
**Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

7 May 2004

Original: English

Third session

New York, 26 April-7 May 2004

**Implementation of article VI of the NPT and paragraph
4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament**

Report submitted by the Czech Republic

1. The goal of this report is to present the steps undertaken by the Czech Republic in the implementation of article VI of the Treaty and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" in accordance with 13 practical steps of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.
2. As a Non-Nuclear Weapon State the Czech Republic strongly believes that the final goal of the NPT is the general and complete disarmament. However, it can only be achieved through a series of balanced, incremental and reinforcing steps. In achieving this goal full and pro-active co-operation of all states is necessary.
3. The Czech Republic has always been adamant supporter of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and signed it in 1996. Being the first European State that ratified it in 1997 it considers the Treaty as one of the pillars of the non-proliferation regime. Therefore it believes that its early entry into force (EEIF) continue to be a high priority task.
4. The Czech Republic has been actively supporting the work of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission in Vienna in implementing the Treaty's verification mechanism and Conferences pursuant to the article XIV. The Czech Republic also supported the Ministerial Declaration on the EEIF of the CTBT in 2002. It has served as the Chair of the Preparatory Commission.
5. In addition to the above mentioned facts the Czech Republic is hosting on its territory an auxiliary seismic station in Vranov u Brna which is part of the International Monitoring System (IMS). The fully and early operational IMS before entry into force of the Treaty would constitute an important confidence and security-building measure. To achieve this goal will require further efforts from all State Parties to the CTBT.

6. Any partial or regional test moratoria are welcomed by the Czech Republic and considered as a significant confidence and security-building measures. However, they cannot replace the legally binding commitment represented by the obligations under the CTBT.
7. The Czech Republic as a Non-Nuclear Weapon State and not party to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) is of the view that the goal of nuclear disarmament could be achieved through various international forums and instruments. At the same time it believes that the CD is an integral part of the general disarmament. It is with regret that the CD has not yet been able to start its substantive work and that the membership is not open to all countries which credentials in the field of disarmament have been proven.
8. The Czech Republic as a Non-Nuclear Weapon State considers the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) as a logical step on the multilateral arms control agenda. It shall be one of the top priorities of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) negotiations. The Czech Republic notes with interest that regardless the deadlock situation in the CD the informal work initiated by the Netherlands on the FMCT issues is carried out in Geneva.
9. Principle of irreversibility has always been supported by the Czech Republic both in multilateral and bilateral arms controls and considered as a very important element for the strengthening of the international stability and security.
10. The Czech Republic as a Non-Nuclear Weapon State welcomes all achievements in nuclear disarmament and both unilateral and bilateral measures oriented to the future reduction of nuclear arsenals as well as new arrangements on the way to the final irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons. In this context the Czech Republic welcomes the entry into force of the Strategic Offensive Treaty (Moscow Treaty) between the United States and the Russian Federation in June 2003 and looks forward to its full implementation.
11. On number of occasions it was pointed out by the Czech Republic that it would be a logical step of the highest significance that all fissile material designated as no longer required for military purposes by each of Nuclear -Weapon States to be placed under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards or other relevant international verification.
12. The Czech Republic highly appreciated successful completion of the first phase of the Trilateral Initiative for placing excess nuclear materials from the Russian and the US dismantled weapons under the IAEA safeguards.
13. The Czech Republic also welcomes any other unilateral placements of Nuclear-Weapon States' fissile material under the IAEA safeguards and urges the IAEA to continue research and development into the practical aspects of verifying such material declared excess to military use.
14. The general stability and security are directly linked to the nuclear non-proliferation. Therefore the universal implementation of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards including Additional Protocol (AP) as well as application of physical protection objectives and fundamentals is the

main confidence building measures in the nuclear non-proliferation. Naturally, the Czech Republic favours that the 2005 Review Conference will take a decision that the AP is mandatory under Article III of the Treaty. Only with universal adherence to the IAEA comprehensive safeguards and the AP could be possible to achieve much higher level that assures the terrorists would not be able to gain access to nuclear material. At the same time the Czech Republic strongly believes that AP should become a condition of supply for transfer of nuclear and dual-use items.

15. The IAEA's verification activities and its achievements under strengthen safeguards system are highly appreciated by the Czech Republic. However, to assure compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements it is of the view that further development of reliable equipment and procedures is necessary. The Czech Republic therefore joined the IAEA's Safeguards Support Programme in 2003.
16. The IAEA's Action Plan to Combat Nuclear Terrorism has been supported by the Czech Republic since its creation. It contributed 40.000 USD to the IAEA's Security Fund in 2003 and 55.000 USD will be contributed in 2004.
17. The Czech Republic supports the IAEA's efforts to enhance the safety and security of radioactive sources and adherence to the relevant Code of Conduct.
18. The Czech Republic attaches great importance to the efforts aimed at the amending the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). It welcomed the Austrian initiative aimed at convening a Diplomatic Conference to amend the Convention in line with its article 20. The Czech Republic is among those countries that signed up the letter to the Director General in this regard.
19. The non – proliferation regime can be enhanced by strict observance of the export controls. The Czech Republic as an active participant of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has implemented in its national legislation high standard of export controls including catch all principle. During the Czech chairmanship of the NSG (May 2002- May 2003) transparency of the NSG through the outreach dialogue with countries outside of the NSG was further enhanced. The antiterrorist clause was added to the NSG Guidelines. It is the view of the Czech Republic that these guidelines could be used effectively in the fight against the nuclear terrorism worldwide.
20. This report, together with the national statements provided within the NPT PrepCom sessions, constitute the fulfilment of the Czech Republic's obligation under the agreed reporting procedure. The Czech Republic believes that such reports submitted by all States Parties can significantly improve the NPT's review process.