By Jennifer Jaeger
Published in The Ploughshares Monitor Autumn 2024
Since April 2023, Sudan has once again been experiencing intense and violent internal conflict. In July 2024, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project reported that since the current war began, more than 18,760 people had been killed. This number is likely underreported, as the United Nations (UN) Panel of Experts on the Sudan estimated that up to 15,000 people were killed in El Geneina, West Darfur alone in 2023. More than 12 million Sudanese have been displaced from their homes and 25.6 million—more than half of the country’s population—are facing critical levels of hunger.
Central to this turmoil is the pervasive influx of weapons into the region—a factor often overlooked.
Despite international sanctions, foreign actors continue to fuel the war by supplying weapons to the conflict parties. Such actions only exacerbate the humanitarian crisis and undermine efforts for peace. As Sudan receives little international attention and warring parties continue to target civilian areas, both understanding weapons flows and taking decisive action to curtail the spread of weapons are critical.
The anatomy of the conflict
The current conflict grows out of a complex history of political power struggles, ethnic tensions, and systematic economic marginalization. Since civilian protests prompted the coup d’état of President Omar al-Bashir in 2019, attempts to establish a transitional civilian-led government and reach a peace agreement have been unsuccessful.
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, with the support of Rapid Support Forces (RSF) leader Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo—both perpetrators of the 2003 genocide in Darfur—took full control of Sudan’s government in 2021. In December 2022, the two leaders signed a Framework Agreement for a transition to a civilian-led government in which the military would no longer have a formal role. However, the leaders could not settle on a process for security sector reform, as it did not align with the desire of both men to preserve their extensive economic empires. As a result, violent clashes between the RSF and the SAF broke out in April 2023. Burhan remains the de facto head of state, although there is no functional, legitimate government. Sudanese grassroots civil society organizations continue to advocate for freedom, justice, and peace.
This multidimensional conflict, marked by shifting alliances, localized violence, and targeted attacks on civilian areas, has created ideal conditions for the proliferation of arms.
The influx of arms: A perilous escalation
The sheer number and illicit nature of arms exports to Sudan make it impossible to estimate with any certainty the number of weapons entering the country. The Small Arms Survey estimated that there were more than three million weapons in Sudan in May 2023. According to Agence France-Presse (AFP), a government commission estimated that five million weapons were held by civilians at the end of 2022. What is clear is that Sudan is awash in assorted types of conventional arms; even so, smugglers reported to the AFP that dealers cannot keep up with demand.
The arms come from various sources, including international and regional arms dealers, neighbouring countries, and internal stockpiles. Porous borders, coupled with weak governmental control, have made Sudan an attractive destination for illicit arms traffickers. The UN Panel of Experts reported that weapons ranging from small arms to advanced military equipment were being smuggled into the country, often ending up with parties located or operating in Darfur, which is under UN sanctions.
Within the first few months of the war, the RSF had established new weapons supply routes that contributed to an escalation of its efforts: capturing cities in the Darfur region, ransacking major SAF manufacturing facilities, and cutting off SAF supply routes. The procurement of more sophisticated weapons allowed the RSF to take on the Sudanese Air Force, changing the dynamic of the conflict. The RSF continues to overpower the SAF in most regions of the country.
Major suppliers and supply routes
One particularly concerning aspect of this conflict is the involvement of foreign powers. Actors with vested interests in Sudan’s resources and strategic location have been implicated in supplying arms to the warring parties. The international community’s failure to enforce the longstanding UN arms embargo on the Darfur region and to hold violators accountable makes the situation worse.
While it remains difficult to create a complete picture of arms flows to Sudan, useful information on suppliers to the SAF, RSF, and the Sudanese black market can be gathered from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database, the Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan from January 2024, Amnesty International’s recent study of arms used in the conflict, research from the German Institute for Global and Area Studies, and media sources.
Sudanese Armed Forces
The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database indicates that over the last decade the SAF supplemented its domestically produced weapons with military imports such as artillery, aircraft, missiles, and armoured vehicles from Russia, Belarus, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and China. Amnesty International found that the SAF is largely supplied by partially state-owned Russian companies and a major Turkish weapons manufacturer. Iranian-made drones acquired in early 2024 have reportedly allowed the SAF to gain ground in Khartoum. The SAF has likely received its supplies through Port Sudan, where Burhan’s headquarters are located.
Amnesty International identified large quantities of recently manufactured weapons and military equipment used by both the SAF and RSF that were exported to Sudan by partially state-owned Russian companies and various Turkish military manufacturers. Both parties also used Serbian, Yemeni, and Chinese small arms (origins unconfirmed) throughout Sudan, including Darfur.
Rapid Support Forces
The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database does not contain information about arms transfers to the RSF. However, the RSF has evidently maintained close ties with the UAE, the Wagner Group, the Libyan National Army (LNA), and South Sudanese officers. The RSF maintains a complex network of proxy companies, entities, and new and preexisting supply routes that it reinforces with major regional arms trafficking routes. The UN Panel of Experts discovered major RSF supply routes for military equipment and fuel from Chad, Libya, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan.
UAE and Wagner Group affiliations with the RSF seem to extend beyond involvement in Sudan’s lucrative gold industry. The UN Panel of Experts tracked frequent arms shipments from the UAE to the RSF via Chad, with regional stops in Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda. These shipments allegedly contained man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), ammunition, drones, fuel, and medical equipment. Amnesty International confirmed the RSF’s possession of a variety of recently manufactured armoured personnel carriers from the UAE, but the UAE officially denies allegations of illicit involvement.
The Wagner Group, a Russian state-funded private military company, has likely supplied the RSF with air cargo, MANPADS, ammunition, fuel, training, and several hundred mercenaries. The Wagner Group and the LNA have allegedly cooperated to supply the RSF with surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft weaponry, air cargo, vehicles such as Landcruisers, and discounted fuel via the Central African Republic, Chad, and Libya.
The UN Panel of Experts also found that the RSF had secured a fuel supply from South Sudanese officers, with weekly deliveries from South Sudan to South Darfur.
Arming civilians
Escalating insecurity, military recruitment of civilians, and targeted attacks on civilian areas have led to a proliferation of small arms among Sudan’s civilian population. Eritrea, Ethiopia, and parts of Sudan’s coast are points of entry for small arms that could end up in civilian hands. Some civilians, especially allied militias and recruits in Darfur, are also armed by the RSF.
Humanitarian impact: A growing catastrophe
The influx of weapons has had catastrophic consequences for Sudan’s civilian population. Armed groups, emboldened by their access to sophisticated weaponry, have committed widespread atrocities. The UN Panel of Experts highlighted evidence of alleged violations of international humanitarian law by the RSF, SAF, and allied militias in 2023, including targeting of civilians, destruction of critical civilian infrastructure, child recruitment, sexual violence, mass forced displacement, and obstructing the distribution of aid.
The presence of so many weapons results in persistent violence that hinders the delivery of aid and makes most areas inaccessible to humanitarian assistance. The SAF, RSF, and allied groups also regularly deny humanitarian access to areas controlled by the opposition. The resulting insecurity increases the suffering of vulnerable populations. Additionally, the destruction of infrastructure by armed groups further isolates communities. Because of the war, more than 80 per cent of Sudan’s hospitals are no longer in service and 25 million people are in urgent need of humanitarian aid.
The horrific humanitarian consequences of this armed conflict are made more severe by climate change. Hotter winters and longer, more intense rainy seasons increase stress on the country’s already limited resources, destroy infrastructure, displace civilians from their homes or shelters, and further complicate aid delivery.
Call for action
The crisis in Sudan is a stark reminder of the devastating impact that unchecked arms proliferation can have on a nation and its people. The international community must take immediate, decisive action to control the flow of weapons into the region, enforce UN sanctions, and ensure the protection of civilians.
Jennifer Jaeger has a Master of International Public Policy from the Balsillie School of International Affairs. She was a Ploughshares Peace Research intern in summer 2024.
