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Overlooking the faults of peacebuilding

By John Siebert

In the course of a few weeks several summary or reflective articles on the meaning, value, and effectiveness of peacebuilding crossed over my electronic transept. Coincidence? Maybe. It was all quite dispiriting at first. A trip to Istanbul in early July put matters into perspective.

**A journey too far**

Since the end of the Cold War something called “peacebuilding” has gained increasing salience in international relations circles. Foreign ministries, academics, and civil society practitioners have taken up the charge. A range of institutions have emerged to study this new policy frontier, producing in-the-field, evidenced-based this and theoretical-comparative that. Early warning and conflict prevention, more deployments of UN Special Representatives and Department of Peacekeeping Operations, track two diplomacy, mediation, conciliation, security sector reform, and governance strengthening and innovation—each and every topic is making careers for a rising slew of writers.

Despite this more welcoming rhetorical cover for those working for peace, Simon Fisher and Lada Zimina (2009) ask if we are “just wasting our time.” Their work started as an open letter to sympathizers, trying to pose “provocative thoughts for peacebuilders” and soliciting responses that helped the letter grow into an article. Despite the clear drop in the number of armed conflicts over the past decade (Project Ploughshares 2009; World Bank and Human Security Report Project 2008), Fisher and Zimina despair that “militarised views of the world still dominate” and peace practitioners “remain weak and implicitly focused on a relatively narrow approach to peace” (p. 11). They ask if the peacebuilding community is “stunted,” lacking vision for the bigger picture (or “peace writ large”) and stuck in “essentially ‘technical’ peacebuilding, focused on project-bound locations and time-scales and trusting that the bigger picture will look after itself” (p. 13).

With a cooler, less passionate approach, Jenna Slotin and Vanessa Wyeth (2009, p. 1), rapporteurs for the 2008 International Peace Institute’s (IPI) New York Seminar, address the shortcomings of the “international community’s toolbox” for improving “international responses to armed conflict.” The seminar participants identify a world of “policy circles” that have failed to recognize “that all conflicts are fundamentally rooted in political dynamics.” The institutional weakness, which corresponds to policy recognition failure, stems from the “lack of a coherent and strategic approach by international actors in any given conflict or postconflict situation.” Is it any wonder that with a “lack of strategic planning capacity,” “confused accountability and authority structures,” “fundamental conceptual dilemmas,” and “contradictions in means and ends” we have the current confused result? The short version of the seminar list of solutions starts with the words “improve,” “address,” “rebuild,” “harmonize,” and “strengthen.”

Establishing connections to regional intergovernmental organizations is better done ahead of a crisis rather than in the middle of it.

Laurent Goetschel and Tobias Hagmann (2009, pp. 56-57) continued the parade of unsolicited peacebuilding overviews by sticking a rhetorical needle in the current peace balloon in “Civilian peacebuilding: peace by bureaucratic means?” Some congratulations may be in order because “peace has forcefully entered contemporary discourses and practices of policy-makers, bureaucrats and development planners.” However, the authors claim that the process of peacebuilding has been made reliant on “technocratic and prescriptive interpretations of peace,” follows “a number of vaguely stated assumptions about how peace can be achieved,” and “privileges a top-down variant of liberal peace to the detriment of societal visions of peace, justice and co-existence.”

After they “problematise the normative underpinnings and ethical dilemmas of the current ‘peacebuilding bandwagon’” (Goetschel & Hagmann 2009, p. 57) and take a few other steps, I think Goetschel and Hagmann are zeroing in on the same territory as Fisher and Zimina. It’s hard to say. They are primarily looking at the bottom-up approach of NGOs.
The final paper of my unplanned odyssey into the peacebuilding discourse has roots a little closer to home. The International Development Research Centre (IDRC), in cooperation with the Peacebuilding Support Office and the Carnegie Corporation of New York, also had a seminar that focused on the UN system, called “Bringing Research Perspectives to Inform the UN’s Peacebuilding Work” (Fischer 2008).

I learned that the “body of knowledge” amassed since the 1990s on peacebuilding has “two serious shortcomings. First, the literature on peacebuilding is dominated by Northern and Western views. Second, deep divides characterize the theory, policy and practice of peacebuilding” (Fischer 2008, p. 1). The inevitable key recommendations in the final report (required for the seminar’s funders, to be sure) left me breathless: build capacity, clarify, focus, sequence correctly, put in place public information strategies, do not create unachievable objectives, learn how to affect incentive structures, and “improve expectations management” (Fischer 2008, p. 2).

It’s always nice to know you are part of a larger movement, but honestly, has it come to this? Improve expectations management?

**Running back to Istanbul**

So, what’s Istanbul got to do with it?

The opportunity blew in on the wind, or rather a general invitation arrived by email from Peacebuild (formerly the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee) to attend a workshop in Istanbul, Turkey, July 9-11, 2009 on “Enhancing Engagement between Civil Society Organizations and (Sub)Regional Inter-governmental Organizations.” It was organized by the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC, see www.gppac.net), an international network of peacebuilding organizations, in cooperation with the Initiative for Conflict Prevention through Quiet Diplomacy and the Folke Bernadotte Academy. I could barely contain my recently acquired anxiety about the potential deployment of inadequate conceptual frameworks and privileged points of access, but I had never been to Istanbul and the topic looked interesting. I was chosen to go.

The purpose of the workshop was to explore how civil society organizations (CSOs) could work with regional and subregional intergovernmental organizations on conflict prevention. It was facilitated by Canadian John Packer, now at the University of Essex and Coordinator of the Initiative on Conflict Prevention through Quiet Diplomacy. His colleagues from previous work with the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Sally Holt and Zdenka Machnyikova, also made presentations.

Seventeen participants represented members of the GPPAC community from Europe, the Middle East, Canada, Latin America, Africa, and Asia. In introducing themselves participants named over 25 intergovernmental organizations to which they relate or that are relevant in their various regions. There was some discussion on the nature of these organizations. Are they regional organizations as defined by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter? Are all intergovernmental organizations relevant to this discussion on conflict prevention or only some? It turns out that all are fair game because they may in fact be key actors in violence prevention in a given situation.

Many of the intergovernmental organizations were characterized as being closed to CSO interaction. Why? One possible reason is that recent postcolonial states can be very jealous of their sovereignty—on their own soil or in intergovernmental arenas where they are members—and don’t see the need for the involvement of CSOs. By all appearances, some of these organizations are ineffective in most of their endeavors, not just in building security within and among their members.

**By sharing practical experience and wrestling with the road blocks encountered in different parts of the world, peacebuilding will remain a worthy pursuit.**

Packer emphasized “quiet diplomacy” as a mode or technique of engagement, rather than “diplomacy” formally practised by recognized representatives of states. Intervention via quiet diplomacy is particularly apt at key points in the conflict cycle to prevent an outbreak of violence. While structural prevention that addresses the deeply rooted economic or social causes of conflict needs to be considered, such circumstances exist in too many places. How can limited attention and resources be focused on prevention when 50 or more states are considered fragile, failed, or failing? (The Fund for Peace 2009).

The focus is on operational prevention when the proximate causes of violence—the sparks leading to the actual wild fires of violence—are visible. It’s a timing question. The international community—acting through the UN or regional intergovernmental organizations—often will not respond until the forces of violence are clearly visible. Quiet diplomacy techniques are less useful later in the conflict cycle when violence has broken out or the international community is employing some type of military intervention to stop the violence. The post-conflict period, which requires reconciliation,
rehabilitation, and restitution in the violence-affected society, is another prime time for CSO quiet diplomacy.

It was also pointed out that establishing connections to regional intergovernmental organizations is better done ahead of a crisis rather than in the middle of it. Negotiating access to the processes while trying to convey positions and alternatives in the midst of an operational crisis is less likely to be successful. GPPAC is trying to focus its work on these practical points of maximum CSO relevance and effectiveness in the conflict cycle.

Practical examples of interventions that worked and did not come from workshop participants around the table. Andrés Serbin from CRIES (Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales), a Latin American and Caribbean network of academics and CSOs working on conflict prevention, systematically described interventions in the Americas. There are many types of regional and sub-regional intergovernmental organizations, the oldest and best established being the Organization of American States (OAS). The exclusion of Cuba from the OAS in 1962, the current UN-mandated operation in Haiti primarily by member countries of the OAS, and the recent military coup in Honduras served as examples of openings and challenges for CSOs to play an active part in conflict prevention through the OAS.

Creating a new path to a peaceful future

Because the final Istanbul workshop report hasn’t come out yet, I can’t poke fun at its terminology, as I have done with the articles that put me in the dumps about peacebuilding. Let’s just say that we CSO peacebuilding practitioners aren’t immune from the terminological hyperbole and obfuscation. We can reasonably expect phrases like “shared interests,” “comparative advantages,” “complementarities and synergy,” and “efficiency and leverage” to show up. “Strategic partnerships” and “entry points” will figure prominently. Knowing “mandates, activities, and capacities” of those you hope to influence will play a role. “Knowledge transfer” was mumbled at some point. But I can say with calm assurance that not once were the words “improve expectations management” used at this GPPAC workshop.

More typical of our CSO discussions and less visible in the peacebuilding overview articles cited earlier are terms such as “civilian monitoring” and “incorporating local knowledge of specific dynamics into ongoing conflict analysis.” Talk of “creating spaces for political dialogue” in intergovernmental organizations and in conflict zones may be an antidote to the “depoliticization of violent conflict” so disparaged in reviews of technocratic peacebuilding adjusted to results-based management (RBM) and log frames filled out precisely. The peacebuilding critics have struck nerves. The Istanbul workshop gave some hope, however, that by sharing practical experience and wrestling with the road blocks encountered in different parts of the world, peacebuilding will remain a worthy pursuit.

Of course there also is the fact that the number and intensity of armed conflicts have dramatically decreased over the past decade. Coincidence? Maybe.

NOTES


REFERENCES


Canada and a nuclear weapons convention

By Ernie Regehr

We call on all member States of the UN – including Canada – to endorse, and begin negotiations for, a nuclear weapons convention as proposed by the UN Secretary-General in his five-point plan for nuclear disarmament.

This statement has been signed, at last count, by more than 300 Canadians named to the Order of Canada. The initiative, led by Ploughshares co-founder Murray Thomson, himself an Officer of the Order, has won the support of a wide cross-section of Canadians from scientific, cultural, business, NGO, and political communities, including:

- aerospace engineer Bruce Aikenhead
- writer Margaret Atwood
- physician Harvey Barkun
- NGO leader Gerry Barr
- former UN Ambassador William Barton
- artist Robert Bateman
- theologian Gregory Baum
- fisheries scientist Richard Beamish
- Senator and musician Tommy Banks
- politician and human rights leader Ed Broadbent
- singer-songwriter Bruce Cockburn
- journalist Peter Desbarats
- fashion designer Marielle Fleury
- business entrepreneur Margot Franssen.

Basis for a nuclear weapons convention

While the idea of a nuclear weapons convention (NWC) has wide public appeal, it has yet to be embraced by the Government of Stephen Harper. Even though it supports the proposal in principle, Canada says now is not the time. The Government insists that before an NWC can be credibly advanced, other treaties to prohibit the development and production of nuclear weapons should be in place. Apparently it sees the convention more as a way of commemorating the completion of disarmament negotiations than as a comprehensive guide, as envisioned by the UN Secretary-General.

Officials generally, and with some credibility, argue that the prospects for adopting an NWC are not promising as long as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is not fully effective, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has not entered into force, and negotiations on a fissile materials cut-off treaty (FMCT) remain stalled. But by this very logic, the basic conditions for launching negotiations for a NWC are actually in place.

The NPT, for example, is far from ineffective. It has been and remains a successful bulwark against proliferation. Only one state party to the NPT, North Korea, has persistently violated it and withdrawn from it. Of course, the NPT has proven least effective in producing timely nuclear disarmament as required under Article VI. In this case, serious work toward an NWC would significantly enhance the effectiveness of the NPT.

Is now the time to begin work on a nuclear weapons convention? The Canadian Government isn’t convinced, but many Canadians are.

And, while the CTBT is not yet in force, is it no longer a matter of serious contention. Negotiations have been successfully concluded. All of the nuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT (China, France, Russia, UK, US) have signed the treaty, with the US and China yet to ratify it, and are adhering to a moratorium on testing pending the Treaty’s entry-into-force. Of the four other states with nuclear weapons, only North Korea has explicitly rejected a moratorium.

Meanwhile, the international community, including all states with nuclear weapons (except North Korea), has agreed to begin negotiations on an FMCT. The nuclear weapon states within the NPT have all already halted production of fissile materials. Negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament still need to overcome procedural hurdles raised by Pakistan, but basic support for a treaty is in place.

Now is, in fact, the ideal time to begin to frame an NWC. It would consolidate multilateral disarmament gains and set out the full requirements, including verification mechanisms, to secure the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.
A role for Canada

What could Canada constructively contribute if it were to embrace the immediate pursuit of a nuclear weapons convention?

1. The first priority would be to reestablish Canada’s active support for a world without nuclear weapons. The Harper Government has certainly not rejected that goal, but neither has it promoted it. So, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister should each make an early and prominent speech in which they address nuclear disarmament and reaffirm Canada’s commitment to a world without nuclear weapons.

2. The Government should also acknowledge that while progress toward a world without nuclear weapons will obviously involve a variety of key measures such as those mentioned above, ultimately, all measures must be brought together in a single umbrella or framework convention. Thus, Canadian policy should explicitly call for a convention that sets a clear timeline for irreversible and verifiable nuclear disarmament.

3. Next Canada could and should institute informal international consultations involving a core group of like-minded states and representatives of civil society to thoroughly explore the focus, scope, verification, and other elements relevant to a nuclear weapons convention. One outcome of this consultation could be an informal international Contact Group or Nuclear Weapons Convention Action Group to systematically press the issue on the international stage.

4. In the meantime Canada should be thinking about the particular contribution it could make to the international process. The UK, sometimes working with Norway, has been focusing on verification measures linked to a nuclear weapons convention. Canada was once active in this area, and still is involved in CTBT seismic verification. Consideration could be given to reviving some of this work to bolster the UK-Norwegian initiative.

5. Canada could also credibly focus on the development of appropriate transparency requirements and identification of the kinds of institutional and governance arrangements needed to ensure an effective, and effectively managed, nuclear weapons convention. Canada has championed reporting in the NPT review process as a means of promoting accountability, has put forward proposals to overcome the institutional deficit of the NPT, and has supported the institutionalization of enhanced civil society participation in multilateral disarmament efforts.

There is no shortage of things to do and no credible reason to wait. The pursuit of a world without nuclear weapons requires Canada’s energetic engagement.

NOTES

1. He is supported by former Senator and Ambassador for Disarmament Douglas Roche and Nobel Prize laureate John Polanyi. Ernie Regehr is also a signatory.

2. And this is only a selection of names from the first six letters of the alphabet. The complete list should be available online soon.

3. At the UN General Assembly Canada was one of only two NATO countries to abstain (generally indicating agreement in principle but objection to specific details) on resolution A/Res/63/49, which calls on states to immediately begin “multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination.” All other NATO states voted “no.” Canada joined its NATO colleagues to vote “no” on another resolution calling for negotiations on such a convention (A/Res/63/75). In this case the resolution also affirmed that any use of nuclear weapons would be in violation of the Charter (an appropriate affirmation but not one likely to be supported by members of a military alliance that claims nuclear weapons as essential to its security).


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While war and peace have long been topics of study, the systematic collection of conflict data is relatively recent (Eck 2005, p. 5). Project Ploughshares’ Armed Conflicts Report (ACR), begun in 1987, emerged alongside other conflict data projects undertaken by academic institutions, individual scholars, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and others in the 1980s and 1990s (Eck 2005, pp. 5-6). With similar goals to better understand conflict trends, these conflict data projects still vary in their definitions of conflict, the aspects of conflict examined, and how data is collected and interpreted. These variations in turn determine the conflicts included by each project.

Recently I compared the data collected over a five-year period (2003-2007) by three projects with similar, though critically different, definitions of conflict: the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP), the Conflict Barometer of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK), and Ploughshares’ ACR.1 My aim was to investigate the extent to which different aspects of a project’s definition informed the datasets, and how these variations could be linked to the theoretical underpinnings of a given project. This study illustrates how Ploughshares’ ACR is both similar to, and different from, other conflict data projects.

**Different conflict data projects, different definitions**

To understand the variations in data between different projects, we must first understand the similarities and differences in the definitions of conflict each project employs. UCDP (Harbom 2008, p. 1) defines an armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths [in a calendar year].” UCDP distinguishes between minor conflicts (between 25 and 999 deaths per year) and wars (greater than 1,000 deaths per year).

Project Ploughshares (2009) defines armed conflict as “a political conflict in which armed combat involves the armed forces of at least one state (or one or more armed factions seeking to gain control of all or part of the state), and in which at least 1,000 people have been killed by the fighting during the course of the conflict.” A conflict is added to the list in the year that the total number of deaths reaches 1,000 and remains on the list for as long as there are 25 battle-related deaths per year. However, to account for the often intermittent nature of fighting, a conflict is only removed “if there has been a formal ceasefire or peace agreement and, following which, there are no longer combat deaths (or at least fewer than 25 per year); or, in the absence of a formal ceasefire,…after two years of dormancy (in which fewer than 25 combat deaths per year have occurred.”

HIIK (2007) defines conflict as “the clashing of interests (positional differences) over national values of some duration and magnitude between at least two parties (organized groups, states, groups of states, organizations) that are determined to pursue their interests and achieve their goals.” Although HIIK classifies conflicts according to five different levels of intensity, I focused on the top two categories, “war” and “severe crisis.” Significantly, HIIK does not use quantitative thresholds, but instead uses qualitative definitions to differentiate between intensity levels. A war is “a violent conflict in which violent force is used with certain continuity in an organized way [and] the extent of destruction is massive and of long duration”; a severe crisis includes instances where “violent force is repeatedly used in an organized way” (HIIK 2009).

The diversity of conflict datasets should be seen as a reflection of the diversity of views in the field of peace and conflict studies on how best to understand conflict.

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The definitions employed by these three projects are similar in their focus on political (rather than criminal) violence. But they differ in significant ways. UCDP requires that one actor in a conflict be a state entity, while Ploughshares and HIIK allow for conflicts between non-state actors with political ends. The projects also differ in their violence threshold criteria. While UCDP and Ploughshares use similar numeric thresholds, HIIK employs a qualitative definition. These differences have interesting effects on the data collected.
From definitions to conflict data: Comparing the results

There is surprisingly little difference in the number of conflict observations that each project records over the five-year period. UCDP counts 156, HIIK 161, and Ploughshares 159 (see Table 1). However, the differences between the datasets emerge when the actual conflicts reported annually by each project are compared.

Table 1: Annual Conflict Totals 2003–2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>UCDP</th>
<th>HIIK</th>
<th>Ploughshares</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Between 2003 and 2007 one or more of the data projects recorded a total of 257 conflict observations,2 of which only 60 (23.4 per cent) were counted identically (see Table 2 for a summary of these results). An additional 48 (18.8 per cent) conflict observations were recorded by all of the datasets, although because of different methods of counting and categorizing conflicts, they were recorded differently. In total, the cumulative rate of agreement across all three datasets is only 42.4 per cent. The rate of agreement between pairs of datasets is higher, with UCDP and HIIK agreeing 50.9 per cent of the time, HIIK and Ploughshares agreeing 57.1 per cent of the time, and UCDP and Ploughshares agreeing 64 per cent of the time. The rate of agreement between different datasets is roughly the same in specific years across the five-year period.

Violence threshold criteria, variations in conflict definition (especially related to actors), and discrepancies in source material explain nearly all variations in which conflicts were recorded, while differences in how conflicts were counted accounted for differences in the number of conflict observations recorded. Differences in violence threshold criteria accounted for 138 variations.

HIIK’s qualitative intensity-level threshold accounted for the most variations by far, as HIIK recorded 96 conflict observations not listed by the other two projects. Ploughshares’ 1,000-deaths threshold accounted for the next highest number of variations, as one or both of the other projects recorded 27 conflict observations excluded by Ploughshares for this reason. On the other end, Ploughshares’ removal criteria accounted for 15 variations, as conflicts that had fallen under the 25-annual-deaths threshold were not counted by UCDP and/or HIIK, but remained on the ACR for one or two years. Interestingly, when compared only to UCDP, these two ends of Ploughshares’ threshold criteria balance out exactly: Ploughshares excludes 13 conflict observations included by UCDP with fewer than 1,000 deaths and includes 13 excluded by UCDP with fewer than 25 deaths.

Definitional peculiarities and the way these definitions were interpreted and applied accounted for 48 variations. UCDP’s requirement that a conflict involve at least one state actor and Ploughshares’ and HIIK’s inclusion of conflicts that may not involve a state actor accounted for 35 cases of disagreement. Interestingly, a number of these conflicts previously involved state actors and were recorded at earlier stages by UCDP. Whether intentional or not, Ploughshares’ and HIIK’s inclusion of conflicts with no state actors has meant that they have tracked conflicts through different stages, including the continuation of violence after a peace accord has been signed.

Different conflict definitions also led to 13 interesting variations. UCDP, for example, recorded the conflict between the US government and al-Qaeda as it was deemed to meet their criteria: there are two clearly identifiable actors, one of which is a state; an identifiable incompatibility (the foreign policy of the American government in certain parts of the world); and at least 25 annual deaths. Another peculiar case was that of Mexico, which was recorded only by HIIK. Mexico was excluded by UCDP because this drug-related conflict does not directly include a state actor. It was excluded by Ploughshares as it was not deemed sufficiently political. Finally, some variations were due to UCDP’s strict criteria for identifying an incompatibility. In eight cases, UCDP did not include a conflict included by the other projects because the incompatibility, among other things, was unclear.

Two other notable factors contributed to variations in conflict observations. In 18 cases, conflicting reports of the number of deaths led to variations, with UCDP maintaining the strictest approach to verifying the number of deaths in a given case. Finally, conflict dyads—pairs of “conflicting parties” involved in a given conflict—were counted differently.3 For example, in 2004 HIIK listed three “severe crises” in Colombia, while UCDP and Ploughshares counted only one. Similarly, Ploughshares counts only one conflict in Northeast India (mentioning many different parties, but recording deaths cumulatively), while UCDP and HIIK count up to six.

While UCDP counts different conflicts based on the number of deaths cumulatively), while UCDP and HIIK count up to six. Whether intentional or not, Ploughshares’ and HIIK’s inclusion of conflicts that may not involve a state actor accounted for 35 cases of disagreement. Interestingly, a number of these conflicts previously involved state actors and were recorded at earlier stages by UCDP. Whether intentional or not, Ploughshares’ and HIIK’s inclusion of conflicts with no state actors has meant that they have tracked conflicts through different stages, including the continuation of violence after a peace accord has been signed.

Table 2: Cumulative rates of agreement across and between pairs of datasets, Percentage (Numeric)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Reported Identically</th>
<th>Reported, dyads counted differently</th>
<th>Total*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>23.3 (60)</td>
<td>18.7 (48)</td>
<td>42.0 (108) N=257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP, HIIK</td>
<td>29.9 (67)</td>
<td>21.4 (48)</td>
<td>50.9 (115) N=224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDP, PP</td>
<td>34.7 (82)</td>
<td>29.2 (69)</td>
<td>64.0 (151) N=236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIIK, PP</td>
<td>30.0 (72)</td>
<td>26.7 (64)</td>
<td>57.1 (137) N=240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The totals for all three databases include all of the conflict observations recorded by any of the projects. The totals for the dataset pairs is the total number (257) less the number of conflict observations unique to the project not included in a given pair (for example, 33 cases were unique to PP, so the rate of agreement for UCDP and HIIK is calculated out of 257-33, i.e. 224).
actors the violence threshold of 1,000 would likely not be met. This difference does not necessarily affect which conflicts are recorded, but rather affects how many conflict observations are counted by a given project.

Diversity in conflict data projects: Weighing the significance

As the above comparison reveals, even small differences in conflict definitions have great implications for the data collected. Why do these differences exist? Put most succinctly, the definition a project employs is “explicitly or implicitly... driven by theory” (Maoz 1988, p. 165). Thus the diversity of conflict datasets should be seen as a reflection of the diversity of views in the field of peace and conflict studies on how best to understand conflict.

Such theoretical commitments may be tempered by the specific purpose of a given project and the institutional objectives and practical constraints of those responsible for a project’s creation. Ploughshares’ approach grew out of classic conflict theory, which focuses on conflict between state actors. Over time the definition changed to include non-state actors—a change that was meant to account for the changing nature of the post-Cold War conflicts being observed. A broad educational purpose and varied audience have shaped the form that the ACR has taken, while different objectives, audiences, and theoretical commitments have also shaped the projects of UCDP and HIJK.

If data-making is theory driven and multiple theories of conflict exist, variation among conflict datasets is inevitable. While some scholars have called for standardized definitions, this diversity is not necessarily bad. Indeed, not only does “having a diversity of definitions and projects [provide] a critical check on the validity of the results reported in the field” (Eck 2005, p. 6), but projects with different theoretical commitments can “highlight different sides of the contemporary global system” (Wallensteen 2007, p. 22). Transparency from conflict data-makers and awareness from data-users are perhaps the more appropriate responses to such diversity.

NOTES

1. This study was completed as a research project under the guidance of Dr. Peter Wallensteen at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. For information on the methodology employed and more detailed results, please contact the author at cwoolner@nd.edu.

2. The term “conflict observation” is used as opposed to “conflict” as this study looked at data across a five-year period. The same conflict could be “observed” more than once if it were recorded by a data project in more than one year. A single conflict could therefore account for up to five conflict observations. The total number of conflict observations (257) does not refer to the total number of different conflicts occurring from 2003-2007, but to the number of times that different conflicts were recorded.

3. “Dyad” is used by UCDP to denote “two conflict primary parties.” UCDP explains that a conflict can have multiple dyads; as long as there is only one incompatibility, only one conflict is counted. See Harbom 2008, p. 2.

4. Both Maoz (1988) and Nicolas Sambanis make the case for more uniform conflict definitions and data coding standards, and suggest the need for greater agreement on a theoretical level as well. Sambanis (2004, p. 815) argues that developing a definition of civil war and coding rules for data collection “are not only relevant for the purposes of accurate coding, but they also reveal the degree to which we share a common understanding of the concept of civil war.”

REFERENCES


Christina Woolner has a BA from Wilfrid Laurier University in Global Studies and Religion and Culture. As a Ploughshares intern she worked on the Armed Conflicts Report. Christina is now pursuing a Master’s degree in Peace Studies at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame.
On August 6 and 9, 1945, the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were bombed with nuclear weapons. Over 100,000 people, mostly civilians, died instantly and thousands more succumbed to burns, malnutrition, and illness. It is our duty to remember these events.

It is also our duty to celebrate the spirit of survivors and those who have dedicated themselves to ensuring that such events are never repeated and that nuclear weapons are never used again. The only way to ensure that these weapons are not used is to eliminate them.

Today

The world continues to live in the shadow of nuclear weapons. Nine countries own approximately 24,000 nuclear weapons, with the United States and Russia accounting for the vast majority. Approximately 9,000 are considered operational and, of these, over 2,000 are on high alert, ready for use within minutes.

While the number of nuclear weapons has decreased significantly since the end of the Cold War, the rate of reduction has slowed considerably in recent years and new arsenals are being developed. Delivery systems are being modernized.

The potential for an arms race in space threatens to derail nuclear disarmament and destabilize global security. The prospect of space weapons and the drive for the ultimate high ground are causing a spiral of weapons and defenses, seen most clearly in the US push for ballistic missile defense, and responses from China for more nuclear weapons.

Tomorrow

More and more people are demanding a world without nuclear weapons, and the voices are being heard.

In July US President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev agreed to revive the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, along with further disarmament measures that would cut their nuclear arsenals by a third or more. Also this year, NATO members launched a review of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, including its nuclear doctrine, which makes nuclear weapons the “supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies.”

As Ernie Regehr from Project Ploughshares notes, this year’s Preparatory Meeting for the 2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty “moved beyond the rancor and discord of previous meetings to focus on concrete proposals”; the session “displayed a new sense that all the recent prominent proclamations of the goal of a world without nuclear weapons are having an impact on real world expectations and negotiations.” Similarly, at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, where negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and a treaty to prevent the weaponization of space have been stalled for over a decade, there is a new agreement to work on these and other disarmament issues.

Conditions for peace have never been as promising as they are now.

Several current campaigns are working for a nuclear-weapon-free world. The International Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons demands a Nuclear Weapons Convention that would make these weapons illegal. The Global Zero campaign has created a plan for the phased reduction of nuclear weapons leading to elimination, which they call global zero. More than 70 Canadian cities are members of Mayors for Peace.

Now we must all add our voices and actions in support of these and other initiatives. In the words of military analyst Gwynne Dyer, “it sounds like a pipe dream, but in fact the conditions have never been as promising as they are now.”

These comments are taken from a presentation at the Hiroshima Day commemoration organized by Ploughshares Hamilton.
Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone

By Ernie Regehr

The entry into force on July 15 (IAEA 2009) of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Pelindaba, was largely ignored by the world's mainstream news media. That's too bad. It is a significant development and a further nudge toward a world without nuclear weapons.

**Background**

In 1964 the heads of state of the Organization of African Unity issued a “Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa,” affirming their “readiness to undertake in an International Treaty to be concluded under the auspices of the United Nations not to manufacture or acquire control of nuclear weapons” (OAU 1964). South Africa’s historic decision to destroy its nuclear arsenal and to accede, in 1990, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state made possible the realization of this objective.

The Treaty was agreed to in 1995 (Stott, du Rand & du Preez 2008). Since then all 53 African states have signed on, due in part to the role of persistent civil society attention. The South African Institute for Security Studies and the American Monterey Center for Nonproliferation Studies carried out research and drew political attention to the proposal. Earlier this year a delegation of the World Council of Churches and the Africa Peace Forum visited Burundi and Namibia to encourage ratification of the Treaty. They helped to spur Burundi to action and the treaty entered into force when Burundi became the 28th nation to ratify it. Namibian ratification may also be close at hand.

**Provisions of the treaty**

The Pelindaba Treaty, named after South Africa’s central nuclear research complex, confirms key provisions of the NPT, including the pledge of all signatories not to develop, produce, or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, as well as the commitment to enter into comprehensive safeguard agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify each state’s non-nuclear-weapon status (21 states have yet to conclude such agreements).

The Treaty prohibits the testing of any nuclear explosive device and, in effect, fulfills the basic conditions of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty on the African continent. The Pelindaba Treaty also prohibits the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of any state party to the treaty, raising serious questions about Diego Garcia.

Diego Garcia is the largest Island in the Chagos Archipelago. Parties to the Pelindaba Treaty consider it part of the territory of Mauritius and so bound by the provisions of the treaty. But the UK regards Diego Garcia as part of its British Indian Ocean Territory and has allowed the US to build a major military base there. One of its functions is to serve as a staging base for nuclear-capable strategic bombers. Now that the Treaty has entered into force, we will be hearing more about Diego Garcia, because the possible presence of nuclear weapons puts Mauritius in violation of its Treaty obligations (Sand 2009).

The entry-into-force of the Pelindaba Treaty should be registered as a significant advance in nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament efforts.

The Treaty also prohibits the dumping of radioactive waste in Africa and requires African states to apply the “highest standards of security and effective physical protection of nuclear material, facilities and equipment to prevent theft or unauthorized use and handling” of such materials and facilities. It prohibits any armed attack on nuclear installations within the African nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Sola Ogunbanwo (2003, p.132), a Nigerian nonproliferation expert, argues that the Treaty’s entry into force will yield significant security benefits by reducing proliferation risks and improving verification measures. Most notably, Protocol I of the Treaty provides for assurances from states with
nuclear weapons that they will “not...use or threaten to use a nuclear explosive device against...any Party to the Treaty,” and Protocol II provides for assurances that they will “not...test or assist or encourage the testing of any nuclear explosive device anywhere within the African nuclear-weapon-free zone.” China, France, and the UK have ratified both protocols. The US and Russia have signed but not ratified (Horovitz 2009).

**A southern hemisphere free of nuclear weapons**

With the entry-into-force of the Pelindaba Treaty, all sovereign territories in the southern hemisphere, plus Antarctica, are now in legally binding nuclear-weapon-free zones:

- South America — the Tlatelolco Treaty
- the South Pacific — the Rarotonga Treaty
- Southeast Asia — the Bangkok Treaty
- Antarctica — the Antarctic Treaty.

In the northern Hemisphere the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone covering Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan came into force in March 2009.

The Blix Commission (WMDC 2006, p. 79) called the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones “a success story.” They “complement and reinforce” the nonproliferation commitments made through the NPT and they fill in “gaps” left by the NPT. Thus the entry-into-force of the Pelindaba Treaty should be registered as a significant advance in nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament efforts.

**REFERENCES**


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**Acronyms and Abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACR</td>
<td>Armed Conflicts Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATT</td>
<td>Arms Trade Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>Canadian Commercial Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFIS</td>
<td>Canadian Firearms Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPIC</td>
<td>Canadian Police Information Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRIES</td>
<td>Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMCT</td>
<td>Fissile materials cut-off treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPPAC</td>
<td>Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIJK</td>
<td>Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDRC</td>
<td>International Development Research Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPI</td>
<td>International Peace Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWC</td>
<td>Nuclear weapons convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBM</td>
<td>Results-based management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANG</td>
<td>Saudi Arabian National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSI</td>
<td>Space Security Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCDP</td>
<td>Uppsala Conflict Data Project</td>
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**Emile Regehr, O.C.,**

is Senior Policy Advisor with Project Ploughshares.
In July the Canadian government quietly released its latest report on military goods exports. It revealed that Canada exported military equipment worth $360.4-million to 68 states during 2006. Six of the recipient states were involved in armed conflict (and concomitant human rights violations) and for an additional five there were reputable reports of serious violations of human rights by state forces. However, the published detail is insufficient for a public assessment of the risks of specific transfers. In fact, the level of report transparency remains a major problem and this new publication is no improvement over the previous report in terms of detail.

Similarly, Canadian military goods worth $100,000 or more were exported to six additional states where there were reputable reports of serious and persistent human rights violations by state forces (see Table 3). Export guidelines call for close control of military goods and technology to governments with “a persistent record of serious violations of the human rights of their citizens, unless it can be demonstrated that there is no reasonable risk that the goods might be used against the civilian population” (DFAIT 2009, p. 2).

### Summary of findings

Breaking with a tradition of tabling reports on arms exports in Parliament, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT 2009) posted the report of 2006 arms exports to its website several weeks after the House of Commons rose in June. Previous reports have received little parliamentary attention, but the timing of the latest release reduces even further the likelihood of parliamentary questions to the Foreign Affairs Minister.

At $360.4-million the total value of reported military goods exported from Canada during 2006 was greater than the 2005 total of $322-million but remained less than half the recent record peak of $723.5-million reported for 2003. The number of recipients increased to 68 from an average of 58 per year for the previous three years. As with prior reports, the military export data did not include exports to the US.

Following the pattern of earlier years, most reported military goods were shipped to a few major recipients. The five largest importers, in descending order, were the United Kingdom, Australia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and Germany. The value of military goods shipped to these states totaled $209.5-million or 58 per cent of the reported value of all exports (see Table 1). In contrast, the shipment value for eight states was less than $10,000.

Canadian export control guidelines call for close control of military exports to countries “that are involved in or under imminent threat of hostilities” (DFAIT 2009, p. 2). Canada nevertheless shipped military goods valued at more than $100,000 to each of six states that were the sites of armed conflict during 2006, according to Project Ploughshares’ Armed Conflicts Report 2007 (see Table 2).

### Table 1: Largest five non-US recipients of Canadian military goods during 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Reported value of military goods shipments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>$80,151,594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>$51,804,263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>$43,515,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>$18,374,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>$15,605,755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>$209,451,727</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2: Canadian arms exports to states in armed conflict*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Reported value of military goods shipments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>$365,263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>$1,177,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>$692,872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>$994,653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>$165,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>$378,335</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional source: Project Ploughshares 2007a

*Only states receiving more than $100,000 in Canadian military goods during 2006 are included.
Table 3: Canadian arms exports to states with reported serious human rights violations by state forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Reported value of military goods shipments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>$738,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>$1,815,587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>$115,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>$43,515,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>$1,142,828</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional source: US State Department 2006
*Only states receiving more than $100,000 in Canadian military goods during 2006 are included.

Are international obligations being met?

According to this latest report (p. 3), the authorization of arms exports involves consultations with a wide range of DFAIT, Department of National Defence (DND), and other governmental experts and “each export permit application is assessed for its consistency with Canada’s foreign and defence policies.” This consultative, case-by-case approach to export authorization is advocated by many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and states promoting negotiation of an international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). They argue that an ATT must be based on obligations under international law and emerging international norms, and that state authorization must be preceded by an assessment of the risk that these laws or norms will be breached as the result of a particular arms transfer. Moreover, to create multilateral and public confidence in the implementation of an ATT, there should be sufficient transparency in state arms transfer reports that external observers can monitor whether authorities are appropriately assessing these risks.

Canadian export control guidelines call for close control of military exports to countries “that are involved in or under imminent threat of hostilities.”

The degree of transparency in Report on Exports of Military Goods from Canada 2006 is insufficient. Like its predecessor for the three-year period 2003–2005, the latest report provides less detail on transfers than prior publications up to 2002. Whereas earlier reports distinguished among weapons systems, support systems, and parts and included descriptive detail such as “sporting firearms” or “small arms components,” the latest reports omit this information. Instead, reported shipment values correspond to Export Control List groups that represent a broad range of equipment. At this level of detail it is not possible to ascertain the risks posed by the weapons shipments.

For example, the report lists $160,000 in shipments to Egypt of the Export Control List item 2-1. Item 2-1 contains “smooth-bore weapons with a caliber of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a caliber of 12.7 mm or less, and accessories” (DFAIT 2007, p. 52). From the data it is not possible to verify that the reported transfers are “firearms intended for sporting or other recreational use” that the report claims are “the bulk of reported firearms” (DFAIT 2009, p. 3). The goods could equally well be automatic firearms for military or police use. Clearly, more detail is needed to adequately assess the risk that the transferred weapons could be used in such breaches of international obligations as violations of human rights.²

The report has additional transparency failings, including “double-counted” figures that are assigned to two (or more) categories, making a determination of the real value of either category impossible. Most strikingly, as noted above, there is no figure for weapons shipments to the US even though the current report (DFAIT 2009, p. 7) notes that these “are estimated to account for over half of Canada’s exports of military goods and technology.” Indeed, according to Project Ploughshares estimates, Canadian arms sales to the US totaled $1.66-billion in 2006,³ more than four times the total reported for all other states combined. Hence, by far the largest component of Canadian military exports is omitted, creating a major gap in transparency that obscures the full extent of Canada’s role in the international arms trade.

Other failings and inconsistencies contribute to a general decline in reporting standards. Covering a calendar year that ended more than 50 months before, this report is less current than equivalent reports of many other arms-exporting states. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI 2009), as of July 2009—when the Canadian report was released—at least 20 states had reported details of their arms transfers during 2007. At least four of these states (Belgium, Estonia, Norway, and Switzerland) had also reported on their transfers during 2008.

Not for the first time, the detail of the report on military exports differs from data supplied by the Department of Foreign Affairs to the UN Register of Conventional Arms. During 2006 Canadian exports that fell in the categories of the UN Register included 160 armoured combat vehicles to Indonesia (noted as “bulldozer configuration”) and one armoured combat vehicle to the United Arab Emirates. For the same period DFAIT reported no equivalent transfers (i.e., category 2-6, ground vehicles and components) to either country in the just released exports report.

However, Canadian military aid, including transfers of surplus equipment from DND, is not subject to the Export and Import Permits Act and export permits are not required. Since the report on military exports is compiled from permit data, the discrepancy could thus be accounted for. But this variation suggests that, even from the standpoint of reporting consistency, DND surplus equipment transfers should be included in the 2009 report as additional data.⁴

The 2006 report data records shipments of military goods included in Group 2 on the Export Control List, defined as “specially designed or modified for military use” (DFAIT 2009, p. 2). Goods and technology not on the Export Control List are not normally subject to export controls even, as the
report notes, “if they are intended for sale to a military end-user” (DFAIT 2009, p. 2). Yet Canada regularly supplies civilian-certified equipment for military end-use. Table 4 offers examples of transfers during 2006 of aerospace equipment for military end-use reported by open sources. None of these “dual-use” exports appear in the latest report. If export authorization were required for such equipment the reported value of Canada’s military exports would rise significantly.

Table 4: Examples of Canadian aerospace equipment transferred for military end-use during 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Military end-user</th>
<th>Reported or estimated value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PC-9 aircraft engine*</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>$1 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBell-412 helicopter engines</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>$3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamond training aircraft*</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>$1 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC-9 aircraft engines*</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>$2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y-12 aircraft engines</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>$4 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Reported as a military transfer by SIPRI 2009
Source: Project Ploughshares 2007b

The 2009 report on the export of military goods from Canada in 2006 is a minimal effort, maintaining the level of inadequate information on Canadian arms transfers found in the previous report. Important data is missing, muddled, inconsistent, or overlooked. In February 2009 Project Ploughshares met with Department of Foreign Affairs officials in Ottawa to review Ploughshares’ “audit” of Canada’s Report on Military Exports, 2003–2005. At the time export controls officials agreed to consider recommendations for report improvements, but predicted that the report on 2006 exports would not likely reflect them. Their prediction proved correct. There is wide scope for the report on 2007 exports to do much better.

The 2009 report on the export of military goods from Canada in 2006 is a minimal effort.

NOTES

1. An exception occurred in the Fall of 2007 when parliamentary questions were raised, not about report details but about an unprecedented delay in publication. The first ever multi-year report (for three years, 2003–2005) was released by the government two months later.

2. In some exceptional cases it is possible to comment on the risks of specific transfers because information is available from other sources. For example, the 2006 shipments of “ground vehicles and components,” worth $26.5-million, to Saudi Arabia can be confirmed as transfers of armoured vehicles for the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) on the basis of reports from several sources, including the company that manufactures the vehicles, General Dynamics Land Systems Canada. Since the purpose of the SANG is to protect the autocratic rulers of Saudi Arabia, there is a significant risk that the armoured vehicles will be used against opposition groups, including civilian protestors.

3. Project Ploughshares estimates Canadian arms transfers to the US from data obtained from the Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC) under the federal Access to Information process. The CCC is a crown corporation that brokers trade between foreign governments and Canadian exporters. About 60 per cent of its contracts are with foreign military agencies, chiefly the Pentagon.

4. For more discussion of the exemption of military aid from export control regulations see Regehr 2009.

5. See Epps & Gossen 2009.

REFERENCES


Kenneth Epps
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In June 2009 Canadian groups, including Project Ploughshares, joined those in 85 other countries in marking the Global Week of Action Against Gun Violence. Coalition for Gun Control President Wendy Cukier (IANSA 2009) noted, Although gun violence takes different forms in different countries, there is a common theme: where there is easy access to firearms, there are higher rates of women and children killed with guns. The Global Week of Action is a good opportunity to draw attention to the fact that in spite of the differences, whether in Canada, South Africa, Australia, Trinidad or Brazil we share common goals: safe communities.

Gun-related domestic violence in Canada

At the end of 2007, there were 1.8 million valid firearm licences and 7.2 million firearms registered in Canada—91 per cent of them non-restricted firearms, i.e., rifles and shotguns (RCMP 2007). While most gun owners in Canada do not abuse their partners, when a gun is present in the home, the risk of physical harm, threats, and intimidation to family members increases. The great majority of victims of firearm-related domestic violence are women.

The rate of spousal homicide1 against females was between three and five times higher than the rate against males between 1977 and 2006, although rates for both sexes were declining (Statistics Canada 2008). Between 1985 and 1994 guns, usually shotguns and rifles, were the most frequently used weapons in female spousal homicides (40 per cent of all cases) (Leesti 1997). Between 1997 and 2006 30 per cent of female victims of spousal homicide were shot (Statistics Canada 2008).

Firearms use in domestic violence is higher in rural areas and smaller communities where gun ownership is positively valued for its use in such activities as hunting, ranching, and pest control. In New Brunswick, 51 per cent of females killed by their partners between 1988 and 2009 were shot, the majority with rifles and shotguns. Women experiencing domestic violence in rural areas also reported significant threats and intimidation with firearms (Doherty 2009).

The Firearms Act as a tool to prevent domestic violence

Canada’s firearms control legislation specifically restricts access to guns by confirmed and potential perpetrators of domestic violence. The 1995 Firearms Act and its supporting regulations require:

- licensing of all firearm owners and users, with renewals every 5 years;
- registration of all firearms;
- background checks and screening of licence applicants for risk factors for suicide, mental stability, and domestic abuse;
- notifying current and previous spouses of the past two years when individuals apply for a licence so that they may voice concerns for their safety or the safety of others; and
- courts to notify the Chief Firearms Officer of all firearms prohibition orders.
The licensing and registration information is contained in the Canadian Firearms Information System (CFIS). Every day CFIS checks the Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC), a computerized central database on crimes and criminals, for any new public safety risk (e.g., charges, court prohibitions). Reports are forwarded to the appropriate Chief Firearms Officer.

The Firearms Registry, a subset of CFIS, links each registered firearm with its licensed owner and is searchable by police. It provides officers real-time access to information about the presence of firearms in the home and has been used on average of 10,288 times a day so far in 2009 (RCMP 2009a).

The risk of physical harm, threats, and intimidation to family members increases when a gun is present in the home.

A firearms licence can be revoked if the licensee is involved in an act of domestic violence. If an individual is taken into custody for abusing a spouse, premises can be searched, guns can be seized, and the individual can be prohibited from owning or acquiring firearms pending trial. However, in practice, this procedure is subject to interpretation by the front-line police officers. Furthermore, it is not public policy for the Crown to request and be granted a firearms ban for everyone convicted of domestic violence. This wide discretion is illustrated by a high-profile murder-suicide in New Brunswick in 2007:

James McCurdy, 50, shot his common-law wife Karen Buchanan, 45, in their Oak Bay home before turning the shotgun on himself. During their 10- to 12-year abusive relationship, McCurdy has been before the courts three times with charges of assault on Buchanan. He pleaded guilty to charges of assault in 2001 and again in 2002.... The prosecutor’s office said he was never prohibited from owning a weapon. The RCMP noted none of the charges were weapons-related. (Cumby, 2007)

The gun control divide

Two bills tabled in the second session of Canada’s 40th Parliament seek to eliminate registration of non-restricted firearms (rifles and shotguns). The bills’ supporters argue that the long gun registry has little benefit to public safety. They contend that

- the licensing requirement and the registration of restricted and prohibited firearms are sufficient to deny gun access to persons who present a real threat to public safety;
- unregistered handguns and prohibited weapons that are mostly smuggled from the United States are the guns used in criminal activity; and
- long gun owners are mainly law abiding citizens who use firearms for legitimate purposes.

Opponents of the bills argue that registration

- allows the police to know the number of firearms a person owns;
- facilitates the tracking of guns to their registered owners and reduces the diversion of legal firearms to the illicit market;
- promotes better accountability and compliance with safe storage by firearms owners; and
- provides law enforcement officials with ownership information that helps to enforce firearm prohibition orders, facilitate investigations, and assess risks when responding to calls, especially those involving domestic disputes.

According to a statement by the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (2009), “All guns are potentially dangerous, all gun owners need to be licensed, all guns need to be registered, and gun owners need to be accountable for their firearms.” Indeed the first ever report on national gun-seizure statistics2 shows that non-restricted firearms, mostly rifles and shotguns, made up 74 per cent of the 8,261 guns seized from owners who were either violent, had threatened violence, or were subject to a prohibition order. Forty-three per cent of the guns seized were registered in the Firearms Registry (MacLeod 2009).

Recommendations

Between 1991 and 2006, the use of shotguns and rifles in homicides declined by 65 per cent because of stricter controls (Statistics Canada 2008). Should the long gun registry be eliminated, women and children will be among the biggest losers. But they won’t be the only ones. Rifles and shotguns are the guns most often used to kill, and are involved in domestic violence, suicides, accidents, and the murders of police officers.

To further address the current situation of domestic gun-related violence, the following are recommended:

- increased public awareness about the domestic violence provisions of the Firearms Act;
- better education and training of law enforcement officers on guns as instruments of control, abuse, and intimidation in domestic violence situations and on risk assessment;
- automatic prohibition of firearms when an individual is arrested and charged in relation to a domestic call;
- a firearms ban for those convicted of domestic violence;
- research into the gun culture and the demand for guns in Canada that can be used to guide future gun control policy and the development of specific strategies to reduce gun violence and promote personal and community safety;
- a reexamination of the three amnesties granted by the government since 2006 to allow firearm owners additional time to obtain proper licensure and register their non-restricted firearms; and
- regular updating and maintenance of firearms classifications as new types of firearms come into the market.

Elizabeth Mandelman was an Advocacy Project Peace Fellow, partnered with IANSA (International Action Network on Small Arms) and Project Ploughshares in the summer of 2009.

NOTES

1. Spousal homicides involve people in registered marriages and common-law unions (including same-sex spouses), as well as those separated or divorced.

2. The report comes as a result of the public agency regulations that came into effect at the end of October 2008, requiring police and public agencies to report on firearms in their possession. The statistics compiled cover November 2008–April 2009. See RCMP 2009b & MacLeod 2009.

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Maribel Gonzales
is a Program Associate with Project Ploughshares.

New role for APFO’s Bethuel Kiplagat

President Kibaki of Kenya has appointed Africa Peace Forum Executive Director Bethuel Kiplagat to chair the Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC). The nine-member commission will, among other things, address Kenya’s “historical injustices” around issues of land allocation, regional imbalances, and “negative ethnicity.” The team, which will serve for two years, consists of six Kenyans and three international experts.

Speaking in August, Ambassador Kiplagat said:

I have been given the job, I will do it. Blame me if I and other commissioners fail you. We will allow the truth to come out and justice to be done so that we can reconcile our great nation.1

Africa Peace Forum and Project Ploughshares have long been partners on projects in the Horn of Africa involving small arms and peacebuilding. Ambassador Kiplagat was a featured speaker at Ploughshares’ 30th-anniversary conference in 2006.2

1. Further details can be found at http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=1144021745&cid=159&.

Staff transitions

In mid-August we said farewell to Jessica West, Program Associate with Project Ploughshares since September 2006. Over the last three years she managed the Space Security Index (SSI) project, overseeing the research, production, and publication of the annual report on space security. She also worked with staff in carrying out Ploughshares’ nuclear disarmament program. Jessica made presentations on space security at numerous events around the world, including the US Air Force Space Command in Colorado, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, and an e-Parliament hearing in Brussels. In September Jessica entered the joint University of Waterloo – Wilfrid Laurier University PhD Program in Global Governance at the Balsillie School of International Affairs. We wish her much success in this new challenge.

In September we welcomed Cesar Jaramillo as a Program Associate. Cesar will manage the SSI project and the publication of the annual report on space security, as well as participate in implementing nuclear disarmament initiatives. Cesar has a degree in Journalism from Pontifical Bolivariana University in Medellin, Colombia and BA and MA degrees in, respectively, Political Science and Global Governance from the University of Waterloo. Cesar has worked as a journalist, translator, interpreter, teacher, and researcher and brings this wide range of skills and experience to his new position with Project Ploughshares.

In memoriam

Muriel Duckworth, a lifelong champion of social justice and an icon of the peace and justice movement in Canada, died on August 22, 2009 at the age of 100. Among her many involvements, Muriel was a founding member of the Voice of Women, helped establish the Canadian Council for International Co-operation, and served on the board of Oxfam Canada. A Quaker and a committed activist, Muriel was a defender of human rights, particularly women’s rights, and in the 1970s was instrumental in arranging a cross-Canada tour by Vietnamese women affected by the war.

In 1985, former Ploughshares staff member Kathleen Wallace-Deering, Muriel Duckworth, and six other Canadian women were featured in the National Film Board film, Speaking Our Peace, directed by Bonnie Sherr Klein and Terre Nash.

Awarded many honours, Muriel Duckworth was a Member of the Order of Canada and recipient of the Lester B. Pearson Peace Medal. Nova Scotia Premier Darrell Dexter said of her: “Muriel will be forever remembered as an ambassador of peace, defender of women’s rights, and champion of educational development.” Her biographer, Marion Douglas Kerans, said that “her regret was that wars are not lessening.” This regret Muriel Duckworth has bequeathed to the many who, inspired by her life and work, continue to pursue the goal to which she dedicated her life.
For the first time, the SIPRI Yearbook includes the Global Peace Index of the Institute for Economics and Peace in Sydney, Australia. The Index ranks 144 countries according to their relative peacefulness. The five most peaceful countries in 2009 are New Zealand, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, and Austria. The five least peaceful are Sudan, Israel, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Canada is in the 8th position, while the US occupies position 83.


The United Nations and Nuclear Orders analyzes the past, present, and future responses of the UN to the threats and challenges posed by nuclear weapons. Experts from around the world contribute chapters in which they examine UN actors and tools, as well as some of the issues associated with the changing environment in which the UN must operate. These issues include doctrinal questions on the use of force, the regional dynamics of nuclear proliferation, and the growing concern that the nuclear order established by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) may collapse or simply be overtaken by events.

One of the chapters, “The Security Council,” is by Ernie Regehr of Project Ploughshares. From this chapter:

The Security Council should pass a resolution to formalize the understanding that all nuclear proliferation is a threat to international peace and security and within that to set the framework for regular reports, deliberations on the implications of those reports, and efforts to agree on follow-on undertakings to meet agreed benchmarks. Transparency is not compliance, but it is a large step toward accountability, which in turn encourages compliance. In the absence of effective legislative, judicial, or enforcement action on disarmament, a Security Council commitment to promoting and formalizing transparency and accountability could still encourage discernable progress toward the “unequivocal undertaking,” promised in 2000, “to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons” as promised in Article VI of the NPT.

Jane Boulten holds a Canada Research Chair in International Relations and Security Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada. Ramesh Thakur, former UN Assistant Secretary-General, is Director of the Balsillie School of International Affairs and Distinguished Fellow of the Centre for International Governance Innovation in Waterloo, Canada. Thomas G. Weiss is Presidential Professor of Political Science at The Graduate Center of The City University of New York and Director of the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies.

The Small Arms Survey is produced annually by a team of researchers based in Geneva, Switzerland, and a worldwide network of local researchers. The Small Arms Survey 2009 contains two thematic sections. The first highlights the challenges of ensuring security after the formal end of war and comprises an overview chapter and three case studies (Aceh, Afghanistan, and Southern Lebanon). The second explores various aspects of small arms transfers, including the value of the authorized trade, national controls, and weapons tracing. Additional chapters focus on small arms measures and impacts.

Some key findings

- The Small Arms Survey estimates the global authorized trade in firearms reached about US$1.58-billion in 2006. The undocumented trade, which remains significant despite greater reporting on firearms transfers, is likely to be at least US$100-million.

- Suspected or known significant exporters of small arms that report little or no information on their firearms exports include Belarus, Iran, Israel, North Korea, and South Africa. Other exporters including China, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, and Singapore provide some data on exports of sporting shotguns and rifles, but little or no data on their military firearms exports.

- In 2006 the top exporters of small arms and light weapons (those with an annual export value of at least US$100-million) were (in descending order) the US, Italy, Germany, Brazil, Austria, and Belgium.

- The top importers of small arms and light weapons for 2006 (those with an annual import value of at least US$100-million) were (in descending order) the US, France, Japan, Canada, South Korea, Germany, and Australia.

- The 2009 Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer identifies Switzerland, the UK, Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, Serbia, and the US as the most transparent of the major small arms and light weapons exporters. The least transparent major exporters are Iran and North Korea, both scoring zero.

- The US imports most of the world’s exported handguns and many of the world’s exported sporting shotguns and rifles. In 2006 handgun sales to the US accounted for 59 per cent of the major exporters’ sales, and US imports of sporting and hunting shotguns and rifles accounted for 42 per cent.


Since the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks, no state has unleashed nuclear weapons. What explains this? According to the author, the answer lies in a prohibition inherent in the tradition of non-use, a time-honoured obligation that has been adhered to by all nuclear states—thanks to a consensus view that use would have a catastrophic impact on humankind, the environment, and the reputation of the user.

The book offers an in-depth analysis of the nuclear policies of the US, Russia, China, the UK, France, India, Israel, and Pakistan and assesses the contributions of these states to the rise and persistence of the tradition of nuclear non-use. It examines the influence of the tradition on the behaviour of nuclear and non-nuclear states in crises and wars, and explores the tradition’s implications for nuclear nonproliferation regimes, deterrence theory, and policy. It concludes by discussing the future of the tradition in the current global security environment.

TV Paul is James McGill Professor of International Relations, McGill University, and Director, University of Montreal-McGill Research Group in International Security.


This collection of essays was written to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Canadian Music Educators’ Association/ L’Association canadienne des musiciens éducateurs. The 27 contributors to this book are professors, teachers, and students representing Canada, the USA, Brazil, Norway, Finland, and South Africa. They wrestle with the meaning and practice of social justice in and through music and education.

A sample of the chapter titles:

- Music as a Practice of Social Justice
- A Question of You Taking the Bread and Giving Me the Crust? Post-1994 Music Education in the Republic of South Africa as a Human Rights Issue
Democracy and Popular Music in Music Education

What does “Teaching for Social Justice” Mean in My Elementary Music Classroom?

Critical Pedagogy for Creative Artists: Inviting Young Composers to Engage in Artistic Social Action

This book is endorsed by MP Bob Rae, former UN Special Envoy Stephen Lewis, CIGI Executive Director John English, and Project Ploughshares Executive Director John Siebert.


Franklyn Griffiths, Towards a Canadian Arctic Strategy, Foreign Policy for Canada’s Tomorrow. No. 1.

While the strategic significance of the Arctic is increasing rapidly, Canada has no strategy for the region in its entirety. This paper aims to encourage such a strategy.

Griffiths argues that Canada has a great deal at stake in the evolution of the Arctic as an international political region. Should change favour conflict, not only Canada but the region as a whole will suffer the costs and risks of strategic rivalry.

Franklyn Griffiths is a Senior Fellow, Massey College, University of Toronto and George Ignatieff Chair Emeritus of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Toronto.

P. Whitney Lackenbauer, From Polar Race to Polar Saga: An Integrated Strategy for Canada and the Circumpolar World, Foreign Policy for Canada’s Tomorrow No. 3.

According to Lackenbauer, Canada’s defence and resource development agenda needs stronger diplomatic and social dimensions. A 3D (defence-diplomacy-development) approach that recognizes the possibility for international cooperation, fixes less on potential “sovereignty loss,” and encourages sustainable socio-economic development will place Canada in a better position to become a world leader in circumpolar affairs.

P. Whitney Lackenbauer is Assistant Professor of History, St. Jerome’s University, University of Waterloo.

Rob Huebert, Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security in a Transforming Circumpolar World, Foreign Policy for Canada’s Tomorrow No. 4.

Huebert argues that, given the transformation of the Arctic, and the consequent challenges to Canadian Arctic sovereignty, the protection of Canadian Arctic sovereignty is essential to the provision of Canadian Arctic security, and vice versa. He believes that sovereignty and security are not mutually exclusive concepts, but are interdependent.

Rob Huebert is Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, and Associate Director, Centre for Military Studies, University of Calgary.

Update on the Geneva Declaration

By July 2009 the Geneva Declaration had been endorsed by 108 states (Canada signed in 2006), most recently Luxembourg. Signatories commit to supporting “initiatives to prevent and reduce human, social and economic costs of armed violence, to assess risks and vulnerabilities, to evaluate the effectiveness of armed violence reduction programmes, and to disseminate knowledge of best practices.” The Declaration calls upon states to strive to achieve demonstrable reductions in the global burden of armed violence and improvements in human security by 2015.

The implementation of the Geneva Declaration focuses increasingly on concrete projects that link the reduction/prevention of armed violence and development. By playing a key role in the realization of these projects, civil society helps member states to reach one of the key aims of the Geneva Declaration: “to strive to achieve, by 2015, measurable reductions in the global burden of armed violence and tangible improvements in human security worldwide.”

For more information go to http://www.genevadeclaration.org/index.html.
Space Security 2009

Space Security 2009 is the sixth annual report on trends and developments in outer space, covering the period January to December 2008. It is the premier publication of the Space Security Index (SSI) project, which aims to improve transparency with respect to space activities and provide a common, comprehensive knowledge base to support the development of national and international policies that contribute to space security.

This assessment of space security is organized under eight indicators that relate to these three themes:

- The condition of the operating environment;
- The type of actors in space and how space is used; and
- The status of space-related technology as it pertains to protecting or interfering with space systems, or harming Earth from space.

Space Security 2009 does not provide definitively positive or negative assessments of outer space activities in 2008. Instead, it indicates the range of implications that developments could have on the security of space across the various indicators and highlights the difficult challenges faced by policymakers.

Space Security 2009 is a collaborative effort of the Spacesecurity.org partners: the McGill University Institute of Air and Space Law, Project Ploughshares, the Secure World Foundation, the Simons Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Research, and the Space Generation Foundation. Editing and production were based at Project Ploughshares, under the supervision of Managing Editor Jessica West.

An electronic version of Space Security 2009 can be found at www.spacesecurity.org. An order form can be found by going to the library link of the Project Ploughshares website, www.ploughshares.ca.