Canada again shipping UAV sensors to Türkiye

Canadian authorities halted the export of L3Harris Wescam surveillance and targeting sensors to Türkiye in October 2020, after it was revealed that the Turkish government was diverting them to ally Azerbaijan for use in airstrikes during its invasion of Nagorno-Karabakh that year.

New data from Statistics Canada indicates that Canada has resumed exporting this targeting equipment to Türkiye after lifting this embargo in January 2024 following political pressure from the Turkish government. The value of these arms transfers from June 2024 to March 2025 could be as high as $123-million.

Wescam and Baykar

L3Harris Wescam, based in Waterdown, Ontario, is a premier manufacturer of Electro-Optical/Infra-Red (EO/IR) surveillance and targeting sensors. These sensors, typically affixed to the underside of aircraft such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), allow users to surveil targets on the ground in real time and through 360 degrees. The CMX-15D, the variant that Canada has shipped most frequently to Türkiye, also includes a laser designator that allows operators to direct airstrikes against targets.

Istanbul-based UAV manufacturer Baykar has been a principal recipient of these EO/IR sensors. Baykar produces the well-known Bayraktar TB2 UAV which, over the last few years, has been sold to at least 30 countries, according to the manufacturer. In the initial years of the Bayraktar’s development and proliferation, every one of these UAVs relied on a Wescam CMX-15D.

In September 2020, Project Ploughshares published a major report, Killer Optics: Exports of WESCAM sensors to Turkey – a litmus test of Canada’s Compliance with the Arms Trade Treaty. At that time, it established that certain commodity or HS (Harmonized System) codes that pertained to EO/IR sensors, as listed in Statistics Canada’s Canadian International Merchandise Trade Web Application, could be utilized in conjunction with other open-data sources to trace the export of Wescam surveillance and targeting sensors. This data, combined with arms export data released by Global Affairs Canada (GAC), allowed for precise monitoring of Canada’s export of this critical technology to countries around the world.

Wescam sensors in armed conflict

In October 2019, the Turkish government launched “Operation Peace Spring,” a military offensive into northern Syria against NATO-aligned Kurdish groups considered terrorists by Türkiye. In response, several NATO countries, including Canada, halted arms transfers to Türkiye. In Canada’s case, this suspension lasted only until April 2020.

Airstrike footage analyzed by Ploughsharesconfirmed that Wescam sensors were mounted on Bayraktar TB2 UAVs that were deployed during the Syrian invasion. Further analysis indicated that, in 2018, the Turkish Air Force employed the same sensors in extraterritorial targeted killings against members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in northern Iraq.

Similar evidence was found on downed UAVs in Libya; analysis of images showed that Türkiye had supplied Bayraktar TB2 UAVs, equipped with Wescam CMX-15D sensors, to armed groups operating in Libya that had been deployed in that country’s second civil war (beginning in 2014), in direct violation of a UN arms embargo and Canadian export controls.

Imposing a ban

Killer Optics established that, between 2017 and early 2020, Canada exported sensors worth as much as $301-million to Türkiye. It also indicated that Türkiye was diverting some of these arms to conflicts and conflict parties across the Middle East and North Africa, violating end-use assurances provided by Türkiye to Canadian authorities.

Just days after these findings were published, Azerbaijan launched an assault on the Armenian-populated enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, with material support from Türkiye. Project Ploughshares again analyzed airstrike footage and images of downed Azeri-operated UAVs, confirming that Wescam sensors had once more been deployed — marking yet another case of diversion by the Turkish government.

The realization that these Canadian-made sensors were being utilized in the invasion of Nagorno-Karabakh forced the Canadian government to, first, suspend further exports in October 2020 and then, in April 2021, extend the ban indefinitely. Exports of Canadian EO/IR sensors to Türkiye fell to zero.

Turkish industry and officials were quick to condemn Canada’s decision, even while claiming that domestic alternatives, namely the Turkish-made Aselsan CATS EO/IR sensor, was a perfectly suitable alternative to Wescam’s offerings. Nevertheless, Canada was subjected to Turkish pressure for several years. One of the key bargaining chips that Türkiye used was its ability as a voting NATO member to allow or prevent Sweden’s accession to the alliance. With unanimous approval required, Ankara effectively leveraged its vote to gain advantages from several NATO members, including Canada.

Commercial trade data available through Statistics Canada indicates that, beginning in the summer of 2024 and continuing into early 2025, Canada transferred L3Harris Wescam EO/IR sensors to Türkiye worth as much as $123-million.

Arms control in action

Arms control measures cannot be reduced to political posturing; they have real-world effects on the supply of weapon systems to countries or actors that would misuse them. The diversion of Canadian Wescam sensors from Türkiye to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh would almost certainly not have been possible if Canada’s arms embargo of October 2019 had not been overturned in April 2020.

Documents released in early 2021 by Canada’s Parliamentary Foreign Affairs and International Development Committee indicate that political pressure from the Turkish government played a part in the resumption of Canadian arms exports to Türkiye after April 2020.

Included in those documents were copies of export permits — the regulatory instruments that either approve or deny arms exports based on human rights considerations — that relate to this resumption of arms exports to Türkiye. Each included a footnote in which Canadian officials  expressed concern that continuing to ban these exports could have “especially negative impacts on bilateral relations” with Ankara. They therefore recommended that the arms transfers should be authorized.

Canada’s arms control obligations, particularly as outlined in the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, prohibit the transfer of weapon systems that pose a substantial risk of being used in violations of international humanitarian law or that threaten the enjoyment of peace and security. The treaty also requires arms-exporting states to take all possible measures to address the potential diversion of their arms transfers, up to and including “not authorizing [their] export.” These legally binding obligations do not permit exceptions based on political expediency or shifting priorities — the very factors that have, in recent years, enabled the continued flow of Canadian arms to Türkiye.

The current situation

Canada is again providing Türkiye with critical UAV components, transparently in exchange for  Türkiye’s agreement to vote in favour of Sweden’s accession to NATO; Sweden became a member state in March 2024.

In the export control notice that discussed the dissolution of the arms embargo, Global Affairs Canada stated that arms transfers to Türkiye would require greater regulatory oversight, including additional assurances from Turkish officials that they would notify their Canadian counterparts if any Canadian-origin military goods were to be re-exported.

While this appears, on paper, to be a good initiative, the fact that the Turkish government has diverted Canadian armaments on several occasions, and that each of those retransfers was in violation of Canadian end-use assurances, casts doubt on whether these new measures will meaningfully prevent future violations.

Canada’s reversal on banning these arms exports speaks to an unfortunate but consistent watering down of its export control regime, which officials continue to extoll as one of the more robust in the world. Canada has the toolkit to substantively control the trade and transfer of weapon systems when end-users pose a significant risk. But does it have the political will to enforce those measures?

Photo: Bayraktar TB2 UAV pictured with a L3Harris Wescam CMX-15D EO/IR sensor visible on its underside during Teknofest 2025, May 2025. It is unclear when this sensor unit was exported to Türkiye. Photo: Baykar

Published in The Ploughshares Monitor Summer 2025