
**Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

Report submitted by Norway

1. This report presents the steps taken by Norway to implement Article VI of the NPT and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”. The report focuses on the 13 practical steps in the 2000 Final Document, which is the most recent document elaborating the obligations embodied in Article VI and the “Principles and Objectives”.

Step 1 – CTBT

2. Norway signed and ratified the treaty at an early stage. Universal adherence to the treaty and its early entry into force continue to be a high priority. Norway has worked towards this goal by actively promoting the signing and ratification of the treaty, and by supporting the efforts of the CTBTO PrepCom in Vienna to implement the treaty’s verification mechanism.

3. At the 57th UN General Assembly last autumn, Norway’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Jan Petersen, signed a Joint Ministerial Statement in support of the CTBT.

4. Norway has expressed the view on several occasions, notably at the two Article XIV Conferences and in the UN 1st Committee, that it is vitally important that the nuclear powers ratify the Treaty without delay, and that the remaining States Parties listed in Annex II to the treaty do so as well. In order to accelerate the ratification process Norway has granted financial assistance to selected countries, through the Preparatory Commission in Vienna.

Step 2 - Test Moratoria

5. Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, it is important that the moratoria on tests remain in force. However, Norway considers that such self-imposed moratoria cannot replace the legally binding commitment that the signing and ratification of the CTBT represents.

6. The CTBT establishes a far-reaching global monitoring and verification system, capable of detecting all relevant nuclear explosions. The verification system is thus at the core of the treaty. The full and early implementation of the International Monitoring System

(IMS), without waiting for the entry into force of the treaty, would be a significant confidence- and security-building measure. Six monitoring stations, with a total of 119 field instruments, are located on Norwegian territory as part of the IMS. With the ratification of the CTBT in 1999, NORSAR has been established as the Norwegian National Data Center for treaty verification.

Step 3 – FMCT

7. Norway considers it to be a top priority for the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to start negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Such a treaty is the next logical step on the multilateral arms control agenda and is essential if we are to make progress in nuclear non-proliferation.

8. As long as the deadlock in the CD remains, Norway welcomes the ongoing parallel process to identify and assess technical aspects of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. It is necessary to deal with the entire field of weapons-usable material in a comprehensive manner. All nuclear-weapons states should conclude and implement arrangements to place fissile material that is no longer required for military purposes under the IAEA verification regime. Norway advocates the principle of irreversible disposition in order to ensure that excess stockpiles of fissile material remain outside the military cycle. To that end IAEA monitoring is required.

Step 4 – Nuclear disarmament in the CD

9. Norway has expressed concern about the continued deadlock in the CD and has supported the efforts to agree on a programme of work, including the cross-regional initiative by the five former presidents of the Conference. The impasse of the CD prevents its members from addressing also the issue of nuclear disarmament.

Step 5 – Irreversibility

10. Norway has repeatedly expressed support for the principle of irreversibility in arms control and nuclear disarmament.

Step 7 – Strategic arms agreements

11. Norway welcomes the US- Russian agreement on a new treaty on further reductions in strategic nuclear warheads, and hopes it will soon be ratified. Reductions in the numbers of operationally deployed strategic warheads will be an important contribution to the implementation of the decisions of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and to continued strategic stability and enhanced security in the new international context. While welcoming reductions in strategic nuclear warheads, Norway underlines the need for reductions that are verifiable, transparent and irreversible.

Step 8 – Trilateral Initiative between the US, Russia and IAEA

12. Norway holds the view that emphasis should be given to the completion and full implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the US, Russia and the IAEA. Efforts could be made to expand this arrangement to include all nuclear weapon capable states, which would be an important step in the direction of international control of excessive stocks of fissile material and deeper cuts in nuclear arms.

Step 9 – Steps by the nuclear weapon states

13. Norway strongly supports increased transparency with regard to nuclear arsenals. At the NPT Review Conference three years ago, we introduced proposals to this end, together with Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands.

14. We also advocate transparency through the conclusion of Additional Safeguard Protocols with the IAEA. We urge all those States that have not yet signed or ratified such a Protocol to do so without delay. Norway supports the view that IAEA safeguards should be applied to all peaceful nuclear activities in all States Parties, in accordance with the treaty. It is regrettable that only a few countries have concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements, since these agreements promote confidence that no nuclear material and activities are undeclared. The measures contained in the IAEA's Model Additional Protocol are important for the Agency's efforts to enhance nuclear non-proliferation and as a new verification standard. They strengthen the effectiveness of the comprehensive IAEA safeguards system.

15. Norway welcomed the unilateral declarations by the US and Russian presidents in 1991-1992, which resulted in the elimination of large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons. These declarations are in Norway's view still relevant and should be maintained and strengthened. We encourage the adoption of transparency measures such as reporting on the implementation of these two important declarations and reciprocal exchange of information by the two countries involved. In this regard we would like to point to the transparency measures that NATO has proposed to Russia. Norway hopes to see the early start of further negotiations on substantial cuts in the arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons.

Step 11 – General and complete disarmament

16. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation issues continue to be central elements of Norwegian foreign policy.

17. An Action Plan to Combat Nuclear Terrorism was drawn up by the IAEA and approved by the IAEA General Conference in March 2002. Norway has contributed USD 130 000 to activities under the Action Plan's sub programme K 6 on nuclear and radiation emergencies. Norwegian experts have been made available to the Agency. The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency forms a good basis for international co-operation. The implementation of these conventions needs, however, to be strengthened and enhanced.

18. Norway has for more than 10 years been co-operating bilaterally with Russia on nuclear safety issues. Radioactive waste and spent fuel are a challenge to non-proliferation efforts. Secure handling and storage of such materials is a primary goal of the Norwegian Plan of

Action for nuclear safety in northwestern Russia. Since 1995, Norway has spent more than USD 100 million on nuclear safety measures in Russia.

Step 12 – Reporting

19. Norway believes that national reports by States Parties should contain regular, systematic and detailed information to other States Parties with the goal of improving the functioning of the NPT's strengthened review process. By submitting its national report, Norway is demonstrating its view that reporting should be done by all States Parties. It should be obligatory rather than optional.

Step 13 – Development of verification

20. Norway supports the further development and strengthening of verification capabilities, an issue that is clearly linked to that of compliance.
