CONTEMPORARY THREATS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

Project Ploughshares’ 30th Anniversary Symposium,
9-10 November 2006
Contemporary Threats to International Peace and Security

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About this Publication
On 9-10 November 2006, Project Ploughshares celebrated its 30th anniversary with a public lecture and a full-day symposium. The lecture on 9 November was co-sponsored by Project Ploughshares, the Centre for International Governance Innovation, and the Waterloo Region Branch of the Canadian Institute for International Affairs. The symposium on 10 November consisted of two consecutive morning sessions, followed by lunch and an address, and then two consecutive afternoon sessions. Edited versions of the various presentations are included in this volume.

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Project Ploughshares
Project Ploughshares is the ecumenical peace centre of The Canadian Council of Churches, established to work with churches and related organizations, as well as governments and non-governmental organizations, in Canada and internationally, to identify, develop, and advance approaches that build peace and prevent war. Project Ploughshares is affiliated with the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Conrad Grebel University College, University of Waterloo.

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Table of Contents

Introduction 1
    John Siebert

Public Lecture
    Into the Long War: Contemporary Threats to International Peace and Security 3
        Paul Rogers

    Selections from the Question-and-Answer Session 10

PAPERS FROM THE SYMPOSIUM, CANADIAN RESPONSES TO CONTEMPORARY THREATS TO
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

Luncheon Address
    Pursuing Peace in the Horn of Africa 15
        Bethuel Kiplagat

Session One: Controlling Small Arms and Light Weapons
    Lead paper 21
        Keith Krause

    Responses 26
        Mike Perry, Ochieng’ Adala, Lynne Griffiths-Fulton

Session Two: Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons
    Lead paper 33
        Randall Forsberg

    Responses 38
        Paul Heinbecker, Jennifer Simons, Ernie Regehr

Session Three: Protecting People in Extreme Peril
    Lead paper 48
        Ochieng’ Adala on behalf of Musifisky Mwasali

    Responses 52
        Bob Lawson, Peggy Mason, John Siebert

Session Four: Responding to the Global and Canadian agendas
    The Global Agenda 59
        Paul Rogers

    The Canadian Agenda 62
        Ernie Regehr

Presenters and Respondents 64
Symposium Attendees 67
Project Ploughshares has marked its significant anniversaries with a gathering of friends and colleagues to both celebrate achievements and discuss shared work in the pursuit of peace. In 1996 the 20th anniversary conference considered demilitarization and peacebuilding in the context of changes in geo-political security following the end of the Cold War. The discussion was framed in the language of “common security,” which sets the stage for increased peace with social justice. Security and stability result from mutuality, not competition; peace must be nurtured rather than guarded; and sustainability depends on shared decision-making, not on a paradigm of control.

At the 25th anniversary commemoration, held in March 2002, Stephen Lewis spoke with vivid compassion about the global conditions that make concrete action for peace more important and urgent than ever. He related the horror of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, where 800,000 people died while the world watched and did nothing. From his position as Special UN envoy, Lewis witnessed the devastation of the AIDS pandemic on civil society in Africa. He emphasized the critical role of civil society and organizations like Project Ploughshares in building a safer and more just world. The notion of “human security” was at the fore. Securing the social, political, and economic wellbeing of people in their communities, countries, and regions provided the conceptual key to understanding and interrupting the root causes of violent conflict.

The 30th anniversary of Project Ploughshares in 2006 was an opportunity to consider once again the challenges facing the pursuit of peace. The human security language was still in use, while the US-led war on terror in the aftermath of 9/11, the quagmires in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Darfur were setting the stage for security discussions.

In Waterloo, Ontario on 9-10 November 2006, friends and colleagues from civil society, academia, and the Canadian government gathered to consider contemporary threats to peace at a public lecture followed by a day-long symposium called Canadian Responses to Contemporary Threats to International Peace and Security. The day concluded with an anniversary dinner and tribute to Ernie Regehr for his pursuit of peace over three decades—as co-founder of Project Ploughshares in 1976, as its Executive Director until 2005, and in his continuing role as Senior Policy Advisor.

This volume presents edited versions of the proceedings. We hope that this record will convey both the ideas and the passion of the participants to find ways to build peace and reduce the resort to the use of force.
The first paper, “Into the Long War: Contemporary Threats to International Peace and Security,” was presented Thursday evening by Dr. Paul Rogers from the Department of Peace Studies at Bradford University, UK. The 200 people who heard Rogers speak witnessed one of the world’s clearest and nimblest policy minds at work. The talk was followed by a lively question-and-answer session; a selection of the questions and responses is included here.

Next is an address by Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, Executive Director of Africa Peace Forum, given after the luncheon on Friday. Ambassador Kiplagat told the 80 symposium registrants about peacebuilding efforts in Africa, and explained why we should share in the hope held by Africans that violent conflicts are decreasing and democracy and development are taking hold across that continent. He also pointed to specific contributions that Ernie Regehr and Project Ploughshares, in partnership with APFO, had made to peace processes in the Horn of Africa.

The symposium consisted of four sessions: #1 Controlling Small Arms and Light Weapons, #2 Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons, #3 Protecting People in Extreme Peril, and #4 Responding to the Global and Canadian Agendas. For each of the first three sessions, we present the lead papers and brief addresses from three respondents. The format of the last session was different, with only two speakers, Paul Rogers and Ernie Regehr. We are pleased to conclude with their insightful remarks.

Not included in this volume are the many tributes to Ernie Regehr spoken at a concluding dinner attended by over 150 people. Witty, warm, and humorous words and anecdotes conveyed the impact of Ernie’s work on the pursuit of peace in this country and elsewhere. Ernie expressed thanks to many people and organizations, starting with his wife Nancy, who continues in her role as Associate Director of Project Ploughshares.

The anniversary events were organized largely by Project Ploughshares staff. They deserve thanks for this and all the work accomplished every day in the office. The anniversary celebrations were supported financially by individuals and institutions indicated in the acknowledgements. Thank you for these contributions.

Project Ploughshares benefits from the stability and experience it has acquired over 30 years. Renewal through refocusing and inevitable staff changes is always taking place. Although we have accomplished much, our work is far from complete. We celebrate this anniversary as a milestone on the journey to new and increasingly effective ways to address threats to peace.
I’d like to examine the defence and security paradigm of the United States and its allies in light of what has happened since the end of the Cold War. Are these countries adopting the right approaches or are major contemporary threats to international security being neglected? Does this context for the five years of what President Bush calls the “global war on terror” and is now being termed “The Long War Against Islamofacism” give us cause for a real rethink? Do the changes in the United States Congress in the November 2006 elections mean that the tide is turning?

Defense Secretary-designate Robert Gates was head of the CIA under President George HW Bush, and one of his successors was James Wolsey, appointed by Bill Clinton. When Wolsey went to his Senate approval hearings in 1993, he was asked how he would contrast the post-Cold War with the situation in the United States during the Cold War. And he said that he liked to put it the following way: “we have slain the dragon, but we now live in a jungle full of poisonous snakes.” And essentially this was the new world – this uncertain and rather fragile world where control had to be maintained, and there were new requirements, new forces, new methods to insure peace and security. So the jungle full of snakes has to be handled and 9/11 was an illustration of the jungle biting back.

The Drivers of Insecurity
But while we look back to the Cold War and major interstate conflicts it may be that other phenomena will be the real drivers of insecurity over the next 30 years. I’ll examine four of them.

1. Economic injustice. Heritage Park in South Africa is a major housing development about 20 miles east of Cape Town near Somerset West, which is being constructed on a 500-acre farm by developer George Hazelden. It’s about half-built now with over 1,000 people already in residence. Eventually it will be home to about 4,000 residents. It has very pleasant houses, a range of income brackets, trout streams, wildlife areas, a cricket pitch, a village church. In fact, it’s almost the epitome of a larger English village, even with some of its own high-tech industries alongside.

The key thing about Heritage Park is that the entire complex is surrounded by a 33,000-volt electrified fence. It has a private police force, about 40 strong, and you have to have pretty high security clearance to enter it if you can not prove you are a resident. The many people who work in Heritage Park as cleaners and parks people live in their own accommodations just outside the wire. In a sense, I think that Heritage Park is a metaphor for the world that we are moving into, a world of very sharp divisions in which the elite communities need to
hold onto their own. This is no critical reflection on South Africa; if anything, the South African Government is moving as far as it can to actually redress these imbalances. You can point to gated communities in many parts of the world – in the United States, quite possibly in Canada, certainly in Britain.

São Paulo in Brazil is reportedly one of the leading markets for helicopters.Apparently the really rich elites of the city, facing problems of drive-by shootings and car-nappings, prefer to commute from the rooftop heliports on high-rise buildings to their country estates by helicopter.

These examples illustrate a worldwide phenomenon. In the last 20 years, the era of economic growth has singularly failed to deliver economic justice. And what has happened is a wider division between an elite and the majority. Now, this elite is over a billion strong and enjoys a very good life. It is largely concentrated in the countries of the North Atlantic and East Asia, but there are major elites right across the world: in Brazil maybe up to 10 million, in India maybe 100 million, in China maybe 120-150 million. But the key trend is that this group, about one-fifth of the global population, is becoming more separate, year by year, from the other 5 billion or so. This is the first marker of the future.

2. The awakening of the marginalized. The second driver, which has close links with the first, is the positive development seen in many parts of the world over the past 40 years in the fields of primary education, literacy, and communications. For example, in East African countries many more children are getting at least four years of education than when I worked in Uganda nearly 40 years ago. One result is that the globalized majority on the margins are more aware of their own marginalization in a way that simply wasn’t true even in the time of colonial independence. We used to talk of the consumer society and the revolution of rising expectations. What we are facing is the revolution of frustrated expectations. It leads to the Heritage Parks, high urban crime rates, and, on occasion, very radical social movements such as the Sendero Luminoso in Peru, the Maoist rebellion in Nepal, and Naxalite rebellions in one-third of the states in India. In China, there are innumerable examples of social unrest in the rural areas, so much of the development is concentrated in the major coastal cities. I’d even suggest that, in a way, the al-Qaeda phenomenon is part of this. I believe that we are much more likely to be moving into an age of insurgencies than a clash of civilizations.

3. Global climate change. But there are two other features as well. For the first time in human history we are coming up against ecological global limits to human activity. This phenomenon has only been recognized in the last 20-25 years. The marker was the impact of fluorocarbon pollutants on the ozone layer. We saw that the human community worldwide could now have an impact on the global ecosystem. And surprisingly, partly because ozone depletion could be quite simply controlled by removing particular pollutants, it was subjected to a very quick agreement, the Montreal convention of 1987. But of course the really big issue is not ozone depletion but climate change; and climate change, we now recognize, has a major interconnection with global security.

We have to recognize the new understanding of climate change that has come about in the last 10-12 years. In the mid-1990s, when climate change was already recognized as a
developing global phenomenon, most models suggested that the impact would be felt primarily in the temperate latitudes, from northwest Europe through to Siberia and in the South as well. And it was believed that these economies could best cope with the impact of climate change. In Britain, for example, the expectation was that weather would get warmer, windier, and wetter. I live in the north of England, not far from York and the East Pennines. My wife and I have run a smallholding there for the better part of 30 years. I planted a vineyard about eight years ago and I’m currently producing my first few bottles of wine. I couldn’t have even thought about planting vines in the north of England 20 years ago.

All the indications are that climate change is speeding up. What is now reckoned likely is that world rainfall patterns are going to progressively change quite drastically, so that rainfall will move away from the tropical landmasses and towards the oceans and the polar regions. In other words, there will be a progressive drying out of the tropical landmasses where some 4.5 billion of the world’s 6.3 billion people live, the great majority of them dependent on agriculture. If this change occurs, the impact on human security and the huge increase in migration pressures will make our current problems very small beer. This issue is still largely unrecognized, partly because the climate change people do not talk enough to the international security people. Although there are other environmental issues, not the least being the very heavy concentration of energy resources in the Persian Gulf, climate change is the really big one.

4. Militarization. The final driver, inevitably, is militarization. To some extent, that still takes us back to the Cold War years when the arms race gained momentum. But while we have escaped from the sudden catastrophe of going over the nuclear abyss, we are on a slippery slope to nuclear proliferation. And we are also facing all the problems of the proliferation of other kinds of weapons. The revolution of precision guided munitions and wars against real estate is essentially hooey, because alongside it has been the revolution in air impact munitions, cluster bombs, and the rest, which actually make warfare even more devastating, as we’ve seen most recently in southern Lebanon.

The Impact of 11 September 2001
If these four phenomena work together there is the potential for a very unstable and divided world over the next 20-30 years—if there aren’t changes. But even when this kind of analysis was being developed maybe eight or 10 years ago, the first responses to these dangers were emerging. The anti-globalization campaign of the late 1990s can be seen in this light. Even at meetings of the World Economic Forum at Davos and elsewhere, many of the great and the good of the economic world were starting to admit that the free market was not delivering the kind of stability expected and so there were debt relief campaigns and all the rest at the end of the 1990s. Five or six years ago I was cautiously hopeful that new paradigms, new approaches to sustainable security, really stood a chance of being developed.

And then we had 9/11. Just a day or so after 9/11, a close friend and colleague who worked for many years in the United States, Dr. Malcolm Dando, said to me that the real problem with 9/11 in the United States was that the hawks would now do what they wanted. In the US 9/11 was a visceral blow and aroused a strong need to regain control of the jungle.
In the late 1990s, particularly in Washington, a cluster of interest groups came to the fore. We often use the term “neo-conservative” but essentially these were groups with a pretty clear agenda: to develop the New American Century. They had a mission, and I use that word advisedly—it was almost of a religious fervour. But here was the opportunity for the United States to exercise world leadership and make the world more civilized by following the American model of a free-market liberal democracy.

This idea is curiously reminiscent of the Pax Britannica. I’m reminded of a joke told to me by a Ghanaian friend 40 years ago when we were at college. He said, “You know, Paul, there’s a very good reason why the sun never set on the British Empire.” I said, “What’s that?” and he said, “Well, God didn’t trust the British in the dark.” If that joke had been cracked in 1890s London, it would have fallen on stony ground. The Victorian entrepreneurs, the people of Empire, would not have recognized its validity. And similarly, those of us who tried to say in Washington at the time that maybe the idea of a New American Century was not how the majority world saw it did not get much of a hearing.

When George W. Bush became US President in November 2000, with the help of the Supreme Court and the Florida chads, the initial expectation was that he might run a consensus presidency. But by early 2001, a strong unilateral move was clearly discerned in his opposition to the International Criminal Court, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and talks to prevent the weaponization of space. Both Dando and I, biologists by original training, were most dismayed by the virtual withdrawal from the long attempt to get a strengthened Bioweapons Convention. The 1972 Convention was very good on paper but had no teeth. And years of attempts in Geneva to strengthen it fell by the wayside because the Bush administration was not interested in seeing US biotech companies opened up to verification and inspection. By August 2001, about eight months into the Bush administration, the US was essentially going its own way and was viewed with a certain degree of unease in some European capitals. American columnist Charles Krauthammer coined the phrase “operating a benign imperium,” but it wasn’t benign for those in the majority world.

Almost inevitably, there was huge support for the US after the 9/11 atrocities. Jean-Marie Colombani in Le Monde said, “We are all Americans,” and this sentiment largely held during much of the regime termination in Afghanistan. Then between January and June 2002 the mood in Europe began to change quite perceptibly, tied to two major speeches that Bush gave early that year. The first was the State of the Union address, in which the concept of the war on terror was extended to the war against the axis of evil. From talking about a rather diffuse al-Qaeda group with Public Enemy No. 1 Osama Bin Laden and Public Enemy No. 2 Mullah Mohammad Omar, talk turned to a much wider conflict in which the axis of evil—principally Iraq, Iran, and North Korea—were countries that might be developing weapons of mass destruction and might aid terrorism. These regimes had to be terminated.

In the West Point speech a few months later, Bush put much greater emphasis on pre-emptive action by the US against those who threatened its security and, by implication, coalition and even global security. By early 2002, the talk in Washington was about terminating the Saddam Hussein regime. I vividly remember attending a conference in Washington in March 2002, and discussing Iraq with some neo-conservatives. I said rather mildly that such an attempt could be extremely dangerous and result in fighting a long-term
insurgency. One of them looked at me as if I were naïve and said, “You really don’t get it, do you, Paul?” I said, “No” and he said, “It’s really not about Iraq. If we get Iraq right, we won’t have to go for the big one, which is Iran.” This statement brings to mind the phrase, “the road to Tehran runs through Baghdad.”

I think that regime termination in Iraq, begun in March 2003, was much more about restablizing the Persian Gulf area for US interests. Incidentally, there was a simple military reason for the long delay before the US started regime termination in Iraq. Virtually the entire stock of key precision guided munitions was used up in the war in Afghanistan. During most of 2002, key US arms manufacturers were on 24/7 shifts to replenish the stocks of munitions in preparation for the war with Iraq. The question does arise about the seriousness of all the UN negotiations in 2002. They could go on at the time because the US military was not ready to go to war.

What did Washington anticipate from these US actions in Afghanistan and Iraq? It was believed that the Taliban regime would fall and that Afghanistan would then turn to state-building and development, with most of the burden of assistance falling to European countries. Afghanistan would emerge as a pro-Western country in a geo-strategically important area. There would be two American bases in Kandahar and Bagram in the longer term, but not because of any need for a major long-term military presence within Afghanistan. The development of two or three key US military bases in central Asia was important for two reasons: central Asia included the Caspian Basin oil reserves; and the US would gain a presence in the heart of Asia at a time when the one power that might cause concern in the future was China.

From statements issued by Paul Bremer and the coalition provisional authority in the first few months after the termination of the Saddam regime in Iraq, it is clear that Iraq was intended to be a pro-Western country, almost a client state, with four large US military bases, a free market, wholesale privatization of all state industries, and oil facilities opened up to foreign—including Israeli—investment and, essentially, foreign control. The Persian Gulf, which contains more than 60 per cent of the world’s oil reserves, would then be secure from a US and Western perspective. The stability of the House of Saud would not be too significant, and Iran would behave.

As for the al-Qaeda movement, it would recede. It would not end but it would have lost its base in Afghanistan, and would tend to whither away.

After Regime Change
What has happened instead? In fact al-Qaeda has been more active in the last five years than in the five years before 9/11. There were bombings in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005. There have also been two major double-bombings in Istanbul; the bombing of a Marriott Hotel and the Australian embassy in Jakarta; two major bombings in Bali; multiple bombings of Western targets in Casablanca; three major attacks in Karachi, mostly against the American consulate; the bombing of the synagogue in Djerba in northern Tunisia; the bombing of the Paradise Hotel in Kikambala and the attempt to shoot down the Israeli jet in Kenya; three sets of bombings in Sinai; the attack on the American warships in Aqaba; and
the hotel bombings in Amman. And many attacks have actually been forestalled. This movement is not fading away.

In Afghanistan, we’ve seen a major revival of the Taliban across the south of the country. While in the north and around Kabul life is more secure than it was under the Taliban, the security situation has gotten demonstrably worse in southern Afghanistan, particularly over the last year. Taliban and other militia elements are also much more entrenched in north and south Iristan in Pakistan, near the border with Afghanistan.

It’s worth noting that attempts to control opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan have failed absolutely. The crop this year is the highest on record. Three-quarters of it is refined in-country into heroin and morphine. Ten years ago, only about one-quarter of the opium poppy crop was refined in-country. So, there has been a huge increase in illicit revenues into Afghanistan, both in smuggling in the precursor chemicals used in refining and in smuggling out the hugely value-added heroin and morphine. Much of the money goes to criminal elements and warlords; much of it goes to the Taliban. Taliban local leaders can now hire paramilitaries and not rely only on their own dedicated followers.

When the Taliban regime was terminated five years ago, the key UN people said that a peacekeeping force of 30,000 troops was needed immediately. But the ISAF force was never more than 5,000 strong over the first four years. What few people have noticed is that throughout the last five years, the US military has been fighting a vicious counterinsurgency war near the Pakistan border, with up to 20,000 troops involved. There are now 40,000 foreign troops in Afghanistan: 20,000 Americans and 20,000 from the Netherlands, Britain, Canada, and other NATO countries. Much of what they do is counterinsurgency. Their role in stabilization and aiding development is being lost.

The situation in Iraq is bleak, with Iraqi and US casualties continuing to rise. Insurgency and inter-communal violence reign while al-Qaeda remains active. This situation had a direct impact on mid-term elections in the US in November 2006, but the real question is, is there going to be a resultant change in US policy in Iraq?

A New Way Forward?
The US response to 9/11 was a classic example of the control paradigm, of taming the jungle and not understanding the rainforest. In the last five years the US and its allies have imposed a military strategy on a problem which goes well beyond military and, in fact, is not amenable to military solutions. But, while I was very pessimistic immediately after 9/11 that responding to the big global problems was going to take a back seat, I’m not so pessimistic now, because, in fact, the response to 9/11 demonstrated that if you fight terror as this war on terror is being fought, things get worse. And I think that we are in a demonstrably worse position than we were five years ago as far as al-Qaeda, Iraq, and Afghanistan are concerned.

Is there a chance of a real change in attitude, even in policy, that could result in the development of a more sustainable security paradigm instead of a control paradigm? The phrase that some people use for the way that we do things at the moment is “liddism”—keeping the lid on things rather than actually exploring why the pot is boiling. I think there is
now a real chance in the next five years to rethink directions in global security. Control of the Senate by the Democratic Party is not necessarily going to speed up this process, because in Iraq the US has approached a particular problem with a very strong military response, and it’s going to be extremely difficult, although ultimately necessary, to disentangle and withdraw. The situation in Afghanistan also needs a real rethinking, but that is only likely to happen if people are really trying to think in new ways when they look at the al-Qaeda movement, its motivation and aims, and how it can be undercut at the political and socio-economic levels.

While counterterrorism actions within the law might be appropriate, we must be concerned when such tactics have resulted in the last five years in the worldwide detainment of 100,000 people without trial for varying lengths of time. At any one time, 15,000 people are being detained without trial, far more than the 400 to 500 inmates at Guantanamo. Of that 100,000, about 1,000 have been brought to trial and half of those have been acquitted. All the rest have either been detained for long periods or released without charge. Such detainments have a huge effect, particularly on Muslim communities across the Middle East.

Counterterrorism has produced high civilian casualties. Although we don’t have accurate figures for Iraq, it seems likely that between 50,000 and 200,000 civilians have been killed in the last three-and-a-half years alone. The deaths, huge numbers of injuries, and incidents of torture are covered in much greater detail in the media in the Middle East than here. What we are doing is deeply and persistently counterproductive. It seems to me, therefore, that there is an extraordinary window of opportunity over maybe the next five years in which we can actually rethink our approaches to international security, both in the short term in responding to al-Qaeda and in the longer term, looking at those global issues that I started with.

If we are going to achieve a more peaceful, stable, and just world in the next 20-30 years, the more elite, advanced economies must contribute to the sustainable development of the majority world with huge aid and assistance. Debt relief, aid, and especially trade regulations must be transformed. Our attitude towards global environmental management must be transformed. People in Britain are starting at last to think seriously, not about 10 or 20 per cent cuts in carbon emissions, but 50 to 60 per cent cuts around the world within the next two or three decades, if we are going to get a grip on climate change. And finally, inevitably, there has to be a much greater move to solve the problems of global militarization.

Although a group such as Project Ploughshares operates in a range of these areas, one problem which prevents a holistic view is that academics and activists and policy groups concentrate on particular issues like arms control and disarmament, the environment, or development. But they’re all part of one whole and we need to integrate our understanding and approaches.

Although the problems I’ve outlined can seem very depressing, there is a real possibility of optimism. The response to 9/11 has shown that our wider attitude towards global security is wrong. We now have the possibility of plotting a new course. That, I think, is a tremendously powerful inducement to work with much greater skill, in universities and NGOs such as Ploughshares and in many other institutions. If we can start to turn global relationships around in the next four or five years, then I think that the prospects for our
children and grandchildren will be much better. Otherwise we face an extremely difficult future.

Notes


Selections from the Question-and-Answer Session

Question: What opportunities for world peace exist if enemies focus on building trust and common ground?

Rogers: Twenty-five years ago it really did look as though we were facing the possibility of a global nuclear exchange. We got out of that partly by putting pressure on governments in the West, and partly through major changes in the Soviet Union. What was extraordinary was that conflict stretching over 45 years ended relatively quickly.

I went to Moscow several times in the mid-1980s and I remember a very subtle change in Soviet attitudes. In 1984-85, just before Gorbachev came in, all they talked about was matching the West at every level of armaments. In 1985-86, they began to talk about “reasonable sufficiency.” If President Reagan and British Prime Minister Thatcher had responded more quickly, the transition of the Soviet Union might have been a lot easier than it was.

The example I gave of ozone depletion is interesting because it took only two years to get a global agreement on a worldwide ban of a chemical which was widely used. If we can indicate the threats we are facing and the absolute need to work together, change could happen.

We need people with a longer-term vision. I heard former President Bill Clinton at the London Guild Hall about six months ago. Look at Al Gore and the job he is doing speaking to audiences of a thousand or more two or three times a week on climate change. One of the problems worldwide is that politicians in office rarely demonstrate wisdom at the international level.

Recognition of the extent of the problems could drive people to work much more closely together. There is scope for cooperation, especially at a revitalized United Nations. We do need more political leaders with the wisdom to take risks, because things have to be done which may have a short-term electoral disadvantage.
**Question:** What is the possibility for the world emergency service, as suggested by Hilary Benn, or a UN emergency peace service?

**Rogers:** The British Minister for Development, Hilary Benn, has suggested a world emergency service. He doesn’t have much support in the British Foreign Office or the Ministry of Defence. The idea of a permanent UN force may get more support from Britain but not as much as it should. The British armed forces, particularly the army, have embraced peacekeeping, in a way they hadn’t 15 years ago, partly as a result of activities in Croatia and Bosnia.

Another reason for a change in attitude relates to the huge problems that the British forces have in Iraq and Afghanistan. When Prime Minister Tony Blair steps down, the new PM may well pull most of the British troops out of southern Iraq. At the present time, Afghanistan is not as unpopular in Britain. But if troops are pulled from southern Iraq, there may be stronger moves within the British armed forces for more of a peacebuilding role. Just possibly there may be fertile ground for pushing the idea of stronger British support for a permanent UN force.

**Question:** What is your response to urban violence that is so extensive that there are more child soldiers in urban areas than in state conflicts?

**Rogers:** By and large, the crucial combination of urbanization and fundamental socio-economic divisions leads to gang culture and a heavy loss of life. It can also lead to radical social movements. Strong examples are the Maoists in Nepal, the Sendero Luminoso in Peru, and the Naxalites in India.

This brings me to the nature of al-Qaeda, which is also partly drawing from the margins. Now I’m not saying that the paramilitaries in al-Qaeda are the poorest of the poor—they’re usually not. But they come from the margins. Al-Qaeda supporters in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s, when the Saudi economy dipped, were almost exclusively men coming out of the schools and colleges who could not get work because they were not linked to one of the 1,000 princely families. In one way the al-Qaeda movement should be considered a symptom of a much wider trend that leads to marginalization.

The nearest historical parallel would be the movements for colonial liberation 40 to 50 years ago. There was no global movement, but different movements which sometimes linked and sometimes didn’t. I think that we are moving into an era of anti-elite actions and movements in which major urban criminality in the south is a very strong symptom. In such circumstances, charismatic leadership can rapidly develop, leading to very brutal radical social movements. Inevitably, the tendency will be to control them by using private security—and it won’t work.

**Question:** How do you view our role in Afghanistan?

**Rogers:** I can’t remember the precise figures but I think that over the last five years, the spending on development in Afghanistan has been about $80 billion US. The spending on
military operations has been more than 10 times greater. Afghanistan has got an incredibly raw deal.

Until about a year ago I thought that there was probably a case for having a much stronger stabilization force and much great aid for Afghanistan. I still thought that it might be possible for the Afghans to bring things around themselves with outside help. I'm not sure now.

US operations in east Afghanistan over the last five years have involved persistent use of very heavy firepower, which has helped to change the mood in much of the southern part of Afghanistan against foreign coalition operations. Now the British are using huge firepower to protect their own men. Instead of being involved in reconstruction, they are involved in destruction. We may now be at a point where all military operations in southern and eastern Afghanistan are going to be more and more counter-productive and ISAF forces involved in counter-insurgency, including the Canadians and the British, would be better advised to withdraw.

Next spring and summer the Taliban will be back in larger numbers and in a more sophisticated manner. They're looking at their own four- and five-year plan, aided by their own young paramilitaries who now go to Iraq to get training against American troops in urban environments and take that training back to use against ISAF forces in Afghanistan. From al-Qaeda's perspective, which is operating on a 50-100 year timescale, Iraq is producing a new generational cohort of paramilitaries who are trained against the world's best equipped army.

In Afghanistan there are going to have to be political settlements with a wide range of groups, including Taliban elements, to achieve a peaceful transition in the longer term. There will not be a return to Taliban control, but they will have to be brought in.

**Question:** How do you get the US to cooperate at the UN?

**Rogers:** The UN has a very strong record on setting possible blueprints. For example, a lot of the action that was taken on the ozone depletion came about because the UN environment program between about 1983 and 1986 was pushing for a regime that actually looked at this as a major issue and had established a framework for rapid progress.

It is worth remembering that what I’ve said about US policy is hugely dangerous to ascribe to the whole of the US body politic. There are a huge range of views within the United States. People like Nancy Pelosi are now coming to significant positions and we may well see the wider part of the American political environment becoming more politically active in relation to the UN as well. The UN needs a lot of support from other member states.

**Question:** Will the blockade at Faslane by women change England’s policy on nuclear weapons renewal?

Many of the activists in Britain who oppose Trident and arms transfers and arms sales use the legal argument that they are preventing a great crime. We've had two major examples in the last five years where people have been acquitted.
The Labour Party quite clearly wants to go ahead with Trident replacement. What on earth can Britain say to North Korea or to Iran or to Pakistan or to India, if it is now planning to have nuclear weapons for the next 50 years? A lot of anti-nuclear activists are really trying to generate a debate on this—the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament is undergoing something of a renaissance. The Scottish Catholic Bishops have come out against Trident replacement. The growth of a mass movement on this issue is possible.

**Question:** You seem optimistic about our ability to rethink current approaches to security but the US President has nothing to lose over the last two years of his term so couldn’t he undermine our efforts?

**Rogers:** The next five years are an unprecedented opportunity for rethinking. I would caution against expecting very positive moves in the United States with Bush as a weakened president. American politics, including the Democratic Party, have moved to the right. It’s going to take a lot of effort to convince the US and other countries, including Canada and Britain, to actually embrace a very different agenda.

The oil factor is hugely important in American foreign policy. One must also remember the close relationship with Israel. What Osama bin Laden wants, above all, is for George Bush to be replaced by Jeb Bush for two terms. But the point I’m trying to make is that we have the opportunity and if we miss this opportunity, we will regret it for decades.

**Question:** Is it more appropriate to deal with al-Qaeda as an organization or an ideology? And as a corollary, why do you think that there haven’t been any attacks in the US since the onset of the “war on terror”?

**Rogers:** Well, there probably have been some attempts. What was al-Qaeda intending with the 9/11 attacks? One suspects that it was to attack the enemy’s home base and show the power of the movement. But, more than that, I think that al-Qaeda wanted to draw large numbers of US ground troops into Afghanistan, and then rerun what had happened to the Soviets 20 years previously. The US military did not fall into that trap. They used a combination of Special Forces and airpower and, crucially, the re-equipping and re-arming of the Northern Alliance with Russian and Ukrainian equipment paid for by the US. In other words, they re-orientated the balance of the Afghan civil war and the end result was that the Taliban melted away. But the failure of the al-Qaeda movement to pull the US into Afghanistan has been redeemed by the coming of the US into Iraq. From that perspective the US has fallen into the trap to end all traps.

Al-Qaeda is somewhere between an ideology and a movement, more of a political revolutionary organization than a purely radical religious entity. Their short-term aims are very clear-cut: eviction of what are termed “crusader forces” from the heartland of the Islamic world, namely the Middle East. They claim that they’ve achieved that in Saudi Arabia since the Americans have withdrawn their military forces. Beyond that, al-Qaeda wants, at an early stage, the termination of the House of Saud and its replacement with a proper Islamic regime. They want the replacement of elite, pro-western regimes in countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. They support local movements in places such as
southern Thailand, and they have, against the wishes of most Palestinians, embraced the Palestinian cause. These short-term aims could take 20, 30, or 50 years.

The long-term aim of al-Qaeda is to progressively create a new kind of Islamist caliphate. The historically great Islamic Abbasid caliphate reigned from 750 to 1258, corresponding to the flowering of Arab Islamic culture. The caliphate was centred at Baghdad. What is being created now is incredibly strong propaganda about the occupation of the heartland of the greatest historic caliphate by neo-Christians and Zionist forces that are also after Islamic oil.

What could be done to undercut those short-term aims?

1. A just peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians would help a great deal.
2. There is going to have to be a military withdrawal from Iraq. While the majority of insurgents in Iraq are fighting to evict the American forces, the minority, the Jihadists from abroad, would like the Americans to stay for the next 20 or 30 years because their presence offers a greater training opportunity.
3. Better governance, respect for human rights, more equitable sharing of the wealth in the Middle East would undercut the radical movements.

**Question:** What do you think about the idea of a clash of worldviews?

**Rogers:** I do not believe in the clash of civilizations. We are likely entering an age of insurgencies. Radical movements may encourage people to fall back on different parts of their cultural, religious, and personal identities, and there could well be powerful radical movements in the Islamic world. But there are also problems of Hindu nationalism in India, and brutal versions of Maoist ideologies in Nepal, Peru, and India. There were Christian fundamentalists in the Balkans. More significant are the processes of marginalization and the nature of the movements that result. Religious identity is only one factor.

**Question:** Comment on NATO involvement in Afghanistan. What is the impact of so-called regional organizations on militarization?

**Rogers:** NATO, obviously, is an organization desperately searching for a new role. I think NATO has been looking for a new role since the end of the Cold War. From a US perspective, bringing NATO into Afghanistan was a way of sharing an increasingly difficult burden. This is the first really big occasion in which NATO has moved outside its traditional area. Quite a few people in NATO can conceive of the possibility of failure in Afghanistan inducing an utter crisis in the entire organization in the next five years.

**Question:** How has development been militarized?

**Rogers:** A lot of security sector reform is about reforming police and other forces to make them more effective in maintaining control, in maintaining the status quo. Of course, genuine development can be more easily achieved in secure, peaceful environments. But the dividing line between security sector reform as an integral part of rapid, genuine, gendered, and self-sustaining development and security sector reform as a means of maintaining the status quo and keeping dangerous urban areas quiet is very fluid. NGOs must insist that the provision of security is only acceptable when it is one part of a determined effort to improve the development prospects of the people concerned.
Luncheon Address
Pursuing Peace in the Horn of Africa
By Bethuel Kiplagat

Five or ten years ago, Ernie Regehr and some other colleagues and I paid a courtesy call on the Organization of African Unity, now the African Union. It was a Sunday afternoon and we were all feeling rather tired. We walked through the office of the Secretary-General, greeted him, and then he introduced us to his colleagues, saying, “Well, welcome here, these are my friends, these are extinguished friends.” I’m thinking that Ernie is not extinguished yet. Neither am I, although I have been retired now for some time.

First, on behalf of my colleague Ambassador Adala, Africa Peace Forum, the people of Kenya, and of the Horn of Africa, I would like to say a big, big thank you to Project Ploughshares and to Canada for the commitment, the accompaniment, and the support that you have given us for almost a decade. You have walked with us, on the very long road to peace and security in the Horn of Africa.

I am aware that there has been a bit of pessimism about the African continent—with HIV/AIDS, conflict, mismanagement, the whole lot. But those of us who have examined the last decade or so can see some signs of hope. I want to briefly paint that picture as an introduction to Africa, and then I will come specifically to the Horn and the role that Ploughshares and Canada have played in assisting us.

**Indicators of Hope**
If 10 or 15 years ago you had examined a map of Africa and pinned red flags to indicate sites of conflict, you would have been shocked to discover that 34 of the 53 countries had red flags. The whole continent was, in many ways, aflame, with conflict zones stretching from Senegal all the way to Djibouti, Mozambique, and further. Thirty-four countries were in some sort of turmoil. If we look back over the last 30-40 years, we see instability, coups, and assassinations of leaders. I was shocked to realize that 16 heads of states and governments have been assassinated in the African Continent during that time. So the picture is grim.

Now when we look back, we can say, “Well, it seems the tide is turning.” I will list only a few examples. Currently, strictly speaking, on the whole continent there is really only half a red flag, in Darfur—well a little bit into Chad and Central Africa Republic. I’m not saying that there is peace all over. The situation in Côte d'Ivoire is not yet resolved, the eastern part of Congo is unsettled, Somalia has not stabilized, and on and on—sometimes there is peace, sometimes there isn’t. When you look at the continent as a whole now, you can say that the hottest spot is Darfur. So when we look at Africa, we can say to ourselves, “Well, thank God, there is something that is actually secure.” So there is one indicator of hope.
The second indicator is the number of elections that have taken place. Between 25 and 30 countries have had multiparty elections in the last half-dozen years. These elections might not have been perfect—there might have been rigging here or there, but no one today is accepting coups as they did in the past. The only recent coup was in Mauritania, where the military took power in August 2005, and they have said that they are organizing for elections next year. Let’s hope that the elections will take place. Widespread elections are another indicator of hope.

Third, we can see the beginning of an upswing in economic development. I’m not talking about redistribution. I’m not talking of the gap between the rich and the poor, which is increasing. Our unemployment problem is massive, but we can see a positive development.

The crowning achievement is the way African leaders in 2002 sat down together and said, “We cannot go on the way we have been going. We see that the main reason why we have low indicators for development and conflict is bad governance. What are we going to do?”

So they sat down, and came up with what I consider to be a most innovative idea, the peer review of governance. I have the privilege of being a member of the first team to review countries. We examine intently every aspect of governance: the powers of the heads of state, separation of powers, human rights, women’s rights, and children’s rights. So far we have finished reviewing Ghana, Rwanda, and Kenya. These countries subjected themselves to peer review. The Kenyan report did not present a rosy picture, but it did paint an accurate picture of where things are today and, I must say, it was very, very well received. Now the country has to show how it is going to remedy the weaknesses. We are going back in six months or a year to look. This is another indicator of hope.

**Recent History in the Horn**

The Horn of Africa consists of seven countries: Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya. Together they form a regional development organization known as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), with its headquarters in Djibouti.

I met Ernie about 12-13 years ago. At that time the Horn, like the rest of Africa, was in turmoil. Ethiopia was still engaged in a civil war that would conclude with the breaking away of Eritrea. Djibouti was also engaged in civil war. In Somalia warlords were in control of the whole country. The war in northern Uganda, supported by Sudan, was at its peak.

War raged in Sudan. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A) were in complete control of the three provinces of southern Sudan, except for three or four towns held by the government. The SPLM/A had begun to make incursions into northern Sudan and had started fighting in eastern Sudan. We also had information that they were moving west into Darfur.

The war in Darfur originated with southern Sudan and its leaders. The SPLM/A were supporting the movement of marginalized communities (and by the way, the SPLM/A coined the word “marginalization”). Now, the international community, particularly the
western world, looks at that war as a religious war, but when we did our analysis of the actual conflict we said, “No, this is not a religious war. This is very close to a racial war. People of Arab origins who speak Arabic are discriminating against the marginalized people of African origin.” When you looked at the actual conflict, even during the time of the SPLA, there were many Muslim soldiers fighting with the SPLA.

**APFO and Ploughshares at Work in the Horn**

In 1993 a group under the umbrella of the All Africa Conference of Churches was just beginning and we met with Ernie Regehr to discuss how Ploughshares could be of assistance to us. The first help that Ernie provided was to give us our name: Africa Peace Forum. That name was born in Canada, not in Kenya. We sat down together and said, “What should we call ourselves? Should we call ourselves Pan-African peace movement? And Ernie, after listening, said, “I think Africa Peace Forum would be the most appropriate.” So I want to say we are like a grandson or maybe granddaughter and Ernie has to look after us, and of course as he gets older, we will look after him. So that is the first direct contribution that Ernie made to us.

**Control of small arms.** Over time, the whole idea of small arms began to emerge. We didn’t know that this was something that we ought to grapple with, but in conferences and meetings which Ernie and I attended, the idea of management and control of small arms came up.

While I was attending a conference in Canada, Ernie graciously organized a luncheon with the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Briefed by Ernie, I talked to the Minister and said, “Can you help us with the problem of small arms in Kenya and in the Horn of Africa?” The Minister said, “I would be quite interested. Please talk to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Kenya. If my colleague is interested, if he would like any help from us, we would be ready to consider it.” So I flew back home and said to the Minister, “Greetings from your colleague in Canada. By the way, he would be prepared and ready to assist you in any area, particularly on small arms.” He looked at me and said, “Yeah, we would be interested.”

Later I had a telephone call that the Kenyan Ministry was setting up a working group to prepare for a conference to write a declaration. Before the conference Ernie and a Norwegian expert were invited to Nairobi to meet with the Minister. They prepared the declaration. The Minister called a conference, and to outrageous surprise, nine or ten Ministers of Foreign Affairs came to Nairobi for a conference on small arms. After three days they all signed the document that Ernie and a Norwegian colleague and the Kenyans had prepared and that became the Nairobi Declaration.

So, Canadians have a lot to do with the Nairobi Declaration and the Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (RECSA) that arose from the declaration. Eleven countries are involved in the centre, which is being developed as fast as possible. This whole idea came through cooperation and cost very little money. Work coming out of the Nairobi Declaration has an impact on the whole region and is the most advanced in Africa. Internationally, the Nairobi Declaration is seen as a good example of cooperation among countries in the management of small arms. Both Ploughshares and APFO can take credit for this result.
Prohibition of anti-personnel landmines. As the war continued in Sudan, Ernie was preparing for a conference on landmines. At a meeting we discussed landmines, and I thought, ‘Now what shall we do about it?’ Since I was so deeply engaged with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, I went and saw John Garang. I said, “John, why do you continue using landmines? Don’t you think this is destructive to you?” I had picked up the idea that you don’t actually gain by using these landmines; if anything it’s the opposite. So I was able to insert that idea, which came from contact with Ernie.

After a time, John called me back and said, “Well, that is a very interesting idea.” Because he was going to be traveling in Europe, I said to him, “John, while you are in Europe, why don’t you make a unilateral declaration about stopping the use of anti-personnel landmines in Sudan while the war is going on?” He didn’t say anything before he left. I heard his statement over the radio. He surprised everybody, and the diplomats in Nairobi thought, “Well, this is just a joke. How can you trust rebel leaders?”

When he came back, I met him and said, “Thank you very much, this was really wonderful. But, John, nobody will believe you, unless you come out and endorse your idea.” So, a few weeks later he came back and said, “Here is the resolution.” So again I said, “John, yes, but this is just on paper.”

A week or two later, a military guy arrived in my office and said, “I have been sent by our chairman [Garang]. He asked me to come, and you are now the chairman of the board of an organization we are starting called OSIL [Operation Save Innocent Lives–Sudan], and we want to deal with the problem of landmines.” I said, “But you are not a registered organization.” He said, “We know we’re not registered, but we are starting one with you.”

So I gave them a desk in a small office, which was supported by Ploughshares, and I said, “Start here.” And so we started, and nobody could believe that while the war was going on, there was a whole program for mine awareness and the removal and mapping of landmines in southern Sudan. Because we were doing that, the government of Sudan also came on board. I am pleased to say that the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement was the first non-state actor to sign the Geneva Protocol on Landmines. Again, Ploughshares can list this achievement as a contribution to peace in the Horn.

Peace processes for Sudan and Somalia. While APFO was particularly engaged with the Sudanese, Ploughshares and the Canadian government supported us, a very small NGO that was trying to get all the parties in Sudan to continue with the peace process. There were many drawbacks, but we were able to convince the SPLM and the government of Sudan that the best option was to carry on with the war, but to take the talks seriously. And they did. I must thank God and thank you because, on 9 January 2005, the Sudanese signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. I’m not saying everything is perfect, but change has taken place.

There are many Somali refugees in Kenya, and APFO kept considering what we could do to help. An opportunity came when I was asked by my government and IGAD to be the special envoy to negotiate the peace process among the Somalis. More than 300 Somali
delegates met in Nairobi for 24 months, and I was their father, their mother, their brother, their grandfather, tending to them in every sense of that word.

I must confess that there were times when I was very discouraged and disappointed with the international community. We were struggling with this peace process and often we ran short of resources. One morning when I went to the office where we were meeting, Somalis came to me and said, “Oh, we had no breakfast this morning.” So I thought, well, maybe there’s a power shortage, and I didn’t take any notice. About 2 o’clock, another group came and said, “How are you, Chairman? You know, we had no lunch.” I began to get a bit worried. So I saw the director of the centre and said, “What is going on?” He told me, “I’m sorry, you are in such a big debt, and we cannot pay our suppliers, so there is no food for the delegates.”

I rang other hotels, and they had also stopped feeding the Somali delegates. So I called an emergency meeting of the leadership and said, “What should we do? We’d better close the meeting. We cannot carry on.” They said, “No. We will starve, we will share whatever little we have, but peace is important.” For the next six weeks they were able to feed themselves and assist each other until help came. I kept on begging and crying to Canadians, Americans, anyone I could think of, but support was slow to come. And so I learned that some of us who believe in a peace have to make greater sacrifices and work much harder. Do not believe governments when they say, “We have made peace a top priority.” You have to work hard to reach that goal.

The road ahead. In the Horn of Africa, we can see some signs of hope for Uganda with the talks that are going on in Juba with the Lord’s Resistance Army. There are many problems, but the latest information we had was that things were slowly progressing. I’m sorry about Somalia, on which we spent a lot of money and a lot of time and where the situation is very precarious. They could slide into another conflict which would produce thousands and thousands of refugees in Kenya. Anyone who has ever been inside the theatre of conflicts cannot come back and be the same again. I have been inside in Mozambique, in Uganda, in Sudan, and in Somalia, and I tell you, when you look at the people, when you look at what has happened to them, you cannot go and eat and sleep and say, “Well, this is not my problem.” It is the problem of all of us.

We always like telling stories in Africa, so let me finish with a story from Mozambique that was retold by the secretary-general of the All Africa Conference of Churches. This is the story of a married couple who were being bothered by rats all over the place. They decided to do something about the rats, not by using poison but by putting a trap in the loft of the house. A rat came along and saw this thing and saw that it was a danger. So the rat went away and met with the chicken. He told the chicken, “You know, there is some danger up in the raft of this house. I was wondering whether you and I could work together to deal with it.” The chicken responded, “That’s nothing to do with me,” and left. So the rat was still concerned about this trap and met with the pig. He said, “You know, there is something up there. Can we work together to see what we can do?” The pig said, “Really, this is nothing to do with me,” and left. Then the rat met a cow, and the cow said the same thing.

Later, the lady of the house went up to the loft and found that a snake had gotten into the trap. She took hold of the trap and the snake bit her. She was in great pain and suffering, and the family and neighbours tried to treat her, but her heart deteriorated. In Africa, you make
soup to boost the person’s system, and so someone slaughtered the chicken and made soup for the lady, but her health deteriorated further and distant visitors came to offer assistance. Now, in Africa, just like here, you must offer your guests food. So someone slaughtered the pig, and the visitors were fed. Despite all this attention the poor lady died. Hundreds of people came to the burial service, and of course they had to be fed. What else could be done? The cow was killed to feed the whole group.

The only creature who escaped death was the rat. The moral of the story is, let’s not look at a problem out there and say, “This is not my problem,” because if you do not deal with it, it will become your problem, and you may go the same way as the chicken, the pig, and the cow. So please try and be the rat.
Ken Epps and I actually worked together on a project many years ago on the conventional arms trade for the Department of Foreign Affairs and I have also known Ernie Regehr since the late 1980s when he worked on issues of the Arms Trade Register. That of course leads you to the conclusion that I am Canadian. I am. And I’m very glad to be back here and speaking to this audience today about an issue that I have spent a good deal of my time over the past decade working on: the interface of policy and academic considerations.

Overview
What I want to do today is to give an overview of some of the key issues that we should be concerned about with respect to small arms and light weapons and maybe, at the end of the discussions, not so much reflections on Canada’s position but some reflections on what states should be doing and what we as individuals and advocates should be doing. Maybe in the discussion we can talk a little more about specific policy roles for now and perhaps in the future.

More than 300,000 people are killed each year from small arms and light weapons and, of course, many more thousands are permanently injured or disabled. These people are killed in both conflict and non-conflict contexts, and small arms are the weapon of choice for armed groups, for paramilitaries, for criminal groups, and for most actors that are engaged in violent exchanges. In recent wars, small arms have accounted for between 60 and 90 per cent, depending on the war, of the direct conflict deaths. And of course in non-violence settings, small arms are the vector for violence, for homicide, for suicide, and for other kinds of violent interchanges between people. So, the arms themselves are important as an element of our broader understanding of human insecurity and armed violence.

In some cases, the levels of violence that we witness in so-called peacetime urban settings, such as in Rio de Janeiro, are actually higher than the levels that we see in some contemporary war zones. To give you another dramatic statistic, the life expectancy of males born in Colombia in 2002 is reduced by more than three years by the results of the risks of armed violence. In South Africa, homicides are the leading cause of death for men between 15 and 21 years of age.

What’s a little puzzling is how long it took for this issue to get onto the international agenda. Small arms have been described by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan as weapons of mass destruction in slow motion, but it really wasn’t until the 1990s that people started to take this
issue seriously through a formal diplomatic process at the United Nations and through a whole host of multilateral initiatives that were pursued within the UN and in other contexts.

I’m not going to talk about that process. Instead I want to say a few words about what we know and don’t know about armed violence, and then try to analyze the kinds of measures that we currently see and say how I think things are going to move forward over the next few years and where we might find some useful points to advance this agenda. I’m also going to say a few things about the difference or the distinction between traditional multilateralism and global public policy. If we are going to effectively tackle armed violence and small arms issues, we need to shift from traditional multilateral diplomacy, including that focused on the UN, and really think about them as a public policy challenge. We need to learn from people in the environmental sector, the public health sector, and elsewhere how to treat armed violence like any other public policy issue problem.

Costs of Armed Violence

What do we actually know about the costs of armed violence? There are about 640 million small arms and light weapons in circulation, roughly one for every ten persons on the planet, but the distribution of these weapons is extremely uneven both geographically and demographically, and in terms of who or what institutions hold them. About 50 to 60 per cent of the world’s small arms are in civilian hands. Only about 35 per cent are held by armed forces, three to five per cent by the police and other state institutions, and a very small percentage, maybe up to one per cent, by non-state armed groups. This last number is responsible for much of the destructiveness in such wars as the one in Sierra Leone and those in Southeast Asia. So a small percentage of these weapons might be responsible for a vastly disproportionate number of victims.

I can’t continue with these figures without mentioning that our neighbour to the south has the highest concentration of weapons in the world. There are about 260 million small arms in the United States, or about 40 per cent of the global total. If the rest of the world were as heavily armed as the Americas, there would be about five billion small arms and light weapons around the world. This unique situation has a tremendous impact on how the international response to this problem has been framed.

Leaving aside the US, weapons are still unevenly distributed among countries. There are about 25 weapons per hundred people in places such as Finland and Canada. There might be fewer than 10 weapons per hundred people in a place such as Brazil, which is one of the countries that is most affected by armed violence. This tells us that there is no really simple or straightforward link between the availability and misuse of weapons. We need to think very hard about the circumstances in which weapons are used violently, and when they are simply sitting or being used for legitimate or possibly legitimate purposes.

As I said earlier, the annual human toll of violent weapon use is extremely high, and in fact the 300,000 I quoted earlier is probably low. When we look more closely at the statistics, we realize that Brazil, Colombia, South Africa, and the United States account for something like 100,000 deaths. Now this could mean one of two things: those are incredibly violent places or, as I suspect, we’re not counting very well in much of the rest of the world, and the real
toll of victims is much higher. One of our key challenges is to try to understand exactly how violence is distributed.

I also want to say a word about conflict deaths because many of you might be familiar with the work of Andy Mack and the Human Security Report, which I think paints a fairly rosy picture, even though I think that it is correct in noting the decline in major armed conflicts and is probably also correct in seeing a decline in the number of direct victims—of battle deaths—in those armed conflicts. But I think that it is really a bit misleading as an analysis of what’s going on there today. When it is stated that about three million people have died in the last five or six years in the Democratic Republic of Congo, more than 90 per cent of those deaths are attributed to indirect causes. Only about 10 per cent of those people died violently by being shot, but all of them are victims of the war. It doesn’t really matter if they were shot or died of malnutrition or other preventable diseases because their village had been destroyed and they fled into the bush or to a refugee camp. And I think our calculus of the human security consequence of armed violence has to include not just the people who are shot in war but also all of the indirect victims of these conflicts.

These chilling facts can be used to draw our first lesson: small arms is not one problem, but a cluster of problems that are only vaguely related. If landmines are like the ozone hole, then small arms are like climate change. There isn’t only one problem and the solutions won’t be found in some individual treaty that somehow will allow us to master or control this issue. Solutions depend on location; on whether the problem is one of urban violence, or post-conflict disarmament, or stockpile management, or security. So it’s really a very large issue area rather than a single issue. Parenthetically, I’d also say that the yearly total of deaths due to small arms is at least ten times greater than the number of victims of anti-personnel landmines, and yet we probably receive one-tenth of the attention and the money to deal with the problem.

First-Generation Measures

How is the international community responding? I’m going to draw a very broad contrast between two categories of measures. The first I’m going to call first-generation approaches to the problem of small arms; these grew out of the traditional arms control/disarmament optics that many of us brought to the issue. We focused on supply-side measures and on the weapons themselves: we thought about controlling exports and putting in place codes of conduct; we worried about brokering and about marking and tracing weapons. This was a fruitful approach and it dominated the international and UN agendas for probably the first four or five years as an issue. It gave rise to several positive developments, including an international instrument to mark and trace weapons internationally and the first steps towards international regulation of arms brokering. Peggy Mason chaired an expert group on this issue a few years ago, and another group will meet in the fall. I don’t think we need two expert groups to learn more about the problem, but we do need a second expert group to galvanize political will towards international negotiations.

Among the most important developments in recent years are the 2006 UN resolution to start a process of negotiation on an arms trade treaty, and the Control Arms Campaign in support of that goal. The search for an arms trade treaty represented an innovative fusion of the
work and activities of NGOs, starting with the Óscar Arias Foundation and some of its laureates, with the interests of more than 40 states that have endorsed an arms trade treaty. I think that this example of the way that NGOs and governments have worked in parallel and together is going to set an important standard in judging future progress. More lobbying was done by the Control Arms Campaign than by the British government to get that resolution passed. But they worked very closely together and maintained an open channel of communication. As well, not surprisingly, the British government provided some of the funding for the campaign.

Second-Generation Measures
Second-generation attempts to deal with the small arms problem are probably more important and thornier because those of us who come out of an arms control or disarmament background have so much to learn from the development, humanitarian, public health, and crimes control communities. When you start to talk about second-generation measures, you shift your focus to the demand-side of the equation, to what drives people to seek and to hold, use, or misuse weapons—whether for personal or community security or with criminal and violent intent. Many programs now focus on the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) post-conflict context; security sector reform and small arms; and armed violence prevention and reduction in connection with public health. I will talk briefly about DDR and security sector reform.

**DDR.** The example of DDR shows just how difficult it is to go from a simple observation about what needs to be done to practical and effective programs. One of the lessons of the wars in Central America in the 1980s was that if combatants are not disarmed after conflicts end, extremely high levels of social and political violence persist. The number of people who now die of armed violence in Guatemala—approximately 6,000 or 8,000 a year—is not much lower than the number of people who were killed each year during the conflict. From a human security perspective, the situation might even be worse, because violence is now much more random than the war violence, which at least was structured and had certain primitive rules. The Guatemala story is also true in El Salvador and other countries across the world. So we have to take seriously the necessity to disarm after conflicts and to provide some kind of process of demobilization and reintegration. However, programs to get combatants to give their weapons back turned out to be a lot more complicated in practice than anticipated, for a number of reasons. I want to talk about only three here.

First, what is the impact on the community when you set up a system of rewards and incentives that effectively provides benefits for the people who took up arms and went to war, and nothing for the people who chose at great personal risk to stand aside and not get involved? So, the first dilemma is: how do you deal with both getting the weapons out of circulation and not creating this image that people are being rewarded for having gone to war and fighting?

Second, how do you negotiate with ex-combatants in situations where the armed groups are extremely fluid, the number of fighters is unknown, their command and control structure is unknown, the quality and kind of weapons they had is unknown, the location of the
weapons is unknown, and expectations about what should be returned are unestablished? These problems are being confronted in Southern Sudan right now. The situation is extremely difficult and the first steps towards DDR that have been taken are not altogether successful.

The third dilemma is, perhaps, more important than the other two. The number of people that carry weapons and actually do the fighting is only a small proportion of the people associated with the armed group. How do you design effective DDR programs especially for women and children who have been associated with fighting forces but might not have actually carried a gun? They have nothing to turn in for benefits that are being offered, such as micro-credit or training, but they too have been affected very severely by the conflict. This problem can only be addressed by learning from other communities, in particular the development community, which has faced similar dilemmas when doing large-scale programming in a village, whether to provide education, or training, or opportunities to one specific group.

Security sector reform. I now want to speak briefly about security sector reform. It is possible to be left with the impression that people who engage in security sector reform might not recognize where power lies in these situations. In fact we do recognize that there are very serious dilemmas and even dangers in working to reform the security sector to provide better training for the police forces so that they respect concepts such as the UN basic principles on the use of firearms. We also recognize that engaging in civilian disarmament in a repressive state is not necessarily a good idea and isn’t going to win you the respect of the people whom you are trying to help. These dilemmas are very practically presented each day. But coming to this point does not represent a militarization of the development discourse; it represents a simple recognition that sustainable development is not going to be achieved unless there is sustainable security at the same time. And building sustainable security requires an equal partnership between security and development communities, each with its own institution, bureaucracy, ideas, and, in many cases, competing interests that need to be overcome.

The Way Forward
What do these different examples mean for the programs that are undertaken and the policies that are pursued? First, multilateral processes—in particular the UN system and other kinds of multilateral negotiations—are much better suited to dealing with what I call first-generation measures. Perhaps the UN is the right venue to deal with arms brokering, in which negotiated, harmonized regulations involving all the major world players are necessarily part of any effective solution. Multilateral processes might also work for the arms trade and a few other similar issues.

But most of the important issues that we undertake or should undertake don’t require this kind of full-scale major multilateral activity. My views are influenced by my environment in Geneva. In fact the perception in Geneva, headquarters of the major humanitarian agencies, is that controlling arms is a problem that needs to be dealt with on the ground, in the field—one country, one village, one district at a time. Real gains in reducing or preventing armed
violence can be achieved through the development of practical programs that don’t require a UN conference.

I don’t think the inability to come up with a final document at the Small Arms Review Conference in New York last summer stops us from doing anything. It certainly shouldn’t stop the momentum towards reducing the human toll from armed violence. It certainly shouldn’t stop governments from developing innovative programs that draw on their development and humanitarian communities. That non-success doesn’t make the problem go away. We need to move on from the lessons and the limitations of traditional multi-lateral diplomacy and develop new, flexible, and often non-traditional approaches.

Canada has in the past played a leading role in non-traditional diplomacy. The Ottawa Process and the Ottawa Treaty are hallmarks of that kind of approach. Many other governments, such as the Swiss, the Dutch, and the Norwegian, also recognize that they don’t need to focus on centralized top-down multilateralism to advance their own public policy issues and their own vision of the world. I think that the challenge for the next five years is to move beyond the first-generation traditional peace-and-security approach to small arms to envision a problem of armed violence. By talking with the humanitarian, development, public health, and justice communities, we can develop practical programs that might actually reduce the human toll of armed violence.

Responses

#1: Mike Perry

I bring congratulations from all the members of the Mine Action and Small Arms Team at Foreign Affairs. It’s wonderful to be here with friends from Ploughshares and other organizations, and to be here with Keith. Our team at Foreign Affairs is very much looking forward to our continued work with Project Ploughshares.

Working with Ploughshares and all members of civil society is very important to Foreign Affairs in furthering its work, especially the agenda to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects. We’ve enjoyed an excellent partnership with civil society in our work to date, and encourage its continuation, especially given the unique role that we recognize civil society plays in implementing the Programme of Action on the ground. We also see that civil society brings policy expertise to issues related to the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.

I am thankful for the opportunity to provide some insight into Canada’s current policies on the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons and perhaps lay the groundwork for some future action.

In hearing Keith’s remarks today and in reviewing his paper I was certainly heartened to see Canada’s efforts on the small arms and light weapons file positively recognized. We are proud to be recognized as a leading country in combating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. Canada now has five or six areas of priority, which flow from the UN
Programme of Action, the instrument that was negotiated on consensus by some 130 countries in 2001. The Programme of Action is not a legally binding instrument or a treaty under international law, but rather a catalogue of commitments by states to take action at the international, regional, and national levels to combat the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons.

Canada has the following priorities in controlling small arms:

- **transfer controls**—strengthening the global regulatory framework governing arms transfers, including brokering, to combat the illicit flow of small arms and light weapons, while respecting the legitimate interests of firearms owners, producers, brokers, and retailers.

- **national regulation of civilian possession**—encouraging states to establish appropriate minimum criteria for the lawful possession and use of small arms.

- **appropriate use of small arms and light weapons by state officials and security agents**—steps and measures that can be undertaken to ensure that these firearms are not misused. Developing nations might look at instances when firearms used for work could then provide an alternative source of income after hours and beyond their jobs or official capacity. Canada supports full compliance in adopting the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.

- **stockpile management and disposal**—not only ensuring that stocks are secure and safe but also tightening regulations so that arms in stockpiles don’t end up in the illicit trade. Stockpiles must not pose a risk to the community by, for example, being built too close to a school, as we have seen in the past. We are encouraging countries to adopt best practices in stockpile management and the safe disposal of stocks that are declared surplus.

- **reducing demand for small arms and light weapons**—looking at research and analysis on what causes people to need to, or perceive a need to, acquire small arms for illicit purposes. And there is a development aspect here. Can the demand be addressed by anti-poverty measures, health care initiatives, or social programs? What issues are challenging or redefining stereotyped roles of masculinity? Is there a gender identity dimension to possessing or misusing firearms? This very complex issue requires a multidisciplinary exploration of the root causes of such a demand.

- **cooperation and assistance**—how best to help and provide funding for the concrete issues on the ground, and to countries that need assistance to fully implement the UN Programme of Action and the commitments that are contained in that document.

I would like to briefly discuss the Arms Trade Treaty. Canada is a proud co-sponsor of the Arms Trade Treaty resolution that was just passed at First Committee at the UN in New York last month. Canada supports in principle the negotiation of an Arms Trade Treaty that prevents the flow of arms into conflict zones.
In First Committee every year there is a resolution known as the Omnibus Resolution, which tries to capture the main events of the past year on small arms and light weapons. The big issue this year was the continuation of the follow-up process at the global level. One of the results of the Review Conference was that, without agreement on an outcome document, there was no agreement to follow-up at the global level by continuing to meet. As it has in the past, Canada co-sponsored the Omnibus Resolution. The resolution passed, and there will be another Biennial Meeting of States to review and strengthen implementation of the Programme of Action scheduled no later than 2008.

We in Canada have proposed that an informal meeting be held next summer to examine transfer controls, global principles, and consensus on those principles. The meeting would take a broader approach to look at issues like implementation of transfer controls and how we match needs with resources, and will share best practices and lessons learned on that issue. My director Earl Turcotte is currently in Geneva at the Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, where he is gauging states’ support for the meeting. We’ve had very positive responses from Ploughshares and Ambassador Adala, to whom we spoke at First Committee.

What should states be doing? I think we have to focus on implementation of the UN Programme of Action, the guiding document that continues to be in effect regardless of the non-success of the Review Conference. The commitments contained in the Programme of Action are very good and there is a lot that states need to implement. The PoA brings a level of international consensus that can’t be underestimated. Framing implementation in the PoA is very helpful, especially in finding ways forward.

We need to engage at all levels in combating the illicit trade in small arms, implementing the PoA, and reflecting Canada’s priorities. At the international level, we’re trying to make sure that work is done and that occasions or international meetings are maximized. We hope that hosting the proposed informal meeting next summer in Geneva will help at the working level to prepare and make the next Biennial Meeting of States more effective. I know that Keith mentioned in his paper that it would help to have a more useful and parallel process, but we’re trying to avoid creating a “parallel” process. What we’re trying to develop is a process that complements the Biennial Meetings with global meetings to make them more effective.

All kinds of activities and actions are going on at the regional level and they need to be supported. For example, in June the ECOWAS countries of West Africa agreed to a very broad, extensive, and legally binding convention for its member states. At the national level, a big issue right now is resource mobilization. How do we have full implementation of the Programme of Action and have states take on those complex endeavours without providing assistance, technical know-how, lessons learned, and financial resources? The two hands go together.

And finally there’s action at the community level. I think this level is where many of the public policy initiatives that Keith mentioned will be realized and where the development angle can play into addressing the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons on the ground. Many of you will know that the OECD DAC (the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) recently approved small
arms and light weapons programming and assistance as Official Development Assistance (ODA). So countries can claim as Official Development Assistance small arms and light weapons programming and assistance to countries, and incorporating armed violence reduction strategies into the national development plans of states—something that Canada has been advocating.

We see second-generation measures, to use Keith’s terms, at all these levels. And I would make a plea that all four levels work in concert to have the maximum effect. I know that on the mines action and small arms scene for Canada, we’ll continue to work on all levels and to engage in both policy and programming to help address the humanitarian impact of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.

#2: Ochieng’ Adala

Let me join the previous speaker in complimenting Keith for his brilliant research and a paper well presented. I find lots to agree with Keith on this paper except one or two points, based on perception rather than difference on facts. I think he’s got all the facts correct.

Keith correctly points out that little was known about the full scope and nature of the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons until the 1990s. It is not surprising, therefore, as we deliberate on the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons and strive to know more of the dynamics of these tools of everyday violence, that negative interventions are beginning to emerge. Some of these are deliberately put forward and are clearly meant to derail multilateral efforts addressing the pressing issues related to small arms and light weapons—issues such as social and economic hopes, human rights, and international humanitarian law, which are very special considerations of small arms and light weapons. It also comes through clearly in Keith’s presentation that small arms and light weapons affect communities differently in different regions and different parts of the world. Consequently, efforts to reduce small arms proliferation and misuse will fit uneasily into traditional categories or concepts of formal multilateral efforts with the emphasis on state-to-state negotiations of international instruments that are also legally binding. We’ve got to put these at the back of our minds.

The Nairobi Declaration regime that spans the subregion of the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa has chosen second-generation measures in tackling key challenges of small arms and light weapons. The focus is more on the demand side of the equation and political problem-solving and pragmatic measures than on the formal, multilateral, negotiated, diplomatic solutions. Nevertheless, I see an interconnection between the first-generation measures, which address supply, and the second-generation measures in both the Nairobi Declaration and the UN process. The Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol cover at great length the issues of marking, tracing and record-keeping, brokering, stockpile management, and, significantly, export, import, and transit of small arms and light weapons. These first-generation measures are raised alongside second-generation measures like DDR, security sector reform, civilian possession and national regulation, and armed violence prevention and reduction programs.
My sense is that strong support for traditional multilateralism and the UN conference and Programme of Action came from a number of key African states. Keith mentioned Mali, Kenya, Mozambique, and South Africa. My perception is that South Africa was not one of the key supporters, but one of the blockers. The key African champions of the Arms Trade Treaty and the Programme of Action were Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, with support from a few other countries.

The UN process proved very uncongenial for nongovernmental organization participation, but only as far as free access to the conference hall was concerned. The problem was the rules of procedure which provided for consensus. When one or two countries objected to the participation of NGOs, the chair had no alternative. I think that NGOs have had a great influence on the progress and in the discussions at the United Nations, both at the PrepCom and at the Review Conference. Close to 25 countries, Canada included, incorporated nongovernmental organizations into their delegations. The International Action Network on Small Arms came out with very pertinent analysis during the meetings. These timely and highly appreciated comments were passed on to member states and helped them to shape their participation and their contribution. So, apart from the limited access, the influence of the nongovernmental organizations was tremendous.

Nongovernmental organizations successfully lobbied for the Arms Trade Treaty draft resolution in October and collected more than 116 co-sponsors for the draft resolution. Let me congratulate Canada for having come in as one of those co-sponsors, even if belatedly. Canada is influential in reaching Commonwealth countries and other countries within the subregion.

#3: Lynne Griffiths-Fulton

I’d like to join my colleagues in again thanking Keith for his excellent overview of where we are now and how we work in the future in the next phase of controlling small arms and light weapons. The paper will be very useful to the Canadian NGO and small arms community as we continue to work on this issue.

I’d like to focus my comments on the continued policy challenges and on some recommendations for further action. Keith has outlined a very good framework of first-generation and second-generation measures to help us to understand how the small arms issue has been treated to date. Certainly the focus of the UN Programme of Action process has been on multilateral arms control, and demand-related issues have been secondary. But I would suggest that both first-generation and second-generation measures must be taken into consideration when seeking to deal in a comprehensive manner with the problem.

Organizations like Ploughshares, which have been working on this issue since it emerged on the international agenda, recognize that controlling the supply of small arms will not ultimately solve the problem. Dealing with what fuels the demand for guns—the socioeconomic, cultural, and political conditions—as well as mopping up the existing pool of weapons and controlling new supplies may require different approaches, different actors,
and varying levels of resources. The link between small arms control and development has been pushed by NGOs in the past and appears to have more traction with states now.

However, I would argue that we should not now move into a phase where the greater part of the international community’s attention is on the demand part of the equation. Supply-side measures such as marking and tracing, brokering, transfer controls, and stockpile management will continue to need more work from both states and civil society. The fact that a resolution to begin negotiations towards an international Arms Trade Treaty was agreed at the UN First Committee this fall and passed by a majority of states illustrates the continued traction of supply-side issues. Civil society and government partnerships must continue to move these issues forward.

The overwhelming approval of the Arms Trade Treaty was due in large part to the extensive lobbying efforts of civil society organizations that camped out at the UN and lobbied governments during the month-long process. All those who have been part of the effort to move that process towards an Arms Trade Treaty forward understand how much more work is still required to achieve the actual treaty. What is needed now is continued scrutiny by both states and NGOs to follow and influence the mandated UN Secretary-General’s survey of member states in 2007 and the work of the Group of Governmental Experts, slated to begin in 2008. If the momentum is maintained and the schedule pursued, there still remains the formidable task of pressing for treaty negotiations that could lead to a document that truly reflects the arms transfer obligations of states under international law.

Other supply-side norms will continue to be developed. Existing processes of marking and tracing, brokering, ammunition, and national regulation will need more work by both state and civil society in the coming years. This is obvious when we look at regional arms control agreements. As Ambassador Adala pointed out, in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa we have an example of a politically binding agreement, the Nairobi Declaration, which has since been further strengthened by the creation of the Nairobi Protocol, which is legally binding. Although all Nairobi Declaration signatory states have signed this protocol, not all have ratified it or done the work that is needed to fully implement it.

Through Project Ploughshares’ work with the Africa Peace Forum (APFO), we have found that delays in implementation of these agreements can be attributed in large part to both a lack of awareness at the governmental level about the very existence of the agreement and a general lack of resources and technical expertise. I am very pleased to hear Mike suggest that states step up to the plate to ensure that these regional agreements are fully implemented. It is crucial that resources are mobilized to ensure that states actually live up to their commitments and that these agreements are not just words on paper.

It is certainly the case that second-generation measures are receiving more attention at the international level, but there is some hesitancy on the part of development agencies and organizations to see small arms as a development issue. In part this stems from the perception that already limited resources will be going towards security in the traditional state-centred sense rather than to poverty reduction and should therefore be dealt with by other departments and organizations. However, recognition of the link between reducing armed violence and development is growing. Project Ploughshares is currently working with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) to provide examples of how small
arms have an impact on development and explore how controlling and dealing with the proliferation and misuse of small arms can and should be integrated into development programs. Other countries such as the UK, Switzerland, and Norway provide helpful examples on how this can actually be done.

One of the recommendations in Keith’s paper was for more research on the impact of armed violence on development and the lessons learned from existing armed violence reduction programs. That’s a very welcome and helpful suggestion, one that perhaps the Canadian Government would examine and provide resources for civil society. Project Ploughshares, NGO colleagues in Canada, and our partners overseas are calling for this very kind of research as well as for the opportunities to share the results. We are aware of recent examples of sharing of expertise and it is clear that there would be significant benefits in replicating such initiatives.

An early challenge we have found in our current work with CIDA is to encourage a corporate culture within government and civil society that will foster integration of small arms reduction and control with development programming. Fundamental to such a culture is a shared recognition that small arms reductions can contribute to development and that development can be key to reducing small arms demand. The Millennium Declaration at the World Summit in September 2005 and the 2006 General Assembly resolution that linked development and small arms indicate that there is political will on the part of many governments. We are hopeful that over time, small arms and violence reduction measures will be incorporated into national peacebuilding and development programs.

I’d like to stress, as my colleague Ambassador Adala did, that the contribution that NGOs can and have made in keeping the issues of arms proliferation and misuse on the international agenda is one that should not be underestimated. Around the globe, NGOs are engaged and working at all levels: in policy development, research and analysis, DDR, community-based control projects, etc. However, as with the landmines issue, it will be necessary to continue to foster civil society-government partnerships.

Of course, small arms reduction is not purely a multilateral arms control issue. It’s part of the human security paradigm to free people from fear and want. For too long, people around the globe have been suffering from the ready availability and misuse of these weapons. Reducing or eliminating the suffering will be achieved by increasing our joint efforts and ensuring a comprehensive strategy that puts equal emphasis on both first- and second-generation measures in the future.
Thank you very much. It was a great honour for me to be invited to be one of the speakers at the 30th anniversary symposium. I was very happy that I could accept because I am a tremendous admirer of Project Ploughshares. I think they’ve done an enormous amount of good work on a practically nonexistent budget, and I wish we could all do so well.

I was asked to talk about nuclear disarmament, and the short paper I gave out to the respondents is called “Nuclear Disarmament Interrupted.” I’m going to look at why we’re not there, how far we’ve gotten, and what might be done to resume the process and eventually reach the goal.

**Early Success**

I think that one of the reasons that we are having a hard time with nuclear disarmament today is our partial success. I don’t think that we stop often enough to recognize and take credit for areas where NGOs and grassroots peace groups really have made a significant difference. Nuclear disarmament is one of those.

The first big success came in the late 1980s with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the treaty banning all intermediate-range nuclear forces from the US and Russia—all missiles with a range between 500 and 5,000 miles. This is the first treaty that actually banned a whole category, a rather broad category of nuclear weapons. Of course it was a product of North American and European antinuclear movements, and of the fact that the Reagan administration kept demanding concessions, which they thought Gorbachev would never make and he kept on agreeing to them, so they got hoist by their own petard.

Then the START I treaty was completed under President Bush Sr. It is the first treaty that provided for cuts in strategic intercontinental nuclear weapons, not just ceilings. Those cuts were implemented between 1990 and 1999. START I made a significant contribution, in part because that treaty was verified, all the reductions were observed, and the weapons that were reduced had to be destroyed, and that was observed, and so on. It was a very solid beginning that was intended to be followed by START II and START III.

The next big steps, and in my mind, the most important so far, were reciprocal, unilateral actions by President Bush Sr. and Gorbachev that were taken in 1991 to completely eliminate what were then called tactical nuclear weapons. [The mutual declarations were not and are not subject to verification, and implementation is incomplete.] There were an estimated 10,000 of these on the US side, and 6,000 on the Russian side. They were scattered.
among the ground forces, air forces, and naval forces of both countries, both at home and all over the world, wherever the forces were. Their purpose was to make nuclear war inevitable if there were another war like World War II that involved the USA and Russia or the great powers. The nuclear war-fighting theory went that, because it would be impossible to fight such a war without its going nuclear, we would never have such a war. It was an extremely dangerous nuclear tripwire, like a nuclear sword of Damocles hanging over our heads and saying, “You know, if you cross this line, everything gets destroyed.” Well, completely eliminating these weapons significantly reduced the risk of a nuclear war by accident or miscalculation or loss of control, in addition to just reducing the numbers of deployed nuclear weapons on the two sides.

Gradually in the 1990s, all of the existing nuclear powers—the USA, Russia, Britain, France, and China—imposed either a moratorium or a permanent ban on nuclear weapon tests. Both Britain and France reduced their nuclear arsenals. The United States, which had been the main country to continue to develop new types of nuclear warheads and new types of delivery systems, stopped. The people in Los Alamos started working on environmental issues because they were quickly going out of business. There were no plans for refurbishing facilities for producing nuclear warheads. In fact the main activity was dismantling them. And, finally, the START II treaty was negotiated, which provided for further cuts in US and Russian weapons, but was really a kind of bridge to what was foreseen as a START III treaty that would bring each side down to maybe 1,500 strategic nuclear weapons and no tactical weapons.

By the mid-1990s we had gone from 50,000 US and Russian nuclear weapons to about 20,000. Still, it was a big cut. There was less risk of an inadvertent escalation into nuclear war. There was no new development and testing and production of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. In other words, all the goals of the nuclear freeze movement in the United States in the early 1980s—to stop testing, development, and production of new warheads and delivery vehicles as a first step towards deep cuts and eventual elimination—had in fact been achieved.

**Advances Stalled**

Then suddenly in 1996, all bets were off. That was the year that the UN passed and adopted for the first time a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which was eventually signed by nearly every country in the world and was immediately ratified by many countries. However, the United States did not ratify the treaty. The control of the Senate passed into Republican hands. Jesse Helms became the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Jesse Helms didn’t like arms control treaties and didn’t like disarmament. So we stopped having any in the United States. Because of Jesse Helms, the United States did not ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

In 1998 India and Pakistan tested their nuclear warheads. I personally think that if the United States had ratified the CTBT, it could well have prevented the nuclear tests in those two countries from ever happening. Russia was definitely planning to ratify the treaty and China had said it would if the United States did. Virtually every country, outside of India and Israel, would have been on board to go forward with this treaty. I think that the
environment that supported an end to testing was slowly but consistently moving towards nuclear disarmament.

There’s no doubt in my mind that a key to India’s motivation to get nuclear weapons has been the failure of the existing nuclear weapon powers to make good on their commitment to nuclear disarmament, and their continued treatment of nuclear weapons as a useful instrument of international policy and a source of influence in the international system. If India had seen that going away, I think that there’s a very good chance that they would have held off, waiting for further developments.

Jesse Helms also prevented the ratification in the United States of the START II treaty, which was ratified in Russia with considerable difficulty. Because the United States did not ratify, there was no way to go forward to the much more profound and meaningful START III treaty.

The Administration of George W. Bush

Then we had the election of George Bush Jr. Most people focus on his administration’s bad deeds in the area of the Iraq War, civil liberties, the Patriot Act, and the environment. Let me tell you the record on arms control. I bet that no one is aware of how many arms control treaties they have reversed, blocked, or undermined. They withdrew from the ABM treaty. They developed a missile defence that they have deployed even though they have publicly acknowledged that it doesn’t work; we have a nonfunctioning defence against a nonexistent threat. They’re using the missile defence program as a research vehicle for developing weapons that will be placed in space. The United States is the only country that has such a program, and that’s the reason that the US alone has blocked international negotiations to ban weapons in space. These include weapons that could conceivably attack both satellites of every kind—communications, observation, warnings—and also targets on the ground.

In the fall of 2001, Bush sent a representative to the UN to a meeting of the group that was negotiating some means of verifying the biological weapon ban, which was adopted in 1972 on a multilateral/unilateral basis with no means of verification. The US representative said, “We don’t think these means of verifying will work effectively; therefore, we oppose having any verification protocol.” Because that group worked by consensus, one nation could stop the work of the group. The other representatives to that meeting were so angry that the US was unilaterally sabotaging six years of very hard work that looked close to fruition that they refused to close the meeting. They just adjourned it as still ongoing until the next year, because they thought that by the next year the US would have come to its senses. But in 2002 the US representative came back and said, “No, we haven’t changed our mind,” so they gave up. And that protocol was down the drain.

At the same time we are watching a war on Iraq because of possible biological weapon programs. But we don’t want to have any verification system that would find out if countries have biological weapon systems or not. We also have undermined the verification components of the ban on chemical weapons on the grounds that they could compromise industrial secrets of major corporations. So it’s more important not to take any chances with the proprietary interests of corporations than to verify the chemical weapons ban.
In late 2000, the United States had been prepared to sign a treaty with North Korea that banned any tests or exports of missiles with a range over 300 miles. The treaty also banned the export of experts who would help Iran or Pakistan or anyone else develop longer-range missiles. In October 2000 Madeleine Albright went to Pyongyang to celebrate the agreement that the two sides had made. Clinton was supposed to go to Pyongyang in November to actually sign the treaty. Because the election was in doubt, Clinton decided it wasn’t a good time to leave the country and go to North Korea, and so the treaty wasn’t signed.

When Bush came in, instead of following up, as Colin Powell had planned to do, the new administration had a policy review that took until June, and then it announced a new policy on North Korea and missiles. Their policy stated that banning testing and exports that can be observed from the outside was not good enough. North Korea had to destroy any missiles with a range of over 300 miles that it might have built already. To be sure that the North Koreans had destroyed the missiles and weren’t building any more, the US wanted the right to request observation of any site in North Korea, including all military facilities. In exchange they offered no incentives but said that after North Korea had complied with these new terms, they would consider some economic and political incentives. Basically that was the end of the treaty to end North Korea’s missile testing, which of course is the justification for the US missile defence program.

On a trip to Seoul in 2001, I had a meeting with the head of the international relations department of the South Korean equivalent of the CIA, who said to me that, in his opinion, Bush wasn’t negotiating with North Korea on the missile treaty because he wanted to be able to give contracts to his cronies in the missile defence industry. He also said that destruction of the stockpiles of missiles and on-site inspection should have been part of the negotiations between North and South Korea. In parallel with the US missile-testing negotiations, North and South Korea had started talking about confidence-building measures on the ground, including pulling back troops from the front lines, exchange of military observers, and other things. So the impression I got from the South Koreans I met on two trips there in 2001 was that what the United States was doing was directly in opposition to the security interests of South Korea.

Bush then negotiated a new strategic treaty with Russia that provided for no verification and no destruction. It did require that the numbers of strategic intercontinental weapons on active duty on the two sides come down to about 2,200, which was certainly a positive step. But it didn’t require that any of the weapons taken off active duty be destroyed. And in fact, the Bush budget included money to keep many of the weapons that were withdrawn from active service in excellent condition so they could be returned to service at short notice. In addition, this treaty didn’t go into effect for 10 years, it didn’t have any intermediate goals, and it expired the day after it went into effect, so that all the withdrawn weapons could be reintroduced the next day.

The Bush administration also had money in its budget for reinvigorating the US nuclear weapon development and production infrastructure, including new money for people at Los Alamos to study new types of nuclear warheads, build a new facility for the production of tritium, build a new facility for the assembly of nuclear warheads, and decrease the amount of time it would take to go from a decision to hold an underground nuclear weapon test to
the actual conducting of the test. In the *Nuclear Posture Review*, which was submitted to Congress 31 December 2001, there was the threat to use nuclear weapons against countries that don’t have nuclear weapons, which violates many longstanding US international commitments, and a threat to use nuclear weapons first, which is part of the same package.

People in Canada who follow war and peace issues know the extent to which the United States has been an obstruction to international efforts for peace and disarmament over the course of the Bush administration. I hope that the results of the mid-term congressional election spell the beginning of the end of this stance by the United States. I do think that Bush Jr. and his neo-cons have been far to the right of any previous Republican administration in opposing international treaties to mutually limit and reduce in a verifiable way threatening arms that provoke suspicion and mistrust. The collapse of the NPT regime is a very real danger because of the Bush decision to backtrack on the 2000 NPT commitments. The Bush position was foreshadowed in an article that Condoleezza Rice published in *Foreign Affairs* magazine in January 2000, in which she called for the US to withdraw from the ABM treaty, not join the Kyoto treaty, and generally avoid all international commitments, on the grounds that they did not really prevent proliferation and bad guys kept doing bad things, but they did tie the hands of the US; in other words, it’s better to have no limits than to have US limits.

**Mobilizing Support for Nuclear Disarmament**

In view of this horrendous policy, why has it been so difficult to mobilize a new movement for nuclear disarmament comparable to the popular movements of the 1980s? As someone who has tried very hard over the past five years to mobilize grassroots concern, without success, I’ve thought about this a lot, and I can only conclude that, besides the fact that we have too many things to worry about that need the attention of liberal voices, with the Iraq War the first among them, the actual degree of success of the previous nuclear disarmament efforts has made the public less concerned. The danger in 2006 is not as great as the danger in 1986. Because tactical and strategic weapons have been reduced, testing has been suspended, and the Cold War has ended—with the subsequent improvement in the relationships between Russia and the West, Russia and Europe, Russia and the US, the US and China, and Russia and China—there is less risk of nuclear war today than there was 20 years ago.

But the policies of the Bush Jr. administration have done more than anything else could to promote nuclear proliferation by threatening other countries, by setting an example of not fulfilling our commitments, by threatening to use nuclear weapons against countries that don’t have nuclear weapons, and so on. So the danger is not just the remaining 10,000 nuclear weapons each in the United States and Russia but nuclear proliferation. If nothing changes, in my opinion, we are likely to see more proliferation.

To people on the street this very dangerous situation doesn’t seem dangerous enough to warrant their investing time in a grassroots activist campaign. In the face of the evidence that this kind of popular opposition is not going to be mobilized, it makes sense to aim for an incisive and effective elite campaign. Like many other public policy issues, this issue involves a certain amount of knowledge. Such campaigns are often successful. Even though it may
take a while to convince members of Congress and Members of Parliament and their aides and the executive branch, usually sensible arguments win eventually.

Responses

#1: Paul Heinbecker

I agree largely with the presentation we’ve just heard. I think the US midterm election result really is very good news. The stabilizers in the American public and the American political system have started to take effect, and we’re seeing the United States bringing itself back to something more proximal to the rest of the world.

At the same time, I want to offer the following experience. I made a presentation at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in January 2006, and a large number of participants were from the nuclear business and they were very committed people. I noted that I had been listening to all American voices, with the exception of one French voice, which was even more enthusiastic about nuclear weapons. I commented that maybe it was time for one voice from the rest of the world who wasn’t so sure about this, and I can tell you that I was regarded decidedly as the skunk at the picnic.

So I want to warn you that, midterm elections notwithstanding, Darth Cheney is still the vice-president and foreign policy is still an area where the president has enormous capability to act. I don’t know if this is true, but I read that the legislation that allowed the war in Iraq didn’t specify Iraq. According to Seymour Hersh, the episode in Lebanon was supposed to be a precursor to an attack on Iran, and the attack on Iran is already unfolding, with the CIA already there. While it’s helpful that the Senate is in Democratic hands, not all Democrats are equally sensitive to the issue of nuclear weapons. In addition, their capacity to act is somewhat constrained. Certainly they cannot ratify treaties that the administration does not bring before them.

The other good news is that a lot of polls in the United States suggest that Americans in general do support multilateral cooperation, do want to have the United States participating in the international system, don’t want to be going it alone, don’t see themselves as an empire, and generally don’t buy the neo-con vision.

As well, according to Paul Meyer, Canada’s Ambassador for Disarmament, there have been modest improvements in the function of the intergovernmental arms control machinery in the last year or so. It is functioning at nowhere near the level that is necessary, but better than the year before. And he’s inclined to give it a little bit of time before he talks about finding innovative new ways forward. By the way, in Washington that evokes the landmines treaty process. Whether we can actually do anything in this area is another question.

There’s a lot of bad news. The North Korean situation is bad news. The fact that Iranian President Ahmadinejad got a lot of traction at the UN is bad news. Basically he went to the UN and stood in front of the gathered multitudes there (mostly third secretaries from delegations but that’s what everyone gets except for the people who speak on the first
morning) and said, “Why should we do what the Security Council says? Who are these five permanent members, these leftovers from the Second World War? They’re not living up to their obligations. Why do they think they can sit in judgment on us? We don’t have to listen to them. We, the 187 other members, don’t have to listen to them.” Whatever we think of Iran and Ahmadinejad, of what he says about Israelis, and of his nuclear weapons, that kind of talk is getting traction in the UN.

If Seymour Hersh is right and the attack on Iran is unfolding, we are heading into World War III. This is a war that can’t be won. It would be catastrophically stupid. It would become impossible for Americans to walk down any street in any city outside of the United States and maybe not even there. I find it hard to understand why the people who are making these decisions can’t envision this result, but we’ve just had six years of experience that they can’t see it.

The India-US agreement is also a problem. It’s the National Rifle Association approach to nuclear weapons: “nuclear weapons don’t kill people, countries kill people.” It’s okay for India to have them because it’s a democracy, and it hasn’t proliferated except within India, and it hasn’t behaved like North Korea or Pakistan.

I’m not sure, but I think the nuclear renaissance is bad news. We’re doing a project at the Centre for International Governance Innovation on the nuclear renaissance. Our judgment so far is that nuclear energy is coming back as an energy source, partly under the pressure of climate change considerations. Let me just read some statistics that are quite dramatic. By 2030 (that’s not long from now), the number of automobiles in the world will increase by 50 per cent and 25 per cent of Canadian climate change comes from the transportation sector. In 20 years the world will consume 40 per cent more oil than it does today. These timeframes are already practically decided. By 2100 global climate temperatures are expected to rise by about 6 degrees Celsius. That change isn’t programmed, but the trend is already apparent.

India already has a flourishing and largely indigenous nuclear power program and by some estimates expects to have 20,000 megawatts of nuclear capacity online by 2020. China has apparently announced plans to build 30 new reactors by 2020. A study by former CIA director John Deutch indicated that by 2050 China could have the equivalent of 200 full-scale nuclear plants. A Chinese team of scientists has said that there will be 300,000 gigawatts of nuclear output by that time, which is almost the total nuclear output in the world today. Egypt, Vietnam, and others must also be considered.

If the Iranians proceed with their program, there will be reactions from the Saudis and the Turks. If the Iranians get nuclear weapons, the Turks are unlikely to sit there “exposed.” Such a Turkish reaction would make the European Union react, or at least make it nervous. Obviously the domino effect could be quite significant.

In our project we take the view that this renaissance is happening. In countries like Sweden, Germany, and the United Kingdom, there’s talk about going back to nuclear energy. Many other countries might avail themselves of this energy source. But all of the old problems haven’t been resolved: what to do with the waste and what to do about nuclear safety. And there are also some new problems: for example, what to do about people who are close to
giving themselves nuclear weapons and how to keep the surplus weapons and the nuclear materials that have been developed out of terrorists’ hands. We’re aware that the arms control and disarmament regime is faltering and could fail. In our judgment, if it failed it could fail catastrophically. We hope to make some suggestions to the international community about how it might respond in a way that ensures its own future.

#2: Jennifer Allen Simons

Congratulations to Project Ploughshares for their 30 years of success. Ernie and Murray Thomson must be very proud of their foresight in establishing it 30 years ago.

It seems as though there has never been a darker time for raising the subject of the prohibition of nuclear weapons. Randy has assured us that the danger is lower than it was in the mid-1980s; however, my view is that, absurd as it may seem, the MAD (mutual assured destruction) nuclear doctrine, though terrifying, kept us reasonably safe. The nuclear dangers that we face now are different, but they are just as formidable.

The Cold War prevented the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons we are now facing—the possibility that another 20 or 30 states could follow North Korea’s exit from the NPT and develop nuclear weapons. There is also the loss of “strategic stability,” which acted as a rein for the Cold War superpowers’ ambitions; this means that there is no longer a formidable deterrent to US political and military ambitions, a situation of which the US has taken advantage. US rejection of treaties, flouting of international law, and unilateral actions are endangering world peace and could bring about the very conflagration the US is purportedly—or misguidedly—seeking to prevent. A grim example is the invasion of Iraq in the guise of fighting terrorism, which has transformed Iraq into a breeding ground for terrorists.

The prospects for nuclear disarmament, in the current political environment, are virtually nonexistent. The only glimmer of light on the near horizon is the new Democratic majority in both houses and a possible return to multilateralism. However, the possibilities for change in the US nuclear posture, in the short term, remain unlikely and, until the next Presidential election, do not hold any promise for nuclear disarmament. The US needs some rare and powerful being for President, and currently there is no candidate in sight capable of taking on the militarist factions in Washington, and the military-industrial complex.

The nuclear danger, with all its new complexities, has risen to a level not seen since the Cold War.

Although the US refused to ratify the CTBT prior to the end of the NPT 2000 Review Conference, the conference ended on a high note and provided some hope for the disarmament and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. All states party to the Treaty committed to Article VI of the NPT, the 13 steps to the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

Since then, most of what has taken place in the area of nuclear issues is a long list of negatives:
• continuing refusal by the US to ratify the CTBT;
• US recommitment to nuclear weapons;
• US unilateral withdrawal from the ABM treaty, which resulted in the death of the START treaties;
• the development of a globally controversial Ballistic Missile Defense System that also created the avenue for space weaponization and a consequent new arms race;
• increasing unilateralism by the US, which we hope will be halted now;
• the US Nuclear Posture Review;
• the US National Security Strategies and preventive war policy;
• US threats to use nuclear weapons if attacked or threatened with attack, with Russia and France following suit;
• September 11 and the rise of terrorism with its possible nuclear dangers;
• the Iraq fiasco;
• endeavours by Iran, Libya, and North Korea to acquire nuclear weapons, with the help of the Pakistani (Khan) network of clandestine nuclear technology transfers;
• North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT and its recent nuclear weapons test;
• the US-India nuclear technology transfer cooperation agreement;
• US plans to replace its entire nuclear arsenal with new kinds of nuclear warheads, which involves the development of 30 to 80 plutonium pits (plutonium warhead cores) a year by 2012—the first pits for stockpile since 1949 and an upgrade that would extend the life of the nuclear arsenal for another 30 years.1

So it goes.

In October 2002, at the 57th session at the First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, the disarmament agenda—to quote a highly placed UN official—was “highjacked” by the introduction of concepts of “managed proliferation,” “controlled proliferation,” and “counterproliferation.” The following NPT conference in 2005 ended in failure, and the UN World Summit in 2005 was notable for its absence of disarmament recommendations.

The report of the Swedish government-initiated Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission2 is a welcome contribution to the current bleak nuclear disarmament environment. It is hoped that the recommendations will give new life to the disarmament agenda.

The fundamental and crucial point in the Report, around which the whole area of disarmament pivots, is Hans Blix’s statement in relation to the CTBT and the ban on the production of fissile materials. It is relevant to all aspects of nuclear disarmament: “The US has the decisive leverage. If it takes the lead, the world is likely to follow. If it does not take the lead, there could be more nuclear tests and new nuclear arms races” (p. 15).

I’m not as optimistic as Randy in believing that Democrats in power in the Congress and the Presidency of the United States will work for nuclear disarmament. Both the Republicans and the Democrats have moved to the right. A change in US leadership may lead to some disarmament and arms control measures but will it lead to a prohibition of nuclear weapons?
There was a brief but heady moment for the world community that emanated from Reykjavik in 1986. “What the hell use will ABMs [anti-ballistic missiles] or anything else be if we eliminate nuclear weapons?” said a possibly testy Ronald Reagan. “What the hell use will SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative—Star Wars] be if we eliminate nuclear weapons?” countered a possibly equally testy Mikhail Gorbachev.3

Between them, they decided to eliminate all nuclear weapons within 10 years. However, the US administration quickly backtracked from Reagan’s statements. Although subsequent, important breakthroughs in major disarmament issues were achieved, and were continued under the first President Bush, nuclear arsenals remained targeted and on high alert in sufficient numbers to eliminate everybody in the world.

There have been several realistic opportunities to inhibit these weapons. But the world continues to sleepwalk through these wakeup calls. The first came after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Later, the success of the NPT Review Conference, at which Israel was identified for the first time as a state possessing nuclear weapons, could have been, in part, a response to the new South Asia “wakeup” call. I was walking out of the Main Committee Room at the UN with another member of the Canadian delegation and a member of the US delegation. My Canadian colleague, referring to the 13 steps in Article VI, said, “How are you going to deal with this decision in Washington?” (or words to that effect) and the American Ambassador laughed and said, “They’re just words.”

No American president has been sufficiently interested or powerful to overcome the military factions in the administration, Congress, and Senate, and the military-industrial complex. In the 1950s, President Eisenhower was talked out of halting nuclear tests by Livermore and Los Alamos laboratories representatives. His famous public warning about the military-industrial complex was left to his farewell speech: “In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.”4 This quote has been used as praise, but actually is a testament to Eisenhower’s failure to combat a budding threat of which he was aware.

In 1977, Democratic President Jimmy Carter was successful in halting the development of the original B-1 Bomber and, in 1978, in reversing the US decision to deploy the “neutron bomb.” However, “Harold Agnew, Los Alamos Laboratory director, and Roger Baetzel, his Livermore Lab counterpart, each took pride in claiming that they had personally talked President Carter out of a Comprehensive Test Ban.”5

The last Democratic President, Bill Clinton, weakened by Republican control of both Houses, refused to ratify the CTBT and also signed “Presidential Decision Directive 60,” which “recommitted the U.S. to nuclear weapons as the cornerstone of its national security and reaffirmed the U.S. policies of threatened first use and threatened massive retaliation.” This directive “further institutionalized a policy shift that… nuclear weapons… be used to ‘deter’ a range of threats including… nuclear… chemical and biological weapons.”6

Except for Reagan, a Republican, no American president has considered (at least publicly) the abolition of nuclear weapons. According to former US Secretary of State George Shultz, Reagan advocated “the elimination of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles,” in agreement
with Gorbachev. Shultz writes in his memoirs that he “was criticized for not ‘stopping’ Ronald Reagan from offering to eliminate nuclear weapons.” “Meanwhile,” he says, “a storm was brewing over at…the Pentagon.” “Face it,” he says to Poindexter, “the president’s aim is to eliminate nuclear weapons…. When he gets an idea in his head, it stays there…. Elimination of all nuclear weapons. He won’t go away from those ideas.” “In truth,” he says, “the world was not ready for Reagan’s boldness…. We were even contemplating a notion of a world without nuclear weapons.” Here was a US Republican president who had a vision and, though in control of the nuclear button, lacked the control to disconnect it.

According to History Professor Lawrence Wittner, President Reagan and the US administration were influenced by the global anti-war movement. And Chernobyl, it is said, was the dominant factor which influenced Gorbachev’s support for nuclear disarmament.

This information is possibly helpful in seeking ways to revive the nuclear disarmament agenda. Naturally a renaissance of anti-nuclear public opinion and activism is preferable to the alternative of a major nuclear explosion.

But perhaps a prohibition of nuclear weapons will be achieved only when there has been a disastrous nuclear incident in the United States. However, if the incident is an attack, then the US will retaliate and this will also provide justification for US retention of nuclear weapons. If the US used nuclear weapons unilaterally on, for example, Iran, it would be rationalized as necessary for the survival of the American people or some such justification and would not necessarily bring about any change in the status quo. So only a national nuclear accident involving weapons or a power plant that caused multiple deaths and endangered American lives would provide a catalyst for abolition. This unlikely event is, of course, not to be wished for.

A change in administration in the US will not necessarily mean a change in US weapons policy. No US President, with the exception of Reagan in his moment, has reversed the nuclear weapons policy. Yet without US leadership, nuclear prohibition will not become a reality.

So, where do we go from here?

How can we reinvigorate the anti-nuclear movement and raise its influence to the level of the 1980s? It’s an absolute necessity to breathe new life into the disarmament agenda, to return disarmament to the political discourse in the UN and in all countries—their parliaments, governments, and civil society. However, when faced with the excellent recommendations in the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission Report, I am left with the question, how does one follow through? The recommendations all require acceptance by the nuclear weapon states. Any reform at the UN Security Council—enlargement of the number of permanent members to truly represent the global community, and the removal of the veto—would undoubtedly be vetoed by the five veto-wielding permanent members.

At the global policy level, in the short term, we can hope for expressions of confidence and support for the NPT in order to encourage the non-nuclear weapon states to remain in and abide by the Treaty; encouragement to North Korea to return to the NPT; an inducement to India, Pakistan, and Israel to become parties to the treaty; a focus on confidence-building
measures such as ratification of the CTBT; a Treaty on Negative Security Assurances; agreement on issues of compliance, verification, and enforcement; agreement on a program of work at the Conference on Disarmament so that a treaty banning fissile materials, for one thing, can be negotiated.

The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission Report, if widely disseminated and supported, could provide the fundamental material for worldwide education and a renaissance of an anti-nuclear movement that would influence the political realm to work towards a world without nuclear weapons. The Simons Foundation is continuing support of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission in promoting the Report and its recommendations.

#3: Ernie Regehr

This panel has painted a rather grim and, sadly, accurate picture of the kind of challenges that we face. And I’d thought I’d pick up where Jennifer ended off in identifying some ways to respond. I want to focus in particular on the ways a country like Canada and other like-minded countries can respond to these extraordinary challenges.

The Canadian situation is in a state of flux. We’re not entirely certain what the arms control/disarmament agenda of the new government is and will be. There have been some positive indications of continuity, and of course the tradition in Canada is of substantial continuity across Liberal and Conservative governments.

Canada has stated broad support for the international nuclear disarmament agenda as it was articulated at the 1995 conference of the permanent extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and in 2000 in the 13 steps for disarmament. This agenda really addresses nuclear weapons at three levels. There are actions and proposals to prevent the deliberate or accidental use of nuclear weapons, like taking weapons off high alert status. Other recommendations are designed to prevent expansion of existing nuclear arsenals and to promote reductions—for example, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and a treaty to ban the production of fissile materials for weapon purposes. The third set aims to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials into military and weapons uses. Canada has been an activist in international forums like the Non-Proliferation Review Conferences in promoting that agenda.

We don’t test nuclear weapons and we don’t have a finger on any button, so there are limits to what middle powers like Canada can do, but they can do something. Paul Meyer, currently Canada’s Ambassador to the United Nations and Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, represents an honourable tradition of activism within the disarmament machinery. In the fall of 2005 the Canadian delegation took leadership in the formulation of a resolution at the UN General Assembly to deal with the four issues that have been deadlocked in the Conference on Disarmament for a decade:

- the prevention of an arms race in outer space;
- negotiation on a global ban on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes;
the reaffirmation by nuclear powers of a legal obligation to provide negative security assurances—that is, assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used or threatened to be used against non-nuclear weapon states;
• and a broader, relevant disarmament agenda.

It’s a scandal of considerable proportion that the CD has been unable for a decade to approve a program of work and enter into any negotiations on any of these issues, although it is the one multilateral forum that is designed specifically to negotiate treaties.

The proposed General Assembly resolution simply proposed that those four issues on which the CD is stalemated by the consensus rule be put before the General Assembly, in which a majority vote prevails, with an ad hoc committee on each of the four to start the multilateral discussion and actually do something substantive. This draft resolution, sponsored by Canada, Brazil, Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand, and Sweden, was never tabled in the UN. There was extraordinary and sharp reaction from certain capitals and the resolution was withdrawn—but with the agreement of the forthcoming presidents of the CD that they would hold substantive discussions at informal meetings on each one of these issues. The CD has now held substantive discussions. The proposed resolution was an innovative stimulation to action.

But, of course, we don’t need another 10 years of discussions in informal settings. We need negotiation. The threat of movement into the General Assembly is not going to be put forward this year. The charitable interpretation is that the CD has acted more effectively in the past year and members, including Canada, want to give it another year to act. The less charitable interpretation is that there is a different mood and attitude in Ottawa. What a government like Canada’s brings to multilateral settings is activism and goodwill and the ability to act with other countries in coalitions to move an issue along politically. One of my key worries is whether that activism is going to survive. One role of civil society is to provide ongoing encouragement for that kind of activity.

I want to identify a couple of issues in which I think Canada and like-minded states can make some progress. Agreements in both 1995 and 2000 committed all states, including nuclear weapon states, to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security policies. The consequences of such a doctrinal shift include downgrading the readiness level of nuclear weapons and limiting the circumstances under which a potential use can be made in directives to nuclear planners, and the people who operate the missile systems. While Canada is a strong advocate of the abolition of nuclear weapons, it is also a signatory to a NATO nuclear doctrine that says that nuclear weapons are essential for our security for the foreseeable future.

Successive Canadian diplomats have spoken openly of the intolerability of this fundamental contradiction. During Lloyd Axworthy’s tenure as Foreign Affairs Minister Canada made some ambitious but ultimately unsuccessful efforts to have the NATO doctrine rewritten. Canada must deal with this fundamental problem, but not alone. It must work with likeminded NATO partners like Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway. This issue needs to be reactivated because, increasingly, countries like India are expressing extraordinary disdain for what they call “Canadian self-righteousness” on the nuclear question. Anyone who raises
the issue of the Indian nuclear program with an Indian ambassador to Canada will get an
earful, to the effect that we are in North America amongst friends, surrounded by oceans,
and with very pious views about the abolition of nuclear weapons, and yet we say that
nuclear weapons are essential for our security—while India, which borders on China and the
Middle East, is castigated for its pursuit of the same security.

Canada still has a significant role to play in connection with the Indian nuclear program. The
danger is that India will be accepted as a full-fledged nuclear weapon state, with no penalties
at all and without any legally binding obligation to disarm (such as Article VI of the NPT).
Canada has influence in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, where key decisions will be taken,
because Canada is a major supplier of uranium. I want to stress that the status quo with
India is not acceptable. India is a regional hegemon and has ambitions to be more, so we
have to deal with it, but a one-time exception to allow India to be considered a nuclear
weapon state will not end there. Pakistan would not tolerate that. We need to find an
innovative option that deals with reality but does not acquiesce to proliferation.

As more and more states around the world gain nuclear technology for non-weapons
purposes, they gain access to technology that can be used in building a nuclear weapon. The
solution endorsed by the Blix Commission and Mohamed ElBaradei, the Nobel Laureate
and head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, is generally known as the
internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle. For example, individual states would not be
allowed to enrich uranium, which would instead be put under international, multilateral
control. The United States is proposing this solution for Iran and the other Axis of Evil
countries, but not for anybody else. But this standard should be universalized. Canada has
some influence in this decision because it is a supplier and has nuclear technology capability.

Canada has also been active in trying to repair the nuclear disarmament machinery. The
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the one treaty that creates a legal obligation on nuclear
weapon states to disarm, has no institutional infrastructure. It has one review conference
every five years but has no other capacity to act. North Korea can test a weapon and
withdraw and nobody can do anything about it. Canada has put forward some very strong
recommendations to the NPT for a standing bureau, annual decision-making meetings, and
greater transparency in reporting. While these issues are not fancy, they’re fundamentally
important and Canada has the capacity to act on them. We trust that the new government
will also adopt a commitment to nonproliferation.

Notes

1. Greg Mello, guest editorial, Las Alamos Monitor, 14 September 2006, Los Alamos Study Group,

2. The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and


Session Three
Protecting People in Extreme Peril

Lead paper
By Ochieng’ Adala on behalf of Musifiky Mwanasali

NOTE:
Musifiky Mwanasali was invited to be the lead presenter for the session “Protecting people in extreme peril.” Dr. Mwanasali currently is a Special Assistant in the United Nations Department of Political Affairs in New York. Unfortunately he was unable to attend the symposium. In advance he provided to the respondents a copy of a chapter entitled, “Africa’s Responsibility to Protect,” that was published in a book edited by Adekeye Adebajo and Helen Scanlon, A Dialogue of the Deaf: Essays on Africa and the United Nations (Auckland Park, South Africa: The Centre for Conflict Resolution, 2006, pp. 89-110).

On short notice Ambassador Ochieng’ Adala graciously agreed to provide a summary of Mwanasali’s argument for the symposium. Ambassador Adala’s presentation is based on Mwanasali’s printed chapter, which he quotes at length.

It should be Musifiky Mwanasali standing before you to present this paper. I know that Musifiky put a lot of research into this paper. It is an essay on Africa and the United Nations that he contributed as a chapter in a book that was written by a number of prominent Africans.

Africa’s Responsibility to Protect
Musifiky wanted to discuss the issue of sovereignty, noninterference, and the Responsibility to Protect in the light of the AU Constitutive Act, and in particular Article 4(h) and “the emerging international consensus over the ‘responsibility to protect.’” Musifiky sought “to analyze the implications for Africa of this evolving international norm” in light of that particular article, and “to explore some of the issues that could confront African governments as the international community strives to give substance to the idea of ‘the responsibility to protect’” (p. 89).

Not only does [the] Constitutive Act proclaim the organisation’s commitment to the sanctity of human life, it also grants the AU “the right to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, as well as a serious threat to legitimate order to restore peace and stability to the member state” [Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 4(h)].

... In a clear break with the past, African leaders recognised that “good governance”, transparency and human rights are essential elements for building representative and
stable governments and for contributing to conflict prevention efforts on the continent. (p. 90)

**R2P: AU and UN Perspectives**

Musifiky looks at various areas of the responsibility to protect. The first is the AU and UN perspectives:

Advocates of the “responsibility to protect” usually associate it with three distinct but interconnected sets of responsibilities: “the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react, and the responsibility to rebuild.” Although the language in the AU Constitutive Act of 2000 and the 2005 UN World Summit document are strikingly similar, there was such a misunderstanding among the UN member states—including African governments—about what “protection” meant, that the effort to include this proposal in the 2005 summit’s final resolution was in danger of being dashed.

During the discussions leading up to the adoption of the AU Constitutive Act in Lomé, Togo in July 2000, delegates generally accepted the principle of, and the need to, protect civilians against war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity....Discussions... focused largely on two issues: the authorisation of the intervention, and the need to add the preservation of political stability to the reasons to intervene. (p. 92)

“At the 2005 UN World Summit,” Musifiky observes, “the process was not as smooth.”

A number of government delegations questioned the whole notion of the “responsibility to protect” on the grounds that “the vision...for a future United Nations should not be filled with vague concepts that provide an opportunity for those states that seek to interfere in the internal affairs of other states.” (pp. 92-3)

The views of the UN member states on the “responsibility to protect” are reflected in Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Summit document.

Paragraph 138 recognises that “each individual State has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity,” and encourages the international community to help states—especially small and weak nations—to build their capacity to exercise this responsibility.

Paragraph 139..., on the other hand, points out the responsibility of the international community, the United Nations and its 15-member Security Council, “to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapter VII and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”...The World Summit document also prescribes recourse to Chapter VII of the UN Charter to be carried out “on a case by case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organisations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” (pp. 93-94)
Crisis Prevention and Collective Action: Darfur

Musifikasi then continues to look at crisis prevention and collective action, and particularly the tragic case of Darfur. “Collective action to respond to emerging crises is the cornerstone of the notion of the ‘responsibility to protect’” (p. 94). This responsibility “is central to the mandate of the AU.”

Yet no AU legal document explicitly mentions it…. The Constitutive Act and the [Peace and Security Council] Protocol provide a sufficient legal basis for the AU to make this norm operational.

The crisis in Sudan’s Darfur region illustrates what can go wrong with the “responsibility to protect” concept when the rhetoric on international norms is not translated into robust action on the ground to uphold them; when means are not commensurate with ends; and when mandates are not effectively synchronised with what needs to be done to exercise the responsibilities entailed in such norms.

The international community belatedly awoke from its indifference to the long-festering crisis in Darfur in 2004, only to find itself powerless in the face of the heavy toll in human suffering and the immensity of the task needed to prevent the escalation of the crisis in a territory the size of France. By default, the AU was catapulted to the frontline with the blessing of powerful members of the UN Security Council. But this was soon to become a case of “mission impossible” for the continental organisation which eventually forced the [Security Council of the AU] to shed all pride and call for a transition to the UN in March 2006. (p. 95)

Chapter VII, the Use of Force, and the Authority to Intervene

Musifikasi also looks at Chapter VII, the use of force and the authority to intervene. Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act and the Peace and Security Council Protocol of the AU designate the AU as the legitimate authority to authorise interventions. In the Constitutive Act, this decision is the exclusive prerogative of the Assembly of Heads of States and Government, while the PSC Protocol confers on the PSC—presumably at the head of state and government level—the authority “to use its discretion to effect entry into”, and take appropriate action, to address potential or actual conflict situations. (p. 98)

The UN Charter lays on the Security Council the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, but also encourages regional arrangements to deal with peace and security issues in their regions. However, the Charter subjects this responsibility to two conditions: no enforcement action should be taken by regional organisations without the Security Council’s authorization, and the Council should, at all times, be kept fully informed of the activities undertaken or contemplated by regional organisations in the maintenance of regional peace and security. (p. 99)

The AU’s position on the use of force is articulated in the Ezulwini Consensus of March 2005, which…recognises that the AU and sub-regional organisations should be able to intervene with the approval of the UN Security Council, although in
certain situations—notably in circumstances requiring urgent action—such approval could be granted “after the fact”. The rationale for this position is that since the UN Security Council is often far from the scene of conflicts, it may not be in a position to undertake effectively a proper appreciation of the nature and development of conflict situations. (pp. 99-100)

The AU feels that, under these circumstances, it has a mandate to take preemptive action.

**Reconstruction in the Post-Intervention Phase**

The third consideration that Musifiky dealt with was reconstruction in the post-intervention phase.

Since the adoption of the Millennium Declaration in 2000, the UN undertook to review its approach to conflict prevention by requesting UN agencies to develop an integrated approach and to move closer to addressing the root causes of crises and conflicts. The Millennium Declaration reaffirms the commitment of UN member states to the core values of freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature and shared responsibility.

By establishing the Peacebuilding Commission in December 2005, world leaders reiterated the commitment and need for the international community to assist countries emerging from conflicts towards recovery, reintegration and reconstruction, and to help them lay the foundation for sustainable peace, security and development. (p. 101)

UN experience in peacebuilding evolves around three clusters of issues: security sector reform, state-institution building and development. (p. 102)

**Concluding Reflections**

In his concluding reflections Musifiky writes,

Over the years, the AU—with the support of the UN and the rest of the international community—has taken steps to push protection, conflict prevention, mediation and peacekeeping higher up the agendas of its member states. With the proposal to establish a framework for post-conflict reconstruction and development following the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission in December 2005, the institutional set-up for the “responsibility to protect” in its three dimensions is now in place at the international and regional levels as an intrinsic component of collective efforts towards peace and development. There are therefore no more excuses for the failure of the international community to implement this emerging international norm.

In Africa, peace and development must go hand in hand if the “responsibility to protect” is to make a difference. The onus is now on us as African citizens, individual African countries, the United Nations and the international community at
large, to help the peace and development nexus become a reality on our continent. (pp. 106-107)

Responses

#1: Bob Lawson

While these are my views and not the views of DFAIT, I will address the Department’s policy on the Responsibility to Protect. We’re all familiar with the Human Security Report. It does paint a fairly optimistic view of what we achieved working together in the 1990s to respond to the challenges of human security. However, we also recall that the 1990s witnessed some pretty horrific experiences in Srebrenica, Rwanda, and Kosovo, and thus Canada launched the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in September 2000 to respond to those challenges.

We believe that the Commission’s work provided three seminal contributions to what was then known as the debate around humanitarian intervention. First, it moved the discussions away from the controversial “right to intervene” debate to the Responsibility to Protect framework. This was a semantic and legal shift of great substance. Responsibility questions lie first and foremost with the state, but where the state is unwilling or unable to act to protect its citizens, the Commission argued that there was a subsidiary responsibility on the part of the international community to act.

Second, the report posited a new norm of sovereignty as responsibility. It developed the idea that sovereignty confers not only rights but also responsibilities on states, particularly for protection of civilian populations.

Finally, the report put forth three dimensions of what has become known as R2P: responsibility to prevent, responsibility to act/react, and responsibility to rebuild. Each of these has equal priority—prevention, of course, being the first among equals.

In most discussions the greatest resistance to this new normative framework has focused on the issue of intervention. The Commission made its third major contribution by identifying thresholds for action and outlining principles to guide the use of force in these cases (such as right intention, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable prospects for success). A side benefit of this work was that it stopped people from using the term “humanitarian intervention,” which unhelpfully polarized the debate.

At the World Summit in 2005, the UN community adopted this normative framework. Very few people would have given us much chance of success when this work began in 2000. Like the landmines campaigns and others that have animated the human security agenda in the past decade, we started out with slim chances of success, but in moving the debate forward we’ve had perhaps unexpected successes. Again this is a tribute to the cooperative relationship we’ve developed with civil society in advancing these efforts.
The 2005 World Summit was a milestone. It represented global acceptance that states do bear a responsibility to protect their citizens. It acknowledged that the international community does have a subsidiary responsibility to protect citizens and articulated a willingness on the part of the international community to take action. The World Summit acknowledged that Chapter VII endorsement actions would be legitimate, “should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” And thus R2P is animated by three factors: the nature and severity of the problem, the manifest failure of those in authority to react, and the ability of the community to assume the right of subsidiary responsibility.

What have we been doing since the declaration at the Summit? What are Canada’s priorities for following up on this work? I’ll focus on three areas of work: normative development, information analysis, and operationalization of the concept itself.

Promoting the Responsibility to Protect hinges on strengthening the principle of sovereignty as responsibility. Such a focus lays bare the legal gaps between contemporary security needs and expectations, on the one hand, and the rules we have put in place to manage the global order. A report commissioned by Canada implies that the concept of sovereignty needs to be updated. In practice there has been a clear evolution from sovereignty as noninterference, to sovereignty as impunity within the domestic boundaries of a country, to sovereignty as responsibility towards the people.

Additionally, there have been few clear principles to guide decisions regarding the nature of intervention. The Council has used discretion to define Chapter VII, sometimes quite broadly. And some have argued that, as a result, there is no need for updating legal principles. We believe that Chapter VII has been applied quite selectively, with problematic effects. Such application creates an inconsistent precedent and exacerbates the political will. Therefore, Canada will continue to promote and strengthen the R2P norms, with a focus on the principle of sovereignty as responsibility and the need for clearer guidelines for the use of force to protect civilians from genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

Secondly, the UN Summit articulated a threshold and an evidentiary base for action on the part of the international community. Thus an area of our work will revolve around the monitoring and recording, education, and advocacy that are required to build a political will to ensure timely and effective decision-making. We are placing the onus squarely on the UN Security Council. However, the lack of consistent, high quality, publicly available information about Security Council activities and those of its subordinate bodies is a consistent barrier in monitoring the performance of elected members. In conjunction with our existing work on protection of civilians, further work will be done to enhance monitoring and recording mechanisms to support Security Council decision-making.

The final pillar of our work has been focusing on the operational capacity to implement R2P. There’s some debate over whether distinct operational considerations are related to R2P. Many operational considerations for strengthening peace operations generally apply to R2P, but they’re not distinctive in that respect. There’s a need for better training in humanitarian law and a range of operational considerations related to that.
We conducted a research project with the Henry L. Stimson Center in 2004, which identified a significant gap between the normative interests in civilian protection and the military operational requirements for conducting missions to protect civilian populations. We found, for example, definition and language problems. The definition and application of the term “civilian protection” varies widely across a broad range of military doctrines around the world. There was also little evidence that member states, regional organizations, and the UN have adequate training and doctrine in place to prepare troops to carry out missions involving the protection of civilians under imminent threat in a non-permissive environment.

Greater emphasis is needed on military roles in humanitarian and peace operations. The focus has been on the military’s role in the expansion and support of governance, development, peacebuilding, and traditional humanitarian roles, rather than on refining the discrete use of force in non-permissive environments for humanitarian purposes.

We must also develop capacity for a range of scenarios. The research we found developed an appetite for more work. We need to review the doctrines of the various countries involved, such as the United States. How do we articulate and develop the doctrinal requirements of R2P with the UK, NATO, ECOWAS, and the AU? How do we then take that doctrine and turn it into real training to protect civilians? Finally, have we put in place a systematic lessons-learned analysis of our experiences of protecting civilians in an operational context?

R2P remains a core priority for Canada. Our challenge now is to get on with the business of making it real in terms of doctrine and training, as well as to strengthen and deepen the norms of sovereignty as responsibility.

#2: Peggy Mason

I want to focus on two key areas. The first is the limits on the utility of the use of force to protect civilians in grave danger. And then I want to touch briefly on prospects for the peacebuilding commission in helping the international community to meet the responsibility to rebuild.

Because the African Union has not yet set out clear guidelines on when they might authorize the use of force for the purposes of the protection of civilians, Kofi Annan set down the following conditions: the seriousness of the threat; the proper purpose of the proposed military action; whether other means short of the use of force might plausibly succeed in stopping the threat; whether the military option is proportional to the threat at hand; and, the one I’m going to focus on, whether there is a reasonable chance of success.

As Paul Rogers illustrated, the Bush Administration is a real-world demonstration of the limits of the use of force to solve political problems. This, alas, also applies where the intent really is good and the need really is great. We simply cannot underestimate the difficulty in exercising a protection mandate in the face of a determined military opposition. No matter how robust your force, if it doesn’t work to deter—if your bluff is called—then you slide
very quickly into war fighting. So I completely agree with Bob Lawson’s comments about how little militaries know about a protection mandate.

The first step is to get the military doctrines developed. The second step is to get some joint training going so that the doctrines can be applied. Canada could take up this role. The Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force machinery we now have at Foreign Affairs could easily be used to develop doctrine and training.

I’m glad to hear what Bob is saying about the focus on operationalizing the responsibility to protect, but I don’t see any move to that end. Speaking from my peacekeeping training background, I would say that the only realistic basis for thinking about operationalizing the use of force for the protection of civilians is in the context of an overall comprehensive agreement, in which all the key players are on side, with only a very limited number of spoilers. Some good reports indicate how to contain, control, and arrest those spoilers by using the rule of law (e.g., specialized police units), with the military in the background for support. Out of that context, the evidence suggests that attempts to protect people by going to war simply will not work.

Another problem with the constant focus on using force to protect civilians in grave need is that the international community is dragged away from the other tools before them, and from the tough political decisions. I will read from an October 2006 report from the International Crisis Group on Darfur: “The impasse over deploying a major UN peacekeeping force to Darfur results directly from the international community’s three-year failure to apply effective diplomatic and economic pressure on Sudan’s government and its senior officials.” Politicians will do anything to avoid the tough decisions. So they keep chasing the chimera of a military force that’s going to be a substitute for solving the political problems. There is no substitute for international diplomacy—for getting all of the key actors to agree to a series of positive and negative incentives. I recommend the ICG report to you because it talks very specifically about targeted sanctions—for example, no-fly zones—that is, very realistic, concrete steps that can be taken. It’s very hard for China to willfully obstruct such an approach.

The Peacebuilding Commission was the one positive outcome of the 2006 UN Summit to review the Millennium Development. This new machinery at the UN is an attempt to bring some overall coherence to the post-conflict peacebuilding efforts of the international community. We talk about the problem of trying to get all the international actors moving in the same direction in a peacebuilding context. What must it be like from the point of view of the recipient country to be on the receiving end of this plethora of actors, all of them more or less moving in their own direction? It’s not just a matter of coordination, but of coherence among the huge range of international actors—the UN agencies, each with its own mandate and turf; the international financial institutions; the NGOs; and the members of each donor agency. Each country pursues its own national objectives in the post-conflict context without a coherent strategy. Canada is a very good example, “3D” notwithstanding.

One of the organizations that I chair, the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, has repeatedly urged Canada to develop a coherent peacebuilding policy and principles as a starting point for a strategy in a particular country. Canada is now allegedly developing its own capacity to intervene coherently in post-conflict situations through the Stabilization and
Reconstruction Task Force, but to date our urgings have been to no avail. Against that backdrop along comes this very modest new machinery at the UN, which has the mandate to somehow pull together all of these various elements to develop a more coherent international approach. The issue, of course, will be whether or not donor countries, in particular, get behind this measure. What is Canada doing? Another question that CPCC keeps asking is, “What links are being made with the international machinery that’s now being developed and fleshed out at the UN?”

The single biggest problem besides incoherence in the international approach is the funding gap. There’s lots of money initially for short-term, crisis relief, humanitarian assistance. At the other end, there’s long-term development assistance, but the in-between funding for post-conflict peacebuilding, which has been described by the Secretary-General as “the funding gap,” is not filled by ad hoc national contributions. That’s where the peacebuilding fund comes in. But will enough money be pledged to it? Are countries going to contribute? Are they going to put their money where their mouth is and put it into a centralized fund that will then be able to develop some kind of overall coherence?

One of the stumbling blocks is the NGO community. It’s much easier for Canadian NGOs to lobby the government directly for funds than to go through a multilateral mechanism. But we have tried the ad hoc approach. Now it’s time to get behind these new mechanisms—particularly the funding mechanism—which offer some prospects of overall coherence.

My final point is about local ownership. When I worked in 1998-99 with General Erskine (of Ghana) to develop UN principles on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, we concluded that the most important principle for developing and implementing meaningful, effective programs was local ownership. We’re supposed to be building local capacity, with the locals setting the priorities. What follows is the notion of donor accountability to the locals, on which the International Peace Academy has done wonderful work. If donors get behind the Peacebuilding Commission and its efforts to set an overarching strategy and key principles of peacebuilding as the basis for a coherent country-by-country strategy, then there will be a real opportunity to put local ownership into practice and actually operationalize the responsibility to rebuild.

#3: John Siebert

Military intervention under the R2P framework, even under the most stringent adherence to conditions and cautions, is always going to be a very messy affair with indeterminable results. Doctrinal points of R2P can be debated, and there are grey areas that have not been resolved.

I want to focus on Darfur. Security Council Resolution 1706, which passed on 31 August 2006, is the first invocation of R2P language from the September 2005 World Summit in a particular situation. And I’m going to ask if R2P, with the Darfur resolution of the Security Council, met a perfect storm. Playing off the old idea of “generals fighting the last war,” R2P was structured in the wake of a situation like Rwanda, in which intervention was circumscribed by a certain set of conditions in which the forces to be confronted were more
like killers than fighters. In this situation, it was possible for an external force to go in and, under fairly constrained but potentially lethal rules of engagement, stop the killers and restore a measure of security to a vulnerable population, after which other processes could kick in.

In other words, do parts of the R2P doctrine need to be worked on? I’d like to acknowledge that Project Ploughshares, our sponsoring Churches, and The Canadian Council of Churches haven’t collectively come to a firm decision yet on R2P. We’re in an ongoing discussion. But, if you go through the R2P checklist on Darfur, you can say yes at almost every point:

- Just Cause—With the massive loss of life (potentially ethnic cleansing), say yes.
- Right Authority—SC Resolution 1706 gives it.
- Right Intention—I believe yes to limit further human suffering there. There is no suggestion that it’s about regime change in Khartoum. It’s not about a permanent force, it’s not colonialism and it’s not crusading.
- Last Resort—Potentially not. There are, as Peggy pointed out, International Crisis Group recommendations and other things that can be done, but frankly, to stop that suffering I think most observers would say that somebody, somewhere, has to intervene with a sufficient mandate and sufficient potential for actual firepower to do it.
- Proportional Means—This determination is subjective. Probably the international community will summon the least means possible under the circumstances.
- Reasonable Prospects—This is iffy, but that’s the messy nature of interventions to begin with.
- Clear Objectives and Rules of Engagement—They can be met by enhancing the United Nations Mission in Sudan and sending it into Darfur or by supplementing the African Union force AMIS.

Doctrinal questions on R2P and consent or permission need to be settled, because clearly the Sudanese government has said no. And in effect that withholding of consent has paralyzed the international community and the Canadian government. In two speeches in September Prime Minister Harper reportedly said that the international community should go into Darfur whether or not Khartoum says yes. In a parliamentary debate in October, Peter MacKay, the Foreign Affairs Minister, said that we can’t go in unless Khartoum says yes.

Moving into an environment without permission was considered in the R2P articulation, but Khartoum is close to being, even under the shaky conditions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, a regional hegemon. Khartoum is a strong force. Sudanese forces are disciplined and they have been fighting for many decades against the south. There are not only killers in Darfur.

Also, after three years, is a humanitarian emergency just emerging or not? Clearly what is happening in Darfur is an ongoing, flaring, intense conflict with many parties. It could be said that R2P is not necessary in Darfur, because a peace agreement, shaky as it is, was signed in May 2006. The international community is going in to support a peace agreement and to set up an intervening force—much like traditional peacekeeping. So, cases in which
consent by a powerful central government is denied must be looked at, because serious
human rights violations, loss of life, perhaps ethnic cleansing must be addressed.

Unless the intervention is enforceable and sustainable, there’s no use talking about an R2P
intervention. What is needed is political will. I’m quite sure that when we were talking about
R2P, we weren’t talking about sending an international force into Chechnya because we
weren’t going to challenge the Russian bear on its territory. But Rwanda was a different case.
It might have been possible for 5,000 or 10,000 troops with the right equipment and the
right timing to have intervened. As it was, an international intervention of Tutsi forces from
neighbouring countries eventually stopped the slaughter.

Unfortunately, R2P has had a setback in its progression from a candidate norm in
international law to becoming an internationally enforced obligation because it has hit, in
Darfur, a set of circumstances that can’t quite be answered.

Notes

1. International Crisis Group, Getting the UN into Darfur, Africa Briefing #23, 12 October 2006,

2. In addition to agreement on the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission and a small supporting office
at UNHQ, there will also be a dedicated trust fund.
Session 4
Responding to the Global and Canadian Agendas

The Global Agenda
By Paul Rogers

It has been such an incredibly rich day. Looking at what we’ve heard today from a huge range of expertise, I think it has been really quite brilliant. There has been a focus on particular themes—one simply can’t have everything, not even everything that Ploughshares itself is involved in. What we’ve heard on the Responsibility to Protect agenda and also the very interesting session by the Ambassador at lunch raise so many issues. One can sense from the discussion afterwards that there are many issues on which people still have to do more thinking.

I was struck by the session we had this morning on nuclear issues. What came back to me time and time again was the way in which the dangers looked so incredible in the early 1980s. But simply because they were so extreme, people could recognize them easily. The situation we are in now is more of a dangerous slippery slope, ending not in a sudden all-out nuclear world war but in the possibility that nuclear weapons will be seen as useable in small nuclear wars in far-off places. The danger of actually neglecting the nuclear weapons dimension is considerable. It is very easy to think that we are out of the woods but we aren’t.

I was hugely appreciative of the first session on light arms, not the least because of Canada’s record in this area. I was particularly struck by Keith Krause’s comments about what was called the “second generation” approach, a much more holistic, integrated approach. The idea that many individual issues are part of a much wider whole permeates a lot of the discussions we’ve had today.

It’s clear now that the control paradigm—the mindset that we’ve seen over the past five years since 9/11—has demonstrably failed, giving us this extraordinary opportunity. I’m frankly dubious about how big a difference the change in the US Senate and House will make. For many of us it was such a breath of fresh air, but we’ve got to be a lot more resilient. The Washington scene might be quite significantly different but we shouldn’t expect massive change. At the same time, I do think that, in terms of new thinking, we have a much better opportunity in the next four or five years than we have had for many years. I believe that the second decade of this century will be the decade in which we have the best opportunity to change towards a sustainable security paradigm that is actually rooted in justice and emancipation.

I’d like to briefly reflect on my own experience of how the British Government works on these issues and indicate why it is so difficult to get a government to embrace a new mindset. In Britain, as in most countries, government is divided into various divisions. Under New Labour the Department for International Development has made a lot of progress—big
improvements in quality and quantity of aid. It still has a long way to go, but there has been change. But it is very much concerned with the Millennium Development Goals and a focus on development. DFID is also slightly uneasy because it knows that political climates can change. Currently it’s getting expanding budgets but that can change and so there is a tendency not to say things that are too controversial. And it is focused just on development, much less on security and much less on environment.

Our Foreign and Commonwealth Office engages in many of the issues we’ve discussed, but its focus is the status and standing of Britain. If you talk to the people who work in the research sections within the Foreign Office, some of whom I know, about the capacity they might have for blue-skies open thinking, they look at you and say, “We’re not working month-to-month or week-to-week; sometimes we’re not even working day-to-day—we’re working hour-to-hour. We are responding almost immediately to requests from the politicians. We don’t have time to think!”

The Ministry of Defence is concerned with defending the country. There are a couple of think-tanks established within the Ministry of Defence and Bradford has dealt with them. One is the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre. I was at a presentation recently by one of their senior people who gave a very interesting presentation on long-term security threats. An RAF Wing Commander, she was talking about climate change, the widening socioeconomic divisions, and migration. The analysis was quite extraordinary, but then she asked how we would protect Britain from these effects. That is their job.

You can say the same for the Treasury, the Department of Trade and Industry, the Home Office, the Department of the Interior, and their divisions—the police and the Metropolitan Police Service Counter Terrorism Command; MI5, our security service; MI6, our secret intelligence service. They are all focused on the standing security of Britain. Their responsibility is not, apparently, to look globally, to look at the majority world.

Where is this capacity? British government has a Cabinet and the Prime Minister’s Office. Within the Cabinet, there is the Joint Intelligence Committee and its joint intelligence staff to bring all the intelligence together. But it is operating day-to-day, week-to-week, maybe month-to-month, feeding into government all the analysis.

Eight years ago, Blair set up a strategy unit to take a longer-term view, but it has been almost entirely focused on domestic issues. Four or five years ago it did a very interesting study on long-term energy trends. The security and intelligence advisors and the policy unit within the Prime Minister’s office essentially provide immediate responses. By and large in the British government there isn’t the capacity to do the really broad-based new thinking on global issues.

Where does such thinking go on? Nongovernmental and campaigning groups such as Greenpeace, World Development Movement, Oxfam, and Christian Aid are doing a lot of work in their own areas. The World Development Movement is a very effective campaigning group on development issues. Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth do a lot of work. The peace movements—the Quakers and other groups—do good work. There is a tendency to work their own areas, but integration is necessary. I don’t mean that people have to be
involved in everything. It’s more a question of understanding our own individual roles in the wider scheme of things.

People may change. I got into this field because of an interest in development and resource conflict. I diverted in the 1980s to work on the nuclear issue because very few independent people in universities had the capacity to do it. In the last 15 years, I’ve gone back to what I was really interested in originally, global security. Activists do this as well and there is no harm in that. Good campaigners and people skilled at generating public movements can transfer their skills. By participating in the wider scheme of things it is possible to recognize where you fit in without trying to encompass everything.

There are problems with the think-tanks. We have some very establishment ones in Britain like Chatham House and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Some, like the Institute for Public Policy Research, Demos, and one or two others, are more independent, but they depend on external funding and the staff rarely have the opportunity to do really independent thinking.

Should such thinking be going on in universities? It certainly should, but it rarely does. In Britain most international relations departments are dead from the neck up or, at least, very theoretical from the neck up. Academics who are involved in policy don’t have the best of career prospects and they are looked down on. They do sometimes have an impact, annoying the people who want to indulge purely in theory. University staff, particularly those who have reasonably secure funding, have an immense responsibility. I know that in Canada some people who do independent work end up not getting tenure. The ones who get tenure are often the ones who are rather more establishment orientated, but academics have a huge responsibility to do the independent work.

Absolutely crucial is combining specialization with being part of the whole. Actors must be prepared to work in different environments, to see new ways of handling things. One of my learning experiences goes back to the World Food Congress in 1974 where I represented World Development Movement. The Canadian group GATTFly had a small team in Rome and people who would be able to get onto the MPs back in Canada. They played the time difference beautifully. Rome is six or seven hours ahead of Ottawa and 10 hours ahead of Western Canada. I was told that, at the end of the day’s negotiations, GATTFly people in Rome would talk to staff in central Canada, when it was still fairly early in the morning. Then the trick was to get onto MPs and tell them what the government should be doing. In that fairly short World Food Congress, the Canadian delegation, many of whom privately supported GATTFly’s aims, actually pulled out a lot of rabbits from the hat. I learned a lot and I think that World Development Movement did as well. The question is how to use new systems better.

NGOs and others have to find the time to do some new thinking about the long term, while avoiding burnout. While it’s incredibly difficult to do, we have to do it. Resilience is absolutely critical. We mustn’t expect to succeed but we must hope to succeed. We are in it for life and there is no escape.
The Canadian Agenda
By Ernie Regehr

I was struck by the extent to which, although Project Ploughshares divides our program into four units—small arms, defence policy, nuclear, and peacebuilding—and structured this symposium along those lines, in every session participants ended up talking about the full range of issues. It isn’t possible to talk about small arms without engaging questions about economic development and economic justice, human rights, the way in which armed police conduct themselves, democracy, and the ability of citizens to participate, assured that their government is pursuing their interests.

I am reminded of when the landmines treaty was being concluded. I believe that Kenya was one of the late signatories to the treaty, but did meet the signing deadline. The bureaucrats and the politicians could make a late decision to sign onto this treaty, and everyone could have confidence that it was going to be implemented because they could go to the military and decommission the antipersonnel landmines in stock and write operational manuals to prevent future use, and so on. But what if Kenya were to decide late in the day to sign onto a treaty banning civilian possession of automatic weapons? Well, confidence in such implementation would be a lot lower. I’m not singling out Kenya—the same is true in Canada and parts of Toronto. Implementing a ban on the civilian possession of automatic weapons requires a lot more than bureaucratic decisions. Society must deal with urban gangs and their social circumstances, provide economic opportunities for young people, give them a stake in their society. There is a whole broad set of social and economic policies and initiatives to engage in to make that kind of change stick. It engages a broad set of public policy and program issues.

One can draw a similar analogy between implementing a ban on automatic weapons and nuclear disarmament, particularly the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and issues related to cases like the DPRK or Iran. Acquiring either automatic or nuclear weapons has a great deal to do with societal perceptions of threat, of the level of respect that countries receive from other countries. Inevitably, a kind of nationalism fuels the pursuit of a nuclear weapon capability.

A whole range of social, economic, and rights issues attends both the effective pursuit of nuclear disarmament and the protection of vulnerable civilian populations, which we’ve learned is not fundamentally a military problem, but a social and economic problem. It requires development, the democratic inclusion of disaffected populations, and respect for human rights.

Increasingly the rhetoric on peacebuilding in Afghanistan, for example, includes the notion that the process is sequential. First security must be gained by military means and then all of the other issues can be addressed. But we know fundamentally and have been saying since the early 1990s that conditions for sustainable peace are not sequential and that a mass
application of force is not going to make people safe. Pursuing the objectives that we have been talking about, including the protection of people, requires a broad range of activities related to development, disarmament, human rights, democracy, diplomacy, and conflict resolution.

In the late 1960s, when he headed the Commission on Development, Lester Pearson commented that we prepare for war or combat like precocious giants but for peace like tentative pygmies. While it might not be politically correct the point is clear. We see this phenomenon in Canada today. Canada is a modest military spender by world standards. Even though International Institute for Strategic Studies lists us consistently at about 12th or 13th largest in the world, we’re a lot smaller than the big ones. But recently the Prime Minister has spoken confidently about Canada’s being “back”—we’re now an actor on the world stage again, we’re a player again. That role is linked pretty closely to significant increases in military spending.

To be fair, development spending has also increased, but at not nearly the same rate, even though we understand that to deal with all of the problems that we have examined at this symposium we need to fundamentally address issues of economic justice, democratic inclusion, more effective diplomacy, and conflict resolution. We say on a daily basis, whether about Afghanistan or Darfur, that the conflict isn’t going to be won by military means. We all understand that, by now, conventional wisdom. But where are we putting the greatest increase in resources? It’s primarily on the military level. We’re not acting on the basis of what we know and what we understand needs to be the solution. So, we must keep at it. We’ve got a look more work to do.
Presenters and Respondents

AMBASSADOR OCHIENG’ ADALA is a Program Officer with the Africa Peace Forum. A career diplomat, Ambassador Adala retired in 1993 after 30 years in the Kenyan Diplomatic Service. He served as Ambassador to Egypt and the Northern African Countries, High Commissioner to Zambia and the Southern African Countries, and as Kenyan Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York. He was a member of the Kenyan delegation to the UN General Assembly, OAU Summit and Council of Ministers, Conference of Heads of State of Non-Aligned Countries, and other international and regional forums. Since 2002 he has been a member of the Pugwash Council.

DR. RANDALL CAROLINE FORSBERG is Anne and Bernard Spitzer Professor of International Security Studies at the City College of New York and the Executive Director of the Institute for Defense & Disarmament Studies (IDDS), a think-tank she founded in 1980. IDDS publishes the Arms Control Reporter. Among her books are Cutting Conventional Forces (1989), The Arms Production Dilemma: Contraction and Restraint in the World Combat Aircraft Industry (1994), Nonproliferation Primer (co-authored 1995), and, with Elise Boulding, Abolishing War: Culture and Institutions (1998). Dr. Forsberg has also contributed to many journals and served as an advisor to US Presidents George HW Bush and William J Clinton.

MS. LYNNE GRIFFITHS-FULTON was a Program Associate with Project Ploughshares at the time of the symposium. Active in the Control Arms Campaign, she was also the Coordinator of the Small Arms Working Group for the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee. She represented Ploughshares and SAWG at the 2006 UN Small Arms Review Conference in New York. She was also recently in Southern Sudan to attend meetings on the peace process in Sudan. Before coming to Ploughshares, Ms. Griffiths-Fulton managed the International Centre for Reconciliation at Coventry Cathedral and worked as a researcher for The Barnabas Fund in London, UK. She is now with the K-W Reception Centre, which provides services to recent immigrants.

AMBASSADOR BETHUEL ABDU KIPLAGAT is the Executive Director of the Africa Peace Forum in Nairobi, Kenya. A distinguished diplomat, he served as Kenya’s Ambassador to France and High Commissioner to the United Kingdom. From 1983-1991 he was the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kenya. Ambassador Kiplagat has been closely involved in the conflict resolution efforts on the continent, particularly in Eastern Africa. He facilitated peace talks in Uganda (1985-86), initiated and facilitated peace talks in Mozambique (1988-1992), and engaged warring parties in Ethiopia in 1988-1992. He has also been a resource person to the IGAD Peace Process for Sudan since 1985 and has been advising Sudanese civil society on conflict resolution.

DR. KEITH KRAUSE is Director of the Programme in Strategic and International Security Studies, and Programme Director of the Small Arms Survey at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. His research interests focus on three areas: arms transfers and contemporary arms control issues, changing concepts of security, and multilateralism and the United Nations system. He recently served on the Board of Directors of the Academic Council on the United Nations System. His published works include Arms


MS. PEGGY MASON is Canada's former Ambassador for Disarmament and Canadian member of the Tokyo Forum, an international commission established by Japan in the wake of the India-Pakistan nuclear weapons tests. She is also an adviser to Foreign Affairs Canada on the control of small arms, chair of the UN 2001 Group of Governmental Experts on small arms regulation, external faculty member of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, a Senior Fellow at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, a member of the Executive Committee of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, and the Chair of the Board of Directors of the Group of 78.

DR. MUSIFIY MWANASALI is a staff member of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, in which he serves as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs. He previously served as Regional Adviser for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Central Africa, and as political analyst in the Conflict Management Centre of the African Union. Dr. Mwanasali also held research and teaching posts in academia and think-tanks in Africa and the United States, including the New York-based International Peace Academy. He has published and lectured extensively on African political and security issues.

MR. MIKE PERRY is currently Senior Programme Coordinator for Small Arms and Light Weapons with the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force at Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. A lawyer by profession, he was the Coordinator of Canada’s International Criminal Court Campaign and a member of the Canadian delegation to the 2006 UN Review Conference on Small Arms and to the UN First Committee on International Security and Disarmament. Mr. Perry has published in a number of law journals, writing on international law and human rights. He has made numerous presentations in Canada and the US.

MR. ERNIE REGEHR, O.C. is Senior Policy Advisor with Project Ploughshares. The co-founder of Project Ploughshares in 1976, he was for many years its Executive Director. He is also a past president of Conrad Grebel University College at the University of Waterloo. He has authored or edited several books, including Arms Canada: The Deadly Business of Military Exports and Militarism and the World Military Order, and written numerous articles, working papers, policy presentations, and briefings. He has served on many national and international panels. He is a Commissioner to the World Council of Churches Commission on International Affairs.
DR. PAUL ROGERS is Professor of Peace Studies at Bradford University in the United Kingdom. His research interests include arms control and disarmament, proliferation, environmental and resource conflict, and global security after the Cold War. His most recent book is *Into the Long War* (2006). Other recent works include *A War Too Far: Iraq, Iran and the New American Century* (2006), *A War on Terror: Afghanistan and After* (2004), *The War on Terror: Winning or Losing?* (2003), and *Losing Control: Global Security in the 21st Century* (2nd ed., 2002). Dr. Rogers has also contributed chapters to a number of books and published extensively in journals. He gives many radio and TV interviews and writes columns for newspapers and the Web.

MR. JOHN SIEBERT is the Executive Director of Project Ploughshares. He previously served as a Foreign Service Officer with the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs; Program Officer for Human Rights and Aboriginal Justice with the United Church of Canada; and as consultant to governments and nongovernmental organizations in Canada and overseas in project and program development, institutional evaluation, and policy development. He consults frequently with Canadian government agencies and with Ploughshares partner organizations in Africa, most recently on peace in Sudan and the Horn of Africa.

DR. JENNIFER ALLEN SIMONS is President of The Simons Foundation and Visiting Fellow at Simon Fraser University. She is past Director of the Simons Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Research at the University of British Columbia. She was a member of Canadian delegations to the UN NPT Review Conference and PrepCom and funds UNIDIR Conferences on Space Security. Dr. Simons has served on the boards of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, the Hague Appeal for Peace, and the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. Dr. Simons established The Simons Foundation, which supported the 2006 World Peace Forum, the Swedish Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, and the Commission on Humanitarian Intervention. Recent endowments include the Simons Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Research at UBC and two Chairs on International Law and Human Security at SFU.
Symposium Attendees

Ambassador Ochieng’ Adala, Africa Peace Forum
Stephen Allen, The Presbyterian Church in Canada
Janis Alton, Voice of Women
Dr. Douglas Alton
Rev. John Barker, Project Ploughshares Board (The United Church of Canada)
Joyce Barrett, Project Ploughshares Kawartha
Dr. Barbara Birkett, Project Ploughshares Board (The Anglican Church of Canada)
Grant Birks, Project Ploughshares staff
Linda Bowron, Project Ploughshares Board (Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace)
Jim Caughran, Project Ploughshares Board (Canadian Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends)
John Crawford, Project Ploughshares Saskatoon
Philip Creighton, Treasurer, Project Ploughshares Board
Phyllis Creighton, Science for Peace / Voice of Women
Tom Csizmar
Chris Derksen-Hiebert, World Vision Canada
Dr. Alistair Edgar, Academic Council on the United Nations System / Wilfrid Laurier University
Ken Epps, Project Ploughshares staff
Sarah Estabrooks, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
Lowell Ewert, Conrad Grebel University College, University of Waterloo
Shirley Farlinger, Voice of Women / Science for Peace
Dr. Randall Forsberg, Institute for Defense & Disarmament Studies
Dr. Nathan Funk, Conrad Grebel University College, University of Waterloo
Lynne Griffiths-Fulton, Project Ploughshares staff
John Groh
Daniel Guillemette, Wilfrid Laurier University (student)
Jo Hayward Haines, Project Ploughshares Kawartha
Dr. Paul Heinbecker, Centre for International Governance Innovation
Debbie Hughes, Project Ploughshares staff
Emily Hunsberger
Moira Hutchinson, Chair, Project Ploughshares Board
Dr. Roger Hutchinson, Emmanuel College, University of Toronto
Dr. Bill Janzen, Project Ploughshares Board (Mennonite Central Committee Canada)
Krystal Kasepchuk, Wilfrid Laurier University (student)
George Kelly
Geraldine Kelly
Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, Africa Peace Forum
Anne Marie Kraemer, Project Ploughshares staff
Dr. Keith Krause, Small Arms Survey
Dr. Peter Langille, University of Western Ontario
Dr. Bob Lawson, Foreign Affairs & International Trade Canada
Peggy Mason, Group of 78 / Norman Paterson School of International Affairs
Rev. Maylanne Maybee, Anglican Church of Canada
Jean McCutcheon
Barbara McLean, McLean & Associates
Rev. Walter McLean, The Osborne Group / Honorary Consul–Namibia
Rachel McQuail, Canadian Friends Service Committee
Maria Meyer
David Milne, Christian Peacemaker Teams
Peter Noteboom, The Canadian Council of Churches
Rev. Lowell Nussey, Project Ploughshares Board (Evangelical Lutheran Church in Canada)
Choice Okoro, Project Ploughshares Board (The United Church of Canada)
Dr. Derek Paul, Science for Peace
Mike Perry, Foreign Affairs & International Trade Canada
Don Peters, Mennonite Central Committee Canada
Rev. Dr. David Pfirringer, Waterloo Lutheran Seminary
Tracey Pickup, Project Ploughshares Calgary
Ernie Regehr, Project Ploughshares staff
Nancy Regehr, Project Ploughshares staff
Virginia Reimer
Dr. Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, University of Western Ontario
Dr. Paul Rogers, Bradford University
Marjorie Ross, KAIROS
Rev. Dr. Martin Rumscheidt, Project Ploughshares Board (The United Church of Canada)
Peter Schmolka, Project Ploughshares Ottawa
Gerd Schönwälder, International Development Research Centre
Douglas Scott, Markland Group
John Siebert, Project Ploughshares staff
Dr. Jennifer Simons, The Simons Foundation
Erin Simpson, Canadian Council for International Co-operation
Wendy Stocker, Project Ploughshares staff
Murray Thomson, co-founder of Project Ploughshares
Kathleen Wallace-Deering
Jessica West, Project Ploughshares staff
Dr. Henry Wiseman, University of Guelph
Anne Wright-Gedcke, Project Ploughshares Board (The Presbyterian Church in Canada)
Dr. Tom Yoder Neufeld, Conrad Grebel University College, University of Waterloo