Consultation on NATO Nuclear Policy, National Missile Defence & Alternative Security Arrangements

Tasneem Jamal

Working Paper 01-1

Ottawa, Canada 28 -30, September 2001
Convened by the Simons Foundation in partnership with Project Ploughshares

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Implementing the Global Nuclear Disarmament Agenda: A Challenge to NATO
In September 2000, The Simons Foundation in partnership with Project Ploughshares convened a Consultation on NATO Nuclear Policy, National Missile Defense, and Alternative Security Arrangements. The Consultation brought together civil society experts, Canadian government officials, and a number of representatives of other countries to discuss the key nuclear weapons issues facing Canada and the North Atlantic community and to explore and articulate proposals in support of nuclear disarmament and alternative security arrangements. The purpose of the Consultation was to identify and build support for Canadian initiatives to advance nuclear disarmament and alternative security arrangements, globally and in the NATO context.  (First printed February 2001)

 

Appendix 1:  Consultation Participants

Appendix 2:  Consultation Agenda

Appendix 3:  Final Document of the Sixth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Appendix 4:  “Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: the Need for a New Agenda”

Consultation Panels

Consultation Papers

 

Implementing the Global Nuclear Disarmament Agenda:

A Challenge to NATO

 

Report on the Consultation on

NATO Nuclear Policy, National Missile Defence,

and Alternative Security Arrangements

 

CONVENED BY

The Simons Foundation in partnership with Project Ploughshares

Ottawa, 28-30 September 2000

 

SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Canada should continue to give active leadership internationally to the elaboration and full and timely implementation of the global nuclear disarmament agenda as elaborated by the May 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document, the November 2000 UNGA “New Agenda” Resolution, and the July 1996 World Court Advisory Opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

Canada and all NATO states have a particular and urgent responsibility to ensure that NATO nuclear policy conforms to the requirements of international law and to the nuclear disarmament obligations undertaken by NATO member states through the Non-Proliferation Treaty and reaffirmed and elaborated upon in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

Towards the fulfillment of those obligations, NATO and its member states are specifically called on to:

– Explicitly declare NATO’s commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons and to immediately reducing the political role of nuclear weapons in NATO policy and posture;

– Immediately disavow all threat or use of nuclear weapons in response to any non-nuclear weapon threat or use, as a step toward the total disavowal of nuclear possession and use;

– Adopt a formal no-first-use policy;

– Remove tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe;

– Terminate nuclear-sharing arrangements;

– De-alert and de-mate nuclear forces;

– Pursue deep cuts in strategic nuclear forces, focusing in particular on counterforce capabilities; and

– Ensure that all NATO and member state security policies respect and comply with international and humanitarian law.

NATO should establish an ongoing, open-ended nuclear policy review process, and should provide for improved public and NGO access to NATO and member state nuclear policy decision-makers and decision-making processes, increased transparency of NATO nuclear policy and processes, and improved accountability of NATO members for NATO nuclear policies. A greater emphasis on the mobilization of informed global public support for nuclear disarmament should include support for the UN Secretary-General’s call for an international conference on eliminating nuclear dangers. Specific consultative, accountability, and transparency measures should include:

– Regular meetings between NGOs and NATO officials and national delegations;

– An annual NATO arms control compliance statement; and

– Public disclosure of the full results of the “Paragraph 32” NATO review due for completion in December 2000.

Canada and other NATO states should make clear their opposition to any deployment of missile defences outside the context of an agreed process to manage and eliminate nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. NATO states should actively support alternative approaches to assessing and addressing the ballistic missile problem, and should investigate the possibility of creating a multilateral missile monitoring and control regime.

Canada, in furthering its important international role, should continue to work in close co-operation with the New Agenda states and pursue closer co-operation with the NATO-5 states (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway) and other NATO allies to build NATO commitment to implementing the global nuclear disarmament agenda.

To that end, Canada should advocate the start of international consultations on the scope and nature of general and complete disarmament, and should consider sponsoring a new international commission on the future of nuclear arms control and disarmament.

Canadian disarmament efforts should be pursued in the context of a comprehensive and pro-active global security policy.


PREFACE

The global threat posed by the existence of nuclear weapons certainly did not disappear with the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, in the past decade we have seen a welcome surge in both the support for and the expectation of real progress toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. At the same time, there have been many developments B the defeat of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in the US Senate, the nuclearization of South Asia, the retention of Cold-War-era nuclear postures by the United States and Russia B that tend in the opposite direction: towards the indefinite retention and even the spread of nuclear capabilities. The looming prospect of missile defence deployment threatens further damage to nuclear arms control and disarmament efforts. And thus the opportunity that now exists to make dramatic advances towards complete nuclear disarmament is at risk of being lost.

In September 2000, The Simons Foundation in partnership with Project Ploughshares convened a Consultation on NATO Nuclear Policy, National Missile Defense, and Alternative Security Arrangements. The Consultation brought together civil society experts, Canadian government officials, and a number of representatives of other countries to discuss the key nuclear weapons issues facing Canada and the North Atlantic community and to explore and articulate proposals in support of nuclear disarmament and alternative security arrangements. The purpose of the Consultation was to identify and build support for Canadian initiatives to advance nuclear disarmament and alternative security arrangements, globally and in the NATO context (see Appendix 1 for a list of participants).

The opening, context-setting, address to the Consultation was given by Jennifer Allen Simons and is included as the Introduction to this report. The Consultation then proceeded to focus on six main topics: Status of the NATO Review, Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament Priorities, Implications of National Missile Defense, Deterrence and Assurance Strategies, Post-Nuclear Security Arrangements, and Directions for Canadian Policy (see Appendix 2 for the Consultation Agenda).

The main body of this report is presented as a joint Policy Brief by The Simons Foundation and Project Ploughshares that draws on key points and recommendations discussed at the Consultation and raised in papers submitted beforehand by the participants. We believe these views are broadly representative of those expressed by the majority of Consultation participants, but this report is not intended to and does not represent the views of all participants on all subjects.

We thank all the participants for their constructive participation in the discussion and in the resulting policy brief. Graduate student Angela Neufeld of Simon Fraser University provided notes and Bill Robinson of Project Ploughshares the primary drafting for the brief. Special thanks are due to Elaine Hynes of the Simons Foundation and Mr. Robinson for their work in organizing the event.

Ernie Regehr, Director
Project Ploughshares


INTRODUCTION
by Jennifer Allen Simons, Ph.D.

This consultation built on a Strategy Consultation convened in Vancouver in October 1999, at which The Simons Foundation honoured the Hon. Lloyd Axworthy, then Canada’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, for his role in calling for a review of NATO’s nuclear policy. We want to continue to encourage the Canadian government to actively pursue a meaningful review of NATO’s plan and policies to make them consistent with the NPT 2000 Action Plan; and to further the goal of nuclear elimination by exploring global security arrangements as alternatives to a nuclearized and expanded NATO and to unilateral initiatives such as the United States’ National Missile Defence system.

We have to accept that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, specifically in relation to Article VI, has so far failed in its objectives, notwithstanding the rhetoric to the contrary. It has failed to halt proliferation, and it has failed to secure the elimination of nuclear weapons. Proliferation continues both vertically and horizontally and the vertical proliferation is taking place in several of the nuclear weapons states where modernization, research and development of nuclear weapons continue.

The Conference on Disarmament remains stalled, despite the new NPT Action Plan, so there is no progress on a fissile material ban treaty, no body established within the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear dangers, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has not entered into effect. Moreover, there has been a reassertion of the nuclear war strategy policy as essential to the United States, to NATO and to Russia. All we have are hopes that the Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS) and the NATO Alliance will not continue to flout International Law.

Canada is a champion of International Law and it is in the country’s best interests to comply, and also to insist on compliance in any alliance in which it is a member, particularly with regard to NATO because NATO “operates on the principle of unanimity.” (International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms document). Therefore Canada, as a member of NATO, with nuclear policies unanimously agreed upon, is de facto in favour of nuclear war strategy, and of nuclear-sharing B a form of nuclear proliferation. It is therefore, essential that Canada continue to push, not just for a review of NATO’s nuclear weapons policy but for their elimination from NATO’s Strategic Plan.

The International Court of Justice Opinion states “that any realistic search for complete disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, necessitates the co-operation of all States.” This responsibility, according to an IALANA document, applies to all states but in particular to the NATO member states, “even those that own no nuclear arms or have no nuclear arms on their territory.”

Any reflection on NATO has to include reflection on Russia. The early damage done to relations with Russia with the expansion of NATO has been exacerbated with the bombing of Kosovo, the United States’ threatened abrogation of the ABM Treaty, the proposed National Missile Defence system, and failure to ratify the CTBT. The situation is more dangerous than ever because of the deterioration of Russia’s military establishment, of nation-wide low morale, a poor economy, and Russia’s perceived need to rely on its nuclear force as its sole symbol of power. It is dangerous to ignore this, according to Bruce Blair of the Center for Defence Information. Because of this situation, both sides have thousands of warheads on high alert and, he says, the conference briefing of the U.S. President lasts only 30 seconds. Before there is a catastrophe, both the United States and Russia must be encouraged to take the weapons off this alert and stand down all nuclear weapons.

Moreover, further expansion of NATO will not only have a catastrophic effect on U.S/Russia relations, but with Romania and other Balkan countries lobbying to join NATO, it will further destabilize the Kosovo region. I do not think we can ignore the possible consequences of the further alienating Russia. NATO Nuclear Weapons Policy cannot be viewed by NATO in isolation from its other concerns. NATO expansion will create more de facto nuclear-weapons states. The Balkans situation will be exacerbated by a few of the Balkan states under the NATO nuclear umbrella. European Union relations with NATO in discussions on European Union security strategies cannot exclude nuclear policy. National Missile Defence is a response to nuclear missile proliferation and relations with Russia always include the nuclear component. Nuclear policy is integrally connected with all these problems, and any discussion of these, in the context of the current Review, should include the issue of nuclear weapons policy.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO’s raison d’etre ceased, and as NATO scrambled to redefine itself, the opportunity was lost to pursue alternative security structures more suitable to a changed and changing world system. This was the time when the OSCE, a partnership which ranges from Vancouver to Vladivostok, could have been supported and strengthened with terms of reference emphasizing partnership, and cooperative security measures. However, because of the failure of political imagination, the opportunity has gone, and a re-invented NATO, thus far, has demonstrated that it is not the vehicle for a globally secure world unless it radically changes its terms of reference or one resigns oneself to nuclear domination and United States hegemony. NATO’s idea of conflict prevention is to threaten nuclear attack. And Kosovo is an example of NATO’s failure at humanitarian intervention.

Nuclear weapons cannot be viewed in isolation from chemical and biological weapons. Chemical and biological weapons are the poor man’s weapons of mass destruction — a substitute for nuclear weapons — and there are treaties banning both. There is no treaty banning nuclear weapons. Richard Falk makes the point that it would be “surreal” to propose arms control arrangements for biological and chemical weapons. Can you imagine, states will agree to each destroy two vials of a virus and stand down 10 containers of their most deadly “humanicide” (if that is the equivalent word to “insecticide”). They are all weapons of extermination B nuclear weapons exterminate on a greater scale by incineration and radioactive poisoning lasting for generations. Yet only biological and chemical weapons are considered outrageous and their use unconscionable. Nuclear weapons — at this point more threatening to life on the planet than both (biological are predicted to reach this danger level) — are treated as if they were normal weapons of normal war. Even though it is bizarre, “it seems normal to pursue incremental steps for nuclear weapons.” (Falk).

I have made the point elsewhere, on other occasions, that the words “weapons” and “war” are euphemisms when used in relation to “nuclear”. Nuclear weapons are not weapons in the conventional sense of weapons for war, but rather a nuclear weapon is “an instrument of unlimited, universal destruction.” Nuclear war is suicide and genocide.

Policies of extermination are irrational. And we are dealing with irrational forces. Richard Falk believes that “the danger is seriously underestimated [because] the real danger comes not from proliferation — horizontal, that is — but from those who have weapons.” He makes the point that we have the tendency to treat “our leaders as normal, rational individuals acting in good faith.” However, he believes that there is something “cultist” about the nuclear policy-makers and refers to General Butler’s term “nuclear priesthood” and suggests that Butler is making the point that one is not dealing with rational-policy-makers.

Even so, and notwithstanding the absurdity of “security” policies based on the threat of annihilation, the recommendations that follow are designed to offer real and realistic steps toward nuclear disarmament. They continue to rest on the expectation that governments can and must provide rational leadership and that rationality and public will can combine to produce policies and alternatives capable of moving us back from the nuclear brink.


Jennifer Allen Simons is President of The Simons Foundation, and Adjunct Professor and Associate of The Institute for the Humanities, Simon Fraser University.


POLICY BRIEF

The Nuclear Disarmament Agenda

Among the most positive disarmament developments of recent years has been the renewed attention given to the desirability and feasibility of abolishing nuclear weapons. The debate over the future of nuclear weapons is far from resolved, and the Nuclear-Weapon States are still far from committed to immediate action towards abolition. But the broad outlines of the global nuclear disarmament agenda are now widely accepted.

The Final Document of the Sixth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was adopted by consensus in May 2000, incorporated a substantive set of principles and measures to guide future nuclear disarmament activities. (The relevant section of the Final Document is included as Appendix 3 to this report.) These included “an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals” B without specifying when that might be accomplished, however B and support for a series of interim steps, including “concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems” (commonly known as “de-alerting”) and “a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimise the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.”

This global agenda was strongly reaffirmed at the United Nations General Assembly a number of weeks after the Consultation when a resolution directly based on the Final Document, the “New Agenda” resolution (see Appendix 4), received the overwhelming support of member states. Among the countries that voted in favour of the resolution were China, the United States, the United Kingdom, and every NATO member except France, which abstained. Russia and six other countries joined France in abstaining, while only Israel, India, and Pakistan B the three nuclear-armed countries that are not signatories of the NPT B voted against the resolution.

The success of the NPT Review Conference and the subsequent passage of the “New Agenda” resolution mean that a near-consensus now exists on the outlines of the global nuclear disarmament agenda.

What remains, and it is a huge task, is to translate that agenda into action B to consolidate the progress made, to fill in the details where agreement exists only on principles, to extend the agenda to include additional important measures, and to ensure that it is implemented fully and expeditiously. We believe that Canada should give active leadership internationally to the elaboration and implementation of this global nuclear disarmament agenda.


The NATO connection

Crucial decisions currently being taken individually and collectively by the member states of NATO will do much to determine the future success or failure of the nuclear disarmament agenda:

  • In 1999 NATO formally restated in its new Strategic Concept its position that nuclear weapons are “the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies,” pledging to retain them “for the foreseeable future.” The Alliance also agreed, however, to conduct an internal review of its nuclear policies, including “options for confidence and security-building measures, verification, non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament.” This review B known informally as the “Paragraph 32” process after the paragraph of the Washington Summit Communique that announced it B is scheduled for completion in December 2000, when its results are to be reported to the North Atlantic Council. Although it is not yet clear what decisions will be made at that time, the review process is likely to continue B in one form or another B after December. It is crucial to the future of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts that NATO’s nuclear policies be revised to conform to the global nuclear disarmament agenda and to international and humanitarian law.
  • NATO members are also consulting on the implications of the US National Missile Defence (NMD) program, which, despite President Bill Clinton’s September 2000 decision to delay deployment of the system, could get the go-ahead sometime in the next few years. Missile defence deployment would lead to serious damage to the existing arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation regime and undermine strategic stability and international security.

The discussions leading to these decisions are being conducted mainly behind closed doors, with little public awareness and even less opportunity for public participation.


Canadian action

Canada is one of the few NATO members to publicly encourage the Alliance to rethink its nuclear weapons policies and reduce the role accorded to nuclear weapons. The efforts of Canada and other like-minded members played an important part in the decision to initiate NATO’s policy review. In the aftermath of the NPT Review Conference, then Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy challenged the North Atlantic Council to take advantage of the policy review to

make our nuclear posture in NATO coherent with our non-proliferation and disarmament posture in New York and Geneva. We need to examine our own policy statements from the perspective of non-proliferation, and ask ourselves what further measures we can take to build confidence, to increase transparency and to advance disarmament. In particular, we need to meet the challenge of reducing the political value that our own alliance ascribes to the possession of nuclear weapons, if we are to continue to convince others that they should not acquire nuclear arsenals of their own.

Canadian officials identified six objectives currently pursued by Canada with respect to NATO nuclear policy:

1. To reduce the “political value” of nuclear weapons

2. To diminish the role of nuclear weapons in Alliance strategy and to restrict their function to solely that of deterring the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by others

3. To update Alliance Arms Control and Disarmament Policy and to publicize this (the last comprehensive statement of the subject dating back to 1989)

4. To promote confidence building measures and to take steps to facilitate the reduction of sub-strategic nuclear arsenals in Europe

5. To encourage enhanced Alliance consultation on non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament issues with the view to concerted efforts in other fora

6. To keep Alliance policy on WMD [weapons of mass destruction] issues, including nuclear ones, under continuing political review

In addition, efforts to apply the momentum established by the NPT review and General Assembly resolutions to deliberations within the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva and within NATO were identified as a Canadian priority.


Directions for Canadian policy

Our fundamental recommendation is that Canada should give active leadership internationally to the elaboration and full and timely implementation of the global nuclear disarmament agenda. We commend the efforts that the Canadian government already has undertaken in this regard and we urge it to place even higher priority on preserving and advancing the nuclear disarmament agenda.


NATO nuclear policy

NATO nuclear policy was the main topic of discussion at the Consultation. Our primary recommendation with respect to NATO is that NATO nuclear policy must be made to conform to the requirements of international law and to the nuclear disarmament obligations undertaken by NATO member states in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and reaffirmed and elaborated upon in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. The most basic of these commitments is, of course, the obligation to eliminate all nuclear weapons. NATO policy must be made to conform B and be seen to conform B with this obligation.

As noted above, the disarmament agenda outlined in the Final Document of the NPT Review Conference was strongly reaffirmed a number of weeks after the Consultation when the “New Agenda” resolution, based directly on the Final Document, received overwhelming support at the United Nations. Especially notable is the fact that the entire membership of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group voted in favour of the resolution. (France, the only NATO member to abstain, is not a member of the NPG.) The onus is now clearly on NATO to match the words and commitments of its members with action.

We recommend that Canada and all NATO states work to ensure that NATO:

Affirm its commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons and commit itself to reducing the political role of nuclear weapons. Current NATO policy statements that characterize nuclear weapons as “essential” and assert an intent to retain them for “the foreseeable future” are incompatible with NATO member states’ obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons. The Canadian government should ensure that such references are eliminated from future NATO policy statements and should continue to place high priority on efforts to “make our nuclear posture in NATO coherent with our non-proliferation and disarmament posture.”

Immediately disavow all threat or use of nuclear weapons in response to any non-nuclear weapon threat or use, as a step toward the total disavowal of nuclear possession and use. The position of the Canadian government is that “the only function of nuclear weapons is to deter the use by others of nuclear weapons, notwithstanding that nuclear weapons may have a deterrent effect in the mind of a potential aggressor.” Current NATO nuclear policy does not reflect this restricted view of the utility of nuclear weapons. Indeed, NATO’s recently updated Military Committee Directive for Military Implementation of Alliance Strategy (MC 400/2) reportedly allows for, or is ambiguous on, the use of nuclear weapons to deter or respond to chemical or biological weapon threats. Such a policy B even ambiguity concerning such a policy B contradicts the Negative Security Assurances that the Nuclear-Weapon States have made and seriously undermines nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. States agreed at the NPT Review Conference to pursue “a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies.” Policies that assert a continuing role for nuclear weapons in defending against non-nuclear threats constitute an especially formidable obstacle to progress towards nuclear abolition, since they imply an enduring requirement for nuclear weapons. Canada should provide leadership within NATO in advocating restriction of the role of nuclear weapons solely to deterrence of nuclear use by others. Canada should also be consistent in opposing less restrictive nuclear policies and should not join “consensus” decisions in favour of such policies.

Adopt a formal no-first-use policy. Following on from the previous point, Canada also should advocate adoption of a formal no-first-use policy for NATO. (Some participants at the Consultation argued against making this a priority, since a no-first-use policy would affect the global policies of the NATO Nuclear-Weapon States, not just their NATO policies, and they might therefore resist addressing this issue through the NATO forum. No participants argued that Canada should not support a no-first-use policy, however.)

Remove tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe. There is no necessity or justification for such weapons in Europe, and their continued presence sends a highly undesirable message about the legitimacy and importance of nuclear weapons in national defence policies. The NPT Review Conference agreed to support “the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons”. Canada should advocate the removal of these weapons and a commitment never to redeploy such weapons in Europe.

Terminate nuclear-sharing arrangements. The nuclear-sharing arrangements currently in place between the United States and six Non-Nuclear-Weapon State (NNWS) members of NATO violate the spirit (and, many argue, the letter) of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Canada should advocate the termination of these arrangements. As a contribution to this goal Canada should encourage the participants in these arrangements to declare individually or collectively their willingness to terminate them.

Despite the fact that NATO’s current nuclear policies as specified in the 1999 Strategic Concept and elsewhere are clearly incompatible with its member states’ disarmament obligations, it is widely expected that the “Paragraph 32” process will not produce significant changes in NATO policy. Thus a key objective now must be to establish an open-ended review process to formalize continuing opportunities to engage NATO in pursuit of the changes that are needed to begin carrying out the global nuclear disarmament agenda. The Consultation was informed that this is already a major goal of Canadian policy. Such a review process should include annual public reports to, and responses from, NATO ministers’ meetings.


NATO process

A high priority should be placed on improved public and NGO access to NATO and national nuclear policy decisionmakers and decisionmaking processes, increased transparency of NATO nuclear policy and processes, and improved accountability of NATO members for NATO nuclear policies.
Specific recommendations include:

Regular meetings between NGOs and NATO officials and national delegations. These could include annual conferences similar to those now organized between Canadian NGOs and DFAIT, as well as a commitment to much more frequent informal contact and regular participation by NATO and national officials in NGO meetings and public fora.

Improvements to transparency. Transparency in NATO policy and process is essential for effective public oversight and participation in nuclear policy issues. Transparency is also essential for demonstrating to the international community that NATO is complying in good faith with its members’ arms control obligations. NATO nuclear policy must be both explicit and public. Deliberate ambiguity and spurious secrecy, as shown, for example, in NATO’s continuing refusal to confirm the presence of nuclear weapons at locations where it is well known they are deployed, undermines both democratic debate and international confidence. It is especially important that the results of the “Paragraph 32” review due for completion in December 2000 be made public.

Annual NATO arms control compliance statement. One significant contribution that NATO could make to improved transparency would be an annual public arms control compliance statement, detailing NATO’s current compliance with arms control obligations (this could apply to non-nuclear as well as nuclear obligations) and outlining its plans for future compliance. Individual member states could also produce such statements. Canada should set an example by producing an annual Canadian statement on these issues.


National Missile Defence and related issues

The continued existence and proliferation of ballistic missile capabilities pose a threat both to global security and to arms control and disarmament progress. It is important to recognize, however, that the primary if not exclusive reason to consider ballistic missiles a threat is the possibility that they might be armed with weapons of mass destruction (of which nuclear weapons are by far the most destructive). Vigorous global action to implement the existing commitments to eliminate these weapons found in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention would thus be the most effective means of addressing the ballistic missile threat.

The deployment of strategic ballistic missile defence systems such as the proposed US National Missile Defence system would not provide an effective response to the missile threat. Even if the technology of missile defence could be made to work, such defences would not eliminate the fundamental problem, which is the continued existence of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction capable of being delivered in a wide variety of ways. Furthermore, in the absence of consensus among the nuclear powers on the appropriateness of such defences, missile defence deployment almost certainly would do serious harm to arms control and disarmament efforts and intensify the overall nuclear threat to the world. The issue of ballistic missile defence is not a matter that should be left solely to the parties to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Canada and all countries have a vital stake in the pursuit of global security. Canada and other NATO states should make clear their opposition to any deployment of missile defences outside the context of an agreed process to manage and eliminate nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

Alternative approaches to assessing and addressing the ballistic missile threat, such as closer engagement with possible proliferators, tighter export controls, and creation of a multilateral missile monitoring and control regime, might help to limit the problem and moderate excessive concern about ballistic missiles. Canada and other NATO states should actively support alternative approaches to assessing and addressing the ballistic missile problem, and should investigate the possibility of creating a multilateral missile monitoring and control regime.


Overall nuclear arms control and disarmament policy

Beyond the immediate context of Alliance nuclear policy and NMD, there are a number of arms control and disarmament priorities that Canada and other NATO states should pursue.

The danger of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war still remains far too high, due in large part to the continuation of Cold-War-era “hair-trigger” alert postures by both Russia and the United States. De-alerting and related measures such as de-mating (removing nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles) have the potential to significantly reduce this danger. These measures, which are in effect another form of disarmament B operational rather than numerical B also have considerable potential for augmenting and reinforcing more traditional disarmament measures. The Canadian government declared its support for de-alerting and de-mating in its April 1999 nuclear policy statement. The NPT Review Conference’s call for “concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems” was also a clear reference to the concept. Canada and other NATO states should actively advocate the concept of de-alerting and de-mating nuclear forces.

Much deeper cuts in strategic nuclear forces (as well as the elimination of non-strategic nuclear forces) should also be an important near-term goal. One participant at the Consultation recommended in this regard that Canada should explore the 1994 Yeltsin proposal for a five-power nuclear safety, stability, and disarmament framework, which Russia continues to cite when making disarmament proposals. A deep cuts agreement could contribute significantly to other Canadian disarmament objectives, particularly if it focused on sharp reductions in counterforce weapons, the highly accurate nuclear forces that have the potential to destroy other countries’ nuclear forces in a surprise attack. Counterforce reductions would serve not only to reduce Russian concerns about US NMD plans, but would also B more importantly B eliminate the argument that de-alerting might create an unacceptable vulnerability to surprise attack. Canada and other NATO states should advocate further deep cuts in strategic nuclear forces, focusing in particular on counterforce capabilities.

The 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons was a landmark statement that did not create law but did provide the most authoritative opinion possible regarding the requirements of existing international and humanitarian law with respect to nuclear weapons. By demonstrating the near impossibility of using nuclear weapons in compliance with the law, the Court highlighted the incompatibility between an international society based on law and human rights and the continued existence of security policies based on nuclear weapons. Canada and other NATO states should continuously emphasize the importance of ensuring that all NATO and member state security policies respect and comply with international and humanitarian law.

It is important also that nuclear disarmament efforts be supported by broader disarmament objectives. The pursuit of “general and complete disarmament” B also an obligation that states have undertaken in the Non-Proliferation Treaty B receives insufficient attention. Neither goal should be considered dependent on the achievement of the other, but the parallel pursuit of both is likely to achieve more than the pursuit of one alone. General and complete disarmament would not mean the elimination of all armed forces but rather the progressive elimination of capabilities to conduct major offensive warfare and the placing of residual interventionary capabilities under the firm control of the international community for the purposes of the collective preservation of international order and protection of human rights. There is an element of the US foreign policy establishment that seeks to preserve unlimited unilateral military intervention capabilities for the United States but fails to recognize that the existence (and use) of these capabilities increases the likelihood of some of the threats, such as ballistic missile and weapon of mass destruction proliferation, that most concern the US. Canada should advocate the start of international consultations on the scope and nature of general and complete disarmament. The work of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty might provide a useful starting point for some of these discussions.

Further complementing these efforts must be increased emphasis on the non-military resolution of armed conflicts and on preventive action to improve human security in all its aspects, reduce the underlying causes of conflicts, prevent future problems, and provide peaceful means to address contentious issues. Canadian disarmament efforts should be pursued in the context of a comprehensive and proactive global security policy.


Like-minded governments

Canada can pursue its disarmament objectives most effectively by working in co-operation with like-minded governments to build broad international support for disarmament progress. As a member of NATO and a strong supporter of nuclear disarmament, Canada is in a key position to contribute to this process. The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (SCFAIT) recommended in its December 1998 report Canada and the Nuclear Challenge that “the Government of Canada intensify its efforts, in cooperation with States such as its NATO allies and the members of the New Agenda Coalition, to advance the process of nuclear disarmament.” The government accepted this recommendation, and we believe that the record of the past two years has validated the strategy.

We recommend that Canada continue to work in close co-operation with the New Agenda states to advance the global nuclear disarmament agenda and that it pursue closer co-operation with the NATO-5 states (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway) and other NATO allies to build support for changes in NATO nuclear policy.


Public opinion / global consensus building

The importance of public opinion in maintaining pressure for nuclear disarmament was emphasized by a number of participants at the Consultation, including Ambassador Westdal, who noted that in many instances “the mobilization of shame is the chief engine of progress.” It was also highlighted in the SCFAIT report. Canada should place greater emphasis on the mobilization of informed global public opinion in favour of nuclear disarmament. The annual Canadian compliance report suggested above could contribute to this effort, as could support for other initiatives such as the UN Secretary-General’s call for an international conference on eliminating nuclear dangers. Canada should also consider sponsoring a new international commission on the future of nuclear arms control and disarmament to continue and extend the work of the Canberra Commission and the Tokyo Forum.
Update

The final report of the “Paragraph 32” review was approved by the North Atlantic Council on 14 December 2000. Much of the report dealt with broader arms control issues, ranging from biological and chemical weapons to small arms, light weapons, and land mines. On nuclear weapons, the report was largely status quo. It reiterated the 1999 Strategic Concept’s description of the role of nuclear weapons and asserted that “[t]here is a clear rationale for a continued, though much reduced, presence of substrategic nuclear forces in Europe.” No substantive change was proposed in any aspect of NATO nuclear policy. The report did state that “Alliance nations … reaffirm their commitment under Article VI of the NPT to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” It also pledged NATO’s support for the 13 action items agreed during the 2000 NPT Review Conference (and reiterated in the New Agenda resolution in November 2000). But the report provided no indication of how NATO’s current nuclear policies could be reconciled with such steps. The release of the December report marked the end of the “Paragraph 32” process. No indication was provided of whether or how any further review of nuclear policy would be conducted aside from a pro forma reiteration of the promise made in the Strategic Concept that NATO’s arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation policies “will be kept under review in the light of the evolving security environment.”


APPENDICES


Appendix 1
Consultation Participants

Dr. Mary-Wynne Ashford
Co-President, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
Canada

Dr. Rajesh Basrur
Reader, Department of Civics and Politics
University of Mumbai
India

Dr. Lee-Anne Broadhead
Assistant Professor
Department of Politics, Government and Public Administration
University College of Cape Breton
Canada

Rear Admiral E.J. Carroll, Jr., USN (Ret.)
Deputy Director
Center for Defense Information
USA

Mr. Robin Collins
Steering Committee member
Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

Bev Delong
President
Lawyers for Social Responsibility
Canada

Daniel Durand
Secrétaire national
le Mouvement de la paix
France

Dr. Dietrich Fischer
Co-Director
Transcend: A Peace & Development Network
USA

Dr. Randall Caroline Forsberg
Executive Director
Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies
USA

Colonel(Ret’d) Douglas Fraser
Executive Director
Canadian Council for International Peace & Security

Francis Furtado
Nuclear Weapons Policy Officer
Arms and Proliferation Control
Department of National Defence
Canada

Dr. Hans J. Giessmann
Deputy Director,
Centre for OSCE Research (CORE)
Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, University of Hamburg
Germany

Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr.
President, Lawyers Alliance for World Security
USA

Cdr. Rob Green, RN (Retired)
Disarmament and Security Centre
Aotearoa/New Zealand

Professor Franklyn Griffiths
George Ignatieff Chair
Peace and Conflict Studies
University College
University of Toronto
Canada

Debbie Grisdale
Executive Director
Physicians for Global Survival
Canada

Fredrik S. Heffermehl
Vice President
International Peace Bureau, Geneva

Dr. Sean Howard
Editor
Disarmament Diplomacy

Heidi Hulan
Policy Advisor,
Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs
Foreign Affairs & International Trade
Canada

Elaine Hynes
Assistant to the President
The Simons Foundation

Nicolas Kasprzyk (Ph.D. Candidate)
CESIM (Centre d’Etudes de Sécuritié Internationale)
Nuclear Arms Control
UMLV Aires Culturelles et Politiques
France

Karel Koster
PENN-Netherlands

Steven Lee
National Director
Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development

Dr. George N. Lewis
Security Studies Program
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
USA

Mr. Conakry Marsono
Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the United Nations

Barbara Martin
Deputy Director
North American and Euro-Atlantic Security & Defence Relations Division
Foreign Affairs & International Trade
Canada

Grigory Mashkov
Counsellor (Political)
Embassy of the Russian Federation
Canada

Robert McDougall
Director
Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division
Foreign Affairs & International Trade
Canada

Roman Merkulov
Attaché
Embassy of the Russian Federation
Canada

Paul Meyer
Director General
International Security Bureau
Foreign Affairs & International Trade
Canada

Dr. Otfried Nassauer
Director,
Berlin Information-Center for Transatlantic Security (BITS)
Germany

Angela Neufeld
Canada

Walter Pitman
Chair
Project Ploughshares

Daniel Plesch
Director
British American Security Information Council
USA

Mr. Scott Proudfoot
Deputy Director
Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division
Foreign Affairs & International Trade
Canada

Tariq Rauf
Director
International Organizations and Nonproliferation Project
Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies
USA

Patrick Rechner
TRANSCEND Ottawa
Canada

Ernie Regehr
Director
Project Ploughshares

Sharon Riggle
Director
Centre for European Security and Disarmament
Belgium

Bill Robinson
Project Ploughshares

Senator Douglas Roche, O.C.
Chairman, Middle Powers Initiative
Canada

Professor Paul Rogers
Department of Peace Studies
Richmond Building
University of Bradford
United Kingdom

Professor Douglas Ross
Department of Political Science
Simon Fraser University
Canada

Dr. Jennifer Allen Simons
President
The Simons Foundation

Dr. Elinor Sloan
NATO Desk Officer
North American and Euro-Atlantic Security & Defence Relations Division
Foreign Affairs & International Trade
Canada

Dr. Michael D. Wallace
Professor of Political Science
University of British Columbia
Canada

Mr. Peter Weiss
President
Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy
USA

Ambassador Christopher Westdal
Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament

Ambassador Makmur Widodo
Deputy Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the United Nations

Mr. Zhigang Fu
First Secretary
Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations, Geneva

 

Appendix 2
Consultation Agenda

Thursday

28 September

18:30 Reception and Consultation Registration
Chateau Laurier Hotel, Quebec Suite Foyer

19:00 Dinner
Chateau Laurier Hotel, Quebec Suite

– Introduction
– Keynote Address by Dr. Mary-Wynne Ashford, Co-President, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
Friday

29 September West Block, Parliament Hill

09:30 Opening

10:00 Panel 1: Status of the NATO Review

12:00 Lunch

Keynote Luncheon Address by
The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy,
Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs

13:30 Panel 2: Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament Priorities

15:00 Break

15:15 Panel 3: Implications of National Missile Defence

16:45 Adjourn
Saturday
30 September West Block, Parliament Hill

09:00 Panel 4: Deterrence and Assurance Strategies

10:30 Break

10:45 Panel 5: Post-Nuclear Security Arrangements

12:15 Lunch

13:45 Panel 6: Directions for Canadian Policy

15:15 Conference close

 

Appendix 3
Final Document of the Sixth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

(Excerpt)

The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”:

1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

2. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.

3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI.

7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

 
Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally;

Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament;

The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;

Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;

A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;

The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.

11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

12. Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”, and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

 

Appendix 4
“Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: the Need for a New Agenda”

Resolution 55/33C, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 20 November 2000 by a vote of 154 in favour, 3 opposed, and 8 abstentions.
The General Assembly,

Noting its resolutions 53/77Y of 4 December 1998 and 54/54G of 1 December 1999,

Expressing its deep concern at the continued risk for humanity represented by the possibility that nuclear weapons could be used,

Noting the International Court of Justice advisory opinion entitled “Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons”, issued at The Hague on 8 July 1996,

Noting also that three states continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and concerned at the continued retention of the nuclear weapons option by those three States,

Declaring that nuclear test explosions carried out in 1998 by two of the States that have not renounced the nuclear weapons option do not in any way confer a nuclear-weapon State status or any special status whatsoever,

Noting that despite achievements in bilateral and unilateral arms reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpile still amount to many thousands,

Welcoming the significant progress achieved in nuclear weapons reductions made unilaterally or bilaterally under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process, as steps towards nuclear disarmament,

Welcoming also the ratification of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) by the Russian Federation as an important step in the efforts to reduce strategic offensive weapons, and noting that completion of ratification of START II by the United States of America remains a priority,

Concerned that negotiations on nuclear arms reductions are not actively under way,

Welcoming further the significant unilateral reduction measures taken by other nuclear-weapon States, including the close-down and dismantling of nuclear weapon-related facilities,

Welcoming the efforts of several States to cooperate in making nuclear disarmament measures irreversible, in particular, through initiatives on the verification, management and disposition of fissile material declared excess to military purposes,

Noting the nuclear-weapon States= declaration that none of their nuclear weapons are targeted at any State,

Underlining the necessity of strict compliance by all parties with their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Noting the United Nations Millennium Declaration, in which the heads of State and Government resolved to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers,

Welcoming the Final Document of the Sixth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Taking into consideration the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, in the Final Document of the Sixth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are committed under article VI of the Treaty,

Underlining the need for action to achieve a world free from nuclear weapons,

Determined to pursue practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”,

1. Agrees on the importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;

2. Calls for the upholding of a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty;

3. Agrees on the necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a program of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years;

4. Agrees on the necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a program of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body;

5. Calls for the principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures;

6. Calls for the early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible, while preserving and strengthening the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions;

7. Calls for the completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency;

8. Calls for steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all, for:

(a) Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally;

(b) Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament;

(c) The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;

(d) Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;

(e) A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;

(f) The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons;

9. Calls for arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under the International Atomic Energy Agency or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such materials for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes;

10. Reaffirms that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

11. Calls for regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996;

12. Agrees to pursue the further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world;

13. Calls on all States not yet party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accede to the Treaty as non nuclear-weapon States, promptly and without condition, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, and calls upon those States to bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with additional protocols consistent with the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards for ensuring nuclear non-proliferation, and to reverse clearly and urgently any policies to pursue any nuclear-weapon development or deployment and to refrain from any action which could undermine regional and international peace and security and the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation;

14. Calls upon those States that have not yet done so to conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency and to conclude additional protocols to their safeguards agreement on the basis of the Model Protocol approved by the Board of Governors of the Agency on 15 May 1997;

15. Notes the paramount importance of effective physical protection of all nuclear material, and calls upon all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials;

16. Notes that the Sixth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons agreed that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and that it called upon its Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on this issue;

17. Reaffirms the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objective of nuclear disarmament, and supports proposals for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones where they do not yet exist, such as in the Middle East and South Asia;

18. Affirms that a nuclear-weapon-free world will ultimately require the underpinnings of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments;

19. Acknowledges the Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 54/54G, and requests him, within existing resources, to compile a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

20. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda” and to review the implementation of the present resolution.

 

PANELISTS

Panel 1: NATO Nuclear Policy & Status of the NATO Review

Paul Meyer, Director General, International Security Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Dan Plesch, Director, British American Security Information Council (BASIC)
Panel 2: Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament Priorities

Rear Admiral Eugene Carroll, Jr, Deputy Director, Center for Defense Information

Sean Howard, Editor, Disarmament Diplomacy 

Peter Weiss, President, Lawyers= Committee on Nuclear Policy

Ambassador Chris Westdal, Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament
Panel 3: Implications of National Missile Defence

George N. Lewis, Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Otfried Nassauer, Director, Berlin Information-Center for Transatlantic Security (BITS)

Zhigang Fu, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of the People=s Republic of China to the United Nations, Geneva
Panel 4: Deterrence and Assurance Strategies

Rajesh Basrur, Department of Civics and Politics, University of Mumbai

Amb. Thomas Graham, Jr., President, Lawyers Alliance for World Security

Cdr. Rob Green, RN (Retired), Disarmament and Security Centre
Panel 5: North Atlantic Post-Nuclear Security Arrangements

Dietrich Fischer, Deputy Director, TRANSCEND: A Peace and Development Network

Hans Giessmann, Deputy Director, Centre for OSCE Research (CORE), University of Hamburg

Franklyn Griffiths, George Ignatieff Chair of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Toronto

Sharon Riggle, Director, Centre for European Security and Disarmament
Panel 6: Directions for Canadian Policy

Randall Forsberg, Executive Director, Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies

Tariq Rauf, Director, International Organizations and Nonproliferation Project, Monterey Institute of International Studies

 

CONSULTATION PAPERS

Each of the Consultation panelists was asked to submit a short paper relating to the topic of their presentation. The other Consultation participants were asked to submit brief papers responding to one or more of the following questions:

1. What changes to its nuclear policies should NATO be realistically asked to make, in the context of the current review, to move it towards fuller compliance with global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation obligations and imperatives?

2. Are there realistic and credible alternative means of addressing the security concerns that underlie current U.S. interest in missile defense?

3. What are the most realistic short-term or interim measures that should be taken by nuclear weapon states and nuclear alliances to demonstrate a commitment to significantly reducing the political legitimacy and value of nuclear weapons in order to contribute to the goal of elimination?

The panelists/participants and their papers are listed below:

Canada’s Role in Promoting the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
Mary-Wynne Ashford, MD, Ph.D.,
Co-President, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War

Nuclear Deterrence: An Indian Perspective
Rajesh M. Basrur
Reader, Department of Civics and Politics, University of Mumbai, India

The Need for an Immanent Critique
Dr. Lee-Anne Broadhead
Assistant Professor, Department of Politics, Government and Public Administration
University College of Cape Breton

Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament Priorities
Rear Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, Jr.
Deputy Director, Center for Defense Information

A Nonprovocative Defence Posture: Why Canada Should Start the Ball Rolling at the NATO Review
Robin Collins
Steering Committee member, Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

NATO, Nuclear Weapons and International Law
Beverley J. Tollefson Delong
President, Lawyers for Social Responsibility

The Uncertain State of the U.S.-Russian Nuclear Restraint Regime
Anatoli Diakov
Director, Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies
Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology

For a Nuclear Weapon-Free NATO in a Nuclear Weapon-Free World
Daniel Durand
Secrétaire national, le Mouvement de la paix, France

Towards a Comprehensive and Proactive Security Policy
Dietrich Fischer
Co-Director, Transcend: A Peace & Development Network

Alternatives to National Missile Defence
Col (Ret’d) Douglas Fraser
Executive Director, Canadian Council for International Peace & Security

Concerns and Responses — A Chinese Perspective on NMD/TMD
Zhigang Fu
First Secretary
Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations, Geneva

The Underrated OSCE
Hans J. Giessmann
Deputy Director, Centre for OSCE Research (CORE), University of Hamburg

Deterrence and Assurance Strategy: NATO Nuclear Weapon Use Policy
Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr.
President, Lawyers Alliance for World Security

NATO Nuclear Policy, National Missile Defence, and Alternative Security Arrangements
Commander Robert D. Green, Royal Navy (Retired)
Disarmament and Security Centre, Christchurch, Aotearoa/New Zealand

Post-nuclear Security Arrangements: Indications from the Arctic
Franklyn Griffiths
George Ignatieff Chair of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Toronto

Statement for Consultation
Debbie Grisdale
Executive Director, Physicians for Global Survival, Canada

NATO must Build and Respect International Law
Fredrik S. Heffermehl
Vice President, International Peace Bureau, Geneva

Dimensions of Change: NATO and the NPT Action Plan
Dr. Sean Howard
Editor, Disarmament Diplomacy

Learning the Lessons of Iraq
Dr. Sean Howard
Editor, Disarmament Diplomacy

Choosing the Right Path at a Strategic Crossroad
Nicolas Kasprzyk
Centre d’Etudes de Sécurité Internationale, France

A Note on Possible Changes to NATO Nuclear Policy and Related Issues
Karel Koster
PENN-Netherlands

Ballistic Missile Debate Misses Target
Steve Lee
National Director, Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development

Implications of National Missile Defense
George Lewis
Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Presentation on NATO Nuclear Policy and the Status of the NATO Review
Paul Meyer
Director General, International Security Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Options for Change: NATO, Russia, Nuclear Weapons and the Future of Disarmament
Otfried Nassauer
Director, Berlin Information-Center for Transatlantic Security (BITS)

NATO’s Nuclear Agenda: Recommendations for Action
Dan Plesch
Director, British American Security Information Council (BASIC)

Refocusing Canadian Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament Policy
Tariq Rauf
Director, International Organizations and Nonproliferation Project
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies

A Vision for a Post-Nuclear NATO; or Miracles Really Can Happen
Sharon Riggle
Director, Centre for European Security and Disarmament

Moving NATO Towards Compliance With Global Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation Obligations
Senator Douglas Roche, O.C.
Chairman, Middle Powers Initiative

Contexts for Progress
Prof. Paul Rogers
Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford

Responses to the 3 questions
Prof. Douglas A. Ross
Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser University

Improving the International Control of Ballistic Missiles
Jürgen Scheffran
IANUS, Zintl Institute, Germany

The Threat of Nuclear Weapons: No Time to Be “Realistic”
Prof. Michael Wallace
Professor of Political Science, University of British Columbia

An Essay in Bifurcation: What the Nuclear Weapon Powers Do and What They Say
Peter Weiss
President, Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy

Alternatives to a National Missile Defense and Short-Term or Interim Measures to Contribute to the Goal of Nuclear Disarmament
Ambassador Dr. Makarim Wibisono
Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the United Nations

 

Project Ploughshares Working Papers are published to contribute to public awareness and debate of issues of disarmament and development. The views expressed and proposals made in these papers should not be taken as necessarily reflecting the official policy of Project Ploughshares.

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