energy sector have led to steady improvement, according to a 2016 report by the IMF (Dawn). By April 2015, Pakistan had reduced energy subsidies from almost 2 percent of GDP to 0.7 percent of GDP (International Monetary Fund).
Improvements to the security environment in Pakistan have also enhanced opportunities for economic growth. In 2016, work on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) began with the construction of roads and energy pipelines in Pakistan’s northeast. This project is deepening economic and political ties between the two countries (Human Rights Watch). However, Baluch separatists have opposed CPEC (Deutsche Welle).
The Qatar crisis in the Gulf boosted bilateral trade between Pakistan and Qatar. Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Bahrain cut diplomatic ties with Qatar and imposed an air, land, and sea blockade after Qatar refused to sign a 13-point list that included requests such as the shutting down of Al-Jazeera and closing down of a military base in Turkey.
map: CIA Factbook