Interdependence in the technological race
Written by Adam Ladha and Branka Marijan
Published in The Ploughshares Monitor Winter 2024
In recent years, public discourse on national security has increasingly focused on fears that the United States and its allies are “falling behind” adversaries in a race to develop autonomous weapons and artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities for military applications. This sentiment is echoed by influential voices in technology and defence circles who argue that Western powers, including the United States, face imminent threats if they fail to adopt a Silicon Valley-style approach to military innovation.
This narrative oversimplifies the complex dynamics of technological advancement, in which interdependence, rather than straightforward competition, better characterizes the relationship among global powers. An examination of the competition in AI reveals a global network of innovation and reliance on shared technological resources that complicates any notion of “falling behind.”
Technological interdependence
The idea that the United States is lagging behind in autonomous weaponry says more about the motivations of those advancing this narrative than about gaps in technological capabilities. For example, Raj M. Shah of Shield Capital and Christopher M. Kirchhoff, formerly of the Pentagon’s Silicon Valley office, argue in a New York Times piece that the U.S. military is unprepared for the “new wave of warfare” represented by AI-powered autonomous systems. Their concerns are supported by examples such as Russia’s use of AI-enhanced loitering munitions and the use by Hamas of drones for surveillance, suggesting that some non-Western nations and even non-state armed groups may be better positioned to leverage AI in conflict.
What such examples really underscore is a deeper truth about global technological interdependence. Russia, for instance, relies on Western-manufactured components to power much of its AI capability. According to the Institute for Science and International Security, Russia’s Lancet-3 AI decision-making modules and other key electronics are produced by American companies such as NVIDIA, Intel, and Analog Devices. This dependence means that even as Russia appears to expand its autonomous weapon capabilities, it cannot sustain these developments without access to Western technology.
This interdependence reflects the reality that, in a globalized technological ecosystem, no single country can advance in isolation. The United States, with robust tech infrastructure and funding, contributes significantly to AI development worldwide, through direct collaboration, exportation, and complex global supply chains. Rather than viewing AI as a purely adversarial space, it is essential to recognize how technological advancements rely on collaboration and access to shared resources.
Silicon Valley and the new military-industrial complex
The “falling behind” narrative is partly fueled by technology entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley, who advocate for a rapid innovation model unencumbered by regulation. Shah and Kirchhoff suggest that the U.S. military should adopt a Silicon Valley-style ethos, which values speed and flexibility in innovation. This vision, however, has been criticized by people like Paul Lushenko and Keith Carter, who argue in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that Silicon Valley’s profit-driven mindset can distort the reality of technological capabilities and adversarial threats. According to them, tech entrepreneurs often lack real-world military experience and offer a skewed version of future warfare that may not align with practical combat needs.
These critiques highlight the inherent tension between private sector motives and national security priorities. While Silicon Valley’s approach promises technological agility and rapid development, it ultimately prioritizes commercial success, which may not always align with defence needs. This tension exemplifies the broader challenge of balancing innovation with ethical considerations and strategic stability.
The China factor: Advancements in research but mutual dependency
Much of the urgency about Western innovation centres on China’s rapid advancements in AI and military technology. China is widely regarded as a formidable competitor, with significant investment in AI-driven applications for the People’s Liberation Army. According to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s Critical Technology Tracker, China leads in 57 of 64 critical technology categories, including AI algorithms, adversarial AI, and advanced data analytics. This dominance fuels concerns that China is closing the technological gap and will soon have a military advantage.
However, China’s notable advances do not eliminate the interdependence intrinsic to global tech development. China still relies on Western and U.S.-based technology firms for certain high-performance hardware; this reliance has slowed its progress in certain areas. Furthermore, U.S. defence spending far exceeds China’s estimated expenditures. This economic power allows the United States to sustain a robust research and development pipeline across defence sectors, from AI to cybersecurity, and enables it to collaborate with allies that are key in the technological pipeline.
For example, Netherlands-based company ASML produces the machinery needed to make the most sophisticated chips for advanced AI applications. The Dutch government, with American encouragement, instituted export controls that prevented ASML from exporting machinery needed by Chinese semiconductor companies. These restrictions preserve China’s two-generation lag in semiconductor chip technology and prevent, so far, China from developing advanced chip technology.
Moreover, the United States and its allies are also making significant investments in AI-enabled military systems. For example, the U.S. Replicator program, with nearly a billion dollars in funding over two years, aims to develop thousands of cost-effective, intelligent drones. Key allies have similar programs dedicated to AI-powered systems, fostering a collaborative framework that strengthens their common security.
It must be acknowledged, however, that China has a near monopoly in rare earth mineral extraction and processing, is the world’s leading producer of many industrial metals, and will control most of the world’s supply of refined graphite, cobalt, and lithium by 2030. China has attempted to target this key area of American vulnerability through export controls. So far, American imports of these Chinese commodities have changed little, if at all. However, additional sanctions and export controls could pose a serious threat to the United States.
A balanced perspective on technological competition
In our interconnected era, framing the advancement of AI and autonomous systems as a zero-sum game is simplistic. The global distribution of technology – whether in the form of shared research, cross-border collaborations, or multinational supply chains – demands a more nuanced perspective. Instead of seeing a race that the United States could lose, we should recognize that each state’s advancements depend on access to shared resources and mutual collaboration.
Great powers today are not isolated competitors in a Cold War-style arms race but participants in a complex network of technology-sharing and regulatory efforts. The competition in AI, especially in military applications, must be viewed through the lens of interdependence, involving both competition and the need for cooperation. This interdependence redefines international security, shifting the focus from unilateral gains to a shared responsibility in developing safe, effective, and ethical AI technology.
This lens reveals a strategic balancing act in which the Great Powers not only compete but depend on one another to sustain and safeguard the technological ecosystems critical to modern security and international stability. According to the International Monetary Fund, protectionist policies on high tech trade between the United States and China could cost the global economy 1.2% of global GDP each year. Such a reality necessitates greater dialogue and regulation at the international level.
Ultimately, the only thing currently “falling behind” is much-needed regulation on autonomous weapons and military applications of AI.
Adam Ladha is a Fall 2024 Balsillie Technology Governance Intern at Project Ploughshares.
