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# The Iraq War as globalized war

By Richard McCutcheon

02-3

## About this Paper

The paper was originally presented by Richard McCutcheon at the *Forum on international arms embargoes and the case of Iraq* held in Toronto in November 2001. The Forum was co-sponsored by Project Ploughshares and Kairos (Canadian Ecumenical Justice Initiatives) with funding support from The Simons Foundation.

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First printed June 2002

ISSN 1188-6811

ISBN 1-895722-34-9

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## A tired debate

On a recent trip to Philadelphia I was able to spend a day or two in the library at Pendle Hill, a Quaker study centre for much of the last century. By complete coincidence, I found sitting on a shelf – a shelf designated as a discard shelf for duplicate library holdings – a thick pamphlet which I was drawn to, for reasons I don't know. I caught a glimpse of just the corner of it under a book. This pamphlet, it turns out, was the proceedings of a conference that had been held at Pendle Hill under the auspices of the Friends' Peace Committee in 1937. The Friends' Peace Committee, housed in Arch Street Friends Meeting, was well known at the time.

If I had read only the title, *Toward Peace and Justice: A symposium on methods for the prevention of war and the achievement of international justice* (Friends' Peace Committee 1937), I would not have noticed that the entire focus of the discussion was the role of sanctions in international affairs. The three core essays represent a wide spectrum of thought on the subject. The immediate reason for the conference was pressing concern about the League of Nations, a group that Quakers were centrally involved in supporting and creating, much like the United Nations which followed. Questions were coming out of the League of Nations experience – questions about how best to articulate an alternative position to that of war as a means of securing peace and international justice – which exercised Friends very much.

One of the authors, Edward Evans, concentrates on the issue of economic and military sanctions (by which he means police-style military actions). He argues that there is a "towering necessity" to do something about the problem of war. As with many today, for Evans the question of sanctions is a question of practicality. He is clearly quite vexed by the debate and has sharp words for those who hold a non-sanctionist view – these folks are ultimately impractical and cynical. For

the community of nations, as opposed to the small idealistic community represented by some pacifists, says Evans (1937, p. 21), "the choice is not between war or no war, but between anarchic, unregulated war, on the one hand, and, on the other, force organized and used only under the direction of the international community for the suppression of war by individual nations."

Frederick Libby chooses to reject the analogy between international sanctions and police actions, and develops an argument for diplomatic measures that would prevent the need for sanctions. He also believes that pacifists have the burden of suggesting alternatives; he encourages a focus on the creation of international diplomatic guidelines to create the conditions for preventing armed conflicts before they happen. For him, as for us today, one of the central analytical points is the enormous wealth disparity between the first and third worlds. Here is a central passage from Libby (1937, p. 27) which may apply as well today as when it was written:

The fact can not be overlooked that it is the economically satisfied nations that support sanctions and condemn "aggression," while the underprivileged nations are the ones that threaten the peace of the world. This suggests the uneasy thought that sanctions, like armies and policemen in many countries, are a device of the privileged for retaining permanently their advantages. The four great satisfied nations, the British Empire, France, Russia and the United States, content with possessing some five-sixths of the earth's good things, might well unite to make their good fortune permanent through imposing sanctions on those that challenge the *status quo*; but such conduct is not moral but immoral.

With prescient clarity, Libby (1937, p. 29) concludes by saying:

We all believe in a collective system, a community of nations. The world is henceforth

the economic unit. The point of difference between us is the question whether we can build our world community on the threat of coercion or whether there is a securer foundation for it.

A third author, David Mitrany, focused on Article 19 of the League of Nations covenant and how it could serve as a possible way to resolve the problem of peaceful change. For Mitrany, the goal is to create an international system of treaties that could be binding upon nations. And sanctions might be one dimension of that international system. In hindsight we know his optimism that “in our time it is inconceivable that a state would engage rashly in war” (Mitrany 1937, p. 33) was misplaced. However, his hope for a humane international system rooted in international laws and treaties is still shared by many.<sup>2</sup>

I was deeply moved by these essays written in 1937. I was impressed by how precisely their arguments matched arguments that I have tracked and been a part of for the past eleven years. While I have known for many years that the question of sanctions has a long history, there was something about this particular discovery – perhaps its sudden appearance, its clarity, the nuances of current debate represented so well, its arrival after I had just spent a year living in the Middle East – that confirmed for me the need to find a new, more radical way forward. And by “radical” I simply mean getting to the roots of the problem.

Our arguments about sanctions – should they be de-linked, military from economic, social from economic, or should we support them at all? – have not substantially changed since 1937.<sup>3</sup> It’s true that in some areas we have become more sophisticated. We have created, for example, a useful typology of sanctions that delineates one form from another with some precision. We have become better at understanding how international financial systems can be fine-tuned to administer sanctions. It’s also true that the United Nations has made some progress in developing mechanisms – and some of this grows out of the errors of the Iraq sanctions – that enable sanctions to be more effective in blocking specific forms of trade. In the end, however, the core questions at the heart of the debate and the substance of the arguments are not all that different from those of previous decades.

Almost everything else around us, however, has changed a great deal. And these changes have significant consequences for human life in many parts of the world.

There are two related processes at work that have affected our analysis. First, we have all been experiencing, for the first time on a global scale, epistemological shock, a phrase I first heard in a conversation with anthropologist Richard Preston.<sup>4</sup> It is an epistemological shock in the sense that our knowledge, and our ways of creating and disseminating knowledge, have lagged far behind the rush of global and local change. While we receive an increasing amount of information, we have not developed the personal and corporate means to assimilate that information into our daily lives in a meaningful way – a way that turns the information into usable knowledge. There is a resulting dissonance between the world we once “knew” and the world as we “know” it today. Without this basic human process of creating usable knowledge we lack clarity about what actions to take in the world we inhabit.

A related process that blinds us to realities of human suffering on scales that are truly immense is a susceptibility to deception and manipulation by “spin doctors” created by the “white noise”<sup>5</sup> of “information flak.”<sup>6</sup> Although human suffering can be experientially, empirically demonstrated,<sup>7</sup> we cannot “see” or “hear” it. The psychological barriers created by this global socio-cultural trauma and information overload, a part of the process Robert Jay Lifton calls “psychic numbing” and Zygmunt Bauman calls the production of “moral indifference,”<sup>8</sup> prevent us from allowing others’ experience of suffering entry into our lives in an accessible, conscious and transformative manner. Instead, these experiences are abstracted, reified entities over which we lay fantasized universes of discourse that float above the heads of those very people we so desperately need to be speaking with, grieving with, working with, and mostly just listening to.

All of this leads me to believe that we need to radically reorient ourselves to the situation of Iraq. In this essay, I suggest that sanctions are no longer a useful primary category under which to subsume what is happening in Iraq on the ground, and between the centres of power in Iraq and the centres of power in the Western world.

The only adequate context for understanding what is happening is globalism. The proper name for what has been happening over the past eleven years is war. The central issue, then, is not sanctions, but rather conflict and its resolution. And in discussing this particular conflict, we need to be discussing violent conflict. For war is violent, and violence has many faces.

## The Iraq War as globalized war

You can be sure that those who are concerned to make war have not been idle over the past several decades. Just as they have vigorously pursued research and development on the technical aspects of killing, so too they have pursued the task of creating the intellectual underpinnings for conducting war on a global scale. They have learned many lessons, from the Second World War to Korea and Vietnam and on through all the wars that have stained the earth. You can be sure that they have studied civil wars in Africa and the Far East, too. And they were certainly doing this prior to 1990. It would be a grave mistake, I think, for us to believe that what is happening today in Afghanistan is in any sense happenstance. There has been immense intellectual effort put into a myriad of models and scenarios that “might” develop on a global stage.

My efforts have increasingly focused on trying to understand the intellectual underpinnings of how war is conducted today. There are not enough of us, I fear, working on this from an alternative perspective. Certainly, there is good work being done. I think here of Michael Shapiro’s book, *Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War* (1997); Mary Kaldor’s *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (1999); Michael Ignatieff’s *Virtual War* (2000); and Rosalie Bertell’s recent book, *Planet Earth: The Newest Weapon of War* (2000), which advances a strong and urgent argument for an ecologically based common security on a global scale.<sup>9</sup> These scholars are beginning to articulate new ways of looking at contemporary warfare. I understand my work to be a part of that effort.

As with all human phenomena, war has elements which have been constant for centuries. War also has significant elements which are variable, mostly having to do with context, but not

entirely. What needs to be repeated at the outset, because it is a central axiom, is that war constitutes a form of violence. Violence, in other words, is the correct category under which to subsume the human activity of war-making. I shall proceed inductively to illustrate my point.

My wife Tamara and I came to love the city of Nasariyah, a small city to the south of Baghdad. Someday I would like to go back there under different circumstances, perhaps wearing the hat of an anthropologist more formally, to just live with the people. Those engaged with biblical scholarship know this place by its ancient name, Ur, the place believed by most to be the home of Abraham for some 65 years. On one of our excursions there, where the NGOs we represented had proposed projects to rebuild primary schools and rehabilitate hospital facilities, we visited a famous archeological site about eight kilometres from the city. While walking through the site we were brought up short by the unmistakable sound of a rocket igniting close by, and the eerie sound of it winging its way skyward. I was quick enough to turn and see the briefest glint of sunlight on its metal skin as it disappeared above us. We all looked at each other, and then heard the air raid sirens gently wafting their wail over the desert, a tragic counterpoint to the beautiful sounds that come from the minarets each day. About five minutes later we heard the ka-thump, ka-thump, ka-thump of bombs falling in the near distance. The sound waves rolled over the desert, over us. Someone had been bombed.

This direct experience of bombing in Iraq is not unusual. Internal UN documents that I have been able to examine, produced by the Office of the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq in Baghdad, clearly show that intrusive sorties and bombing runs have been made over Iraq on a daily basis for a long time. One part of one report analyzes 46 of 143 bombing runs conducted during 1999. It records 110 civilian casualties, 350 serious injuries, over 60 houses destroyed, and over 400 livestock killed – livestock, of course, are a significant source of food and income. There is some acknowledgment of these facts in both *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*,<sup>10</sup> for example, but the reality of these facts has still not penetrated our personal and collective psyche in North America. In other words, it has not become usable knowledge.

Not once to our recollection, in the many times that we traveled to the north or south of Iraq between June 2000 and May 2001, did Tamara and I not experience air raid sirens wailing in the numerous cities we visited. There is simply no shortage of direct empirical evidence that this is happening. UN officials consistently file reports about their experiences of being in the vicinity of bombing. Frequently these bombings are accompanied by civilian deaths and material destruction. The weapons being used are not so-called precision guided munitions – in February 2001, they were cluster bombs. As William Arkin (2001) notes, commenting on this attack, these are weapons “that have no real aimpoint and that kill and wound innocent civilians for years to come.” When we speak about hundreds of such occurrences over years we are no longer talking about the exception, but rather the rule. I have monitored it over the past eleven years, and many of you will have memories of reports received over the years about yet more bombing in Iraq. And we only receive the most notable examples; the vast majority are not reported. This bombing has been an unrelenting feature of the Iraq War.

I want to point out two key aspects of this phenomenon. First, I want us to see clearly that there was a physical exchange happening: bombs were falling down and surface-to-air missiles were being fired up at the airplanes dropping the bombs. This physical exchange represents a conflict. Second, not only is this a conflict, the purpose of the exchange is ultimately to destroy property and to kill people. The purpose of the Iraqi missile is to destroy the airplane, worth a great deal of money, and in so doing, to kill the pilot. So, too, the bombs that fall on Iraq are designed to destroy property and to take human life. What we have, then, on a very regular basis, is armed conflict, armed *violent* conflict.

This physical violence is one of war's constants. Social anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu (1977/1994), whose ideas I am using in this paper, argues that physical violence comprises a specific domain of human behaviour. In the context of war, this domain of behavior assumes the art of killing human beings, something which David Grossman (1995) so ably explicates.

Let me turn to a second set of observations. While living in Iraq, it was clear to Tamara and

me that with varying degrees of success the Iraqi government and very likely individual Iraqis are engaged in smuggling. There is no other way to explain some of the things that we saw in the country. This smuggling is a direct challenge, at the economic level, to sanctions, which are explicitly meant to prevent certain forms of international trade. Really, smuggling is just another form of international trade, one that has been used for centuries in times of war.

As well, while we were in Iraq the value of the Iraqi dinar fluctuated dramatically. At its lowest point 2020 dinars equaled one US dollar, and at its high point 1500, for a few days only. Prior to 1990 one Iraqi dinar was equal to between three and four US dollars. For the last several months of our stay the exchange stabilized at about 1725 dinars to the US dollar. To give a reference point, a jar of jam would cost about 7000 dinars, which is well beyond most Iraqis' standard of living. Unemployment remains at about 65 percent; a family regularly earning 20 US dollars a month would be considered a fortunate family.

Furthermore, last year the Iraqi government took the initiative to prohibit oil from being bought or sold internationally with US dollars. As a result, Tamara and I carried British pounds so that we would have an alternative source of money to exchange if the need arose.

All of these observations are examples of intense conflict. It, too, moves in two directions: from the Iraqi side there are attempts at the level of financial and social institutions to break sanctions. From the UN side there is an increasing effort to modify, make more targeted, and generally improve sanctions. The result of this conflict is, of course, very tangible and real in the lives of people who live in Iraq. It continues to be won for the most part by the UN sanctions regime, but it has also been eroded, been forced at times to backpedal and is now looking for different methods of enforcement. This conflict also has spawned efforts, mostly by humanitarian agencies, to try and relieve suffering caused by it, generally with minimal success. It follows that efforts to improve sanctions are part of a significant conflict being waged through global institutions.

These are examples of what Bourdieu (1977/1994) calls economic violence. The question of

economic warfare is one that has been pursued for several decades.<sup>11</sup> Marrying the economic violence and physical violence happening in Iraq begins to give body to the notion that we have here a web of affiliated forms of violence. We see that we have both significant physical violence, armed military exchanges resulting in loss of human life, and an economic conflict, also a form of violence, also resulting in loss of human life.

A third observation: there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein has become, indeed has now entered Western history, as a key symbol (Ortner 1973) of the “evil madman.” It has been remarkable to see how deeply the symbol of “Saddam” has penetrated our culture. Here we could unearth a great many examples, whether in academic work, in the media, or in popular culture – the symbol is as present as it is on every street corner, every desk, and every shop in Iraq. It has become an international symbol, but notice that I said “it,” not “he,” has become an international symbol.

Living in Iraq showed us clearly that George Bush has become just as much of a symbol as “Saddam.” “Bush” is constructed, manipulated, expanded and reified with much the same effect, only not to the same degree on the international battlefield. There is even a certain irony in the election of George W. Bush which only serves to deepen and magnify this symbol in the hearts and minds of Iraqis we know. “Bush,” too, is a symbol that goes beyond “he” to the realm of symbolizing whatever American civilians wish to hold dear in this matter, and Iraqis don’t. At the level of symbol, then, we have a contested terrain, one where conflict is being waged every bit as much as in the physical and economic domains.

I will not unpack this vital area at length here, except to indicate that we have entered now the realm of what Bourdieu calls symbolic violence. His comments about this kind of violence are revealing (Bourdieu 1983/1990, pp. 84-85):

Symbolic violence ... is a violence exercised, so to speak, in formal terms, and paying due respect to forms. Paying due respect to forms means giving an action or a discourse the form which is recognized as suitable, legitimate, approved, that is, a form of a kind that allows the open production, in public

view, of a wish or a practice that, if presented in any other way, would be unacceptable (this is the function of the euphemism). The force of the form ... is that properly symbolic force which allows force to be fully exercised while disguising its true nature as force and gaining recognition, approval and acceptance by dint of the fact that it can present itself under the appearances of universality – that of reason or morality.

He believes, as do I, that the significance of this form of violence is absolutely crucial today. It’s to his credit that he began to say this in the late 1970s. Then, he was writing about the advent of new social and cultural processes which would intensify the need to control all symbolic capital in situations of social conflict. We should not confuse here the theoretical notion of symbolic violence with the actual deaths of human beings. Symbols do not kill people, people kill people. At the level of culture,<sup>12</sup> however, the role of symbolic violence has become preeminent in sustaining globalized war making.<sup>13</sup>

These three forms of violence – physical, economic and symbolic – are all constants in the making of war. Symbols are created, manipulated and used to create environments that are conducive to sustaining economic violence and veiling physical violence from our sight. I believe that intellectuals who have been doing research on war, for the purpose of making war, have accomplished a very sophisticated blending together of these three forms of violence, so much so that in the context of globalism they have become almost seamless. Once separated, however, that they are all present in Iraq cannot be doubted. They constitute war.

Although I do not dwell on them in this essay, the criteria of even quite conservative definitions of war that are referred to by academics today are met by the Iraq War. A classic definition of war suggests that war is “an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will” (von Clausewitz 1832/1968, p. 101). Anthropologists have said that war is “defined as socially organized armed combat between members of different territorial units” (Ember and Ember 1997, p. 3). Peace research institutes engaged in tabulating the occurrence of war on a yearly basis have developed definitions that include threshold numbers of combat deaths and other

related categories.<sup>14</sup> Using any of these definitions, I now see how the past 11 years cannot be seen as anything less than the most significant international violent armed conflict in the world. It has all of the elements – it has ebbed and flowed in its intensity, but never gone away; it’s an armed military exchange; civilian and combat casualties are far greater than numbers suggested as baselines, and so on. Of course, once we see war holistically in the manner that I have outlined, the deaths that accrue from the three intertwined forms of violence must be tabulated together.

I think the dimension that is most significant in this analysis is the way that warfare is now conducted in the context of globalism. Arjun Appadurai (1996) has provided us with one of the best analyses of these global processes in his book, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. He argues that the two most significant characteristics of global processes are the movement of information, and I would add here that information is essentially the movement of symbolic capital, and the movement, or as he calls it, “the motion,” of human lives. In the last two decades the global flow of cultural artifacts and processes has speeded up tremendously (note how the beginning of the Iraq War dovetails with this process). It is in this matrix of global processes that we see the greatest challenge to separating out sanctions from the rest of the package. The interlocked economic and international political system belies attempts to say that sanctions can be seen as mere mechanisms of coercive social change. Their role is part and parcel of a larger process that constitutes extreme forms of globalized violence.

We have barely begun to understand these realities, especially as they pertain to war and, specifically, to the Iraq War. We have hardly wrapped our mind around the idea of accepting that there is a war happening at all. The fact that recent events have inspired many intellectuals in centres of power in the US to reintroduce the idea of placing troops on the ground in Iraq, however, should serve to remind us that the Iraq War is still very much on the minds of these people.<sup>15</sup>

## The implications of this analysis for three communities

The implications of what I have been saying are far reaching. I am also well aware that I am writing against the grain of a great deal of received wisdom. What I am suggesting is a complete overhaul of the way we understand the events which began in 1990. To even suggest a simple change in the nomenclature of this event, from Persian Gulf War to Iraq War, is a big step for many. But I am convinced that even this small change – a symbolic change – is necessary before we will be able to understand this major world event, let alone find any meaning in it, which will likely be the task of our children’s children.

Let me conclude by commenting briefly on what I believe are some of the implications of this analysis. I choose to direct my comments toward three specific communities, because each has different concerns and different ways of engaging with the Iraq War.

First, some comments to my colleagues in the university setting. I would ask you to consider carefully, the next time you go into your private study, a series of very basic academic questions – questions that every scholar would ask of any piece of research:

- a) With what assumptions have you been working? Where did you get these assumptions? For example, we have been told that the “Gulf War” happened in six weeks in 1991.<sup>16</sup> Why have we accepted this assumption? Have we subjected it to thorough and extensive critical evaluation? What philosophy of war undergirds these assumptions? – for there are many philosophies of war, and they shape our core premises.<sup>17</sup>
- b) What experiential or empirical data are we employing as we engage in discussing all aspects of this conflict? Are we guilty of theorizing at abstract levels without embedding our theory in the experience of human lives? How have we collected our data and how has it influenced our theories, whether about sanctions or international political or economic systems? Surely, as Edward Sapir (1939/1985, p. 581) warns us, it’s precisely those people living their

mundane lives in Iraq that are the ultimate subjects and objects of our theories.

- c) For whom are we working? This is no small matter. Are we going about devising research programs because a first-world government is encouraging us and/or funding us? Have we considered carefully that who we work for will determine significantly the questions we strive to answer? One of the first lessons we learn as scholars and teach to our students is that the questions we pose will shape the answers we give.

To my colleagues in the activist communities, who come from many different backgrounds, let me first say that I remain convinced that all sanctions against Iraq should end. They are part of a web of chronic systemic violence inextricably entwined with symbolic violence and physical violence. Neither as an intellectual nor as a concerned citizen am I able to support them.

I do, however, have some concerns about the anti-sanctions movement.

- a) I am concerned that it has not listened well to voices both here and there that have been alerting us to far greater complexities than we have been willing to acknowledge in public. People in Iraq want to be able to speak as freely as you or I, but their political circumstances do not allow them this freedom (Middle East Watch 1990). I believe that it should.
- b) Have we become too myopic in our view? The very things that work effectively in our campaigns are the same things that work effectively in convincing populations to make war. To oversimplify, to focus repeatedly on the same facts without critically subjecting those facts to contextual analysis and to the realities on the ground is potentially irresponsible.<sup>18</sup> We need to ask ourselves yet again, “What is the relationship between means and ends?”

I am convinced that to take the perspective that this is armed conflict – that it’s war – moves the focus away from sanctions. Many countries have sanctions applied to them and they get along, albeit with difficulty. The focus of this conflict, if just one needs to be stated, is likely the UN Escrow Account: the issue is one of power and control over a nation’s resources. If I were to instigate a campaign now I might well choose

to make the focus of it the dismantling of the UN Escrow Account. If Iraq had access to its own resources, the sanctions would be virtually irrelevant, because Iraq is potentially so wealthy. Sanctions could be completely ended, but if the Escrow Account is still in place and enforced by some other mechanism we will have hardly moved forward at all. Recent visits to and correspondence with missions in New York have alerted me to the fact that few are willing to discuss this question yet. I am also concerned by the absence of any forward thinking on our part about how the three northern provinces, currently under United Nations control, are going to be re-integrated with the other fifteen governorates of Iraq. To focus on an issue like this reintegration would move our discussion much further forward and ground it in practical peacemaking. In the field of Conflict Resolution Studies, it is commonly known that to resolve a conflict you first ask the parties to identify their grievance. I believe you will find that, behind the scenes, the questions of the Escrow Account and the northern governorates are very much on people’s minds.

Finally, some comments to the spiritual community. Clearly I consider a holistic approach the only approach to maintaining intellectual and moral integrity. I believe, with Edward Said (1994, p. 11), that one of the roles of the intellectual is “to represent all those people and issues that are routinely forgotten or swept under the rug.” How has the religious community made a spiritual question of the Iraq War?<sup>19</sup> In what way is it possible for us to see that the suffering experienced by children, women and men in Iraq is ultimately a question that is answered by our religious faith? I want to believe that to see with spiritual acuity what has been happening for the past eleven years to and in Iraq cannot help but inspire us to try to move mountains to end it. Whether you come from a tradition which talks about just war, holy war, or pacifism, I am convinced that the Iraq War goes against any and all criteria that our communities have developed as a spiritual response to war. For those in the Christian community, Elton Trueblood (1994, p. 99) reminds us that “John the Baptist was a voice crying in the wilderness, but Jesus was not, because he depended on the way in which twelve men were bound together.” The way of Jesus was to move amongst people, to bring

them together, to inspire them, to form *communitas*. What he asked for was that we treat the least of these as the most precious. It seems to me that this should be our role, too. To do this we should be planting seeds of peace and understanding in the midst of our communities.

One of the things that has happened to me over the past 11 years is that I no longer believe that an emotional response or an intellectual response or, for that matter, any kind of response in isolation is sufficient to address the Iraq War. But I do want to pay respect to the hundreds of people that we met in Iraq.

For reasons not related to the preparation of this paper I was reading recently a collection of Martha Gellhorn's war reporting, which started with her reports from Spain and ended with her reports from Vietnam and Israel/Palestine. In one of her last reports (1986, pp. 220-221), she is walking through a hospital in Vietnam. There she writes about the beautiful Vietnamese people, "especially the children." She says that the "most beautiful child" in the Vietnam war "was a little boy who looked about five years old, with plaster on both his legs to the hips. He and two little girls sat on the tile floor, which is cooler, resting their heads against the side of a cot. They simply sat, motionless and silent; the girls were also in plaster, a leg and an arm. The boy's eyes were enormous, dark and hopelessly sad; no child should have such eyes," she writes. Gellhorn speaks my mind about the children I had the privilege of knowing in Iraq: no child should have such eyes.

There is a war, a major international war, called the Iraq War. It needs to end. In his 1937 essay David Mitrany (p. 42) makes this concluding comment: "If it be said that the argument of these pages strains after a difficult ideal, I should answer, in general, that in times such as ours a bold ideal is the soundest form of realism."

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> I extend thanks to staff and board members at the American Friends Service Committee for helpful feedback on these ideas. I wish especially to acknowledge the ongoing collegial interaction of Peter Lems and James Matlack. Tamara Fleming, Mark Vorobej and Richard Preston provided constructive criticism during the preparation of this essay. Thank you to the sponsoring groups for providing the forum, and participants for stimulating discussion. Errors are mine alone.
- <sup>2</sup> See, for example, Fawcett and Newcombe 1995. For a particularly concise and hopeful statement see Falk 2000.
- <sup>3</sup> Several good collections of essays have been published that represent a wide spectrum of opinion on sanctions, and the Iraq sanctions in particular, including Arnove 2000; Cortright and Lopez 1995; Weiss et al. 1997.
- <sup>4</sup> Preston traces the idea back to Weston La Barre's idea of epistemological crisis or trauma in his study of the origins of religion. See La Barre 1972. For an introduction to Preston's work see Preston 1999; Preston 2002.
- <sup>5</sup> A notion borrowed from Fawcett 1986.
- <sup>6</sup> A notion borrowed from Hartman 1994.
- <sup>7</sup> There is a growing body of excellent work in this area. For examples of it, see Daniel 1996; Das et al. 2000; Kleinman, Das, and Lock 1997; Nordstrom and Robben 1995.
- <sup>8</sup> Lifton develops the idea of psychic numbing most fully in Lifton 1986. See Bauman 1989 for the idea behind the construction of moral indifference.
- <sup>9</sup> There are others, but these four represent, to my mind, the best of the current lot.
- <sup>10</sup> See Myers 1999; Suro 1999.
- <sup>11</sup> See Forland 1993; Melman 1974; Wu 1952.
- <sup>12</sup> Culture is a process, a continually re-spun web of symbols and rituals. My understanding of culture is significantly influenced by Geertz 1973 and Sapir 1949/1985.

- 13 Articles like Sands 2001 and Sengupta 2001 are tilling the fields of symbolic violence.
- 14 Two examples that I find very useful are Project Ploughshares 1999, p. 10; and Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2001, pp. 643-644.
- 15 Several trial balloons have been sent up; so far no new actions have been taken. See *The Globe and Mail* 2001; Hoagland 2001; Sciolino and Tyler 2001.
- 16 The academic cornerstone of this view is Cordesman and Wagner 1996.
- 17 From a peace scholar's perspective, the most useful and concise (70 fine-print pages) discussion of differing philosophies of war and how they shape our assumptions and analysis of war remains Rapoport 1968. For a general introduction to war from a political science perspective see Nye 2000.
- 18 Reliable studies on child mortality and public health in Iraq are only infrequently mentioned by activists, who continue to use early, less reliable reports. Current thinking on health-related issues that needs to be taken into account includes: Ali and Shah 2000; Garfield 1999; Hoskins 1997; Kandela 2000; UNICEF Iraq 2000.
- 19 To my mind, the spiritual dimension of the issue is particularly well put by Berry 1993 in his essay "Peaceableness Towards Enemies."

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# Project Ploughshares

Project Ploughshares is an ecumenical peace and disarmament agency of the Canadian Council of Churches. It is part of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies at Conrad Grebel University College (affiliated with the University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario). Project Ploughshares undertakes research, dialogue, and public engagement programs on peace and security issues to advance knowledge and understanding of the roots and causes of armed conflict and the measures and policies conducive to achieving a more peaceful world.

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