



***Practical Steps
to
Zero Nuclear Weapons***

Conference Report

January 25-26, 2010

Ottawa, Canada

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Conference Sponsors

The Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
208-145 Spruce Street
Ottawa, ON K1R 6P1
www.web.net/~cnanw/cnanw_member.htm

The Canadian Pugwash Group
c/o 6 Tepee Court
Toronto, ON M2J 3A9
www.pugwashgroup.ca

Physicians for Global Survival
208-145 Spruce Street
Ottawa, ON K1R 6P1
www.pgs.ca

Project Ploughshares
57 Erb Street West
Waterloo, ON N2L 6C2
www.ploughshares.ca

World Federalist Movement – Canada
207-145 Spruce Street
Ottawa, ON K1R 6P1
www.worldfederalistscanada.org

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

CD	Conference on Disarmament / Conférence du désarmement
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
EDAN	États dotés d'armes nucléaires
ENDAN	États non dotés d'armes nucléaires
FMCT	Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty / Traité sur l'interdiction de la production de matières fissiles
MPI	Middle Powers Initiative
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
NNWS	Non-nuclear weapon state
NPR	Nuclear Posture Review (USA) / Révision de la position nucléaire
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NWC	Nuclear Weapons Convention / Convention relative aux armes nucléaires
NWS	Nuclear weapon state
ONG	Organisations non-gouvernementales
RevCon	Review Conference (for NPT)
SC	Strategic Concept (NATO)
TICEN	Traité d'interdiction complète des essais nucléaires
TNP	Traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires

Preface

The January 2010 Ottawa Conference, “Practical Steps to Zero Nuclear Weapons,” was convened to contribute to the discussion regarding the May 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the current review of NATO’s Strategic Concept.

The opening “call to action” reports on the January conference and includes the recommendations of the organizations that sponsored the conference, which were informed by the conference discussions and background papers. It is followed by two background briefing papers, as well as a broad international plan for disarmament developed by the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament in its 2009 report.

The analysis and recommendations in the call to action and the two briefing papers are the responsibility of, and reflect the views of, the sponsoring organizations and are not to be taken as reflecting the views of all conference participants.

A Call to Action

On January 25-26, 2010 some 65 experts including academics; civil society representatives; and officials from the UN, NATO, and US and Canadian governments met in Ottawa for a conference entitled "Practical Steps to Zero Nuclear Weapons." The event, sponsored by a group of Canadian civil society organizations, sought to address the most salient challenges and opportunities on the nuclear disarmament agenda at the dawn of the decade. The sponsoring groups put forward a set of practical recommendations informed by the conference discussions, which are intended to encourage the Canadian government to assume a proactive role in efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons and to seize the moment of renewed momentum for nuclear abolition.

A Window of Opportunity

Virtually all conference panellists referred to the remarkable opportunity that has opened up for the international community to make substantial progress in the effort to eliminate nuclear weapons, and the need to move forward with concrete steps while this window remains open. This opportunity became a common theme throughout the two-day event. Indeed, various speakers pointed out that this opportunity will not last forever and, thus, the need to take prompt action is critical. The president of *Les Artistes pour la Paix*, Pierre Jasmin, said, "The key to a nuclear-weapons free world is to start negotiations now [on a Nuclear Weapons Convention] while political conditions are right." To be sure, several circumstances coalesced to make the timing of this event particularly opportune, and the specific issues that require urgent attention on the path to abolition were repeatedly brought up by conference participants.

The most critical matters that were addressed are set out in the balance of this Report. While the formal presentations were on the record, the discussions that followed were held under the Chatham House Rule to encourage a candid exchange of ideas. Thus, any direct attributions made hereunder either (1) refer to statements that were on the record, or (2) have the speaker's explicit permission.

The NPT Review Conference

Progress toward full implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the cornerstone of the global regime to control nuclear weapons, will be reviewed at the United Nations in May 2010. The Review Conference (RevCon), which takes place every five years, is a unique opportunity to address the deficiencies of the NPT regime, to restore the NPT's credibility as an effective mechanism to curb proliferation, and to confirm implementation of the nuclear-weapon states' (NWS) commitment to disarm.

In his remarks, conference speaker Dr. C. S. Eliot Kang, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, opened with this comment: “The time is right to make real progress in the area of nonproliferation and disarmament, if all states work together to take advantage of this opportunity.” He said that the challenges facing the NPT—such as noncompliance by some states, the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran, and North Korea's unilateral withdrawal from the Treaty—have resulted in the perception by some that the NPT is close to collapsing. Although Kang acknowledged that the US and other nuclear-weapon states parties to the Treaty bear a special responsibility, he made it clear that the US will maintain a ‘safe’ nuclear arsenal for as long as these weapons exist anywhere in the world. He further stated that non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) “bear no less responsibility... to prevent further proliferation and help create the conditions for nuclear disarmament efforts to succeed” and added that NNWS must undertake “rigorous, collective efforts to prevent other countries from acquiring nuclear weapons.” Furthermore, Kang asserted that complete nuclear disarmament is contingent upon a strong non-proliferation regime and added that there was no point in NWS giving up their nuclear arsenals only to have other nations eventually acquire these weapons. He also said that NPT violations cannot be tolerated and thus the international community must make it sufficiently clear to would-be violators that the cost of non-compliance will outweigh the benefits.

In assessing the prospects for achieving consensus on the most critical issues of the NPT, Dr. Randy Rydell of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs said that several substantive disagreements at the last Preparatory Committee will likely resurface during the upcoming RevCon. He noted a need for more high-level policy statements regarding nuclear disarmament. He encouraged legal associations to talk about the Nuclear Weapons Convention and its role in the nuclear disarmament architecture. The work done by Norway and the UK on verification research is a good precedent for middle powers.

Dr. John Burroughs, Executive Director of the Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy, also noted failure of progress at the Conference on Disarmament (CD). He suggested that the CD may need to revisit their rules requiring consensus—which in effect gives each CD member state a veto—on the work program to stop the absurd situation in which states have been unable to approve a program of work since 1996. Moreover, Burroughs said that there is an urgent need for a UN-based nuclear weaponry comprehensive accounting system, since it is essential to know what exists to establish credible benchmarks for progress on reductions.

Among the key issues for the RevCon highlighted by event participants were:

- The need for the US, whose actions and omissions have a significant impact on the fate of the NPT, to support a reaffirmation by all states parties of the commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons, as articulated by President Obama in his 2009 Prague speech;
- The need for concrete steps in pursuing ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and commitment by all state parties to a moratorium on

nuclear testing until such time as the CTBT enters into force. This would build on President Obama's expressed desire to aggressively seek ratification of the CTBT;

- Preliminary negotiations on a Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), to be undertaken in good faith, as well as discussions on strategies for the development of a secure international system for managing the nuclear fuel cycle;
- The NPT regime's institutional deficits, such as the lack of a permanent secretariat and staff;
- Immediate commencement of discussions on a preparatory process to examine the prospect of, and requirements for, a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC). This would come before, and differ from, discussions about an actual NWC; and
- Seeking universality of the NPT and finding mechanisms to bring countries such as India, Pakistan, and Israel into the regime.

It was acknowledged that each of the above-mentioned matters is challenging in its own right, underscoring the difficulty in making progress at the NPT RevCon. For instance, Alyn Ware, Global Coordinator of Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, said that ratification of the CTBT might be problematic if it were seen by some states as being a discriminatory initiative, insofar as it will curtail some states more than others. Ware explained that states with more advanced nuclear expertise, which have already conducted several nuclear weapons tests, are in a more advantageous position, since they may be able to modernize their nuclear arsenals without resorting to actual weapons tests.

On the prospect of a preparatory process for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, it was stated that a distinction should be made between a preparatory process for a NWC, on the one hand, and actual discussions about the content of an NWC, on the other. It was stressed that, if such a distinction is clear, it might become more feasible to garner support for the former. Still, Ware noted that there is already significant support for a UN resolution calling for negotiations leading to a NWC, with 125 countries in favour and 29 against. Moreover, he pointed to three fundamental elements that should be included in an eventual NWC: verification mechanisms, dispute resolution procedures, and enforcement provisions.

Former Canadian Senator Doug Roche, a key figure in Canadian disarmament advocacy, observed that the real problem with the NPT was the failure of the Nuclear Weapons States to honour their obligations, as confirmed by the International Court of Justice. He called for people to take advantage of the opportunity created by President Obama and support the call for an NWC or legal framework. Roche characterized as idealists those who think a two-class world (those with and those without nuclear weapons) can survive in the 21st century, while realists believe that the world must be rid of these weapons to achieve human security.

Responding to the NPT's institutional deficits, André-François Giroux, Director of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Division at Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, said that the Canadian government is supportive of the creation of an NPT Standing Bureau and added that this body should be empowered to convene sessions of states parties to the Treaty. Furthermore, he said that there should be a mechanism for

making substantive decisions every year and not just in five-year intervals at the RevCon, as is currently the case.

NATO Strategic Concept Review

The current review of NATO's Strategic Concept featured prominently in the conference discussions as a crucial opportunity to amend the Alliance's nuclear doctrine. Ted Whiteside, Secretary of NATO's North Atlantic Council, insisted that, although it may be seen as an inconsistency by outside observers, the purpose of nuclear weapons within NATO is political rather than military. With regard to the possibility of making nuclear weapons a priority for the Strategic Concept review, Whiteside stated that, although NATO's nuclear doctrine is important, a “crowded plate” of strategic issues is competing for space during the current review process.

Ernie Regehr of Project Ploughshares addressed specific concerns about NATO's Strategic Concept, including:

- NATO's current commitment to the retention of nuclear weapons seems anachronistic at a time when calls for a world without nuclear weapons are vigorously made from diverse sectors of society.
- There is an apparent inconsistency in the position of countries that are both members of NATO and parties to the NPT. These countries have made an unequivocal commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons. The International Court of Justice has clarified that the Article VI obligation under the NPT requires that states not only pursue elimination but also achieve that goal. Yet as members of NATO they are in fact endorsing a doctrine of nuclear-weapon retention.
- NATO states also promised in the “13 Practical Steps” agreed upon in the 2000 NPT RevCon to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their security concepts. NATO's current Strategic Concept describes an expansive role for nuclear weapons, including first use and use against nonnuclear threats. The notion of Extended Deterrence, whereby the possession of nuclear weapons by some NATO members is justified by alluding to the need to protect other Alliance members (and indeed a geographically expanding area), runs contrary to calls for abolition and only perpetuates the doctrine of retention. It is imperative that the NNWS that fall under this nuclear umbrella declare that such deterrence is unnecessary.
- Articles I and II of the NPT prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons from nuclear weapon states to non-nuclear weapon states. The deployment of US nuclear weapons in NNWS in Europe does not honour either's NPT obligations.
- The faulty logic used by some states to justify nuclear retention seems apparent: if states in stable regions claim the need for nuclear weapons for their security, how can nations in volatile regions be expected to renounce them?

The Obama Effect

Participants noted that President Obama has ushered in an era of cautious optimism, perhaps best epitomized by his 2009 speech in Prague in which he affirmed the commitment of the United States to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and called on the international community in general to take practical steps toward this end. Obama (2009) said:

Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered on a global non-proliferation regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point where the center cannot hold.... [A]s the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act. We cannot succeed in this endeavor alone, but we can lead it, we can start it. So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.

Following the Prague speech, Obama personally presided over a historic session of the UN Security Council, held at the Head-of-State level. Resulting Security Council Resolution 1887 affirms the necessity of taking concrete steps toward nuclear disarmament and reiterates the importance of upholding the tenets of the NPT.

The current United States Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) has also generated significant expectation among disarmament advocates and observers, as it will define the role of nuclear weapons and delineate US nuclear strategy. While it has not yet been released, there is hope that it will reflect the vision articulated in President Obama's Prague speech and will afford a diminishing role to nuclear deterrence as part of overall US military strategy. Daryl Kimball, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association in Washington, D.C., referred to four transformational changes that should be reflected in the upcoming Nuclear Posture Review:

1. The NPR should narrow the role of nuclear weapons to a core deterrence mission to stop use of nuclear weapons against the US and its allies. This would reinforce existing US negative security assurances and recognize that nuclear weapons do not serve the best interests of the US when dealing with terrorist threats.
2. The nuclear arsenal should be reduced to mid- to low-hundreds, and the notion that reduction leads to vulnerability should be refuted by Canada and other allies.
3. The NPR should eliminate the plans for rapid launch in response to a nuclear attack.
4. The NPR should clarify the president's January 2009 pledge "not to authorize new nuclear weapons" by stating that it is US policy not to develop new-design warheads or modify existing warheads to create new capabilities.

Canada's Role

Canada's unique position to take on a leadership role in the efforts to abolish nuclear weapons was repeatedly highlighted at the conference. As a middle power, a member of NATO, an active player in the global nuclear energy industry, a state party to the NPT, and a member of the G8, Canada is well positioned to influence the process of nuclear disarmament. However, as stated in the brief prepared for the conference, “there has always been a strong element of ambivalence in Canadian disarmament policy.”² Calling for a more unambiguous and resolute stance by the Canadian government, University of Western Ontario Professor Erika Simpson observed, “This ambivalence should end now that U.S. President Barack Obama has come out so strongly for active work leading to a nuclear weapons-free world.”

In addition, conference participants pointed to Canada's remarkable opportunity to place the issue of nuclear disarmament on the agenda at this year's G8 and G20 meetings. One of the customary prerogatives of the host nation has been establishing key elements of the agenda. However, a representative from Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada could not disclose whether nuclear disarmament would feature prominently on this year's agenda.

Kimball called on Canada to publicly express a strong desire for positive action by Washington on ratification. He stressed that this can have a powerful effect on both the White House and key Senators. In addition, it is important that Canada and other friends of the CTBT actively encourage the governments of hold-out countries, most particularly China and India, to ratify the CTBT.

Participants suggested that it is important that nations such as Canada assure the US government that a reduction in the role and number of US nuclear weapons would both reinforce existing US negative security assurances vis-à-vis non-nuclear-weapon states and satisfy US positive security assurances to allies.

Civil Society Engagement

The important role that civil society can and should play in pursuing nuclear disarmament was continually stressed by different panellists. The conference itself was held as a testament to the contribution that nongovernmental representatives can make to abolition efforts. Roche noted the call made by President Jimmy Carter at the meeting of the Middle Powers Initiative in January 2010 where he stated several times that civil society must be “aggressive, persistent and demanding.” A key concern expressed at the conference was over the ending by the present government of the longstanding practice of including civil society representation in the official Canadian delegation to the NPT RevCon. Rydell commented on the important role of civil society in keeping the agenda going and encouraged funding for civil society organizations and a role for them on delegations.

Conference Recommendations

The role that Canada could play in the realm of nuclear disarmament was the primary consideration for the sponsors of the Ottawa conference. According to Ernie Regehr, “It is urgent that Prime Minister Harper and Foreign Minister Cannon publicly address nuclear disarmament and reaffirm Canada’s commitment to a world without nuclear weapons.”

Thus, the sponsoring organizations addressed their recommendations to the Canadian government:

- i) It is urgent that the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister find early and prominent opportunities, including the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and Canada’s chairmanship of the G8 and G20 meetings in Canada, to publicly address nuclear disarmament and reaffirm Canada’s commitment to a world without nuclear weapons.
- ii) Canada should encourage a new NATO Strategic Concept that a) welcomes and affirms the groundswell of calls for a world without nuclear weapons; b) confirms NATO’s commitment to the objectives of the NPT and declares that the intent of Article VI is a world free of nuclear weapons; and c) commits NATO to security and arms control policies that conform to Articles I and II of the NPT and that are designed to achieve the nuclear disarmament promised in Article VI.
- iii) The Canadian Government should support new initiatives within Europe and publicly indicate its support for the removal of all remaining non-strategic nuclear weapons from European soil, in support of longstanding international calls that all nuclear weapons be returned to the territories of the states that own them.
- iv) Canada should support the development of an improved strategic relationship with Russia including initiatives such as upgrading the NATO-Russia Council; promoting continuing strategic dialogue between the US and Russia in support of a new nuclear disarmament treaty; and follow-on measures that engage other states with nuclear weapons, including China.
- v) Canada should work to forge a consensus within NATO: that the policies of nuclear weapon states, and of NATO, should reflect the global norm, which has existed since 1945, against the use of nuclear weapons.
- vi) Canada should compliment the United States and Russia for negotiations toward a START replacement treaty and insist on commitments at the NPT Review Conference to further US and Russian reductions and to multilateral reductions leading to elimination.
- vii) As a NATO ally, Canada should encourage the Alliance to take advantage of the present climate of global support for nuclear disarmament to phase out any role for nuclear weapons in its security policies.

viii) Canada should press for the NPT Review Conference to commit to preparatory work on a Nuclear Weapons Convention, or framework of instruments, for sustainable, verifiable, and enforceable global elimination of nuclear weapons.

ix) The government should restore the practice of an inclusive approach to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) by naming representatives of civil society to the Canadian delegation to the 2010 NPT Review Conference in May 2010.

x) At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, Canada should demonstrate its commitment to seize the new hope-filled opportunity, not only to envision a world of peace and security without nuclear weapons, but to generate concrete actions to make it a reality.

Un appel à l'action

Les 25 et 26 janvier 2010, quelque 65 spécialistes, dont des universitaires, des représentants de la société civile et des fonctionnaires de l'ONU, de l'OTAN et des gouvernements américain et canadien, ont tenu une conférence intitulée « Mesures pratiques en vue de l'élimination des armes nucléaires. » L'événement, parrainé par un groupe d'organisations de la société civile canadienne, s'est penché sur les principaux défis et occasions à l'ordre du jour en cette aube de la décennie. Les groupes parrains ont mis en avant un ensemble de recommandations qui, issues des discussions de la conférence, se proposent d'inciter le gouvernement canadien à assumer un rôle proactif dans les initiatives visant à libérer le monde des armements nucléaires et à profiter du mouvement renouvelé en faveur de l'abolition du nucléaire.

Une conjoncture favorable

La quasi totalité des participants à la conférence ont souligné l'excellente occasion offerte à la communauté internationale de réaliser des avancées substantielles dans les efforts pour éliminer les armements nucléaires, ainsi que la nécessité de profiter de la conjoncture favorable pour prendre des mesures concrètes. Cette conjoncture est devenue un thème commun tout au long de la conférence; plusieurs conférenciers ont souligné, en effet, qu'elle ne durerait pas éternellement, d'où l'urgence d'agir sans tarder. « Si on veut libérer le monde de tout armement nucléaire », a affirmé Pierre Jasmin, président du mouvement *Les Artistes pour la Paix*, « il faut absolument amorcer les négociations (sur une Convention relative aux armes nucléaires) tout de suite, pendant que le climat politique est favorable. » La conjugaison de plusieurs facteurs, en effet, fait en sorte que cette initiative arrive à point nommé; des participants à la conférence ont soulevé à maintes reprises les questions sur lesquelles il faut se pencher de toute urgence sur la voie de l'abolition.

Les questions les plus cruciales qu'on a abordées sont énoncées dans le reste du présent rapport. Les présentations formelles ont été versées au procès-verbal, tandis que les discussions se sont tenues sous la Règle de Chatham House, pour permettre des échanges plus ouverts. Toute citation directe ci-après renvoie donc à des déclarations (1) inscrites au procès-verbal ou (2) reproduites avec la permission explicite de leur auteur.

La Conférence d'examen du TNP

Les Nations Unies examineront, en mai 2010, les progrès accomplis en vue de l'application intégrale du Traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires (TNP), pierre angulaire du régime mondial de contrôle des armements nucléaires. La Conférence quinquennale d'examen offre une occasion exceptionnelle de se pencher sur les carences du régime du TNP, de rétablir la crédibilité de ce dernier en tant que

mécanisme efficace de restriction de la prolifération et de confirmer la mise en œuvre de l'engagement des États dotés d'armes nucléaires (EDAN) à se désarmer.

« C'est le moment choisi pour accomplir de véritables progrès dans le domaine de la non-prolifération et du désarmement, pourvu que tous les États s'unissent pour profiter de l'occasion offerte », a déclaré C. S. Eliot Kangm secrétaire d'État adjoint des États-Unis. Les défis auxquels est confronté le TNP, tels que le non-respect de la part de certains États, la nucléarisation possible de l'Iran et le retrait du Traité par la Corée du Nord, a-t-il poursuivi, ont amené des gens à prévoir la faillite du TNP. Tout en reconnaissant que les États-Unis et d'autres États dotés d'armes nucléaires parties au Traité portent une responsabilité particulière, le conférencier a affirmé clairement que les États-Unis conserveront un arsenal nucléaire sécuritaire tant qu'il subsistera de ces armes dans le monde. Il a fait observer que « les États non dotés d'armes nucléaires (ENDAN) n'en demeurent pas moins responsables...d'empêcher toute autre prolifération et d'aider à créer les conditions favorables à la réussite des initiatives de désarmement », ajoutant que les ENDAN doivent entreprendre « de rigoureux efforts collectifs pour empêcher d'autres pays de se procurer des armes nucléaires. » Il a affirmé que le désarmement nucléaire présuppose un régime de non-prolifération ferme et qu'il serait inutile que les États dotés d'armes nucléaires se défassent de leurs arsenaux nucléaires, si d'autres pays devaient, par la suite, se doter de ces mêmes armes. Il a aussi déclaré qu'on ne saurait tolérer la violation du TNP et que la communauté internationale devait prévenir clairement les éventuels contrevenants que le coût de leur non-respect l'emporterait largement sur ses avantages.

Dans son évaluation des probabilités de parvenir à un consensus sur les plus cruciales des questions relatives au TNP, M. Randy Rydell, du Bureau des affaires du désarmement des Nations Unies, a prévenu que plusieurs désaccords importants auxquels a donné lieu le dernier Comité préparatoire ressurgiraient probablement lors de la prochaine Conférence d'examen. Il a fait part de la nécessité d'émettre plus de déclarations de hautes autorités au sujet du désarmement nucléaire. Il a aussi incité les associations juridiques à traiter davantage de la Convention sur les armes nucléaires et de son rôle dans l'architecture du désarmement nucléaire. Le travail de recherche sur la vérification accompli par la Norvège et le Royaume-Uni constitue pour les puissances moyennes un bel exemple à suivre.

John Burroughs, directeur exécutif du Comité des avocats sur la politique nucléaire, a aussi constaté le peu de progrès réalisés à la Conférence du désarmement (CD). Il a ajouté que cette dernière devrait peut-être revoir ses règlements requérant le consensus – qui accorde effectivement le droit de veto à chacun des États membres de la CD – sur le programme de travail, afin de mettre un terme à une situation absurde qui n'a pas permis l'approbation d'un seul programme de travail depuis 1996. Il a souligné l'urgent besoin d'un système global de comptabilisation des armes nucléaires dans le cadre des Nations Unies, puisqu'il faut d'abord savoir ce qui existe, si on veut établir des critères d'évaluation des progrès en matière de réduction.

Relevons, parmi les principales questions que les participants à l'événement ont été invités à aborder lors de la Conférence d'examen :

- La nécessité pour les États-Unis, dont les actions et les omissions ont un impact important sur le sort du TNP, d'appuyer la réaffirmation, de la part de tous les États parties à l'engagement, à l'égard d'un monde sans armes nucléaires, pour reprendre les mots du président Obama dans son discours de Prague de 2009;
- La nécessité de prendre des mesures concrètes en vue de la ratification du Traité d'interdiction complète des essais nucléaires (TICEN) et de l'engagement, de la part de tous les États parties, à établir un moratoire sur les essais nucléaires jusqu'à l'entrée en vigueur du TICEN. On donnerait ainsi suite au désir, exprimé par le président Obama, de rechercher énergiquement la ratification du TICEN;
- Il faut entreprendre, en toute bonne foi, des négociations sur un Traité sur l'interdiction de la production de matières fissiles (FMCT), de même que des discussions sur des stratégies d'instauration d'un système international sécuritaire de gestion du cycle du combustible nucléaire;
- Les lacunes institutionnelles du régime du TNP telles que l'absence de secrétariat et de personnel permanents;
- L'amorce immédiate de discussions sur un processus préparatoire permettant d'examiner l'éventualité et les exigences d'une Convention relative aux armes nucléaires (NWC). Ces mesures seraient préalables aux discussions sur la création de cette Convention, dont elles différeraient;
- La recherche de l'universalité du TNP et de mécanismes permettant de faire adhérer au régime des pays tels que l'Inde, le Pakistan et Israël.

On a reconnu que chacune des questions énumérées ci-dessus posait son propre défi, d'où la difficulté d'aller de l'avant à la Conférence d'examen du TNP. Alyn Ware, coordonnateur mondial des Parlementaires pour la non-prolifération nucléaire et le désarmement, a affirmé, pour sa part, que la ratification du TICEN serait difficile si des États y voyaient une initiative discriminatoire, en ce sens qu'il désavantagerait certains États plus que d'autres. Il a expliqué que les États pourvus d'une haute expertise nucléaire et qui ont déjà fait plusieurs essais d'armements nucléaires, sont dans une position plus avantageuse, étant en mesure de moderniser leurs arsenaux nucléaires sans recourir à des essais d'armements.

Quant à la perspective d'un processus préparatoire à une Convention relative aux armes nucléaires, on a fait observer qu'il faudrait distinguer entre un processus préparatoire à une NWC, d'une part, et des discussions sur le contenu d'une NWC, d'autre part. On a souligné qu'une distinction claire permettrait d'obtenir plus facilement des appuis au premier. Ware a même ajouté qu'une résolution des Nations Unies faisant appel à des négociations en vue d'une NWC avait déjà recueilli de solides appuis, 125 pays s'étant déclarés pour et 29 contre. Il a en outre énuméré trois éléments fondamentaux à inclure dans une éventuelle NWC : des mécanismes de vérification, une procédure de résolution des conflits et des dispositions d'exécution.

L'ex-sénateur canadien Doug Roche, chef de file de la cause du désarmement au Canada, a signalé que le vrai problème du TNP venait de ce que les États dotés d'armes nucléaires ne respectaient pas leurs obligations, comme l'a confirmé le Tribunal international de la justice. Il a recommandé de profiter de l'occasion offerte par le président Obama en appuyant l'appel à la création d'une NWC ou d'un cadre juridique. Roche a qualifié d'idéalistes ceux qui pensent qu'un monde divisé en deux classes (ceux qui ont des armes nucléaires et ceux qui n'en ont pas) peut survivre au 21^e siècle, alors que les réalistes croient que la sécurité humaine exige que le monde élimine ces armes.

Au sujet des carences institutionnelles du TNP, André-François Giroux, directeur de la Division Non-prolifération et Désarmement, Ministère des Affaires étrangères et Commerce international Canada, a déclaré que le gouvernement canadien appuyait la création d'un Bureau permanent du TNP, ajoutant que cet organisme devrait détenir le pouvoir de convoquer des sessions des États parties au Traité. Il faudrait se doter, a-t-il poursuivi, d'un mécanisme permettant de prendre des décisions importantes tous les ans, et non pas tous les cinq ans à l'occasion de l'examen de la Convention, comme c'est actuellement le cas.

Examen du concept stratégique de l'OTAN

L'examen actuel du Concept stratégique de l'OTAN a occupé une place importante dans les discussions; on y voyait, en effet, une occasion exceptionnelle d'amender la doctrine nucléaire de l'Alliance. Ted Whiteside, secrétaire du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord de l'OTAN, a maintenu que même si cela pouvait paraître illogique à des observateurs extérieurs, la raison d'être des armes nucléaires au sein de l'OTAN était de nature politique plutôt que militaire. Quant à la possibilité d'accorder la priorité aux armes nucléaires lors de l'examen du Concept stratégique, il a ajouté que même si la doctrine nucléaire de l'OTAN est importante, un « menu surchargé » de questions stratégiques se disputent la place lors du processus d'examen actuel.

Ernie Regehr, de Project Ploughshares, a traité de préoccupations particulières au sujet du Concept stratégique de l'OTAN :

- L'engagement actuel de l'OTAN à l'égard de la rétention des armes nucléaires semble anachronique, en ce moment où divers secteurs de la société réclament vigoureusement un monde sans armes nucléaires.
- Il semble y avoir manque de logique dans les positions des pays à la fois membres de l'OTAN et parties au TNP. Ils ont en effet pris un engagement non équivoque à l'égard de l'élimination des armes nucléaires. La Cour internationale de justice a précisé que l'article VI du TNP fait obligation aux États, non seulement de viser à l'élimination, mais aussi d'atteindre cet objectif. Et pourtant, en tant que membres de l'OTAN, ils appuient une doctrine de rétention d'armes nucléaires.

Les pays de l'OTAN ont également promis, dans les « 13 mesures pratiques » adoptées lors de l'examen du TNP de 2000, de réduire le rôle des armes

nucléaires dans leurs concepts de sécurité. Le Concept stratégique actuel de l'OTAN assigne un rôle étendu aux armes nucléaires, dont l'emploi en premier et l'emploi contre les menaces non nucléaires. La notion de dissuasion étendue, en vertu de laquelle la possession d'armes nucléaires par des pays membres de l'OTAN est justifiée par le besoin de protéger d'autres membres de l'Alliance (et cela, dans une zone qui s'agrandit géographiquement) va à l'encontre des appels à l'abolition et ne fait que perpétuer la doctrine de la rétention. Il faut que les États non dotés d'armes nucléaires regroupés sous ce parapluie nucléaire déclarent qu'une telle dissuasion est injustifiée.

- Les articles I et II du TNP interdisent le transfert d'armes nucléaires d'États dotés d'armes nucléaires vers des États non dotés. Le déploiement d'armes nucléaires dans des ENDAN européens ne satisfait aux obligations ni des uns, ni des autres aux termes du TNP.
- Il saute aux yeux que la logique invoquée par certains États pour justifier la rétention nucléaire est déficiente : si des États de régions stables réclament des armes nucléaires pour assurer leur sécurité, comment s'attendre à ce que des pays de régions instables y renoncent?

L'effet Obama

Des participants ont observé que le président Obama a inauguré une ère d'optimisme prudent, comme l'illustre au premier plan son discours de 2009 à Prague, où il confirmait l'engagement des États-Unis à débarrasser le monde de ses armes nucléaires et appelait la communauté internationale en général à prendre des mesures pratiques à cet effet :

Nos efforts pour contenir ces dangers, a-t-il déclaré, se concentrent sur un régime global de non-prolifération, mais si plus de personnes et de nations enfreignent les règles, nous pourrions atteindre le point où le centre ne peut plus tenir... En tant que seule puissance nucléaire à avoir eu recours à l'arme nucléaire, les États-Unis ont la responsabilité morale d'agir. Nous ne pouvons réussir seuls dans cette entreprise, mais nous pouvons la gérer, nous pouvons la lancer. Ainsi, j'affirme aujourd'hui clairement et avec conviction l'engagement de l'Amérique à rechercher la paix et la sécurité dans un monde sans armes nucléaires.

Après son discours de Prague, Obama a présidé une séance historique du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU qui réunissait les chefs d'État. La résolution 1887 du Conseil de sécurité qui en est issue affirme la nécessité de prendre des mesures concrètes en vue du désarmement nucléaire et réitère l'importance de maintenir et de renforcer la doctrine du TNP.

L'actuelle Révision de la position nucléaire des États-Unis (NPR) a aussi suscité de grandes attentes chez les observateurs et les militants du désarmement, car elle va définir le rôle des armes nucléaires et la stratégie nucléaire américaine. Elle n'a pas

encore été publiée, mais on espère qu'elle s'avérera conforme à la vision décrite par le président Obama à Prague et qu'elle attribuera un rôle de moins en moins important à la dissuasion nucléaire dans l'ensemble de la stratégie nucléaire des États-Unis. Daryl Kimball, directeur administratif de l'Arms Control Association de Washington, D.C., a distingué quatre changements transformationnels à effectuer dans le cadre de la prochaine Révision de la position nucléaire :

1. La NPR devrait réduire le rôle des armes nucléaires à une mission essentielle ayant pour objet de dissuader de recourir aux armes nucléaires contre les États-Unis et leurs alliés. Cette mesure renforcerait les garanties dites de sécurité négative et reconnaîtrait que les armes nucléaires ne servent pas les meilleurs intérêts des États-Unis face à des menaces terroristes.
2. L'arsenal nucléaire devrait être réduit à quelques centaines d'unités, tandis que le Canada et les autres alliés doivent réfuter la notion selon laquelle toute réduction est source de vulnérabilité.
3. La NPR devrait éliminer les projets de riposte rapide en cas d'attaque nucléaire.
4. La NPR devrait élucider l'engagement, formulé par le président en janvier 2009, « à ne pas autoriser de nouvelles armes nucléaires », en déclarant que les États-Unis ont pour politique de ne pas deviser de nouveaux types d'ogives nucléaires ni de modifier des ogives existantes pour y ajouter de nouvelles capacités.

Le Rôle du Canada

On a affirmé à maintes reprises, au cours de la conférence, que le Canada était particulièrement en mesure d'assumer un rôle de leadership dans les efforts pour éliminer les armes nucléaires. Puissance moyenne, membre de l'OTAN, actif dans le domaine de l'industrie énergétique nucléaire mondiale, État partie au TNP et membre du G8, le Canada est en effet dans une position favorable pour influencer le processus de désarmement nucléaire. Selon le mémoire préparé en vue de la conférence, « la politique de désarmement canadienne a toujours été marquée d'une forte dose d'ambivalence. » Erika Simpson, professeure à l'Université de Western Ontario, a réclamé du gouvernement canadien une position moins ambiguë et plus résolue : « Cette ambivalence devrait cesser », dit-elle, « maintenant que le président Obama a si vigoureusement réclamé un monde sans armes nucléaires. »

Des participants à la conférence ont en outre souligné l'occasion exceptionnelle qui s'offre au Canada de mettre la question du désarmement nucléaire à l'ordre du jour des réunions du G8 et du G20 de cette année. Le pays hôte jouit habituellement, en effet, de la prérogative d'établir les éléments clés de l'ordre du jour. Un représentant des Affaires étrangères et Commerce international Canada n'a cependant pas révélé si le désarmement nucléaire serait en vedette dans l'ordre du jour de cette année.

Kimball a demandé au Canada d'exprimer publiquement son vif désir de voir Washington faire des gestes positifs en faveur de la ratification. Il a souligné que cela produirait un effet considérable sur la Maison Blanche et les sénateurs influents. Il importe en outre que le Canada et les autres amis du TICEN incitent les gouvernements des pays réticents, et plus particulièrement la Chine et l'Inde, à ratifier le TICEN.

Il est important, selon certains des participants, que des pays tels que le Canada assurent au gouvernement des États-Unis que la réduction du rôle et du nombre de leurs armes nucléaires renforcerait les actuelles garanties de sécurité négative des États-Unis à l'égard des États non dotés d'armes nucléaires, tout en répondant aux garanties de sécurité positive des États-Unis à l'égard de leurs alliés.

Engagement de la société civile

Différents participants ont continuellement souligné le rôle important que la société civile peut et doit jouer à l'égard du désarmement nucléaire. La conférence elle-même se voulait une illustration de la contribution que des représentants non gouvernementaux peuvent apporter aux efforts en faveur de l'abolition. Roche a cité l'appel lancé par le président Jimmy Carter lors de la réunion de l'Initiative des puissances moyennes de janvier 2010, où il a répété à maintes reprises que la société civile doit se montrer « agressive, persistante et exigeante. » On s'est dit grandement préoccupé, à la conférence, par l'abandon par le gouvernement actuel de sa pratique, depuis longtemps établie, d'inclure des représentants de la société civile dans la délégation officielle du Canada dans la Conférence d'examen du TNP. Rydell a mentionné le rôle important que joue la société civile en faisant avancer l'ordre du jour et en encourageant l'appui financier aux organisations de la société civile et l'attribution d'un rôle à ces dernières dans les délégations.

Recommandations de la Conférence

Le rôle possible du Canada dans le domaine du désarmement nucléaire était au premier rang des préoccupations des parrains de la conférence d'Ottawa. « Il est urgent », selon Ernie Regehr, « que le premier ministre Harper et le ministre des Affaires étrangères Cannon interviennent publiquement dans le débat sur le désarmement nucléaire et réaffirment l'engagement du Canada à l'égard d'un monde sans armes nucléaires. »

Ainsi, les organisations ont fait au gouvernement canadien les recommandations suivantes :

- i) Que le premier ministre et le ministre des Affaires étrangères profitent sans tarder d'importantes occasions, dont celles de la Conférence d'examen du Traité de non-prolifération de 2010 et de la présidence du Canada aux réunions du G8 et du G20 qui se tiendront dans ce pays, pour intervenir publiquement dans le débat sur le désarmement nucléaire et réaffirmer l'engagement du Canada à l'égard d'un

monde sans armes nucléaires.

ii) Que le Canada soutienne un nouveau Concept stratégique de l'OTAN qui a) accueille favorablement et appuie le raz-de-marée d'appels à un monde sans armes nucléaires; b) confirme l'engagement de l'OTAN à l'égard des objectifs du TNP et déclare que l'Article VI a pour intention l'élimination totale des armes nucléaires; c) engage l'OTAN à formuler des politiques de sécurité et de contrôle des armes qui soient conformes aux articles I et II du TNP et qui aient pour objet de réaliser le désarmement nucléaire promis à l'article VI.

iii) Que le gouvernement canadien soutienne les nouvelles initiatives européennes et manifeste publiquement son appui à l'élimination de toutes les armes nucléaires non stratégiques qui subsistent en sol européen, faisant ainsi siens les appels internationaux de longue date à retourner toutes les armes nucléaires dans les territoires qui en sont propriétaires.

iv) Que le Canada appuie la mise au point d'une relation stratégique améliorée avec la Russie, en prenant des initiatives telles que la mise à jour du Conseil OTAN-Russie; la promotion d'un dialogue stratégique permanent entre les États-Unis et la Russie en vue de la conclusion d'un nouveau traité de désarmement nucléaire; enfin, l'amorce d'un dialogue avec d'autres pays dotés d'armes nucléaires, dont la Chine.

v) Que le Canada s'efforce d'établir au sein de l'OTAN un consensus selon lequel les politiques des États dotés d'armes nucléaires et de l'OTAN se conformeraient à la norme mondiale en matière d'interdiction des armes nucléaires, qui remonte à 1945.

vi) Que le Canada félicite les États-Unis et la Russie d'avoir amorcé des négociations en vue d'un traité remplaçant le Traité START et insiste sur les engagements, pris lors de la Conférence d'examen du TNP, à demander de nouvelles réductions de la part des États-Unis et de la Russie, ainsi que des réductions multilatérales aboutissant à l'élimination.

vii) Que le Canada, en tant qu'allié de l'OTAN, incite l'Alliance à profiter du climat actuel d'appui au désarmement nucléaire pour éliminer graduellement tout rôle des armes nucléaires dans ses politiques de sécurité.

viii) Que le Canada presse la Conférence d'examen du TNP de s'engager à effectuer des travaux préparatoires à une Convention relative aux armes nucléaires ou à établir un cadre instrumental permettant de parvenir à une élimination mondiale des armes nucléaires qui soit durable et vérifiable et ait force exécutoire.

ix) Que le gouvernement rétablisse la pratique d'une approche inclusive des organisations non-gouvernementales (ONG) en déléguant des représentants de la société civile auprès de la Conférence d'examen du TNP de 2010 en mai.

x) Que le Canada, à la Conférence d'examen du TNP de 2010 manifeste son engagement à saisir une occasion prometteuse, non seulement d'imaginer un monde de paix et de sécurité libre d'armes nucléaires, mais aussi de prendre les mesures concrètes qui en fassent une réalité.

Canadian Action for Zero Nuclear Weapons

Twenty years after the end of the Cold War there are at least 23,000 nuclear warheads still in existence, with a combined blast capacity equivalent to 150,000 Hiroshima bombs. The US and Russia together have over 22,000, and France, the UK, China, India, Pakistan and Israel around 1,000 between them. Nearly half of all warheads are still operationally deployed, and the US and Russia each have over 2,000 weapons on dangerously high alert, ready to be launched immediately – within a decision window of just 4-8 minutes for each president – in the event of perceived attack. The command and control systems of the Cold War years were repeatedly strained by mistakes and false alarms. With more nuclear-armed states now, and more system vulnerabilities, the near miracle of no nuclear exchange cannot continue in perpetuity. – *Report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, 2009*

The Obama Moment

A new moment in the long struggle to eliminate nuclear weapons has opened up for the international community. With both US and Russian leadership seriously committed to nuclear disarmament negotiations, a new opportunity exists to make substantive reductions in existing nuclear arsenals, halt proliferation and set the world on an irreversible path to zero nuclear weapons. President Barack Obama's initiative in convening an unprecedented summit meeting of the United Nations Security Council devoted to the nuclear weapons issue has given new hope to the world. The obstacles still to be overcome in reducing nuclear dangers must not be underestimated. Nonetheless, the climate is bright in which to solidify progress at the 2010 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In his seminal April 5, 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama said: "The existence of thousands of nuclear weapons is the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War. ...Today, the Cold War has disappeared but thousands of those weapons have not. In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up. More nations have acquired these weapons. Testing has continued. Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound[s]. The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered on a global nonproliferation regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point where the center cannot hold.... [A]s the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act. We cannot succeed in this endeavor alone, but we can lead it, we can start it. So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. I'm not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly – perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take

patience and persistence. But now we, too, must ignore the voices who tell us that the world cannot change. We have to insist, ‘Yes, we can.’”

Calls for achievement of a nuclear weapons-free world have continued to pour in from other quarters as well. In 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon put his nuclear disarmament proposals in a broad context: “There can be no development without peace and no peace without development. Disarmament can provide the means for both. ‘We the peoples’ have the legitimate right to challenge the leaders of the international community by asking these questions: What are you doing to eliminate nuclear weapons? How will you fund your fight against poverty? How will we finance mitigation of, and adaptation to, climate change and the protection of our environment? These are global goods that every government and every individual in the world should strive to achieve together in the spirit of renewed multilateralism.... Disarmament can help lead the way to a renewed multilateralism and that is why I have made it a number one priority.”

The historic UN Security Council Summit held September 24, 2009 added momentum to the drive for a nuclear weapons-free world. In their statements, heads of state embraced the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama of Japan said, “The vision of a world without nuclear weapons proposed by President Obama this April has encouraged and inspired people around the world. It is high time for us to take action.” Resolution 1887 adopted by the Summit reflects the agenda laid out by President Obama and some key NPT commitments. While the resolution contains no innovations on disarmament, it references the NPT’s disarmament obligation and the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conference outcomes; endorses U.S.-Russian negotiations on nuclear arms reductions; calls for bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force and commencing negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty; and comprehensively sets forth safety and nonproliferation measures to reduce the risk of a nuclear weapons catastrophe.

During preparations for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and in framing the wider agenda to achieve a nuclear weapons-free world, states can draw on a well developed set of commitments and proposals, reinforced and elaborated in 2009. They include the 1995 NPT Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament; the 2000 NPT Practical Steps for disarmament; draft recommendations of the 2009 NPT PrepCom; UN General Assembly resolutions – Renewed Determination, New Agenda, Nuclear Disarmament (Non-Aligned Movement), and others; UN Security Council Resolution 1887; the Secretary-General’s five-point proposal for disarmament, highlighting the need for a Nuclear Weapons Convention and a Security Council summit on nuclear disarmament; reports of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission and the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament; and proposals of civil society groups, campaigns, and initiatives, among them Global Zero and the Middle Powers Initiative and its Article VI Forum launched in the wake of the failed 2005 NPT Review Conference. Through the Article VI Forum, MPI identified seven priorities for the NPT review process: verified reduction of nuclear forces, standing down of nuclear forces (de-alerting), negotiation of a FMCT, bringing the CTBT into force, strengthened negative security assurances, regulation of nuclear fuel

production and supply, and improved NPT governance. Those measures warrant priority, and they are integrated into the analysis and recommendations of this Briefing Paper.

Canada's Responsibilities

Canada has an important history of active support for nuclear disarmament, even though there have always been strong elements of ambivalence in Canadian disarmament policy. In recent years, certainly at the highest levels of government, ambivalence seems to have turned to indifference. The government has certainly not rejected Canadian policy in support of the elimination of nuclear weapons, but neither has it championed it at this new moment of opportunity. The government has committed up to \$1-billion over 10 years to the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, which conducts such work as securing nuclear materials, redirecting weapons scientists to employment in civilian fields, and ensuring the nonproliferation of biological agents. While a necessary work to thwart terrorism, this is principally a nonproliferation initiative, not nuclear disarmament.

Canada has also previously advanced proposals for starting negotiations for an FMCT and for shoring up the disarmament institutional infrastructure. Canada's effort to strengthen the NPT's institutional and accountability mechanisms are an important contribution. To this work, Canada must now add strong support for President Obama's initiatives to make substantive progress on nuclear disarmament. To make headway will require Canadian leadership that has the courage of its formal policy declarations, supplemented by a coherent strategy and a diplomatic offensive to gather a credible supporting coalition of likeminded States. Canada's chairmanship of the G8 and G20 meetings in 2010 affords a valuable opportunity for advancing the nuclear disarmament agenda just as Canada should be doing in NATO meetings.

The first priority now needs to be a clear decision to reassert Canadian disarmament diplomacy. **It is urgent that the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister find early and prominent opportunities, including the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and Canada's chairmanship of the G8 and G20 meetings in Canada, to publicly address nuclear disarmament and reaffirm Canada's commitment to a world without nuclear weapons.**

Ending NATO Incoherence

The time has come for Canada to work diligently to end the incoherence between NATO's nuclear weapons policies and the NPT commitments of all NATO countries. In 1999, Canada did make such an effort, but it came to naught because of the intransigencies of the NATO nuclear powers (the US, the UK, and France). But, with the Obama initiatives, the climate today is entirely different.

NATO's longtime insistence that its retention of nuclear weapons is "essential to preserve peace" is clearly out of step with the pursuit of a world without nuclear weapons. It is also out of step with Article VI of the NPT, the nuclear disarmament imperative as articulated in President Obama's Prague speech, UN Security Council Resolution 1887, and public declarations by a broad range of governments and individuals prominent in international security affairs. The 2009 NATO Summit advanced a timely opportunity to once again rethink and restate the Alliance's strategic doctrine. To aid this rethinking process, **Canada should encourage a new NATO Strategic Concept that a) welcomes and affirms the groundswell of calls for a world without nuclear weapons; b) confirms NATO's commitment to the objectives of the NPT and declares that the intent of Article VI is a world free of nuclear weapons; and c) commits NATO to security and arms control policies that conform to Articles I and II of the NPT and that are designed to achieve the nuclear disarmament promised in Article VI.**

Both the rationale and the language for such a new NATO approach to nuclear weapons are readily available in the burgeoning anthology of nuclear abolition statements, as well as in the logic with which the NPT was originally constructed – namely, that nuclear weapons, far from being "essential to preserve peace," are ultimately an unacceptable risk to humanity. The new NATO Strategic Concept should thus clearly state that the elimination of nuclear weapons, not their retention, is essential to global security. Rather than asserting that the "strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance" are "the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies," NATO's new Strategic Concept must reflect the new reality most recently articulated by Mikhail Gorbachev's warning that "with every passing year [nuclear weapons] make our security more precarious." Indeed, a new NATO statement could borrow from the 2008 statement of leading US statesmen and thus also acknowledge that "without the vision of moving toward zero, we will not find the essential cooperation required to stop our downward spiral" toward greater insecurity.

The current Strategic Concept says that the fundamental purpose of NATO nuclear forces is "political" – without offering any clarity on how weapons can be political without also being military, and thus militarily threatening, and without recognizing that issuing nuclear threats acts as an incentive to those threatened to acquire similar nuclear threats. On this point, Canada in 1999 offered more constructive alternative language. The government's response to a parliamentary committee report on nuclear disarmament agreed with the Committee recommendation, and thus the government of the day promised that Canada would – and now Canada should again – insist that NATO "work consistently to reduce the political legitimacy and value of nuclear weapons in order to contribute to the goal of their progressive reduction and eventual elimination." This language found its way into Step 9[v] of the "practical disarmament steps" adopted in 2000 at the NPT Review Conference in which nuclear weapon states agreed to "a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination."

The current Strategic Concept is also at odds with the principles and intent of Articles I and II of the NPT when it emphasizes the importance of retaining tactical nuclear weapons in Europe for deterrence and especially to link Europe and North America. There are currently an estimated 150 to 240 nuclear weapons, all US B61 gravity bombs, held in five countries in Europe – Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey. All of the European countries hosting these US nuclear weapons are non-nuclear weapon state parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The future of those tactical deployments is now under active discussion, particularly in light of the German government's explicit call for the removal of nuclear weapons from its territory. Support is growing in Europe for the German position. **The Canadian Government should support new initiatives within Europe and publicly indicate its support for the removal of all remaining non-strategic nuclear weapons from European soil, in support of longstanding international calls that all nuclear weapons be returned to the territories of the states that own them.**

Some NATO states that may support this in principle may nevertheless argue against change at this time on the grounds that the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe should be coordinated with significant reductions in Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal. And it is true that not only Russian tactical nuclear weapons, but relations with Russia on a much broader level, will be central to achieving sustainable changes within NATO. Despite the end of the Cold War, Russia has never stopped thinking of NATO as an anti-Russian institution, and the events surrounding the Russia-Georgia war of 2008 only reinforced that perception. NATO's expansion to the east in the post-Cold War era has created further disquiet in Russia – not to mention that it has also represented the steady geographic expansion of the West's nuclear umbrella, in clear violation of the commitment to “a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies.”

It is now necessary to take up the Kissinger call for a dialogue “within NATO and with Russia, now begun by Presidents Obama and Medvedev, on consolidating the nuclear weapons designed for forward deployment to enhance their security, and as a first step toward careful accounting for them and their eventual elimination.” Progress toward that end will obviously require a new kind of strategic relationship with Russia and active engagement with it in pursuit of reductions to its non-strategic nuclear weapons arsenal. The huge imbalance in conventional forces between Russia and NATO will certainly be a challenge. Russia accounts for less than 6 per cent of world military spending, while NATO states collectively account for more than 60 per cent. As long as Russia regards this overwhelming conventional force as, if not necessarily an overt enemy, then a challenge to its regional interests, it is unlikely to be amenable to significant further reductions to its substantial arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons. This does not mean that the denuclearization of Europe should be contingent on Russian tactical nuclear disarmament. In fact, the removal of US nuclear weapons from Europe would have the effect of depriving Russia of any argument that it needs to maintain a non-strategic nuclear armoury.

Canada should support the development of an improved strategic relationship with Russia including initiatives such as upgrading the NATO-Russia Council; promoting continuing strategic dialogue between the US and Russia in support of a new nuclear disarmament treaty; and follow-on measures that engage other states with nuclear weapons, including China.

In short, **Canada should work to forge a consensus within NATO: that the policies of nuclear weapon states, and of NATO, should reflect the global norm, which has existed since 1945, against the use of nuclear weapons.** Pending the elimination of nuclear weapons through a global treaty, NATO's revised Strategic Concept should pave the way for the only lawful and civilized stance: the total elimination of nuclear weapons. (See Annex I: "NATO's Strategic Concept, the NPT, and Global Zero.")

From Bilateral to Multilateral Negotiations

Whether the United States will alter its overall strategic posture to facilitate deeper bilateral reductions, opening the way to multilateral reductions, remains to be seen. The Obama administration cancelled plans for deployment of ICBM interceptor systems in Europe, but research and development continue, and the medium-range systems to be deployed instead may one day be given a long-range capability. One adverse sign was the US Senate's unanimous adoption of a provision on military spending in 2010 that bars expenditures to implement reductions pursuant to a treaty with Russia unless the President certifies that it does not limit US "ballistic missile defense systems, space capabilities, or advanced conventional weapons."

However, a hopeful sign is US and Russian support for the "Renewed Determination" resolution at the UN, which highlights the role of the principles of verification, irreversibility, and transparency in the process of reducing and eliminating nuclear arsenals. It is significant that the US and Russia have committed to those principles, which are rooted in the 2000 NPT commitments. Both countries presently seek an agreement on a START replacement treaty that would limit each side to no more than 1,675 deployed strategic warheads and between 500 and 1,100 strategic delivery vehicles. Unfortunately, this would still not fundamentally alter the nuclear balance of terror between the United States and Russia.

The Obama administration hopes to negotiate a much more ambitious agreement that would further reduce strategic warheads, reduce non-strategic warheads, and provide, for the first time, for verification of the dismantlement of withdrawn warheads. The result would be verified limits on the entire nuclear arsenals, not just deployed strategic warheads, of both sides. When such a further agreement is reached and US and Russian arsenals are sufficiently reduced – a matter on which other states with nuclear weapons should be consulted – the stage would be set for multilateral negotiations on reductions. **Canada should compliment the United States and Russia for negotiations toward a START replacement treaty and insist on commitments at the NPT**

Review Conference to further US and Russian reductions and to multilateral reductions leading to elimination.

The Trap of ‘Eventual’

With regard to the geopolitical underpinnings of nuclear postures in the new era the world has entered, it is particularly important that US allies convey the idea that “extended deterrence” cannot masquerade as justification for the continuing, expansive role of nuclear weapons. Alliances do not have to depend on nuclear weapons to deter aggression; non-nuclear military power is quite robust. Nor should diplomacy, “soft power,” and conflict prevention be neglected.

The argument now being advanced in the US by opponents of nuclear disarmament – that the US must maintain nuclear weapons to protect the “credibility” of its nuclear umbrella so that allied nations do not have to obtain their own nuclear weapons – is particularly insidious and will undermine Obama’s efforts to work for a nuclear weapons-free world. Similarly, the argument that the US Senate must not ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty absent a guarantee that US laboratories can ensure the modernization of nuclear weapons through lab work will nullify many gains of ratifying a CTBT. Those who claim that nuclear weapons are still necessary do not usually oppose “eventual” nuclear disarmament, but they are so insistent on the modernization of nuclear weapons for “security” purposes today that they drive forward the nuclear arms race.

The world now risks falling into a security trap in which the elimination of nuclear weapons must always remain an “eventual” goal, meaning that the goal is so far over the horizon as to be meaningless. In retaining “eventual,” nuclear defenders will so solidify the justification for nuclear weapons that proliferation is bound to occur; and the more proliferation in the years and decades ahead the harder it will be to even claim that nuclear disarmament has legitimacy. The nuclear weapons cycle, 65 years old, must be broken now before a new and exceedingly dangerous spurt of nuclear proliferation takes place. It would be foolhardy to assume that President Obama’s successor will bring to the White House the same determination to steer the world to the elimination of nuclear weapons. **As a NATO ally, Canada should encourage the Alliance to take advantage of the present climate of global support for nuclear disarmament to phase out any role for nuclear weapons in its security policies.**

Preparing Now for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

The momentum in the quest for a nuclear weapons-free world has now brought the Nuclear Weapons Convention into the spotlight. Though it cannot be completed overnight, the drive to achieve it must be intensified now. The efforts of the past three decades have shown conclusively that nuclear disarmament can only be achieved comprehensively. That is what a Nuclear Weapons Convention does. It would prohibit

development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer, use, and threat of use of nuclear weapons anywhere. States possessing nuclear weapons would be required to destroy their arsenals according to a series of phases. A Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, which has been circulating as a UN document for several years, contains detailed provisions for national implementation and verification; establishes an international agency responsible for enforcement and dispute settlement; and proposes that there be procedures for reporting and addressing violations. Governments are, of course, the principal actors, but civil society would play an important role. The experience of many international and intergovernmental bodies would be useful. Moreover, the scientific, medical, legal, policy, and other expertise of NGOs would make them key partners in the process.

Every year since 1997, the General Assembly has adopted a resolution calling upon all states immediately to fulfill the disarmament obligation affirmed by the International Court of Justice by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In 2009, the resolution was adopted by a vote of 124 to 31, with 21 abstentions (Canada). Ban Ki-moon has also repeatedly lent his authority to this approach, beginning with his October 24, 2008 address, in which he stated that the model convention is a “good starting point” for negotiations to fulfill Article VI through a convention or framework of instruments.

At the 2009 UN Security Council Summit, several heads of states expressed support for a convention. While noting that, for the time being, the NPT “remains the core” of the regime, President Heinz Fischer stated, “Austria supports the idea of a Nuclear Weapons Convention equipped with a sophisticated verification mechanism.” Hu Jintao, President of China, stated, “The international community should develop, at an appropriate time, a viable long-term plan composed of phased actions, including the conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.” India has also raised its voice, most recently on September 29, 2009, when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reiterated India’s proposal for negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

International polls show that people around the world overwhelmingly support the proposition that all countries should sign a treaty that prohibits all nuclear weapons. This civil society position was further reflected by the NGO declaration, “Disarming for Peace and Development,” adopted at a 2009 international conference in Mexico: “Promptly commence negotiations on a convention prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons globally within an agreed, time-bound framework.” This general support is crystallizing into specific actions. The Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament presented a Parliamentary Declaration Supporting a Nuclear Weapons Convention, sparked by a cross-party group of European parliamentarians, to the NPT Preparatory Committee meeting in 2009. Mayors for Peace, which lists 3,488 mayors in 134 countries, is campaigning for the implementation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention by 2020. International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, a Nobel Peace Prize winner, has launched an International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons through a convention. In Canada, nearly 500 members of the

Order of Canada, the country's highest civilian award, have taken an unprecedented action in endorsing a call for government action on a convention.

The sponsors of the Ottawa conference emphatically disagree with the Canadian government's present position that it is "premature" to start work on a Nuclear Weapons Convention. The International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament's 2009 report stated, "It is not too early to start now on further refining and developing the concepts in the model NWC...." The key to a nuclear weapons-free world is to start the preparations now, while political conditions are right, to identify the requisite legal, political, and technical elements while simultaneously undertaking parallel steps on limited measures – such as taking nuclear weapons off alert status, entry-into-force of the CTBT, negotiation of an FMCT, and such other measures as verified reductions on current nuclear stockpiles. Active movement toward a convention will act as a road map to guide and accelerate the current disarmament process. Without the start of such active work, nuclear weapons states will continue to cling to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, which has led to an unsustainable two-class world of nuclear haves and have-nots.

Further, the entry-into-force of the CTBT and the completion of an FMCT will remain in doubt if the emerging nuclear possessor states, such as India, Pakistan, North Korea, and possibly Iran perceive those measures as aimed only at limiting the major states' capabilities while preserving their predominance, rather than as part of a process of the elimination of nuclear weapons. There must be a visible intent to link the steps to the stated goal of elimination. Nuclear disarmament "steps" have been on the international agenda for decades. It is time now to work in a comprehensive manner for a nuclear weapons-free world, as US President Obama is trying to do.

Canada should press for the NPT Review Conference to commit to preparatory work on a Nuclear Weapons Convention, or framework of instruments, for sustainable, verifiable, and enforceable global elimination of nuclear weapons. It should institute formal international consultations involving a core group of likeminded states and representatives of civil society to thoroughly explore the focus, scope, verification, and other elements relevant to a Nuclear Weapons Convention. An international contact group would be an important step forward. It should be remembered that when Canada convened an international meeting to explore the possibility of a landmines treaty, the end result was a landmines treaty.

Civil Society Involvement

The active involvement of civil society with the Canadian government in jointly examining ways to make progress on the nuclear disarmament agenda has had productive results, as the landmines issue showed. The research and public engagement work of disarmament NGOs and think tanks was formerly recognized as an important element of developing the political will to act on the particulars of the disarmament agenda. In fact, in 2003, Canada submitted a working paper to the NPT to encourage a more prominent role for civil society, and diplomats actively pursued support for the

initiative. The present government has not only given up on advocacy on the matter, but has ended the longstanding practice of including civil society representatives on its delegations to the NPT Review Conferences. **The government should restore the practice of an inclusive approach to NGOs by naming representatives of civil society to the Canadian delegation to the 2010 NPT Review Conference in May 2010.**

Building on Momentum

The sponsors of the Ottawa conference endorse the 20-point statement, “A New International Consensus on Action for Nuclear Disarmament,” proposed by the International Commission for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament for states to consider at the NPT Review Conference (Annex II of this document). These measures are at least a basis to consolidate the gains made at the 2000 Review Conference, and Canada should work to augment them in the ways this Briefing paper has pointed out to fully respond to new opportunities.

Since the failed 2005 NPT Review Conference, momentum has been building for revitalizing the nonproliferation regime and setting the course for achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons. It is now time to act decisively to turn the momentum into accomplishment. **At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, Canada should demonstrate its commitment to seize the new hope-filled opportunity, not only to envision a world of peace and security without nuclear weapons, but to generate concrete actions to make it a reality.**

NATO's Strategic Concept, the NPT, and Global Zero

Reconsidering the NATO Strategic Concept

At the 2009 NATO Summit in Strasbourg/Kehl the Alliance Secretary-General was asked to develop a new Strategic Concept. Member Governments called for a participatory review and the Secretary-General appointed a 12-member Group of Experts, chaired by former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, to guide the process. Amb. Marie Gervais-Vidricaire, currently the Canadian Ambassador to Austria, is the Canadian member of the group.

The current review is taking place in a new international context that holds the promise of real progress toward zero nuclear weapons; however, reports on discussions to date, as well as the focus of the growing literature on a new Strategic Concept (SC), suggest that the nuclear question is not receiving priority attention. Afghanistan, other regional conflict zones, asymmetric and terrorist threats, and NATO's role as "an armed global defence and police force with serious strategic capacity"¹ are the concerns and roles that are dominating the review process.

That process, in the first and current phase, includes a series of four seminars² (three of which had been held as of early February). In a second phase the experts will visit NATO capitals to discuss with Governments and Parliamentarians the findings from the seminars. A third and final phase will focus on negotiating a draft Strategic Concept to be approved by Heads of Government scheduled to meet in Portugal in the autumn of 2010.³ The dominant theme – namely, NATO's out-of-area action in an unstable world, including "the challenge of new asymmetric threats, and NATO's engagement in the Middle East and South West Asia" (NATO 2009b) – was addressed in the second of the two experts seminars held to date. The third seminar focused on partnerships.⁴

The topics most closely linked to NATO's nuclear deployments and doctrines were considered during the first seminar (see Note 2 for a brief list of all the topics identified for discussion). The seminar summary reports on discussions of the need for "a tailor-made deterrence" and for NATO to be "ready to operate and reinforce deterrence in a proliferation environment through missile defence and other capabilities." Keeping in mind that this is but a summary of a much longer off-the-record discussion, it may nevertheless be instructive to note that it includes no reference to nuclear arms control and disarmament.

The seminar report does acknowledge that the current Strategic Concept needs "to be reviewed in the context of nuclear policy changes" (NATO 2009a) – and that, in fact, is the focus of the following discussion. It explores appropriate changes to the nuclear weapons elements of NATO's Strategic Concept with a view to proposing a set of Alliance declarations, policies, and actions that will promote strict conformity to

obligations and commitments undertaken through the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and that will advance the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Weapons in NATO's Current Strategic Concept

Nuclear weapons are addressed in nine of the 65 paragraphs of the current SC, adopted by the Washington NATO Summit in 1999 (NATO 1999): paragraph 19 describes advances in arms control and disarmament during the 1990s; paragraph 21 refers to the continued existence of “powerful nuclear forces outside the alliance,” forces which it says need to be taken into account in NATO’s strategic planning; paragraph 37 refers to Ukraine and NATO’s support for it as a non-nuclear weapon state; paragraph 42 describes US nuclear forces in Europe as “vital to the security of Europe”; paragraphs 46 and 62 through 64 set out the core NATO doctrines or “essential principles” governing nuclear weapons in Europe (NATO 2009c); and the ninth reference to nuclear weapons comes in paragraph 65, which simply notes that the Alliance’s conventional and nuclear posture “will be kept under review in the light of the evolving security environment.”

Though relatively brief, the nuclear weapons references in the current SC describe a clear, unambiguous commitment to the indefinite retention of nuclear weapons. The document argues that, due to “the diversity of risks with which the Alliance could be faced, it must maintain the forces necessary to ensure credible deterrence and to provide a wide range of conventional response options.” It then goes on to say: “[T]he Alliance’s conventional forces alone cannot ensure credible deterrence. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.” The SC promises that “the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe” (para 46).

Then in the main doctrinal section on nuclear forces (paras 62-64), deterrence is presented as a broad, essentially open-ended threat to use nuclear weapons against any aggressor – including, by implication, non-nuclear weapon states. It says the purpose of nuclear weapons is to “prevent coercion and any kind of war” and, to accomplish that, nuclear forces are given the “essential role” of “ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies’ response to military aggression” (para 62). As described in a Middle Powers Initiative (MPI) briefing paper, NATO’s policy is one that “permits the use of nuclear weapons when deemed militarily useful in virtually any circumstance” (MPI 2008). European nuclear forces are backed up by the ultimate deterrent, i.e., “the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies,” described as being “provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States” (para 62).

For the broad nuclear deterrent to be credible in the European context, says the SC, European Allies must “be involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles” and must maintain nuclear forces on European territory (para 63). Indeed, “nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link

between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe” (para 63).

NATO’s current Strategic Concept also emphasizes that, given the Alliance’s conventional advantage, “the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated ... are therefore extremely remote.” Nevertheless, the Alliance decided in 1999 to maintain “adequate sub-strategic forces based in Europe” to provide “an essential link to strategic nuclear forces” and thus to reinforce the transatlantic link (para 64).

Toward an NPT-Friendly NATO Strategic Concept

The reference, in the report on the first Strategic Concept review seminar, to the “nuclear policy changes” that are said to help frame the current review, is not elaborated. But it is likely that two kinds of changes were being invoked. The first is the growing concern about the proliferation of nuclear weapons materials and capabilities to more states and to non-state actors, and the second is the increasingly declared commitment by at least some NATO states, as well as by their former or traditional adversaries, to the pursuit of a world without nuclear weapons. These are inextricably linked issues, of course. Without progress toward zero, the proliferation threat grows; and without progress in limiting proliferation, the move toward zero will be stymied.

NATO’s current insistence that its retention of nuclear weapons is “essential to preserve peace” (para 46) is clearly out of sync with both of these imperatives. Resistance to disarmament inevitably generates incentives to proliferate. NATO doctrine is not in step with Article VI of the NPT, the advancing nuclear disarmament imperative as articulated in President Obama’s Prague speech (2009), the UN Security Council Resolution 1887 (UNSC 2009), and the public declarations of a broad range of Governments and individuals prominent in international security affairs. But the 2009 NATO Summit created a timely opportunity to once again rethink and restate the Alliance’s strategic doctrine.⁵ It is a rethinking process that should a) welcome and affirm the groundswell of calls for a world without nuclear weapons; b) confirm NATO’s commitment to the objectives of the NPT and declare that the intent of Article VI is a world free of nuclear weapons; and c) commit NATO to security and arms control policies that conform to Articles I and II of the NPT and that are designed to achieve the nuclear disarmament promised in Article VI.

Both the rationale and the language for this new NATO approach to nuclear weapons are available in the burgeoning anthology of nuclear abolition statements, as well as in the logic on which the NPT was originally constructed – namely, that nuclear weapons, far from being “essential to preserve peace” (para 46), are ultimately an unacceptable risk to humanity. The new NATO Strategic Concept should thus quite simply state that the elimination of nuclear weapons, not their retention, is essential to security. Rather than asserting that the “strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance” are “the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies” (para 62), NATO’s new Strategic Concept must reflect the new reality articulated by Mikhail Gorbachev’s (2007) warning that “with

every passing year [nuclear weapons] make our security more precarious.” Indeed, a new NATO statement could borrow from the 2008 statement by Henry Kissinger and his colleagues and thus also acknowledge that “without the vision of moving toward zero, we will not find the essential cooperation required to stop our downward spiral” toward greater insecurity (Shultz et al. 2008).

With a formal acknowledgement of the risks of a nuclear-armed world, and with abolition endorsed as a strategic objective and core value, it would be understandable for NATO to note, as does the Obama nuclear abolitionist policy, that the road to abolition must be traveled by all nuclear weapon states together. The 1999 document makes this point with the acknowledgement that “the existence of powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance also constitutes a significant factor which the Alliance has to take into account if security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area are to be maintained” (para 21). Although in 1999 the paragraph read as a rationale for the indefinite retention of nuclear weapons, in a new context of abolition, that same statement becomes a compelling call for accelerated multilateral engagement in the interests of mutual disarmament.

The current Strategic Concept says that the fundamental purpose of NATO nuclear forces is “political” (para 62) – without offering any clarity on how weapons can be political without also being military, and thus militarily threatening, and without recognizing that such a military nuclear threat acts as an incentive to those threatened to retain and acquire similar nuclear threats. On this point Canada has historically offered more constructive alternative language. The Government’s 1999 response (Canada 1999) to a Parliamentary Committee report on nuclear disarmament (Graham 1998) agreed with the Committee recommendation, and thus the Government of the day promised that Canada would “work consistently to reduce the political legitimacy and value of nuclear weapons in order to contribute to the goal of their progressive reduction and eventual elimination.” It is language that found its way into Step 9[v] of the “practical disarmament steps” adopted in 2000 at the NPT Review Conference in which nuclear weapon states agreed to “a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination” (RevCon 2000). And it is language that should find its way into a new Strategic Concept.

Two other references to nuclear weapons in the current Strategic Concept are badly dated. The discussion of arms control (para 19) is rooted in the 1990s. An update of disarmament references in a new Strategic Concept should emphasize the urgency of disarmament, declare it essential to preserving peace, and welcome a new US-Russian agreement on strategic arms reduction as setting the stage for subsequent rounds of further reductions, noting the importance of early engagement in the process by all states with nuclear weapons. The document’s reference to NATO-Ukraine relations (para 37) is also rooted in the early post-Cold War period. While it emphasizes and welcomes Ukraine’s new status as a non-nuclear weapon state, the central point behind the reference is NATO enlargement. In a new document, the issue of NATO membership should be recalibrated, not only to take account of the legitimate security fears and interests of Russia, but also to focus on the development of mutual security

arrangements throughout the entire region of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, rather than the expansion of a military alliance to selected states within the region.

Nuclear Forces in Europe

The current Strategic Concept is also at odds with the principles and intent of the NPT when it emphasizes (in paras 42, 63, and 64) the importance of retaining tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, for deterrence and especially to link Europe and North America. There are currently estimated to be between 150 and 240 nuclear weapons, all US B61 gravity bombs, held in five countries in Europe – Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey (Kristensen 2008). All of the European countries hosting these US nuclear weapons are non-nuclear weapon states parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The future of those deployments is now under active discussion, particularly in light of the German Government's explicit call for the removal of nuclear weapons from German territory (Meier 2009). Former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (2009) had earlier written that "all remaining U.S. nuclear warheads should be withdrawn from German territory," and since then Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle has taken up the call within the North Atlantic Council and in discussions with European allies, including Poland, a strong advocate of continued nuclear deployments in Europe (Butcher 2009c). *Arms Control Today* reports that the German Government regards its "initiative both as a disarmament measure and a contribution to nuclear nonproliferation." "We want to send a signal and fulfill our commitments under the NPT 100 percent," a German Government spokesperson is quoted as saying (Meier 2009).

Martin Butcher's blog, *The NATO Monitor* (2009a, 2009b), reports that Turkey has indicated it "would not insist" that NATO maintain forward deployed nuclear weapons in Europe; Italy has indicated openness to reconsidering NATO's nuclear posture; the UK Government has agreed that the NATO nuclear posture be reviewed in the context of calls for a world without nuclear weapons; and the Netherlands, Belgium, and Norway have all indicated support for the German Government's move.

The Canadian Government should join this initiative and publicly indicate its support for the removal of all remaining nuclear weapons (all of them non-strategic) from European soil, in support of longstanding international calls that all nuclear weapons be returned to the territories of the states that own them.

Given the extraordinary historical, political, social, and economic links between Europe and North America, it seems oddly contrived to continue to claim that the presence of nuclear weapons on the territories of European non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT is essential to transatlantic solidarity. Furthermore, without the removal of nuclear weapons from the territories of non-nuclear weapon states in Europe, those states and the US as the supplier state cannot claim full compliance with Articles I and II of the Treaty. The NPT requires that "each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty

undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever [and non-nuclear weapon states undertake not to receive] nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly.”

Germany has emphasized that the decision on the future of nuclear deployments in Europe should be a collective NATO decision rather than a series of unilateral or bilateral changes. That means the decision will require a consensus within NATO, obviously including the concurrence of Washington. Indeed, the current US Administration brings a new openness to the issue. For example, the current US Ambassador to NATO, Ivo Daalder, has a strong personal interest in nuclear disarmament and has written in support of the pursuit of global zero (Daalder & Lodal 2008). Even the late Michael Quinlan (2007), a British security analyst and former Permanent Secretary of Defence, while generally resisting changes to nuclear elements of NATO’s Strategic Concept, expressed doubts about the value of US nuclear weapons in Europe: “I doubt whether their permanent presence remains essential nowadays either in military and deterrent terms or as a symbol of continuing US commitment to the security of its European allies.”

NATO and Russia

Some NATO states that may support in principle the removal of US nuclear weapons from Europe may nevertheless argue against change at this time on the grounds that the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe should be coordinated with significant reductions in Russia’s tactical nuclear arsenal. And it is true that not only Russian tactical nuclear weapons, but relations with Russia on a much broader level, will be central to achieving sustainable changes within NATO.

Despite the end of the Cold War, Russia has never stopped thinking of NATO as an anti-Russian institution, and the events surrounding the Russia-Georgia war of 2008 only reinforced that perception (Antonenko & Giegerich 2009). NATO’s expansion to the east in the post-Cold War era has created further disquiet in Russia – not to mention that it has also represented the steady geographic expansion of the West’s nuclear umbrella in clear violation of the spirit, at least, of the commitment to “a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies” (RevCon 2000).

For these reasons, in the context of denuclearizing Europe, it will be necessary to take up the Kissinger call for a dialogue “within NATO and with Russia, now begun by Presidents Obama and Medvedev, on consolidating the nuclear weapons designed for forward deployment to enhance their security, and as a first step toward careful accounting for them and their eventual elimination” (Shultz et al. 2008). Progress toward that end will obviously require a new kind of strategic relationship with Russia⁶ and active engagement with it in pursuit of reductions to its non-strategic nuclear weapons arsenal. The huge imbalance in conventional forces between Russia and NATO will certainly be a challenge. Russia accounts for less than 6 per cent of world military spending while NATO states collectively account for more than 60 per cent (IISS 2008). As long as Russia regards this overwhelming conventional force as, if not necessarily an

overt enemy, then a challenge to its regional interests, it is unlikely to be amenable to significant further reductions to its substantial arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons.

That does not mean the denuclearization of Europe should be contingent on Russian tactical nuclear disarmament. In fact, Quinlan (2007) argued that the removal of US nuclear weapons from Europe would “have the effect of depriving Russia of a pretext she has sometimes sought to exploit both for opposing NATO’s wider development and for evading the question of whether and why Russia herself need continue to maintain a non-strategic nuclear armoury that is now far larger than that of anyone else.”

A Rand Corporation study of multiple strategic options for NATO sums up the core elements of a NATO strategy to reinforce European stability: an upgrade of the NATO-Russia Council, a freeze on NATO enlargement, and the engagement of all NATO states in East-West disarmament discussions (Chivvis 2009). The German diplomat Rüdiger Lüdeking (2007) calls for overall NATO leadership in a reinvigorated disarmament dialogue with Russia. Such engagement should promote continuing strategic dialogue between the US and Russia in support of a new Treaty and follow-on disarmament measures that engage other states with nuclear weapons; promote NATO-led negotiations, perhaps in the context of the NATO-Russia Council; encourage reporting to the NPT by NATO and Russia of current holdings of non-strategic nuclear weapons (aggregate numbers of warheads and delivery vehicles); encourage more detailed information through confidential exchanges on alert status, security provisions, and safety features; develop new agreements on security and safety measures, deployment restrictions, and reductions; and encourage expansion of such discussions on reductions to the global level.

In the long run, of course, NATO and the West will also be served by seeking a new strategic relationship with China as well.

No-First-Use

It is rather striking that none of the likely threats to the security of NATO states is effectively, or even marginally, deterred by NATO’s European nuclear weapons or by its implied first-use threat. The threats that most worry NATO planners include asymmetrical attacks, terrorism, cyber attacks, attacks with weapons of mass destruction from non-state actors, and long-range missiles (NATO 2009a). The nuclear capabilities of NATO states may be regarded as a deterrent to any long-range missile threat, but the credibility of such a deterrent is not served by the deployment of US tactical weapons on European soil, nor does it require the threat of first use.

A central element of the revised Strategic Concept, in the context of a commitment to reduce and eliminate nuclear arsenals, should therefore be a rejection of first-use threats through a no-first-use commitment and a redefinition of deterrence that confines the role of nuclear arsenals to deterring the use of nuclear weapons by others.

Scott Sagan draws the same conclusion regarding US policy: “the United States should, after appropriate consultation with allies, move toward adopting a nuclear-weapons no-

first-use declaratory policy by stating that ‘the role of US nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear weapons use by other nuclear-weapons states against the United States, our allies, and our armed forces, and to be able to respond, with an appropriate range of nuclear retaliation options, if necessary, in the event that deterrence fails’” (Sagan 2009). Despite his reference to a range of “legitimate” retaliation options, Sagan argues that a no-first-use declaration would reinforce US and NATO support for diminishing the role of nuclear weapons.

Canada and the Strategic Concept Review

Canada’s should pursue active engagement in the NATO Strategic Concept review in support of changes to the Alliance’s declarations and policies that promote strict adherence to NPT obligations and commitments, and that advance the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

Revising the core principles of the Strategic Concept:

New language in the strategic concept should:

- i) welcome and affirm the groundswell of calls for a world without nuclear weapons;
- ii) confirm NATO’s commitment to the objectives of the NPT, and declare that the intent of Article VI is a world free of nuclear weapons;
- iii) commit NATO to security and arms control policies that ensure full conformity to Articles I and II of the NPT (by eliminating nuclear sharing), and that are designed to achieve the nuclear disarmament promised in Article VI;
- iv) declare that the elimination of nuclear weapons, not their retention, is essential to the security of NATO members;
- v) pledge NATO to work consistently to reduce the political legitimacy and value of nuclear weapons in order to contribute to the goal of their progressive reduction and eventual elimination.

Nuclear forces out of Europe:

- i) Canada should give encouragement to the efforts of European allies toward removing all remaining nuclear weapons from the territories of non-nuclear weapon state members of NATO, in support of longstanding international calls that all nuclear weapons be returned to the territories of the states that own them.

NATO relations with Russia (and China):

Canada should support the development of a new strategic relationship with Russia (and China) through initiatives such as:

- i) an upgrade of the NATO-Russia Council;
- ii) restraint on NATO enlargement efforts;

- iii) the engagement of all NATO states in reinvigorated East-West disarmament discussions, with a particular focus on non-strategic nuclear weapons;
- iv) promoting a continuing strategic dialogue between the US and Russia in support of a new Treaty and follow-on measures that engage other states with nuclear weapons;
- v) encouraging enhanced reporting to the NPT by NATO and Russia of current holdings of non-strategic nuclear weapons (aggregate numbers of warheads and delivery vehicles);
- vi) encouraging more detailed information through confidential exchanges on alert status, security provisions, and safety features;
- vii) developing new agreements on security and safety measures, deployment restrictions, and reductions; and encouraging expansion of such discussions on reductions to the global level; and
- viii) engaging China in relevant mutual approaches to strategic stability and nuclear disarmament.

No-first-use:

In the process of pursuing a world without nuclear weapons, NATO should implement a basic shift in its deterrence doctrine:

- i) through adoption of a no-first-use commitment; and
- ii) by confining the role of nuclear weapons to exclusively deter the use of nuclear weapons by other states until such time as arsenals are universally prohibited and eliminated.

Notes

1. This is how Senator Hugh Segal characterized NATO and the challenge of transforming NATO into an effective global security presence. Speech to the Institute of Public Administration of Canada, October 6, 2009. See Pugliese 2009.

2. Seminar topics include:

- “NATO’s core tasks and functions: the meaning of collective defence and deterrence in today’s environment; how to confront a broader spectrum of threats to our populations; NATO’s role in disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation.”
- “NATO as a part of a network of security actors in contributing to global civil and military crisis management and NATO’s likely tasks with a view to enhancing cooperation with international organisations and NGOs.”

- “NATO and the Euro-Atlantic security environment: NATO’s role in building security in the Euro-Atlantic area, enlargement and NATO’s partnerships including relations with Russia.”
- “Forces and capabilities, including defence planning and transformation” and “procurement at a time of increased financial constraints.”

See NATO 2010.

3. Information on the process is available on a Strategic Concept section of the NATO website: <http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/index.html>.

4. NATO’s brief news report on it is available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_60693.htm?mode=news.

5. The Alliance’s Strategic Concepts have gone through successive changes. The original focused on collective operations for the territorial defence of its member territories; in the mid-1950s “massive retaliation,” including nuclear, was emphasized; in 1967 “flexible response” replaced “massive retaliation”; in 1991 there was a new emphasis on cooperation with former adversaries; and in 1999 a commitment was added to wider Euro-Atlantic peace and stability and non-Article 5 operations. The current debate is focused on further development of out-of-area operational guidelines. Throughout this evolutionary process the Alliance has always agreed on a nuclear component and affirmed nuclear deterrence. See NATO 2002 and Hatfield 2000.

6. A point forcefully made in Steinbruner 2009.

A New International Consensus on Action for Nuclear Disarmament

The States party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Review Conference in May 2010 to agree:

On the Objective: A World Free of Nuclear Weapons

1. To reaffirm the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.
2. On the need for nuclear-armed States not party to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty to make a similar undertaking to accomplish ultimately the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, and to acknowledge the universal and binding nature of the norms against testing, acquisition, and use or threat of use of nuclear weapons otherwise than for defence against nuclear attack.

On Key Building Blocks: Banning Testing and Limiting Fissile Material

3. On the importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
4. On a continuing moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.
5. On the need to maintain and increase support for the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in further developing the treaty verification regime.
6. On the need to negotiate to an early conclusion in the Conference on Disarmament a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
7. On the need for all nuclear-weapon States, and other nuclear-armed states, to declare or maintain a *moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapon purposes pending the conclusion of this treaty*.
8. On the need for nuclear-weapon States and other nuclear-armed States to make arrangements to place fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes.

On Specific Steps toward Nuclear Disarmament

9. On the need for nuclear-weapon States, and other nuclear-armed states, to make an early commitment to not increasing their nuclear arsenals, and take whatever steps are necessary, unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally, to achieve nuclear disarmament, in a way that promotes international stability and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all.
10. On the need to set as an interim objective the achievement in the medium term, as soon as possible and no later than 2025, of a world in which:
 - (a) the number of all nuclear weapons, of whatever size, role or deployed status, is reduced to a small fraction of those in existence in 2010;
 - (b) the doctrine of every State with nuclear weapons is firmly committed to no first use of them, on the basis that their sole remaining purpose is to deter the use of nuclear weapons by others; and
 - (c) the deployment and launch-alert status of those weapons is wholly consistent with that doctrine.
11. On the particular need for leadership from, and cooperation between, those nuclear-weapon States which possess the greatest numbers of nuclear weapons in agreeing early on deep reductions, and making sustained efforts to continue such reductions for all classes of weapons.
12. On the need for all the nuclear-weapon States, and other nuclear-armed States, to make further efforts to reduce their nuclear arsenals, and act early to prepare the ground – through studies, strategic dialogues with each other, and preparatory work in the Conference on Disarmament – for a multilateral disarmament process.
13. On the need for the nuclear-weapon States, and other nuclear-armed States, to accept and announce as soon as possible a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in their security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.
14. On the need for the nuclear-weapon States, and other nuclear-armed States, to as soon as possible give unequivocal negative security assurances, endorsed by the UN Security Council, that they will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States not determined by the Security Council to be in non-compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
15. On the need for the nuclear-weapon States, and other nuclear-armed states, to take concrete measures in relation to the operational status of nuclear weapons systems to the extent possible at each stage of the disarmament process, in

particular to lengthen launch decision times and to generally reduce the risk of accident or miscalculation.

On Transparency

16. On the need for increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States, and other nuclear-armed States, with regard to nuclear weapons capabilities, in the implementation of arms control agreements and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.

On Accountability

17. To all States with significant nuclear programs making regular reports, to the relevant United Nations organs and within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, on the implementation of their disarmament and non-proliferation obligations and programs including, in the case of nuclear-weapon States and other nuclear-armed States, on their nuclear arsenals, fissile material not required for military purposes, and delivery vehicles.

On Verification

18. To further study and development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon free world.

On Irreversibility

19. To the principle of irreversibility applying to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and other related arms control and reduction measures.

On General and Complete Disarmament

20. To reaffirm that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

This 20-point draft action statement is taken from: International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament. 2009. Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers, Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, co-Chairs. pp. 153-159. WWW.ICNND.ORG. The ICCND proposes it “for the consideration of the May 2010 NPT Review Conference.”

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