By Branka Marijan
Published in The Ploughshares Monitor Autumn 2024
On contemporary battlefields from Ukraine to Sudan to Myanmar, small, inexpensive drones or quadcopters are ubiquitous. Most are not produced by defence manufacturers but rely in large part on civilian technologies.
Do-it-yourself military hardware
In Ukraine, assembling these small drones is often a do-it-yourself project that can include everyone from shop clerks to experienced engineers. These efforts, which are supported by the national government and private companies, could be said to characterize modern warfare. They allow an increasing role for tech companies and entrepreneurs that enable or support the use of new technologies, from commercially available artificial intelligence (AI) software to small drones.
It is noteworthy that building small drones and leveraging off-the-shelf technology are not only practices of smaller or less powerful states. The Replicator program of the United States is focused on developing “small, smart, cheap, and many” drones that can counter China’s growing military power and could cement a vision of future warfare. The program is expected to spend some $500 million, in 2024 and a similar amount in 2025.
What is perhaps most significant is the widespread drive to infuse startup culture into military operations. Leveraging the rapid development cycles of the tech industry seems to be fostering a culture of innovation that is in sharp contrast with the often slow, bureaucratic nature of traditional military procurement.
As professor of political theory at Queen Mary University of London Elke Schwarz has observed, in this new vision of warfare, expertise is found not in militaries but in technologists. However, as Schwarz reflects in a forthcoming book chapter, “The Silicon Valley ethos ‘Move Fast and Break Things’ is a tragic motto for military operations.” As startup culture becomes more involved in, and integrated into, the defence sector, it is crucial to scrutinize the impact on the character of warfare, particularly the treatment of civilians.
The expanding market for commercial drones
Writing in the September/October 2024 issue of Foreign Affairs, former U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark A. Milley and former Google chief executive Eric Schmidt see wars becoming technological competitions: “Future wars will no longer be about who can mass the most people or field the best jets, ships, and tanks. Instead, they will be dominated by increasingly autonomous weapons systems and powerful algorithms.”
Milley and Schmidt believe that, despite substantial investments in military technology, the United States has fallen behind adversaries Russia and China, which are devoting attention and resources to the testing of AI-enabled systems and drones. To counter these efforts, the authors recommend that the U.S. military adopt a nimbler structure, awarding shorter-term contracts and procuring new technologies more quickly.
Milley and Schmidt describe expanding technological creep from the commercial sector to the military. Chinese drone makers, notably Da-Jiang Innovations (DJI), already supply “90% of the US consumer [drone] market and 70% of the industrial one.” DJI has also captured more than 70 per cent of the global market for consumer drones. Now, DJI drones are being used extensively by both Russia and Ukraine in the war in Ukraine, even though the company suspended sales to both countries in April 2022 and has publicly opposed use of their drones in warfare.
This past May, Ukraine announced that it had recently purchased about 8,200 DJI Mavic drones. A US$27.5 million contract for 4,200 drones included drones ranging in price from “$3,157.50 for the DJI Mavic 3E and around $4,855 for the DJI Mavic 3T.” According to journalist David Hambling, the Mavics are being used for intelligence gathering and reconnaissance but also to guide targeting, making artillery “five to ten times as effective” and allowing much more precise long-range firing from tanks.
The appeal of these drones to militaries worldwide is evident. What attracts as much as anything is an affordable price and the ready availability of the commercial drones, which can be easily modified to accept a variety of payloads.
Humanitarian impacts of innovation
While undoubtedly useful in meeting military needs, in Ukraine and other battlegrounds drones and new technologies are being used in ways that undermine arms control and disarmament efforts, pose significant challenges for post-conflict reconstruction, and contribute to higher civilian death counts.
Tech companies often lament the sluggishness of defence departments that, they claim, stifles modernization. They see a remedy in startup culture, which offers the agility needed to prepare for future wars. What is often left unsaid is any serious consideration of the impacts the resulting innovations may have on civilian populations, the environment, and broader global security.
Ukrainian engineers have developed a “special fuse” that allows mines to be dropped from drones and armed after landing. While these mines are generally anti-vehicle and not prohibited by the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, which specifically prohibits anti-personnel mines, the broader implications for civilian safety and the erosion of established norms remain deeply troubling.
Russian forces are making extensive use of both anti-vehicle and anti-personnel mines. A version of the latter uses seismic sensors so that even stepping close to the mine sets it off. Approximately 1,000 Ukrainian civilians have been killed by anti-vehicle mines alone, most when they returned to farms in which mines had been planted.
Another innovation is wreaking devastation on civilians in Gaza. Yuval Abraham in +972 Magazine describes how the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have used AI-enabled target generation system Lavender in Gaza. While a human reviews the AI-generated target list, it appears that commanders spend an average of just 20 seconds per target, often only verifying that the recommended target is male.
Abraham’s reporting also highlights the use of other AI-enabled systems by the IDF in Gaza. Despite promises that such tech would allow cleaner, more precise targeting, the result has been overwhelming destruction and loss of life. According to UN figures, the death toll in Gaza as of August 26 stood at more than 40,000. While these figures are frequently disputed, there is widespread acknowledgment by international organizations that most victims are civilians, many young children.
Now momentum is building to establish a norm against the use of anti-vehicle mines. Other measures that will protect civilians from the impacts of new technology are also being studied. However, these efforts are increasingly undermined by evolving battlefield dynamics and the lack of political will among states to confront them.
Regulating innovation
Many of the new technologies that are being tested and fielded on the battleground were never intended for military use. Others have emerged from a relentless push for innovation without sufficient regulation or testing.
Tech companies often lament the sluggishness of defence departments that, they claim, stifles modernization. They see a remedy in startup culture, which offers the agility needed to prepare for future wars. What is often left unsaid is any serious consideration of the impacts the resulting innovations may have on civilian populations, the environment, and broader global security.
At a tech defence summit this past January, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks remarked, “Yes, moving fast and breaking things is necessary to win wars.” She added, however, that the United States would never break the law or go against the U.S. Constitution.
Now, however, the organizations in charge of international regulation and diplomacy are struggling to keep pace with rapidly advancing technology that doesn’t account for humanitarian and environmental costs. And so now what the world needs, urgently, are innovations in diplomacy that can adapt to these new technologies and produce norms that preserve global stability.
