Speed Over Certainty

Philip Carrey is a Balsillie School Research Fellow at Project Ploughshares.

How hypersonics are collapsing the window for informed decision-making

A radar screen suddenly flashes, revealing an incoming missile of unknown origin. In House of Dynamite, a new Netflix thriller, commanders have only minutes to decide whether to retaliate. The film depicts a traditional intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the type that defined Cold War fears. However, its tension reflects a reality that is becoming even more dangerous. As nations develop hypersonic weapons that can travel five times the speed of sound and manoeuvre unpredictably through the atmosphere, the time for rational decision-making is shrinking. What once took about half an hour—the warning time of a Cold War ICBM—could soon be less than ten minutes. When speed replaces certainty, the foundation of nuclear stability begins to come apart.

For seventy years, deterrence depended on time: the period needed to verify, understand, and respond. Now, that window is closing. With New START, the last major arms control treaty between the United States and Russia, set to expire in 2026 without a successor, the world faces an age where weapons develop faster than diplomacy can adapt. New technologies like AI and automation further shorten decision-making cycles and diminish the role of human judgment, key ingredients needed to prevent nuclear catastrophe.

Hypersonics: When speed destroys stability

Speed and manoeuvrability are the hallmarks of hypersonic weapons. Unlike traditional ICBMs, which travel along high, predictable arcs in space, hypersonic weapons fly lower, faster, and with more maneuverability. Two main types are in development: hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), which detach from rockets and glide toward targets, and hypersonic cruise missiles (HCMs), which employ air-breathing scramjet engines to sustain Mach 5 speeds within the atmosphere. This combination makes them hard to detect, track, or intercept, allowing them to evade radar and missile-defence systems and significantly reduce response times.

All nine nuclear-armed states now have some form of hypersonic program. Russia has deployed the Avangard and Kinzhal systems, China operates the DF-ZF, and the US, India, and others are testing and developing prototypes. Each nation claims its efforts are for defensive modernization, but together they follow a common pattern: an arms race that provides no genuine security.

For seventy years, deterrence depended on time: the period needed to verify, understand, and respond. Now, that window is closing.

Recent tests show that hypersonic weapons have moved from research to real-world use. Russia has used the Kinzhal and Zircon missiles in Ukraine. China’s 2021 test of a system that combined a fractional orbital bombardment path with a hypersonic glide vehicle surprised U.S. officials. In response, the United States has sped up its own programs. These developments mark a bigger shift: the pursuit of technological dominance is replacing the principles of stability that once guided nuclear deterrence. When advantage is measured in seconds, it becomes hard to justify restraint.

The threat is not just about high speed but also about deliberate ambiguity. Many hypersonic weapons systems are built to carry either conventional or nuclear warheads, making it difficult to identify the type until impact. An attacker may leave the defending nation only minutes to choose a response. As automation and AI become part of these systems, the time for human decision-making shrinks even more. This shortened decision window transforms deterrence from a strategic stance into a reflex action. 

The illusion of control

During the Cold War, early-warning systems such as the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line in northern Canada provided governments time to verify and discuss before responding. Now, that window is narrowing. A false alarm from a cyber-attack, sensor error, or misread trajectory could prompt irreversible actions.

Initiatives like the proposed Golden Dome missile-defence network seek to regain control via automation. This system would link lasers, space-based interceptors, and ground missile fields, utilizing real-time data and predictive analytics. It aims to defend against emerging threats like hypersonics. However, if one country thinks it can intercept any missile, others will create faster or stealthier systems to bypass defenses. This leads not to stability but to an accelerating cycle of innovation and countermeasures, which consumes resources and fosters mistrust. 

For Canada, whose security is closely linked to U.S. early-warning and missile-defence systems via the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), its anticipated participation in this setup ties it to the ongoing push for faster defence responses. Canada must consider whether contributing to these increasingly rapid defences actually enhances collective security or merely perpetuates instability.

Multilateral paralysis

While weapons development accelerates, diplomacy remains sluggish. The Conference on Disarmament has been paralyzed for four decades, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which bans nuclear development, testing, possession, and use, has created divisions among Canada’s allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Many of whom consider it to be conflicting with deterrence policy. Verification systems for arms control are weakening due to declining funding and political support. Recent UN First Committee votes show increasing mistrust, with countries divided over resolutions that once passed easily by consensus. This paralysis is not only procedural but also psychological, reflecting a loss of confidence that cooperation can keep pace with technological progress.

From observer to leader

Civil society groups persist in advocating for disarmament and holding parties accountable. During recent Ottawa events, officials, diplomats, and civil society leaders concurred on an essential point: Canada must move beyond being a passive observer. The decline of arms control treaties and the emergence of destabilizing technologies demand renewed leadership from nations that profess commitment to disarmament.

Canada, as a trusted partner in NATO and NORAD, and a non-nuclear nation with a strong disarmament record, has both influence and responsibility. It can leverage this position to challenge the assumptions behind the new arms race and promote transparency. Within these alliances, Canada can push for limits on nuclear modernization, clearer policies on emerging technologies, and enhanced verification methods. Additionally, it can motivate partners to pair technological upgrades with renewed strategic stability discussions with Russia and China to lower escalation risks. Ultimately, Canada can also act as a mediator between the NPT and the TPNW, helping to restore dialogue between nuclear and non-nuclear states.

Restoring balance

The rise of hypersonic and orbital weapons leads governments to believe that faster missiles mean better safety. However, true security depends less on speed and more on patience and diplomacy. Every new weapon that promises protection diminishes the chance for open discussion. Canada should focus on rebuilding this space by fostering transparency, restraint, and dialogue, especially when these qualities are most vulnerable.

Published in The Ploughshares Monitor Winter 2025