By Cesar Jaramillo
Published in The Ploughshares Monitor Autumn 2024
Having attended several Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Preparatory Committees and Review Conferences over the years, I have witnessed the persistent lack of progress on critical issues. The Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference, held in Geneva, Switzerland from July 22 to August 2, ran true to form. Discussions seemed merely repetitive echoes from previous sessions, lacking any substantial resolution of key disputes. Such ongoing stagnation not only prevents needed change but undermines the credibility of the NPT process.
NATO nuclear-sharing practices: The never-ending Two-Step
A prime example of repetition with no realistic prospects of resolution is the decades-long debate about whether NATO nuclear-sharing practices are compatible with NPT obligations. Providing no definitive answer to this question, discussions have become simply emblems of the broad challenges facing the NPT.
At each NPT meeting, a predictable routine unfolds: most non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) and coalitions unequivocally denounce NATO’s nuclear-sharing practices as incompatible with the NPT. They argue that the stationing of U.S. nuclear weapons in non-nuclear-weapon NATO states, coupled with joint training and planning for their potential use, directly contravenes the spirit and letter of the treaty, particularly Article I, which prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon states. NNWS declare that such practices undermine the treaty’s goal of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and create a double standard that weakens the non-proliferation regime.
In response, NATO members assert that their nuclear-sharing arrangements are fully compliant with the NPT. They argue that the weapons are always under U.S. control. Because certain interpretations of the NPT allow for these arrangements, such practices do not violate the treaty. NATO states further contend that sharing nuclear weapons is a crucial component of the alliance’s collective defence strategy, and altering these arrangements would undermine NATO’s deterrence posture, particularly in the face of perceived threats from nuclear-armed adversaries.
Entrenched positions on both sides reflect the broader challenge of achieving consensus on nuclear policy among states with vastly different approaches to nuclear disarmament. The absence of a clear resolution on NATO nuclear sharing not only perpetuates division but weakens the NPT’s overall effectiveness as a global security instrument to regulate the behaviour of nuclear-armed states. Non-nuclear-weapon states are left feeling frustrated because their concerns are not being adequately addressed.
FMCT redux
The recent Geneva meetings also saw a rehashing of the debate over the scope of FMCT (Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty) negotiations. The core of the debate centres on whether negotiations should address only future production of fissile materials or also include existing stocks. For years, states have taken opposing positions. Some argue that the treaty should concentrate on preventing new production to halt the spread of nuclear materials, while others believe that excluding existing stocks would leave a loophole that would undermine the treaty’s effectiveness.
Despite countless hours of discussion, no agreement has been reached on how to frame FMCT negotiations. With talks stalled, no progress cam be made on a treaty that could play a critical role in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. This inability to agree on the basic parameters of FMCT negotiations reflects deeper strategic and political divides that continue to hinder global nuclear governance.
The pursuit of a Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone: How to engage Israel
I also observed a lack of clarity on the role that Israel, which is not party to the NPT, should play in the perennial pursuit by NPT member states of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Israel’s non-declared but widely acknowledged status as a nuclear-armed state and its strategic relationships, particularly with the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, create significant obstacles in advancing this objective. The call for a Middle East NWFZ has become an annual NPT routine, but only that.
Certainly, the challenges in establishing such a zone are not limited to Israel’s nuclear capabilities. The broader regional security landscape is littered with other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological weapons. Add conventional military imbalances and ongoing conflicts, and the result is a security environment that does not encourage Israel to commit to denuclearization without broad disarmament and security guarantees.
Negative security assurances: Unfulfilled expectations
Also unachieved after decades of discussion are legally binding negative security assurances – promises made by nuclear-armed states that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states. Such assurances are seen by many NNWS as a crucial source of protection that reduces the perceived benefits of nuclear weapons.
Wanting to preserve strategic flexibility, nuclear-armed states have generally been reluctant to commit to such binding assurances, while non-nuclear-weapon states continue to call for stronger guarantees. This impasse highlights the broader challenges of achieving security guarantees that are both credible and acceptable to all parties involved.
Modernization of nuclear arsenals: A contradiction to disarmament
Despite commitments made under Article VI of the NPT, nuclear-armed states continue to invest heavily in the development of new types of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, which they see as necessary to maintain the safety, security, and reliability of their nuclear arsenals.
Many NNWS see such actions as contrary to the spirit of nuclear disarmament. They argue that the continued modernization of nuclear arsenals not only undermines disarmament efforts but sends a signal that nuclear weapons remain a valuable and legitimate tool of national security – but only for some. This expression of double standards within the NPT regime further erodes trust between nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-weapon states.
Breaking the cycle: The need for genuine progress
How do we break this cycle, in which states come together to restate established positions, leaving unresolved the same old problems?
The current state of stagnation not only undermines any potential for real progress; it also erodes confidence in the NPT process itself. This lack of genuine engagement on critical issues must be addressed if the NPT is to remain a viable framework for global nuclear governance.
It is time to lament and challenge this reality. NPT meetings need to evolve from a stage on which established positions are repeated to a forum that produces timely, concrete, measurable change. Such an evolution requires a recognition that repeating old axioms will not achieve change. What is needed is a concerted effort to break free from entrenched positions that have paralyzed the NPT process for far too long.
The time has come for NPT states parties to move beyond familiar routines and embrace a new approach to the critical issues facing the NPT regime. All must be willing to engage in difficult conversations, make tough compromises, and challenge the status quo. Only through such efforts can the NPT fulfill its promise to free the world from the threat of nuclear weapons. The world cannot afford to wait any longer.
